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Abstract 
 
The practices of Corporate Governance, in relation to the optimization of the quality of 
information flows, allow to increase the company transparency and to assist shareholders 
in their portfolio decisions. One of the main roles of an effective disclosure policy is the 
reduction of the information asymmetries between managers – insiders – and general 
investors – outsiders. The information asymmetry results from the fact that managers have 
more and much better information, than the general investors, about the present situation 
and future perspectives of the company. Otherwise, the information asymmetry between 
administration and new shareholders can affect the investment decisions of the company 
because of the sub or under evaluation of the shares in the market.  
  
This study analyses the corporate governance determinants of voluntary disclosure and its 
impact on the reduction of information asymmetry. Our sample consists of Iberian 
Peninsula listed companies. We employed univariate and multivariate techniques for data 
analysis to study the direct and indirect relations between corporate governance 
characteristics, voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry proxies. We built a 
voluntary disclosure index based on the information firms provided in their annual reports 
and used the turnover ratio and the bid-ask spread as proxies for the information 
asymmetry in the market. We examined the association not only between the level of 
voluntary disclosure and the proxies for information asymmetry, but also their relation 
with ownership structure, directors’ and supervisors’ structures, applying the technique of 
structural equation modelling, path analysis, to test simultaneously for existing 
 viii
relationships among these variables. We examined whether corporate governance affects 
the level of information asymmetry in the capital market. We hypothesized that firms with 
effective corporate governance would be more likely to voluntarily disclose corporate 
information and that this would be associated with lower levels of information asymmetry. 
 
The results indicate that the main determinants of voluntary disclosure are the variables 
related with firm size, growth opportunities, organizational performance, board 
compensation and large shareholder ownership. The results also show that for firms with 
high levels of disclosure the bid-ask spread is lower. However, in firms with a high 
ownership concentration investors tend to increase the bid-ask spreads and trade less, 
which, in this case, reduces the liquidity of the stock.  
 
Our results corroborate some of the main theoretical foundations so far available 
concerning the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure, as 
well as the relationship between voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry. In 
addition, the results from the structural equation model allowed us to understand how the 
governance rules exert influence on the proxies of information asymmetry in the market. 
We concluded that the ownership structure exerts a direct influence on information 
asymmetry and that directors’ and supervisors’ structures exert an indirect influence, 
through the organizational performance and the voluntary disclosure of information.  
 
Keywords: corporate governance, voluntary disclosure, information asymmetry, Iberian 
Peninsula listed companies. 
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Resumo 
 
As práticas de Governo das Sociedades, ao nível da otimização da qualidade e do fluxo de 
informação, permitem aumentar a transparência das sociedades e auxiliar o acionista no 
processo de tomada de decisão de investimento. Um dos principais papéis de uma correta 
política de divulgação é a diminuição das assimetrias de informação entre os gestores - insiders 
- e os investidores em geral - outsiders. A assimetria de informação resulta do facto dos 
gestores possuírem mais e melhor informação do que a generalidade dos investidores no que se 
refere à situação presente e às perspetivas futuras da organização. Por outro lado, a assimetria 
de informação entre administradores e novos acionistas pode afetar as decisões de 
investimento das empresas devido à sub ou sobreavaliação das ações no mercado. 
 
Este estudo analisa os determinantes da divulgação voluntária, no que respeita ao governo das 
sociedades, e o seu impacto na redução da assimetria de informação. A nossa amostra consiste 
em sociedades da Península Ibérica cotadas na bolsa. Utilizámos técnicas univariadas e 
multivariadas de análise de dados de forma a estudar as relações diretas e indiretas entre as 
características do governo das sociedades, a divulgação voluntária e as proxies de assimetria de 
informação. Construímos um índice de divulgação voluntária baseado na informação 
disponibilizada pelas sociedades nos seus relatórios e contas anuais e utilizámos o turnover 
ratio e o bid-ask spread como proxies da assimetria de informação no mercado. Examinámos a 
associação não só entre o nível de divulgação voluntária e as proxies da assimetria de 
informação, mas também a sua relação com a estrutura de propriedade, de direção e de 
supervisão, aplicando a técnica dos modelos de equações estruturais para testar de forma 
simultânea a existência de relações entre as variáveis. Examinámos de que forma os 
mecanismos do governo das sociedades afetam o nível de assimetria de informação. Definimos 
 x
como hipóteses que as empresas com um efetivo governo das sociedades tenderiam a divulgar 
mais informação de forma voluntária e que esta estaria associada a níveis mais baixos de 
assimetria de informação. 
 
Os resultados indicam que os principais determinantes da divulgação voluntária são as 
variáveis relacionadas com o tamanho da empresa, oportunidades de crescimento, performance 
organizacional, compensação dos órgãos de gestão e a existência de um grande accionista. Os 
resultados também mostram que para empresas com elevados níveis de divulgação o bid-ask 
spread é menor. No entanto, para empresas com elevados níveis de concentração de 
propriedade os investidores tendem a aumentar o bid-ask spread e a transacionar menos esse 
título, o que reduz a sua liquidez no mercado. 
 
Os nossos resultados corroboram alguns dos principais fundamentos teóricos até agora 
disponíveis no que diz respeito à relação entre o governo das sociedades e a divulgação 
voluntária, assim como a relação entre a divulgação voluntária e a assimetria de informação. 
Para além disso, os resultados obtidos através da aplicação do modelo de equações estruturais 
permitiram-nos compreender como as regras de governo exercem influência nas proxies da 
assimetria de informação no mercado. Concluímos que a estrutura de propriedade exerce uma 
influência direta na assimetria de informação e que as estruturas de direção e supervisão 
exercem uma influência indireta, através da performance organizacional e da divulgação 
voluntária de informação. 
 
Palavras-chave: governo das sociedades, divulgação voluntária, assimetria de informação, 
sociedades cotadas da Península Ibérica. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1 Study subject 
 
The expression corporate governance designates the complex set of rules (of various 
nature), instruments and issues relative to administration and control (or supervision) of 
companies. According to Abreu (2010) it is a classic theme but a renewed one, with new 
problems and new proposals, and flagrantly up-to-date. The economic scandals that 
highlighted the accounting manipulation have damaged investors’ trust in both the United 
States and European financial markets (Méndez and García, 2007). To Câmara et al. 
(2008) the debate on the corporate governance has acquired a notorious strength, namely 
after a series of traumatic episodes revealed in big listed companies (Enron, Worldcom, 
Parmalat, among others), which led to a new reflection particularly in juridical and 
economic literature.  
 
The corporate governance movement began in the 70th in the last century in the United 
States of America. It spread to Europe, through United Kingdom. The reality of these two 
countries presents, however, important affinities: nearly all big companies are listed (the 
shares are negotiable on the stock market) and the property of the shares is dispersed 
(controlling shareholders are rare). It is different from the corporate reality in Continental 
Europe. There are fewer listed companies and the shareholding property is a lot more 
concentrated, i.e., there are controlling shareholders in a great majority of the big 
companies. 
 2 
Therefore, it would seem that the problems and the solutions for corporate governance in 
the European continent are different from those of North America. For Abreu (2010) those 
problems and solutions are not so different, justifying his position. It is true that in the 
European continent the dominating shareholders actively intervene in the companies’ life, 
but it is also notice the absenteeism on the minority shareholders part (sometimes in great 
numbers), given the lesser liquidity of the market. Furthermore, it is also true that if there 
are shareholders that are also managers, the administrators have a lot less power and 
freedom and may be tempted to act to the benefit of the majority shareholders in detriment 
to the minority ones and the social interest. Thus, “some of the measures of corporate 
governance talked about on the other side of the Atlantic are adopted or adoptable here” 
(Abreu, 2010: 17)1. In this area the author namely refers to the reinforcement of the 
administrators’ loyalty and responsibility, the role of the non-executive independent 
administrators as supervisors, the structure of supervision and, within the purpose of this 
work, the transparency between the company and the market.  
 
In relation to this last point, we must enhance that, in the last years, authorities and market 
regulators considered corporate governance and disclosure as two inseparable key 
instruments for investor protection and the functioning of capital markets (Cadbury 
Committee Report, 1992; Blue Ribbon Report, 1999; OECD, 1999, 2004). In this sense, 
our purpose is to empirically examine the corporate governance determinants of voluntary 
disclosure, and its effects on the information asymmetry in the market, considering Iberian 
Peninsula listed companies. 
                                                 
1
 In this domain the author also underlines that, in spite of the clear signs of convergence in corporate 
governance, “it does not seem predictable or predicable to total convergence or uniformity” (Abreu, 2010: 
20). He enhances therefore the weight of the infra structural, cultural and regulatory differences. 
Furthermore, “there is not a sole model of good corporate governance” (OECD, 2004: 13). 
 3 
Through the 1970s and 1980s the research on corporate governance issues was largely 
focused on United States corporations. In more recent years, however, we have witnessed 
an explosion of research on corporate governance around the world, for both developed 
and emerging markets. According to Méndez and García (2007) in contexts featured by 
high ownership concentration and board of directors dominated by representatives of 
controlling shareholders, it is more difficult to extrapolate from studies on the Anglo-
Saxon markets. Specific research is therefore needed to take in account these 
characteristics, which are the norm in many countries (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
 
Portugal and Spain are included in the group of code law countries, specifically in the 
French family (La Porta et al., 1997). To Meek and Thomas (2004) code law accounting is 
characterized as oriented toward “legal compliance”, with low disclosure, and an 
alignment between financial and tax accounting. Banks or governments dominate as a 
source of finance and financial reporting is aimed at creditor protection2.  
 
In this context, Portugal and Spain institutional setting has in common with other European 
Continental countries a relatively low number of listed companies, a relatively illiquid 
capital market and, above all, a high level of concentration in corporate shareholdings. To 
Denis and McConnell (2003: 29) concentrated ownership can be a “reasonable response to 
a lack of investor protection”.  
                                                 
2
 By contrast, the common law accounting is oriented toward “fair presentation”, transparency and full 
disclosure, and a separation between financial and tax accounting. Stock markets dominate as a source of 
finance and financial reporting is aimed at the information needs of outside investors (Meek and Thomas, 
2004: 29). Futhermore, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000) argue that the type of legal system predisposes a 
country toward its principal system of finance. A common law legal system emphasizes shareholder rights 
and offers stronger investor protection than a code law legal system. The outcome is that strong equity 
markets develop in common law countries and weak ones develop in code law countries.  
 
 4 
According to Arcay and Vázquez (2005) corporate governance in Spain has relied heavily 
upon the role played by majority shareholders who were usually involved in the 
management of the company3. Nevertheless, during the 1990s, floating capital4 started to 
represent a significant proportion of equity in some listed companies, giving rise to greater 
concern about corporate governance and the protection of investors’ interests.  
 
To Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) Portugal is a country where companies, even listed 
companies, are family owned and the capital is concentrated in a small number of 
shareholders. Góis (2007) argue that the constraints present in a continental economy such 
as the Portuguese one, hinder the practical application of the best rules of good corporate 
governance to have a positive effect on the quality of financial disclosure presented by 
these companies. For the author, the Portuguese stock market presents a reduced efficiency 
level which implies that disclosure practices and transparency are not valued. 
 
In this sense, Portugal and Spain provide a suitable environment to test the existence of 
interactions among corporate governance, voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry 
in the market. The uncertainty and the asymmetry of information create problems of 
conflict of interest, which affect the basic functions of the organizations as well as their 
potential for the creation of value. Given that the information provided reflects the degree 
of transparency and accountability of the organization with shareholders, it becomes one of 
the most important aspects of corporate governance. According to Allegrini and Greco 
(2011) while large insider shareholders can use the benefits of private control, having 
                                                 
3
 To Leech and Manjón (2002:158), “the Spanhish system of corporate governance is especially interesting 
because in Spain ownership concentration is the main control mechanism”. 
4
 “Floating capital “ is the proportion of equity actively traded in the market (Leech and Manjón, 2002:160). 
 5 
direct access to information, outsider shareholders rely on the monitoring activity of 
directors and on disclosure.  
 
Several studies provided the framework for linking disclosure to corporate governance. On 
the corporate governance side, most of the research focuses on ownership structure and 
board structure (in a broad sense, governance rules). According to Denis and McConnell 
(2003: 2) “the internal corporate governance mechanisms of primary interest are the 
board of directors and the equity ownership structure of the firm”. Managerial ownership 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and blockholder ownership (Kaplan and Minton, 1994) are 
two major governance mechanisms that help control agency problems. In addition, Fama 
(1980) argues that the board of directors is the central internal control mechanism for 
monitoring managers. 
 
Several studies about the relation between corporate governance and disclosure have been 
done. These studies showed that the quality of firms’ mandatory and voluntary disclosures 
increase with the quality of firms’ corporate governance. In the case of firms’ mandatory 
financial reports, better quality governance is associated with a lower probability of 
financial statement fraud (e.g. Beasley, 1996) and less earning management (e.g. Dechow 
et al., 1996). In the case of firms’ voluntary disclosures, better quality governance is 
associated with a higher overall level of voluntary disclosure (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; Allegrini and Greco, 2011). Better governance is also 
associated with both a higher likelihood that management will issue a voluntary forecast of 
future earnings and, if made, a greater level of precision in such forecasts (e.g. Ajinkya et 
al., 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). 
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Most countries demand public disclosure of information about the company, even though 
most companies usually disclose, in a voluntary way, more information than what is 
demanded by law and accounting regulations, answering to the demands of the market. In 
fact, the disclosure of information also helps to increase the public knowledge about the 
company structures, activities, strategies, performance and aspects related to environmental 
and ethical issues, as well as its relation with the communities in which its activities are 
developed. Mandatory disclosure rules ensure equal access to basic information (Lev, 
1992), but this information has to be enlarged by firms’ voluntary disclosures. There are 
major market incentives to disclose information voluntarily and managers’ attitudes to 
voluntary disclosure change according to the perceived relationship of the costs and 
benefits involved (e.g. Gray et al., 1990; Healy and Palepu, 1995; Ho and Wong, 2001). 
Voluntary disclosure and its determinants have been identified as an important research 
area since the 1970s. 
 
The voluntary disclosure of information is also seen in the literature as motivated by its 
effects on the capital market perception level of the value of the organizations. Following 
the arguments of Akerlof (1970), Grossman and Hart (1980), Grossman (1981) and 
Milgrom (1981), we can state that many organizations are induced by the market to 
disclose a lot of private information. Following the arguments of Wan (2009: 14), when 
investors enter the capital market, their investment selection criteria is mostly based on 
information that is provided by managers. If managers do not disclose all relevant 
information that reveals firms’ value, then investors may have “biased estimates of value”, 
and this will result in inappropriate investment choices. Beside that, investors often do not 
participate actively in management activities. In this sense, investors’ impression of firm 
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value is based on manager’s elucidation, which gives managers the opportunity to employ 
a “self-serving behaviour”. According to the author, the above analysis explains the 
importance of information disclosure as a key element in solving the conflict of interest 
problem and in protecting shareholder rights. 
 
In this sense, one of the main purposes pointed to corporate disclosures is the reduction of 
the expectation gap between investors, by decreasing the advantage from which informed 
investors benefit and, consequently, by reducing information asymmetry in the stock 
market. The signalling theory suggests that the increase of publicly available information 
would reduce the production of private information and hence decrease information 
asymmetry between market participants. Empirical studies have found that both mandated 
and voluntary disclosures are likely to signal material information to the market which 
results in lower information asymmetry among informed and uninformed investors (e.g. 
Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Healy et al., 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; How et al., 
2005; Kanagaretnam et al., 2007; Brown and Hillegeist, 2007; Jiang et al., 2011). Thus, 
disclosure is a channel through which existing and potential shareholders obtain valuable 
information about the firm, being, for that reason, the connection between corporate 
“insiders” and capital market “outsiders”. It is the content of disclosure that reveals not 
only a firm’s financial and operational situation, but also its managers’ incentives and 
intentions to disclose relevant information. Therefore, it reflects the power managers can 
exert on disclosure decision making.  
 
The information structure of a firm refers to the three categories of information within a 
firm: that which is subject to mandatory disclosure, that which is voluntarily disclosed, and 
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that which is undisclosed. According to Holland (1998: 29) companies identify two distinct 
or extreme areas for corporate disclosure. The first is“where market failure created a 
clear-cut domain for private disclosure only”. The second is “where regulation created a 
distinct area for mandatory public disclosure”. In between these two “lay a wide area for 
company discretion concerning public versus private disclosure choices”. As information 
is distributed through different channels to different receivers, information asymmetry 
arises among market participants.  
 
So there is a link between corporate governance and information asymmetry through the 
compound relationships between corporate governance and disclosure, and disclosure and 
information asymmetry. Since disclosure is the product of management’s decisions (Meek 
et al., 1995; Healy and Palepu, 2001) the level of corporate governance determines the 
firm’s information structure, and thus influences the level of information asymmetry 
between the company and the market. 
 
Previous research about the relation between voluntary disclosure and information 
asymmetry suggested that voluntary public information can reduce the level of information 
asymmetry among market participants, and thus can help to form an efficient market. 
Analytically, Barry and Brown (1985), Diamond (1985), Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) 
and Kim and Verrecchia (1994) argue that more information generally reduces information 
risk on prices. Likewise, voluntary disclosure serves to reduce information asymmetry 
among traders. Empirically, Welker (1995), Healy et al. (1999) and Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000) investigate links between voluntary disclosure and stock liquidity and argue that 
companies might follow a disclosure strategy in response to perceived illiquidity of their 
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shares in the market. Consequently, corporate disclosures aim to improve stock market 
liquidity. Disclosure literature has also shown that high quality of public disclosures reduce 
information asymmetry and, as a result, increase stock market liquidity. Some authors, like 
Welker (1995), Bushee and Noe (2000), Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Petersen and 
Plenborg (2006) argue that information asymmetry could be measured by both trade-based 
and order-based measures i.e. transaction volumes and bid-ask spreads. 
 
In short, and following the previous arguments, we can state that the balance of power 
between shareholders and management decides how managers follow the corporation’s 
optimal disclosure policy, which determines the level of information asymmetry between 
informed and uninformed traders of company’s shares. The implementation of good 
corporate governance practices can contribute to the optimization of organizational 
performance, as well as the stability of markets and the security of investors. 
  
1.2  Work objectives 
 
Investment decisions are linked to corporate governance, and transparent markets, because 
investors prefer to invest in properly supervised corporations and tend to avoid investing in 
“obscure environments” (Walkner, 2004: 2). According to Esperança et al. (2011) good 
governance practices are essential to give confidence to investors. This confidence, 
generated by corporate governance mechanisms, which lead to the protection of minority 
shareholders, promotes the financial market development. Transparent reporting is 
essential to have effective corporate governance. Corporate disclosure supports investor 
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confidence by providing information about performance and risk profile of the firm 
concerned.  
 
The main purpose of this study is to empirically examine the corporate governance 
determinants of voluntary disclosure and its effects on the information asymmetry, for 
Iberian Peninsula listed companies. We analysed the information disclosed by Iberian 
Peninsula non-financial listed companies, concerning the year of 2007. In this sense, we 
analysed the information disclosed few time after the obligation of following the 
International Financial Reporting Standards5 (IFRS) and after a set of amendments on the 
corporate governance recommendations adopted in both countries. 
 
In line with the European Commission Regulation nº 1606/2002 (European Commission, 
2002), since the 1st January 2005, listed companies of Spain and Portugal have been 
required to prepare consolidated accounts following International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) as endorsed by the European Union. This process of harmonization 
intended to improve the comparability and transparency of the information disclosed and, 
thus, to contribute for a better functioning of the capital market. 
 
In Spain, the Unified Good Governance Code, applicable from 2007 onwards, provided a 
common standard for the good governance practices of all listed firms. The article 116 of 
the Securities Markets Law requires that all companies publish an Annual Corporate 
Governance Report and disclose it as price sensitive information. This report must 
                                                 
5
 International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are accounting rules issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB). In contrast to local accounting rules that differ across markets and 
countries, IFRS are a set of uniform rules that apply in the same way to all public companies in markets that 
adopt the standards. IFRS are principles-based reporting standards that attempt to cover a broad range of 
economic conditions, transactions, activities or events (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). 
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“provide comprehensive and reasoned information on listed companies’ corporate 
governance structures and practices, enabling investors and other users a founded 
judgement on the same” (CNMV, 2008: 15). Spanish legislation leaves it up to each 
company to decide whether or not to follow the recommendations of the Unified Code, but 
requires them to give a reasonable explanation for any departure from the same.  
 
In Portugal, the "Recommendation on Corporate Governance", by the securities market 
regulator - the Securities Market Commission (Comissão do Mercado de Valores 
Mobiliários - CMVM), was implemented also on a comply-or-explain basis in 2001. The 
country has continued to regularly improve its corporate governance recommendations 
through a process of bi-annual amendments. In a 2007 update, the recommendations were 
renamed the “CMVM Code of Corporate Governance”. 
 
In our work an important aspect is the definition of “voluntary disclosure”. To FASB 
(2001b) the term “voluntary disclosure” describes disclosures, primarily outside the 
financial statements, that are not explicitly required by accounting regulation. Consistently 
with prior definitions in different regulatory national environments (Cooke 1989b; 
Raffournier, 1995; Meek et al., 1995; Depoers, 2000; Allegrini and Greco, 2011), 
voluntary disclosure is considered the information released to the outside deriving from 
management‘s insider knowledge of the company, which are not required to be published 
in accounting regulated reports. Voluntary disclosure is, therefore, produced by a 
management’s reporting decision (Meek et al., 1995; Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
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The purpose of the present work is to examine not only the association between the level of 
voluntary disclosure and the proxies for information asymmetry, but also their 
multidimensional relation with governance rules. We employed univariate and multivariate 
techniques for data analysis to study the direct and indirect relations among the variables 
included in our study. 
 
Previous research used as proxy of the overall level of voluntary disclosure the companies’ 
earnings announcements/earnings forecasts (e.g. Coller and Yohn, 1997; Ajinkya et al., 
2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; How et al., 2005; Kanagaretnam et al., 2007) or the 
voluntary disclosure in the annual report (e.g. Botosan, 1997; Ho and Wong, 2001; Eng 
and Mak, 2003; Wang et al., 2008; Allegrini and Greco, 2011). In this study we select the 
second option. Previous studies (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1993) showed the existence of a 
positive correlation between the annual report disclosure level and the amount of 
disclosure provided via other avenues. Also Botosan (1997) argue that voluntary disclosure 
in the annual report can provide a good proxy for the overall level of information 
voluntarily disclosed by companies. 
 
According to Botosan (1997) and Healy and Palepu (2001) disclosure is an abstract 
concept and cannot be measured precisely. Nevertheless, these researchers contend that a 
disclosure index is a useful instrument that can be utilised to rank order the level of 
information disclosed by companies. To analyse the level of voluntary disclosure we built 
an index through a list of items. Our disclosure index was based on the voluntary 
information that the companies made available on their reports and annual accounts. The 
methodology used was the content analysis. This methodology was also used in several 
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international studies dealing with the same issues, among them the studies developed by 
Eng and Teo (1999), Eng et al. (2001), Linsley and Shrives (2006) and, more recently 
Allegrini and Greco (2011). Our index included six categories of voluntary disclosure: 
strategy, market and competition, management and production, marketing, future 
perspective and human capital and we described a total of 60 items considered within the 
six categories. 
 
The bid-ask spread is commonly thought to measure information asymmetry explicitly 
(Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). The turnover ratio reflects the willingness of some investors 
to sell shares and others to buy. This willingness to trade shares should be inversely related 
to the level of information asymmetry (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). Our study follow the 
work of Welker (1995) by investigating the relation between “baseline” spreads (not 
conditioned on the occurrence of an information release) and firms’ general disclosure 
practices. Following Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Petersen and Plenborg (2006) in our 
study the bid-ask spread and the turnover ratio are assumed to be proxies of information 
asymmetry. 
 
We started our analysis by studying the correlations between corporate governance 
characteristics, total voluntary disclosure index and information asymmetry proxies. After 
that we employed multivariate regression to examine the corporate governance 
determinants of voluntary disclosure. Prior studies have found that different types of 
voluntary disclosure will be affected by different types of determining factors (Meek et al., 
1995; Lim et al., 2007). In this sense, we studied the corporate governance determinants of 
voluntary disclosure using, firstly, the total voluntary disclosure index as the dependent 
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variable and, secondly, we made the same analysis using the six categories of the voluntary 
disclosure. Since these six categories of voluntary disclosure reveal different aspects of the 
company, and can be directed to different users, the variables affecting each type of 
disclosure are expected to differ.  
 
To extend the regression analysis, we used a structural equation model. We selected 
structural equation models as a statistical methodology because it provides a better model 
visualization through its graphical modelling interface and the ability to test not only direct 
relations but also indirect relations between the constructs. We pretend to study the direct 
and indirect relations between the governance rules and information asymmetry, through 
the voluntary disclosure of information and organizational performance. The inclusion of 
organizational performance in the proposed model is explained by the fact that disclosure 
is a channel through which existing and potential shareholders obtain valuable information 
about the firm, namely about the company’s performance. A higher profitability might 
induce management to supply more information to illustrate its ability to maximize the 
shareholder’s value (Singhvi and Desai, 1971). In this sense, and according to Healy and 
Palepu (2001: 431), “the association between capital market variables and disclosure may 
be driven by firm performance rather than disclosure per se”. Our model followed the 
arguments of the authors by considering that “disclosure changes are unlikely to be 
random events: they are likely to coincide with changes in firm economics and governance 
characteristics”.  
 
With the proposed model we want to understand how corporate governance rules affect the 
level of information asymmetry in the capital market, directly and indirectly. For that we 
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divided the governance rules in two major constructs: the ownership structure and the 
directors’ and supervisors’ structures. We hypothesized that directors’ and supervisors’ 
structures can influence the organizational performance and the information disclosed and 
this, in turn, would affect the level of information asymmetry between management and 
shareholders. In relation to ownership structure, it is expected to exert an indirect influence 
on the level of information asymmetry, but some previous research showed us that a direct 
influence can also be expected (e.g. Bolton and Von Thaden, 1998; Helflin and Shaw, 
2000; Jiang et al. 2011). We also analysed the impact of the different categories of 
voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry. We used the same structural equation 
model by modifying the voluntary disclosure construct. 
 
Like stated previously, most publicly traded companies in the United States and the United 
Kingdom tend to be widely-held, whereas the ownership structure of most continental 
European companies presents a large and dominant shareholder who exerts considerable 
control (Faccio and Lang, 2002).  
 
Spain and Portugal have in common a high level of concentration in corporate 
shareholdings. We want to understand if this characteristic of the Iberian Peninsula 
companies ownership structure have a significant impact on the adoption of rules of good 
governance which, in turn, will affect the corporate disclosure. In this sense, we included 
in the construct “ownership structure” variables that characterize the ownership 
concentration of the companies under study.  
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So, in this thesis, we pretend to: 
 
(1) examine the association between the corporate governance rules not only with the 
level of voluntary disclosure (and its different categories), but also with the proxies 
of information asymmetry; 
 
(2)  analyse the relations between the ownership structure, directors’ and supervisors’ 
structures, voluntary disclosure, organizational performance and information 
asymmetry, applying the technique of structural equation modelling, path analysis, 
to test simultaneously for existing relationships among these constructs; 
 
(3) analyse the indirect effects of governance rules on information asymmetry, through 
the voluntary disclosure of information and through the organizational 
performance. 
 
The importance or potential contributions of the current study are several. 
 
Like stated previously, research in the subject of corporate governance was predominantly 
based on studies done with countries belonging to the Anglo-Saxon sphere using as a base 
their financial markets. This thesis is hereby intended to contribute to the study of the 
impact of the corporate governance rules in the disclosure of information, and hence in the 
reduction of information asymmetries, in the specific case and reality of the countries of 
the Iberian Peninsula. Furthermore, most of the prior research in this area has studied the 
link between corporate governance and disclosure and between disclosure and information 
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asymmetry. We also pretend to examine the direct link between corporate governance and 
information asymmetry. One way of viewing the contribution of our study is that it 
provides the analysis of the relationships between corporate governance, voluntary 
disclosure and market-determined measures of information asymmetry (i.e. bid-ask spread 
and turnover ratio). In this sense, our work analyse, for the first time, the association 
between governance rules and information asymmetry, in a set of corporate voluntary 
disclosure, using Iberian Peninsula listed companies.  
 
By using the methodology of structural equation modelling, we are able to analyse the 
direct and indirect relations among the variables under study. Furthermore, we analyse the 
impact of the different voluntary information categories on the information asymmetry 
proxies. It was unclear how the different categories of voluntary disclosure exert influence 
on information asymmetry. 
 
Most of the previous research has examined the impact of public disclosure on information 
asymmetry and market liquidity around well defined information events, such as earnings 
announcements. According to Kanagaretnam et al. (2007: 519) “studying the relation 
between corporate governance and changes in information asymmetry in non-
announcement periods is also an interesting question for future research”. This study 
intend to analyse the relation between corporate governance rules, firm’s disclosure 
practices and information asymmetry proxies, not conditioned by the occurrence of an 
information release. 
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We also pretend to highlight the importance of corporate disclosures, under concentrated 
ownership structures, in order to eliminate information asymmetry. We consider that the 
multiple relations among ownership concentration, voluntary disclosure practices and 
information asymmetry should be explored for the realities under study. Furthermore, most 
of the previous research tends to focus on the effect of one single corporate governance 
attribute. In this study we examine simultaneously several corporate governance 
mechanisms, assuming that the different mechanisms interact with each other. 
 
We hope that this research contributes to the perception of the disclosure practices adopted 
by the Iberian Peninsula listed companies. The results of this study may be useful to 
understand the information voluntarily disclosed by companies, their determining factors 
and their consequences in terms of impact on information asymmetry and functioning of 
the market. Furthermore, our findings are expected to provide implications regarding 
corporate governance monitoring mechanisms. Improving corporate governance 
mechanisms should reinforce investor confidence in the financial markets at a time when 
recent corporate scandals have done much to weaken this confidence.  
 
1.3 Work organization 
 
In addition to this introductory chapter, the rest of the thesis is structured in five chapters. 
The second chapter consists of the theoretical framework of the research subject. It 
likewise addresses the issue of corporate governance, in particular its concepts and most 
important attributes. Then it focuses on the agency problem and the several internal and 
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external mechanisms for controlling agency costs. After that we present the main 
objectives of corporate reporting, focusing primarily on the literature review of voluntary 
disclosure of information. Following this, we analyse the previous investigation about the 
relation between the governance rules, the voluntary disclosure and the information 
asymmetry in the market. Finally, we summarize the main aspects related with the 
development of the governance and disclosure rules in Portugal and in Spain. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the proposed research model. We present two groups of research 
hypotheses to be tested and the reasoning that led to their formulation. The first group of 
hypotheses presented will aim to study the corporate governance determinants of voluntary 
disclosure, using the multiple regression methodology. The second group of hypotheses 
will be tested using the methodology of structural equation models. We intend to study the 
direct and indirect relations between governance rules and information asymmetry, through 
the voluntary disclosure of information and the organizational performance,. 
 
In chapter 4 we begin by examining the composition of the sample that will serve as the 
basis for our study, following the description of the methodology used in our data analysis. 
We analyse some of the most relevant aspects of the Structural Equation Model (SEM) 
methodology. After that we discuss the definition of the variables: the construction of the 
voluntary disclosure index, the variables related with corporate governance, the general 
corporate characteristics and the proxies for the information asymmetry. We make the 
presentation and interpretation of the descriptive statistics for all variables. We proceed to 
an interpretation of the results of applying the voluntary disclosure index and assess the 
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validity of this measure. In the last point we present, separately, the descriptive statistics 
for the Portuguese and for the Spanish companies. 
 
In chapter 5 we present and discuss the results of the univariate and multivariate data 
analysis. We start with the analysis of the results from Pearson’s and Spearman’s 
correlations. After that we apply the technique of multiple regression to test the first group 
of research hypotheses. We use, firstly, the total voluntary disclosure index as the 
dependent variable and, secondly, we make the same analysis using the six categories of 
the voluntary disclosure. We also make an evaluation of the models by checking the 
assumptions of multiple regression. To test the second group of hypotheses we use a 
structural equation model. We describe the steps of the development of the proposed 
model. Following this, we present and discuss the results from the second group of 
research hypotheses and analyse the decomposition of structural effects for the proxies of 
information asymmetry. Finally, we analyse the impact of the different categories of 
voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry. We use the same structural equation 
model by modifying the voluntary disclosure construct. 
 
Finally, in chapter 6 we summarize the findings and the contributions of the study. 
Limitations are addressed and suggestions are made for future research. 
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Chapter 2 – Theoretical background 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
In an attempt to securely and credibly inform the various users of information, including  
shareholders and (potential) investors, organizations began to observe with special 
attention the manner in which they are managed and the manner in which they relate with 
internal and external agents. Also the internationalization of capital markets led to the need 
for obtaining financial and non-financial information that is useful for decision making. In 
this sense, and as stated previously, corporate governance and disclosure are two key 
instruments for investor protection and the functioning of capital markets. 
 
In this context, this chapter intends to make a theoretical framework of the subject under 
investigation. The first approach begins by addressing the concept of corporate governance 
and its most important attributes. The second focuses on the agency problem, with a 
special attention to the major conflict analysed in the context of corporate governance, 
which is the one between shareholders and managers. The several external and internal 
mechanisms for controlling the agency costs are also described.  
 
The disclosure policy, as one of the internal mechanisms for controlling the agency costs 
and also as a mechanism of construction of the public perception of corporate governance 
quality, is addressed in the following point. We seek to present the main objectives of 
corporate reporting, focusing primarily on the literature review of the voluntary disclosure 
 22 
of information. We analyse the main supporting theories, as well as the previous 
investigation about the capital market reasons and the economic consequences of voluntary 
disclosure. We also seek to identify the variables that have been used in previous studies as 
measures of voluntary disclosure. 
 
Following this, we analyse the previous investigation about the relation between the 
governance rules, the voluntary disclosure and the information asymmetry in the market. In 
this sense, we address: the relation between corporate governance and voluntary 
disclosure; the relation between corporate governance and information asymmetry; and the 
relation between corporate disclosure and information asymmetry. We also describe the 
main variables used as proxies of the information asymmetry in the market. 
 
Finally, we summarize the main aspects related with the development of the governance 
and disclosure rules in Portugal and in Spain. 
 
2.2 The attributes and institutions of corporate governance 
 2.2.1 Concept of corporate governance 
 
The literature provides a wide range of settings for the corporate governance subject. The 
study has its roots in Berle and Means (with the publication of the book “The Modern 
Corporation and the Private Property” in 1932) and, earlier still, Adam Smith (with the 
publication of the book “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations” 
in 1776). 
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Following the definition of Blair (1995: 3), corporate governance consists of “the whole set 
of legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements that determine what publicly traded 
corporations can do, who controls them, how that control is exercised, and how the risks 
and returns from the activities they undertake are allocated”. Basically, it is important to 
underline that investors in corporations require assurance that their contributions, financial 
capital, human capital, social capital, will produce a return. Corporate Governance 
concerns the institutions that make these investments possible, from boards of directors, to 
legal frameworks and financial markets, to broader cultural understanding about the place 
of the corporation in society (Davis, 2005). It is, therefore, the “control” of corporations 
and that is why it is so relevant and vital to businesses. 
 
Corporate governance involves a vast number of distinct economic phenomenons, making 
the attribution of only one definition impossible. We find several definitions of this 
concept, but all share, explicitly or implicitly, some common elements. They all refer to the 
existence of conflicts of interest between insiders and outsiders, with an emphasis on those 
arising from the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), mostly 
about the partition of wealth generated by a company. Some Corporate Governance 
definitions are provided in table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 – Corporate Governance definitions 
 
Garvey and Swan 
(1994: 139) 
Assert that “governance determines how the firm’s top decision makers 
(executives) actually administer such contracts”, viewing the corporation as a 
nexus of explicit and implicit contracts, in line with Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
Hart (1995: 678) Suggest that “corporate governance issues arise in an organization whenever two 
conditions are present. First, there is an agency problem, or conflict of interest, 
involving members of the organization – these might be owners, managers, 
workers or consumers. Second, transaction costs are such that this agency 
problem cannot be dealt with through a contract”. As Fama and Jensen (1983: 
304) observed, “agency problems arise because contracts are not costlessly 
written and enforced”. 
Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997: 737) 
Argue that corporate governance “deals with the ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”.  
John and Senbet 
(1998: 372) 
Argue that “corporate governance deals with mechanisms by which stakeholders 
of a corporation exercise control over corporate insiders and management such 
that their interests are protected”. They include as stakeholders not just 
shareholders, but also debtholders and even non-financial stakeholders such as 
employees, suppliers, costumers, and other interested parties. 
Denis and 
McConnell (2003: 
1-2) 
Define corporate governance as “the set of mechanisms – both institutional and 
market-based – that induce the self-interested controllers of a company (those 
that make decisions regarding how the company will be operated) to make 
decisions that maximize the value of the company to its owners (the suppliers of 
capital)”.  
OECD (2004: 17) The OECD principles of corporate governance define that “the corporate 
governance framework should promote transparent and efficient markets, be 
consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the division of 
responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement 
authorities”. 
Kanagaretnam et al. 
(2007: 498) 
Corporate governance encompasses “the controls and procedures that exist to 
ensure that management acts in the interest of shareholders (…) reducing the 
likelihood that management, acting in its self-interest, takes actions that deviate 
from maximizing the value of the firm”. 
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We may add to Hart’s conditions the proposition that contracts are always incomplete. In 
fact there is a consensus regarding the assumption that the corporate governance problem 
cannot be satisfactorily resolved by complete contracting because of significant 
uncertainty, information asymmetries and contracting costs in the relationship between 
capital providers and insiders (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 
1995) or simply because in a world of bounded rationality6 (Simon, 1959) there is no such 
thing. 
 
In a wide scope, corporate governance encompasses all the mechanisms that relate to the 
determination of the will of the company and its implementation, be it in terms of defining 
the type of economic activities to be developed, be it in regard to the operational 
organization of these activities, be it in the making of financial decisions and investments, 
or be it in regard to the return of invested capitals or their remuneration. 
 
The corporate governance mechanisms are incorporated in the control and supervision of 
the management exercise and aim to ensure that the company is managed effectively. In 
other words, the administration of every company should contemplate mechanisms that 
include an efficient allocation/production/development of resources and mechanisms that 
ensure accountability for how those resources are used. 
 
                                                 
6
 As Simon (1959, 1982) emphasises in his study the idea of rationality does not have to have 
correspondance with the concept of optimization/maximization of results. Having a mental process which 
consumes resources, the optimum choice is the one that produces an efficient combination between the utility 
produced by the result and the consumption of resources necessary to achieve that result. «Bounded 
rationality», which does not mean an incapacity to reach the best solution through a effort merely cognitive, 
but above all it means the recognition that it does not always make sense to carry out this effort. 
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In this sense, if such corporate governance problems exist, these mechanisms are needed to 
control the resulting conflicts. The precise way in which those monitoring devices are set 
up and fulfil their role in a particular firm defines the nature and characteristics of that 
firm’s corporate governance. 
 
 2.2.2 Corporate governance attributes 
 
Some of the previous studies on corporate governance tend to focus on one attribute of 
governance as opposed to studying a broad set of governance attributes intended to protect 
stakeholders’ claims to firm’ resources  (e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Sengupta 
1998; Bhagat and Black, 2000; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2006) argue that the limitation of this research is that some governance attributes may 
complement each other in protecting stakeholders’ claims. Standard and Poor’s (2002) 
developed a framework for evaluating corporate governance. Their framework included 
three main governance components: ownership structure and influence, board and 
management structure, and financial transparency and information disclosure. In this point 
we use this taxonomic device to describe the governance attributes. 
 
- Ownership structure and influence 
 
Ownership structure and the influence that certain shareholders exert on management play 
a key role in corporate governance. To Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) governance 
mechanisms, that monitor management actions and limit their opportunistic behaviour, 
protect the interests of shareholders and the interests of bondholders as well. The authors 
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state that, sometimes, the interests of shareholders and bondholders can diverge, namely 
because shareholders with significant ownership positions can exercise their influence to 
force management to take more risky investments, where shareholders as a group receive 
the benefits of successful outcomes but bondholders bear a disproportionate share of the 
failures. The study by La Porta et al. (1998), done in 27 developed countries and focusing 
on listed companies, shows that firms with majority shareholders are dominant and, in 
most cases, these shareholders are a family. The concentration of ownership has the great 
advantage of allowing for the majority shareholder to have sufficient power to control the 
management and to implement the necessary changes, but it also carries its own agency 
problems with the possibility of expropriation of the minority shareholders. However, to 
corporate governance what really matters is the ability of shareholders to intervene and 
exercise control over the management if necessary. 
 
- Board and management structure 
 
According to Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) the board structure, as a component of 
corporate governance, deals with such thing as: 
(1) board size and composition; 
(2) board leadership and committee structure; 
(3) competency of the board members; 
(4) the number of outside independent directors on the board, to represent the 
interests of all stakeholders; and 
(5) the compensation of the board members. 
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The first three elements address the board’s role and ability to provide independent 
supervision of management performance. Boards often delegate supervision of key 
functions or decision making to standing committees – audit, remuneration, nominating or 
governance, finance and investment. In relation to the fourth element, Bhojraj and 
Sengupta (2003) argue that firms with a greater proportion of outside directors on the 
board provide better monitoring of management actions. According to Eng and Mak (2003: 
327) “the role of the board of directors is to monitor management decisions”. In this sense, 
having a higher proportion of outside non-executive directors on the board would result in 
better monitoring of the activities by the board and limit managerial opportunism (Fama, 
1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Outside directors who are less aligned to management may 
be more inclined to encourage firms to disclose more information to outside investors. 
Forker (1992) finds that a higher percentage of independent members on boards enhanced 
the monitoring of financial information and reduced the benefits of withholding 
information. The fifth element, board compensation, is another element to be considered. 
Key issues are whether board members are remunerated and motivated in ways that ensure 
the long-term success of the company. To Jensen (1993) boards with greater ownership in 
the firm are more likely to do a better job of monitoring management and fulfilling their 
fiduciary responsibilities.  
 
- Financial transparency and information disclosure 
 
The corporate information is communicated through several ways to the market. The 
market participants interpret the information and use it in their investment decisions. Firms 
that generate a large quantity of relevant and credible information should facilitate the 
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participants to form more precise evaluations. These firms are considered transparent. In 
opposition, firms with vague or imprecise information will inhibit the correct evaluation by 
investors. These firms are considered opaque (Ang and Ciccone, 2000). 
 
The overall level of transparency is probably a function of several components, like 
ownership structure and firm specific characteristics (Ang and Ciccone, 2000). Accounting 
disclosure standards, as mentioned by Lowenstein (1996), are only one possible means of 
achieving transparency. To Ang and Ciccone (2000) corporate governance mechanisms 
induce the company to disclose information to the market but, despite that, important 
information may still be possessed by management. This information is often defined as 
asymmetric information and is often directly related to the company’s future performance. 
According to the authors, management directly controls the amount of information they 
disclose, the truthfulness of the information, and the communication channel, but 
information quality may also be influenced by the precision of the communication channel 
and the firm’s previous disclosure reputation. Despite this, it seams consensual that 
transparent disclosure is a critical instrument to reduce the information asymmetry between 
the company and the market. In this sense, a greater disclosure transparency facilitates the 
monitoring of managements’ actions and makes it less probable that management will act 
opportunistically. Therefore, the perception market participants depend on “both the 
willingness and ability of managers to reveal their superior information” (Ang and 
Ciccone, 2000:5). 
 
As a concluding remark, in what concerns the described attributes of governance, we recall 
Hart’s conditions (Hart, 1995) stating that these attributes/“institutions” are only ways of 
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dealing with an agency problem in a bounded rationality and incomplete contracts setting 
as follow. This agency problem is described below. 
 
 2.2.3 The agency problem 
 
Hart (1995: 678) states that “corporate governance issues arise in an organization 
whenever (…) there is an agency problem (…)”. An agency problem arises within a firm 
whenever managers have incentives to pursue their own interest at shareholder expense 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). So, there are agency costs.  
 
Basically, Hart (1995: 678) explains why corporate governance does not matter in the 
absence of agency costs. He states that in the absence of agency problems,” all individuals 
associated with an organization can be instructed to maximise profit or net market value 
or to minimise costs (…). Also no governance structure is required to resolve 
disagreements, since there are none”. 
 
Let us concentrate on the major conflict analysed in the context of corporate governance 
that is the one between shareholders and managers. This conflict was the main issue of the 
theoretical analysis of the agency problem. In fact the agency problem is an essential 
element of the so-called contractual view of the firm, developed by Coase (1937), Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983). 
 
The theoretical motives for agency problems are analysed by Jensen and Meckling (1976: 
9), who developed a theory of the ownership structure of a firm. The basis for their 
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analysis is the perspective that a corporation is “a legal fiction which serves as a nexus for 
contracting relationships and which is also characterised by the existence of divisible 
residual claims on the assets and cash-flows of the organization which can generally be 
sold without the permission of the other contracting individuals”. In this sense, the 
particular focus of the Jensen and Meckling (1976) model is the contract of an agency 
relationship between a principal (the external owner of the firm) and an agent (the     
owner-manager or entrepreneur). They demonstrate that, as the owner-manager’s fraction 
of the equity falls (as more equity is sold to outside investors), the agent has the incentive 
to appropriate a large amount of the corporations’ resources and to exert less than full 
effort to create value for shareholders. The principal can limit the effects of this divergence 
of interests by incurring monitoring costs to restrain the agent’s self-serving behaviour.  
Monitoring expenditures potentially include those related to payments to auditors to 
inspect the company’s accounts, costs of providing information to financial analysts, rating 
agencies or independent directors on the board.  
 
The difference of interests between the principal intervenient and the agent creates some 
problems, among which, the "adverse selection" and “moral hazard”. The problem of 
"adverse selection"7 (Akerlof, 1970) arises when one party of the relationship has 
information that reveals in a selective manner for their benefit and in detriment of the other 
party. So, by hiding part of the information possessed one deliberately harms the interests 
of another party. Managers have inside information about the position of their businesses 
                                                 
7
 Akerlof (1970) identifies and analyses the problem of asymmetric information in the context of used cars, in 
which the sellers (agents) know better than the buyers (principal) the quality of the cars they sell. The 
consequence is that sellers have the advantage in terms of information on the buyers, and they may sell low-
quality cars at the same price as high-quality cars, as long as the buyers can not distinguish the good car from 
the bad. 
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and have an interest in disclosing such information when they realize that their company is 
not having a proper valuation in the markets. The problem of "moral hazard" appears 
when the principal and the agent have different objectives. The principal cannot easily 
determine if the information and the actions of the agents pursue his goals, or instead, 
respond only to self-interest. In fact, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976), if both 
relationship parties have the same objective to maximize its utility, there are good reasons 
to believe that the agent did not always act in the interests of the principal. The fact that 
there is some freedom allowing for the choice by the manager, may lead to procedures that 
fit more to their personal interests, being this usually called moral hazard.  
 
A further problem is associated with the managers having a different horizon than 
shareholders. In fact, while firms have an indefinite life, the manager’s horizon is usually 
limited to the cash-flows received during the employment relation. This problem is 
naturally aggravated as managers approach retirement. This can lead managers to have a 
short-term perspective on investments, with a preference for projects with faster cash-flow 
returns. 
 
An additional source of conflict between agents and principals is related to different risk 
preferences. Shareholders eliminate unsystematic risk by diversifying their portfolios so 
they are not concerned with company-specific risk but only with market risk. In contrast, 
managers are typically not well diversified as a large portion of their wealth is tied in their 
company’s fortunes. This is not just because of direct cash-flows received from the firm 
but also because their future employment prospects are dependent on the survival of the 
firm (Farinha, 2003). 
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Another problem associated to agency costs is the dispersion of capital which is common 
to most large listed firms. With a large dispersion of capital, individual external 
shareholders have no incentive to engage in managerial monitoring. According to Farinha 
(2003) although it may be in the interests of the collective group of external owners to 
employ in actions aimed at disciplining management, no single rational individual 
shareholder will undertake such actions.  
 
Also the free cash flow theory, proposed by Jensen (1986: 323), considers preponderant 
the conflicts arising from the prevailing theory of agency. The free cash flow is “cash flow 
in excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present values when 
discounted at the relevant cost of capital”. When a company generates substantial amounts 
of free cash flow, conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers arise over the 
payout policies. These companies run the risk, by the lack of good investment 
opportunities, to see those funds spent by managers on projects with no added value. The 
restriction of the problem of free cash flow will depend on the effectiveness of corporate 
governance mechanisms, meaning on mechanisms that ensure that managers do not apply 
the funds available in potential organizational inefficiencies.  
 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 741) the essence of the agency problem also 
relays on the separation of the management and finance. The manager needs the financiers’ 
funds. The financiers need the manager’s specialized human capital to generate returns on 
their funds. “But how can financiers be sure that, once they sink their funds, they get 
anything but a worthless piece of paper back from the managers?”. The agency problem in 
this context refers to the difficulties financiers have in assuring that their funds are not 
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expropriated or wasted on unattractive projects. In most general terms, the financiers and 
the managers sign a contract that specifies what the manager does with the funds, and how 
the returns are divided. Ideally, they would sign a complete contract that specifies exactly 
what the manager does and how the profits are allocated. The problem is that most of the 
future contingencies are hard to describe and foresee, and as a result, complete contracts 
are technologically infeasible (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Because of these problems in 
designing their contract, the manager and the financier have to allocate residual control 
rights, the rights to make decisions in circumstances not fully foreseen by the contract 
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). 
 
In relation to the previous points, the need for mechanisms of decision-making within 
companies is evident and lacks no additional considerations. Without these mechanisms 
the companies simply would not work. It is necessary to take decisions and to promote 
their realization: this is the task of the mechanisms for controlling agency costs. Similarly 
it becomes apparent how important it is that these mechanisms function effectively, for 
only in this manner will the business optimally achieve its goals. In this context, companies 
possess a set of external and internal mechanisms to face the costs associated with the 
agency problem. These mechanisms are following described. 
 
 2.2.3.1 External and internal mechanisms for controlling agency costs 
 
As analysed previously, agency problems arise within a firm whenever managers have 
incentives to pursue their own interest at shareholder expense (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996), so there are agency costs. The governance of each company should contemplate the 
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mechanisms that lead to an efficient allocation/production/development of resources, from 
the decision point to the accounts rendered.  
 
Several external controlling mechanisms have been addressed in the literature. Due to 
theoretical and practical limitations, external disciplining devices including hostile 
takeovers, legal protection, product-market and labour-market competition cannot alone 
solve the corporate governance problem, although they may be important in some 
particular circumstances. Firms therefore have to adopt complementary internal 
disciplining devices in order to minimise their total agency costs. These internal devices 
include the board of directors, large shareholders, insider ownership and compensations, 
debt policy, dividend policy and disclosure policy.  
 
These monitoring devices may carry benefits but also carry costs and are not unlimited in 
their effectiveness at reducing agency costs (Farinha, 2003). In accordance with this, some 
studies have been recognising the simultaneous nature of many of the corporate 
governance mechanisms, suggesting that single-handed interventions on a particular 
mechanism may not be feasible or effective. These external and internal mechanisms are 
briefly explained in the following points. 
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 2.2.3.1.1 External mechanisms 
 2.2.3.1.1.1 Hostile takeovers 
 
When managers show low performance, which are not adequate to maximize the profits, 
external agents can perceive this situation as an opportunity to acquire a company and 
manage in it in such a way that it produces the profit not yet explored. Thus, following 
Esperança et al. (2011), the threat of external acquisition increases the probability of 
dismissal of the managers for low performance. 
 
Hart (1995: 684) argues that a hostile takeover is in principle a much more powerful 
mechanism for disciplining management since “it allows someone who identifies an 
underperforming company to obtain a large reward”. 
 
Farinha (2003) states that small shareholders have little incentive to monitor management, 
but this problem can potentially be avoided by the use of the takeover mechanism. 
According to this view, if management is inefficient or are not acting in shareholders’ 
interests, a “raider” could make a takeover bid, buying the firm at low price, managing it 
better and eventually selling it back with a profit. An aspect of the takeover mechanism is 
that it potentially applies in an indiscriminate way to all firms, while the existence of other 
mechanisms (like debt or dividends) may depend on managers’ or shareholders’ decisions. 
 
Some authors appoint some problems associated with this mechanism. Grossman and Hart 
(1980) point out that this mechanism can be undermined if shareholders refuse to sell their 
shares. Williamson (1970) argues that takeovers involve not just the costs needed to induce 
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reluctant shareholders but also search costs, bidding costs and other transaction costs that 
make takeovers in practice a very expensive solution. 
 
Consistent with the view that takeovers are a source of managerial discipline, Martin and 
McConnel (1991) find evidence of increased management turnover after successful 
takeovers and more frequent turnover when acquired companies previously 
underperformed their industry. Shivdasani (1993) shows results consistent with the view 
that hostile takeovers provide discipline when internal governance mechanisms, such as the 
board of directors, fail to control management’s non value-maximising behaviour. 
 
 2.2.3.1.1.2 Legal protection 
 
To Djankov et al. (2008) law and regulation are potential barriers to the use of discretional 
power by managers. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state that the principal reason for investors 
to provide external financing to the firm is that they receive control rights in exchange. 
External financing is a contract between the firm as a legal entity and the financiers, which 
gives the financiers certain rights to the assets of the firm. If the firm managers violate the 
terms of the contract, then the financiers have the right to appeal to the courts to enforce 
their rights. Much of the difference in corporate governance systems around the world 
arises from the differences in the nature of legal obligations that managers have to the 
financiers, as well as in the differences in how courts interpret and enforce those 
obligations. The most important legal right shareholders have is the right to vote on 
important corporate matters, such as mergers and liquidations, as well as in elections of 
 38 
board directors. Even if shareholders elect the board, directors don’t necessarily represent 
their interests. 
 
Farinha (2003) describes the legislation that directly affects the efficiency, or cost, of one 
or more monitoring devices. For example, in the United States many states have passed 
legislation designed to avoid or increase the costs of hostile takeover. This causes a severe 
impact on the existence of the takeover device as a general mechanism to control 
managerial actions within these states. Another example is the existence of legal rules 
giving a particular importance to dividend policy as a potential instrument for dealing with 
potential equity agency problems. 
 
Another important area of the legal environment, described by Farinha (2003), which also 
may influence corporate governance devices, is that concerned with the protection of 
minority shareholders. La Porta et al. (1997) find that the existence and efficiency of legal 
rules protecting investors are a major determinant of the development of local capital 
markets. According to the authors, if the extent of the corporate governance problem is 
possibly a restriction to external capital rising, this can suggest that the quality of the legal 
system of investor protection is a major determinant on the ability of firms and investors to 
set up appropriate corporate governance structures. 
 
 2.2.3.1.1.3 Product-market and labour-market competition 
 
Hart (1983) presents a formal model where managerial “slack” is lower under competition 
than when the manager’s firm is a single non-profit maximising monopolistic firm. This 
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suggests that the level of competition in product and factor markets may also act as general 
constraint on the manager’s non-wealth maximisation behaviour. 
 
Jensen (1986: 323) states that “product and factor market disciplinary forces are often 
weaker in new activities and activities that involve substantial economic rents or quasi 
rents“8. The author concludes that in these cases alternative monitoring mechanisms would 
become more relevant. Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 738) recognise that product market 
competition may be a “powerful force toward economic efficiency” but they doubt that its 
implementation alone can solve the problem of corporate governance. 
 
Fama (1980: 293) argues that “each manager has a stake in the performance of the 
managers above and below him and, as a consequence, undertakes some amount of 
monitoring in both directions”. This is related to the view that the managerial labour 
market may use the performance of the firm to determine each manager’s opportunity 
wage. The author argues that the existence of a managerial labour market is a key factor 
influencing the level of mutual monitoring by managers. He sees this market as exercising 
a direct pressure on the firm to sort and compensate managers according to their 
performance in order to prevent the best managers from leaving and keep the firm’s 
attractiveness to potentially highly performing managers. 
 
Moreover, for Esperança et al. (2011) the labour market is useful to discipline managers. 
As low performance facilitates the dismissal of managers and gives them a bad reputation 
on the labour market, which makes it difficult for them to be contracted again for similar 
                                                 
8
 Following Jensen (1986: 323) “rents are returns in excess of the opportunity cost of the resources to the 
activity. Quasi rents are returns in excess of the short-run opportunity cost of the resources to the activity”. 
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positions, reaching a high performance may rise out more appealing opportunity of 
employment. 
 
 2.2.3.1.2 Internal mechanisms 
 2.2.3.1.2.1 The board of directors 
 
The constitution of the board can also be named as a potential control mechanism. In fact, 
the composition and leadership of the board are mentioned by several authors as a strong 
monitoring mechanism of corporate governance. The presence of outside and independent 
directors to the board gives a greater experience and a greater independence to the 
management team.  
 
The shareholders choose the board of directors and place them in the top of the 
organizational hierarchy with the intention of protecting their interests (Esperança et al., 
2011). In this sense, shareholders elect the board to act on their behalf and the board in turn 
monitors top management and ratifies major decisions. The board has a very important role 
to play but there are some reasons to doubt of its effectiveness in practice.  
 
The board consists of executive directors (who are members of the management team) and 
nonexecutive directors, who are outsiders. Fama and Jensen (1983) characterise the 
responsibilities of the board of directors as being both the ratification of management 
decisions and the monitoring of management performance. This means that the likelihood 
of managerial collision may be reduced by the presence of outsider directors, who may 
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thus be regarded as another potential source of corporate monitoring (Winter, 1977; Fama, 
1980; Weisbach, 1988).  
 
Outside directors are regarded as professional referees who have the job of overseeing the 
competition between top managers and are disciplined themselves by an external labour 
market which judges and prices their services according to their performance as referees. 
Critics of the efficiency of this monitoring mechanism state that managers naturally 
dominate the board by choosing outside directors and by providing the information they 
analyse (Mace, 1986). 
 
Consistent with the importance of outside directors as monitors, Weisbach (1988) 
documents those CEOs of poorly performing firms are more likely to be replaced if the 
firm has a majority of outside directors. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) report abnormal 
increases in firm value after the appointment of additional outside directors.  
 
With another point of view, Hart (1995: 682) state that “if it is hardly reasonable to expect 
the executive directors to monitor themselves, it is also true that the nonexecutive directors 
may not do a very good job of monitoring for several reasons:  
- First, they may not have a significant financial interest; 
- Second, nonexecutive directors are busy people (they may themselves be chief 
executives and sit on many boards) and probably have little time to think about the 
company’s affair, or to collect information about the company – over and above 
that provided by management; 
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- Finally, nonexecutive directors may want to stay in management’s good graces, so 
that they can be re-elected and continue to collect their fees”. 
 
Empirical research, like the work of Byrd and Hickman (1992), show that the share market 
response to bidding companies that announce tender offers is more favourable when boards 
include independent directors. Cotter et al. (1997) analyse the role of target firm’s 
independent outside directors during takeover attempts. They found that boards with a 
majority of independent directors are more likely to use resistance strategies that enhance 
shareholders’ wealth. 
 
 2.2.3.1.2.2 Large shareholders 
 
Small shareholders have little incentive to monitor management. In this sense, one possible 
way to improve corporate governance is to ensure that a company has one or more large 
shareholders. Hart (1995: 683) argues that, on one hand this idea must be right, since “if a 
company has one shareholder that owns 100% of the company there is no longer a 
separation between ownership and control”. On the other hand, such situation is 
presumably undesirable for other reasons, “not least that the gains from going public – the 
risk reduction benefits from portfolio diversification – are lost”. 
 
Previous research followed the argument that large shareholders can be seen as potential 
controllers of equity agency problems as their increased shareholding can give them a 
stronger incentive to monitor firm performance and managerial behaviour (Demsetz, 1983; 
Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Another potential benefit relates to 
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the potential challenge that large shareholders offer to outside raiders, thus increasing the 
takeover premium (Burkart, 1995). 
 
Jensen (1993) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that blockholders or institutional 
investors, that hold large equity positions in a company, are important to a well functioning 
governance system because they have the financial interest and independence to view firm 
management and policies in an unbiased way, and they have the voting power to put 
pressure on management if they observe self-serving behaviour.  
 
But the notion that large shareholders play an important role on reducing the agency costs 
is not uncontested. Hart (1995: 683) states that “in the case where a large shareholder 
owns less than 100% of the company, agency problems may be reduced but they are not 
eliminated: 
- First, a large shareholder will still underperform monitoring and intervention 
activities since he does not receive 100% of the gains.  
- Second, a large shareholder may use his power to improve his own position at the 
expense of other shareholders.  
- Finally, the large shareholder may simply become management; he may run the 
company himself.”  
 
Also Shleifer and Vishny (1997) observe that large shareholders may have incentives to 
pursue their own interests at the expense of other outside shareholders. Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1993) argue that large shareholdings may inhibit the production of information in 
the market. Furthermore, as suggested by Wymeersch (2002), compliance with the 
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recommendations of codes of good governance is more difficult when a significant 
proportion of a firm’s equity is held by a majority shareholder. 
 
 2.2.3.1.2.3 Insider ownership and compensations 
 
Another important mechanism of governance is the internal property. Increasing the level 
of managers’ stock ownership can be a way to reduce agency costs, because it may permit 
a better alignment of their interests with the interests of shareholders. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) state that, in the extreme case where the manager’s share ownership is 100%, equity 
agency costs are reduced to zero. The argument relies on the fact that, as managerial 
ownership increases, managers support a large fraction of the costs of shirking, perquisite 
consumption and other value-destroying actions. Furthermore, larger share ownership by 
managers reduces the problem of different horizons between shareholders and managers if 
share prices adjust rapidly to changes in firm’s intrinsic value. Also Jensen (1986, 1989) 
emphasizes the importance of equity ownership by managers to reduce the risk of surplus 
cash flow. According to the author this participation allows to align the interests of 
managers and shareholders and ensure proper use of available funds for the purpose of 
maximizing shareholder wealth. 
 
Beck and Zorn (1982) describe a limitation of this mechanism as a tool for reducing 
agency costs: managers may not be willing to increase their ownership of the firm because 
of constrains on their personal wealth. Additionally, personal risk aversion also limits the 
extension of this monitoring device as the allocation of a large portion of the manager’s 
wealth to a single firm is likely to translate into a badly diversified portfolio. 
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A different type of monitoring vehicle is related to the potential links between managerial 
compensation and firm performance. To Jensen and Murphy (1990) a strong relation 
between compensation and firm performance would allow a better alignment of interest 
between shareholders and managers. Relevant elements of the compensation package 
typically include stock related rewards, deferred cash compensation and dividend policy 
compensation. Also Yermack (2003) finds that director’s stock option awards are 
positively related to firm’s investment opportunities and subsequent firm performance. The 
author shows that “tying” director’s pay more closely to stock performance through the use 
of options and other equity awards generally leads to increased performance. To Pereira 
and Esperança (2009) variable compensation is usually supported by the belief that it is 
efficient in interest alignment between principals and agents. In public corporations the 
solution of agency problems lies with the introduction of a variable compensation model, 
including stock options. In this respect, empirical evidence shows that a stock option plan 
for outside directors increases the monitoring role played by the board (Perry, 2000) and 
improves a firm’s value (Fich and Shivdasani, 2005). Moreover, a number of studies 
examined the relationship between stock options and disclosure practices. For example, 
Miller and Piotroski (2000) and Nagar et al. (2003) report a positive association between 
corporate disclosure and the proportion of CEO compensation affected by stock price.  
 
 2.2.3.1.2.4 Debt policy and dividend policy 
 
Some authors claim that another important source of discipline on mangers is provided by 
corporate financial structure, in particular the company’s choice of debt. In this sense, 
Jensen (1986) states that debt can represent a bonding commitment by the manager to pay 
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out cash-flows to debtholders, helping to overcome the free cash-flow problem. Also 
increased debt imposes on management a higher threat of bankruptcy. This threat brings 
potentially serious consequences for management, as a result of potential loss of reputation 
or firing, and is therefore likely to encourage efficiency. On the other hand, debt frequently 
possesses a tax advantage as corporations receive tax deductions from interest payments 
made to debtholders. Furthermore, according to the Pecking Order Theory, there are 
reduced problems of information asymmetry associates with the act of contract debt, when 
compared with capital emission (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
 
Also according to Jensen (1986), the debt discourages managers to make investments of 
cash-flow in unprofitable projects (those only serving their own interests) and create value 
for the company, since it demonstrates the willingness of managers to distribute results, as 
well as being supervised by authorities from outside the company (financial institutions). 
However, the author points out that the theory that debt creates value for the company and 
motivates better corporate governance is very weak because the retention of cash-flow is a 
strong and important source of financing. That is, contracting debt, to address the fact that 
part of the results obtained by the company are distributed, may generate unnecessary costs 
and in extreme cases may lead the company to exaggerated levels of debt.  
 
Also Hart (1995: 685) states that if a company takes on debt, then this limits how 
inefficient management can be, at least if management wants to repay its debt. According 
to the author, debt serves as a commitment device and “debt makes it credible, for 
example, that management will not expand its empire too much by reinvesting profits 
unwisely”. 
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Several authors stated that leverage also brings its own agency problems arising from 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and bondholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976: 
51) characterise debt agency costs as consisting of: 
- “the opportunity wealth loss caused by the impact of debt on the investment 
decisions of the firm; 
- monitoring and bonding expenditures by debtholders and the firm; 
- bankruptcy and reorganisation costs”. 
 
According to the authors, debtholders compensate themselves for these agency costs by 
charging higher interest rates, thus increasing the cost of debt. 
 
To Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) their interests can also diverge because shareholders can 
force management to take more risky investments, where shareholders receive the benefits 
of successful outcomes but the bondholders bear a disproportionate share of the failures. 
 
Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986), among others, provide a discussion about the 
monitoring role of dividends. According to Easterbrook (1984) dividends may control 
equity agency problems by facilitating capital market monitoring of firm’s activities and 
performance. The reason is that higher dividend payouts increase the likelihood that the 
firm will have to sell common stock in capital markets. Fluck (1998) and Myers (2000) 
also present agency-theoretic models of dividend behaviour where managers pay dividends 
in order to avoid disciplining action by shareholders. Furthermore, La Porta et al. (2000) 
show that companies that are surrounded by a stronger investor protection system tend to 
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pay higher dividends. More recently, to Esperança et al. (2011) the level of dividend 
payout exerts influence on the reputation of the company in the eyes of the investors.  
 
 2.2.3.1.2.5 Disclosure policy  
 
According to Wan (2009: 15) “the selective disclosure allows managers the opportunity to 
act in their own interest against the interest of ordinary shareholders, creating the 
possibility of an agency problem”.  
 
Core (2001) assumes that firms’ disclosure policies are determined by the same forces that 
shape firms’ governance structures. The disclosure of information is a potentially 
important mean for management to communicate firm performance and governance to 
outside investors. The corporate governance mechanisms can exert control over manager’s 
actions and can help to fulfil the informational demands of stakeholders. In this sense, the 
investors trust depends on the effectiveness and recognized efficiency of the monitoring 
and control mechanisms of management.  
 
Companies with more timely and informative disclosures are perceived to have a lower 
likelihood of withholding value-relevant unfavourable information. As a result, these firms 
are expected to be charged a lower risk premium by creditors (Sengupta, 1998). But to 
Klein (2002) the reliability of corporate information is also due, in part, to the quality and 
integrity of the audit process. She considers that the audit committees more effectively 
carry out their supervision of the corporate reporting process if they include a strong base 
of independent outside directors. She provides evidence to support this argument.  
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Walkner (2004: 14) also recognizes that the following factors constitute barriers to 
effective disclosure and shareholder oversight: 
- the concept of bounded rationality recognizes that information is a limited 
resource, leading to contracts between management and investors that are not only 
incomplete but also costly to design, to monitor and to enforce;  
- the existence of asymmetric information relates to the natural informational 
advantage that management might have over investors, suggesting that actions 
proposed by management, unknowingly to investors, benefit the management; 
- the opportunistic behaviour where management encourage the existence of an 
asymmetric information environment.  
 
Regulators have enforced legislation to ensure that companies provide at least a minimum 
amount of information. Although, legal requirements do not always satisfy stakeholders 
demands. In this sense, there is a considerable variation among companies in the disclosure 
of information that is not legally required. Previous research about the determinants of 
voluntary disclosure initially focused on corporate characteristics and was based on the 
basic assumption that corporate disclosure is determined by a trade-off between the costs 
and benefits associated with it. Recent researches suggest that other factors than cost-
benefit analysis may determine the firm’s disclosure policy (e.g. Arcay and Vázquez, 
2005). However, it seams consensual that the companies’ disclosure policy is one of the 
internal mechanisms of construction of the public perception of corporate governance 
quality and also a way to ensure the efficient functioning of capital markets. 
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Because this internal mechanism of corporate governance represent a framing part of the 
problem under study, will be subject to further analysis in the next point.  
 
2.3 The corporate disclosure policy 
 2.3.1 The corporate reporting 
 
According to the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA, 2008: 1): 
“Corporate reporting refers to the process used to communicate with stakeholders9, 
regardless of the vehicle used for such communications. It reflects the messages that 
management needs to convey to investors and other stakeholders, taking into consideration 
generally accepted accounting principles for financial reporting and relevant regulatory 
requirements”. 
 
In this sense, the corporate reporting model should follow the changes in the type of 
information needed for the market and, simultaneously, enhance the transparency of 
corporate governance and accountability. Following Leuz and Wysocki (2008) three recent 
trends have spurred the debate about financial reporting and disclosure regulations around 
the world.  
- First, international financial crises and corporate scandals often lead to 
regulation reforms and greater reporting and disclosure requirements.  
- Second, stock exchanges and accounting standards bodies from numerous 
countries around the world have adopted the IFRS to achieve the stated goal of 
“harmonization” and “convergence” of accounting rules.  
                                                 
9
 To CICA (2008: 1) stakeholders are “individuals or groups that may be significantly affected by a 
company’s activities, products and services or whose actions can affect the company’s ability to successfully 
implement its strategies and achieve it objectives”. 
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- Third, the increasing internationalization of capital markets emphasizes 
regulation as a global subject. 
 
So, the corporate reporting has been changing considerably in response to public 
expectations and to social values. It can take many forms such as a company’s annual 
information form, management discussion and analysis (MD&A), information circular, 
interim reports, press releases, annual reports, annual financial statements, corporate 
governance reports, sustainability reports and a variety of electronic disclosures (CICA, 
2008). Despite this, the annual report is the traditional form. But companies, investors and 
other stakeholders are now shifting their focus to the internet. It is becoming the primary 
medium for communicating corporate information. In fact, we can see in our days an 
increasing emphasis on timely and continuous disclosure online. 
 
Studies in recent years have focused the investigation on disclosure practices. Nonetheless, 
researchers recognize the urgent need to develop disclosure metrics that facilitate the 
research and the evaluation of reporting and its quality. According to Beattie et al. (2004) 
the nature of business has changed. Competitive advantages increasingly involve value 
creation processes that rely on intangible assets that may not be recognized in financial 
statements. To serve the information needs of the market and provide the information 
required for corporate transparency and accountability, there is now a consensus that the 
business reporting model needs to expand beyond the traditional financial reporting model 
that emphasises backward-looking, quantified, financial information (e.g. Elliott, 1992; 
AICPA, 1994; Wallman, 1995, 1996, 1997; ICAS, 1999; Lev and Zarowin, 1999; FASB, 
2001a; Lev, 2001; ICAEW, 2003; Beattie et al., 2004). 
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The reporting model has been dominated by financial information. To Beattie et al. (2004: 
206), even though financial information is crucial, it provides only one part of the picture 
of overall business performance and has a built-in bias towards recording the short-term 
results of companies, giving too little emphasis to their long-term value potential. There is 
need of more targeted information for the future and non-financial in its nature. To the 
authors that information will be “soft” information, meaning “unquantified or 
unquantifiable”. To Espinosa et al. (2008) the level of transparency of companies’ annual 
reports has become a central theme of debate in recent years. According to the authors the 
debate has shifted the focus of attention from the usefulness of accounting numbers to the 
importance of transparency on issues regarding company life. 
 
The importance of voluntary reporting done by companies has grown dramatically. If 
previously it was seen as a side report now it’s been given the same status of financial 
reporting, both providing, consequently, the core of the annual report (Beattie et al., 2001). 
Through the annual report it is possible to answer to the increasing demand for information 
by all users and the market pressures for additional disclosure. Like stated previously, the 
disclosure policy is an important instrument of corporate governance, to build an image of 
the organization and to legitimize their activity. According to IASB (2005: 11) “if financial 
statements are not sufficient to meet the objectives of financial reporting, then the IASB 
should consider requiring the disclosure of other information to help the financial reports 
meet their objective (…) this will be achieved only if companies provide clear and 
meaningful information”. Regulators, the academia, consultants, have stated the need for 
new Business Reporting Models. Take, for example, the British Operating and Financial 
Review (OFR), Management Commentary (MC) proposal of the International Accounting 
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Standards Board (IASB) and the multiple New Reporting Models for Business (NRM's) 
that have been proposed10. The general goal of these proposals is to improve quality and 
transparency of information that is provided to users and, in particular, investors that act in 
capital markets. These new proposals criticise the traditional model of reporting due to the 
historic character of the information provided by the financial statements. Like stated 
previously, there is a need for more forward-looking information, that’s not financial in 
nature. Thus, companies must have a much broader reporting model, addressing issues that 
are not restricted only to financial aspects, which go far beyond traditional disclosure of 
financial information.  
 
In this context, it is necessary to mention the importance of the report published by the 
AICPA (1994), known as “Jenkins Report", which became extremely influential in this 
regard. This report adopts a “customer-centric” approach, meeting the information needs 
of investors and creditors. It suggests an ample reporting model. The FASB (2001b) state 
that in the future it expects an increased importance of voluntary disclosure due to the 
increased rhythm of business change. 
 
In this sense, there are major changes taking place regarding the reporting of companies 
which will provide important new information to its users: the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
                                                 
10
 The awaresness that the traditional financial reporting is outdated, due to disclosing information based on 
past events, unable to meet the future information needs of users to support their investiment decisions, led to 
the emergence in the early 90’s of the New Reporting Models for Business (NRM’s). However the adoption 
of these models by businesses has been greatly reduced, either by the ignorance of their existence by 
companies governing bodies or by the cost of implementing and maintaining what they represent. However, 
the response to the information needs of investors and other stakeholders is recognized and can be found in 
the NRM’s. This stimulated the interest of regulatory bodies, including the ICAEW (2002, 2003 and 
2004), the AICPA (1994), for this reason studies have been produced to reform the current model of financial 
reporting. Among the NRM’s, we highlight a few, such as: Balanced Scorecard, Jenkins Report, Tomorrow's 
Company, 21st Century Annual Report, The Inevitable Change, Inside Out, Value Dinamics, GRI, The 
Bookings Institution,Value Reporting TM and Hermes Principles. 
 54 
in the European Union (EU) and all over the world; the substantial increase in the 
disclosures relating to Corporate Governance; the Social and Environmental Reporting, 
such as that proposed by Global Reporting Initiative (GRI); the Operating and Financial 
Review (OFR) implemented in the UK;  the Management Commentary (MC); and the 
project of harmonization of  the conceptual framework  by the IASB/FASB, among others.  
 
In fact, as stated previously, an important tendency in disclosure regulation is the 
increasingly extensive adoption of uniform reporting standards by stock exchanges and 
accounting standards bodies from different countries. The main goal is to achieve global 
convergence of reporting regulations. So, in this changing context, the new business 
reporting models present themselves as a challenge to the harmonization of the structure 
and content of the information reported by companies, especially at the level of their 
annual reports. 
 
 2.3.2 Objectives of corporate reporting 
 
The primary purpose of corporate reporting is to communicate, in a readily understandable 
way, timely, reliable and relevant information on a company’s past, present and future 
activities to help users make economic decisions (CICA, 2008). That conclusion was based 
on an assessment of (i) management accountability, (ii) factors pertaining to the 
communication of useful information and (iii) uses for corporate report. These three 
aspects are following described. 
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 2.3.2.1 Management accountability 
 
The responsibility of management to stakeholders is commonly referred to as 
accountability. The company must determine if a specific group of users has the legitimacy 
to claim the information it wants. It may be accountable to some user groups as a result of 
either statutory or contractual relationships. When legitimacy is defined by law, it is 
enforceable by law and there is no doubt about the question of accountability. Examples of 
stakeholders whose claims to information are legitimized by law include shareholders and 
regulators. Certain management accountabilities are presented in table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2 – Management accountabilities 
 
 
Financial Statements 
 
Present statements in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP). 
 
Control Structure 
 
Establish and maintain control structures that will ensure that assets 
are safeguarded and management policies and procedures are 
followed. 
 
Compliance 
 
Ensure compliance with applicable laws, regulations, policies and 
procedures. 
 
Economy and efficiency 
 
Use resources and operate in an economical and efficient manner. 
 
Goal achievement 
 
Attain the specified goals and objectives. 
 
Fraud 
 
Maintain control processes to prevent fraudulent activities. 
Adapted from CICA (2008) 
 
Because corporate disclosure is a responsibility of management, management prepares the 
financial statements and the other information in the corporate report. Clearly, therefore, 
the information disclosed is a management’s representation. 
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 2.3.2.2 Communicating useful information 
  
Over the years, much time and effort has been spent on trying to delineate the qualitative 
characteristics that are determinants of information usefulness. According to the 
Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting of FASB (2010:16) “the qualitative 
characteristics of useful financial information identify the types of information that are 
likely to be most useful to the existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors 
for making decisions about the reporting entity”.  
 
So the first objective is to inform and provide useful information for decision making. 
Thus, to achieve this objective, the conceptual structure of FASB holds a set of qualitative 
characteristics of information that make it useful to those who use it. A description of those 
characteristics, that define and describe the attributes of information that make it useful, is 
described bellow. 
 
IASC (1989) define the qualitative characteristics as the attributes that make the information 
provided in financial statements useful to users. The four principal qualitative characteristics 
were understandability, relevance, reliability and comparability. In practice a balancing, or 
trade-off, between qualitative characteristics was often necessary. More recently, the 
conceptual framework of FASB (2010), a joint project of FASB/IASB, define as the 
fundamental qualitative characteristics the relevance and faithful representation and has 
enhancing qualitative characteristics the comparability, verifiability, timeliness, and 
understandability. The information must be both relevant and faithfully represented if it is 
to be useful. Neither a faithful representation of an irrelevant phenomenon, nor an 
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unfaithful representation of a relevant phenomenon, helps users make good decisions 
(FASB, 2010). Also according to CICA (2008) relevance and faithful representation are 
fundamental attributes so, at least, a minimal level of each is essential if information is to 
be useful. Accordingly, both characteristics are the prime determinants of usefulness. The 
table 2.3 describes the fundamental qualitative characteristics. 
 
Table 2.3 – Fundamental Qualitative Characteristics 
 
 
Relevance 
 
Relevant financial information is capable of making a difference in the 
decisions made by users. Information may be capable of making a difference 
in a decision even if some users choose not to take advantage of it or already 
are aware of it from other sources. Financial information is capable of making 
a difference in decisions if it has predictive value, confirmatory value, or 
both.  
 
• Predictive value:  if it can be used as an input to processes employed 
by users to predict future outcomes. Financial information need not 
be a prediction or forecast to have predictive value. Financial 
information with predictive value is employed by users in making 
their own predictions.  
 
• Confirmatory value: if it provides feedback (confirms or changes) 
about previous evaluations.  
 
The predictive value and confirmatory value of financial information are 
interrelated. Information that has predictive value often also has confirmatory 
value.  
 
Faithful 
representation 
 
Financial reports represent economic phenomena in words and numbers. To 
be useful, financial information not only must represent relevant phenomena, 
but it also must faithfully represent the phenomena that it purports to 
represent. To be a perfectly faithful representation, a depiction would have 
three characteristics. It would be complete, neutral, and free from error.  
 
• A complete depiction includes all information necessary for a user to 
understand the phenomenon being depicted, including all necessary 
descriptions and explanations.  
 
• A neutral depiction is without bias in the selection or presentation of 
financial information.  
 
• Free from error means there are no errors or omissions in the 
description of the phenomenon, and the process used to produce the 
reported information has been selected and applied with no errors in 
the process. 
Adapted from FASB (2010) 
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According to FASB (2010) the most efficient and effective process for applying the 
fundamental qualitative characteristics usually would be as follows: 
- First, identify an economic phenomenon that has the potential to be useful to users 
of the reporting entity’s financial information; 
- Second, identify the type of information about that phenomenon that would be most 
relevant if it is available and can be faithfully represented; 
-  Third, determine whether that information is available and can be faithfully 
represented. If so, the process of satisfying the fundamental qualitative 
characteristics ends at that point. If not, the process is repeated with the next most 
relevant type of information.  
 
The enhancing qualitative characteristics also may help to determine which of two ways 
should be used to describe a phenomenon if both are considered equally relevant and 
faithfully represented. These characteristics are described in table 2.4. 
 
Table 2.4 – Enhancing Qualitative Characteristics 
 
 
Comparability 
 
Information about a reporting entity is more useful if it can be compared 
with similar information about other entities and with similar information 
about the same entity for another period or another date.  
 
Verifiability 
 
Verifiability helps assure users that information faithfully represents the 
economic phenomena it purports to represent. Verifiability means that 
different knowledgeable and independent observers could reach consensus, 
although not necessarily complete agreement, that a particular depiction is 
a faithful representation.  
 
Timeliness 
 
Timeliness means having information available to decision makers in time 
to be capable of influencing their decisions. Generally, the older the 
information is, the less useful it is.  
 
Understandability 
 
Classifying, characterizing, and presenting information clearly and 
concisely makes it understandable.  
 
Adapted from FASB (2010) 
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Enhancing qualitative characteristics should be maximized to the extent possible. 
However, the enhancing qualitative characteristics, either individually or as a group, 
cannot make information useful if that information is irrelevant or not faithfully 
represented. Applying the enhancing qualitative characteristics is an interactive process 
that does not follow a prescribed order (FASB, 2010). 
 
 2.3.2.3 Uses for corporate reports 
 
The annual report offers the most comprehensive representation of the company. Several 
studies analysed the usefulness of annual reports to shareholders (e.g. Beattie et al., 2004). 
Shareholders use annual reports to confirm previously released information used in their 
decision making. Moreover, because the annual report usually contains the audited 
financial statements, it may be the only information source to be independently verified. In 
general, investors find annual reports to be useful, even without the short-term stock 
market reaction to their releases. Also, annual reports may be an important input to long-
term investment decision making, specifically to confirm information that investors have 
previously received and as a convenient summary to assist risk and return assessments 
(CICA, 2008).  
 
Corporate reports can be considered from two fundamentally different perspectives – of 
management and of users. Management may want to disclose certain information whereas 
users may want different information. The need for, and access to, information is 
influenced by the users objectives and their particular relationship with the business 
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involved. The table 2.5 summarizes the uses for corporate reports according to the user 
perspective. 
 
Table 2.5 – Uses for Corporate Reports 
 
 
From Management 
perspective corporate 
reports intended to: 
 
Provide information for making an informed investment 
decision; 
Report  on financial position, operating results and cash flows; 
Report on managers stewardship; 
Maintain public relations; 
Meet legal and regulatory requirements; 
Provide information for an informed shareholder voting 
decision; 
Promote a higher price/earnings ratio. 
 
From 
Investor/Creditor 
perspective corporate 
reports are used to: 
 
Asses risk and return; 
Provide general reference; 
Provide information for meetings with management; 
Verify information from other sources; 
Make performances forecast; 
Reach current/potential customers; 
Analyse and track industry sector. 
 Adapted from CICA (2008) 
 
Such differences have a significant impact on the type of information required by each 
group, and the extent of information that can be made available. To achieve different 
objectives, users and management need different information for their decision making. 
Moreover, different classes of users11 do not always share the same views on risks and 
uncertainties and may even have conflicting interests. Management’s most difficult 
                                                 
11
 According to CICA (2008) the three primary groups of users are: shareholders (investors), creditors and 
analysts/advisers. The secondary users are: the public, standard setters, government, regulatory agencies, 
employees, customers, suppliers, industry groups, labour unions, other companies and academic researchers. 
 61 
problem, related to corporate disclosure, is the balancing the information needs of the 
different audiences. 
 
Another important aspect is the environment that surrounds corporate reporting. According 
to CICA (2008) corporate reports are communications documents shaped by management, 
taking into consideration legal requirements and generally accepted accounting principles. 
The figure 2.1 describes the corporate reporting environment and the interrelated factors 
having an impact on the content of corporate reports – financial reporting standards, legal 
requirements, current practices and the objective of satisfying users’ information needs. 
 
Figure 2.1 - Corporate Reporting Environment 
 
 
 
 
 
                        
 
 
                                Adapted from CICA (2008) 
 
It’s generally accepted that financial statements, prepared in general by the companies, 
meet the common needs of most users. Nevertheless, these do not provide all the necessary 
information for making decisions. Like stated previously, the “Jenkins Report" (AICPA, 
1994) gave the booster step for new ways to report, arguing the necessity for the business 
report. In this context, there is currently a range of information about companies that 
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cannot be translated into financial terms, such as information about its contribution to the 
environment, social welfare, suggesting, in this way, environmental reporting, social 
reporting, among others. These types of reports occur voluntarily. The voluntary disclosure 
comes as a way for companies to disclose financial and non-financial information beyond 
what is required, thus facilitating the understanding of investors about the company and 
reducing its potential risk. The main aspects about the problematic of the voluntary 
disclosure of information will be provided in the next point.  
 
 2.3.3 The voluntary disclosure of information 
 
Marston and Leow (1998) define the voluntary information as that which is not stipulated 
by laws and regulations. Also Meek et al. (1995: 555) define voluntary disclosure as 
‘‘disclosure in excess of requirements, representing free choices on the part of company 
managements to provide accounting and other information deemed relevant to the decision 
needs of users of their annual reports’’. To García and Monterrey (1997) voluntary 
disclosure is the information revealed voluntarily by companies, i.e., the one that is emitted 
over the minimum requirements establish by accounting regulation. 
 
Voluntary disclosure is frequently considered as the information released to the outside, 
deriving from management‘s insider knowledge of the company, which are not required to 
be published in accounting regulated reports (Cooke 1989b; Raffournier, 1995; Meek et 
al., 1995; Depoers, 2000; Allegrini and Greco, 2011). 
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To the Steering Committee Report (FASB, 2001b) the term “voluntary disclosure” 
describes disclosures, primarily outside the financial statements, that are not explicitly 
required by accounting regulation. However, it is recognized that many of these “voluntary 
disclosures” are made to comply with the regulation requirements concerning description 
of a business and management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition and results 
of operations. To the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2001) a better approach 
to improving voluntary disclosure is to create an overall environment that makes it easier 
and safer for companies to disclose more information beyond the standard financial 
statements. 
 
There are several incentives for voluntary disclosure. Some incentives are based on the 
effort of maintaining credibility, reducing investor uncertainty, reducing the cost of capital, 
making possible an increase in value of securities of the company through public 
disclosure of information known only by administrators, which may reveal that the 
company has a higher value than that perceived by the market. Others are based on the 
desire to maintain a good image and to gain legitimacy (e.g. García and Monterrey, 1993). 
However, there are also disincentives to voluntary disclosure which are, among others, the 
costs associated with disseminating information. Another disincentive is the inconvenience 
of disclosing information that may be used by competitors.  
 
Voluntary disclosure has increased substantially in recent years. The need for financing by 
companies in complex capital markets requires them to provide a wide range of 
information. Graham et al. (2005) focus their study on the economic implications of 
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financial reporting of companies, noting that voluntary reporting comes as a facilitator of 
clarity and comprehensibility of the underlying economic reality by investors.  
 
The decision to disclose may be explained by certain characteristics of the company itself, 
such as size, performance, management practices, among others. Nevertheless, some 
companies limited themselves to the legal requirements and regulations of the report 
claiming protection for strategic information, litigation costs and political costs12.  
 
Voluntary disclosure involves the reporting of various types of information in either annual 
reports or in other disclosure media. According to Meek et al. (1995) financial information 
have obvious decision relevance to investors. Non-financial information is generally 
directed more towards a company’s social accountability and is aimed at a broader group 
of stakeholders than just the investors. The information disclosed by companies is used for 
different reasons by various groups of people namely investors, creditors, financial 
analysts, regulators, government and non-government agencies. 
 
Voluntary disclosure is seen in the literature as being also motivated by its effects on the 
perceived value of the company in the capital market. According to Grossman (1981) 
companies are fully induced by the market to disclose information. Following studies (e.g. 
Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985, 1998) provide a diverse set of configurations that support, 
partially, some reporting strategies. To Khlifi and Bouri (2010) the most important motive 
for corporate disclosure is to reduce information asymmetry between corporate 
management and outside investors, thereby alleviating the agency problem. 
                                                 
12
 Political costs include all expected costs (wealth transfers) imposed on a firm from potential adverse 
political actions involving antitrust, regulation, government subsidies, taxes, tariffs, among others (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978). 
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In short, and in general terms, companies voluntarily disclose information in order to meet 
the information needs of users, and generate competitive advantages with them. 
Nevertheless, the main reasons that support the voluntary disclosure of information made 
by companies reside on the explaining theories of disclosure, which shall be referred to 
further on. 
 
 2.3.3.1 Theories supporting voluntary disclosure of information 
 
There are several reasons that lead companies to disclose information in excess of 
requirements, i.e., there are several motivations for voluntary disclosure. In this context, a 
number of theories arise that attempt to justify this behaviour by firms.  
 
 2.3.3.1.1 Agency theory  
 
As explained previously, the agency theory, initially developed by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), is based on the conflict of interest between owners (the principal) and the managers 
of these (the agent), in situations where there is a separation between the ownership and 
management or in situations where one person delegates a task to another or the 
management of certain interests.  
 
As a result of asymmetric information and interests, the principal should have reasons to 
not trust the agent. In this sense, certain mechanisms are put in place to align the interests 
of agents with those of the principal, thus reducing the possibility of information 
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asymmetry, as well as opportunistic behaviours (ICAEW, 2005). Shareholders monitor the 
actions of managers to make sure that they are acting in a way consistent with achieving 
their objectives. Such a situation encourages managers to disclose additional information 
to, thereby, demonstrate to shareholders that they are acting according to their interests. To 
Khlifi and Bouri (2010), disclosure plays the role of a control mechanism for managers’ 
performance, thanks to which they are likely to disclose more information willingly. 
 
The agency theory assumes the existence of agency costs arising from the contractual 
relationship between parties. The greater the number of contracts, the greater the cost of 
the agency to the company. Thus, revealing more information will result in a reduction of 
agency costs. According to Leventis and Weetman (2000: 5) "a voluntary disclosure may 
serve as a way of reducing the adverse effects of “moral hazard" and “adverse selection". 
Voluntary disclosure can also strengthen the confidence of external investors in relation to 
management, reducing equally the costs of the agency.  
 
The importance of agency theory in disclosure, as claimed by Healy and Palepu (2001), 
deals with the problem of information asymmetry that exists between who disseminates it 
(the managers acting as agents) and the users of that information (investors and other 
stakeholders by acting as principals). A key role of the proposed report models that has 
emerged is to fill in the information asymmetry and to exercise influence on the agents as a 
mechanism of control of their behaviour by requiring information to be more transparent 
and accountable. However, it seems that this information asymmetry will always exist due 
to the conflict of interests between the agent and principal – the maximization of their 
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individual gains. According to the authors, disclosure only serves to reduce this 
asymmetry.  
 
 2.3.3.1.2 Signalling theory  
 
According to Spence (1973) and Ross (1977) in case of information asymmetry, 
approached by Akerlof (1970), the signalling theory assumes that firms with higher 
performance use financial information as a tool to transmit signals to the market.  
 
In a market where there are information asymmetries, managers of higher quality 
companies are encouraged to transmit to the market the information supplements they 
possess, thus contributing to the reduction of agency costs and obtaining finance on more 
favourable terms. However, since the transmission of information implies a cost, managers 
tend to use signs to communicate to investors the information supplements they have and, 
thus, causing changes in investors’ expectations related to profitability and business risk 
(Augusto, 2003). Following Levasseur and Quintart (2000) a signal is a message sent by 
well-informed economic agents (as company directors) to other interveners (as 
shareholders and creditors) supposedly less informed. But for a sign to be credible, and 
thus have effects on the intended agents, it must meet three basic conditions: to be issued 
in advance and verified after the event; have an associated cost; and include incentives and 
penalties. Ross (1977), assuming a perfect capital market and assuming that economic 
agents are neutral towards risk, presents a model demonstrating that administrators can use 
leverage to signal to investors their expectations regarding to future cash flows and, thus, 
alter the expectations of investors in relation to the company’s quality.  
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So, it is incumbent on directors of companies, knowing they have superior information 
than the other market players regarding the company they run, the task of transmitting to 
investors signals than can evidence it. Such signs can be shown by either a good or a bad 
company. To Marques and Conde (2002), in the case of a good company, the information 
submitted will try to focus on that fact. On the other hand if it’s bad, managers often try to 
convey the contrary idea, subject to the risks associated with litigation processes that they 
may subsequently suffer. Also according to these authors, the good companies must report 
in a meaningful and effective manner the characteristics they possess and which cannot be 
imitated by bad companies, so that the signal receiver may distinguish them quickly. 
Morris (1987) developed a study where both the agency theory and the theory of signalling 
are discussed. The author concludes that given the consistency of the two theories, a 
combination of both can be used to predict the ways of disseminating information, the 
choice of accounting policy and the voluntary selection of the auditor. The signalling 
theory holds that, with regard to the choice of accounting policy, companies with high 
quality will choose accounting policies that reveal their superior quality, unlike the lower 
quality companies which will choose methods to camouflage their inferior quality.  
 
 2.3.3.1.3 Legitimacy theory 
 
The legitimacy theory is based on the notion of a social contract that exists between the 
organization and society. Companies operate under the rules and limits of the societies in 
which they operate. Thus, the companies will have to be sure that its activities are in 
agreement, or are perceived as being in agreement, with the norms and values of the 
society, to prevent the disruption of the contract, loosing its legitimacy (Branco e 
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Rodrigues, 2006). This theory focuses on the recognition of society, i.e., on the adequacy 
of corporate social behaviour (Nasi et al., 1997). This means that society judges enterprises 
through the image that companies create of themselves. The only way for companies to 
survive is "if the society where they are inserted realize that the company is operating 
according to a set of values that are beneficial to society" (Gray et al., 1996: 46). Thus, 
companies can establish their legitimacy by matching their performance with the 
expectations and perceptions of society itself. Legitimacy problems occur when there is a 
gap between society's expectations and the perceptions about the social behaviour of the 
company. Suchman (1995:574) defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values beliefs and definitions”.  
 
In fact, the legitimacy theory sees the corporate report as a way to legitimate companies in 
their behaviours. Thus, any action taken by companies that may endanger the social 
environment, in which it operates, may cause possible manifestations of discontentment. 
It’s in this context that social responsibility and environmental accounting appear. In recent 
years we have witnessed a growing awareness of environmental problems, a situation that 
requires companies to have a greater accountability in this area. So, companies have been 
developing systems for the prevention and remedying of any environmental damage they 
might cause. In short, and following Dowling and Pfeiffer (1975), the theory of legitimacy 
comprises two essential factors. Firstly, the activities developed by companies must be in 
accordance with social values of the society in which it operates. Secondly, those activities 
must be submitted to the society through the disclosure made by the company.  
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 2.3.3.1.4 Stakeholder theory  
 
According to Freeman et al. (2002) the stakeholder approach has the following 
characteristics:  
 
- Promote the establishment of a management structure, with strategies flexible 
enough so that the company does not need to regularly adopt new paradigms;  
- Put the objective in the company's survival. To achieve this objective management 
must be supported by all those who influence or are influenced by the company;  
- The various stakeholder groups should share with the company a set of values; and  
- Assumes that the successful strategies are those that incorporate the perspectives of 
all stakeholders.  
 
According to this theory, the main objective of the company is to create value for all 
stakeholders. Thus, the company can not be understood merely as a socio-economic 
institution in function of their owners or shareholders who risk their capital in order to 
obtain profits. Many other factors are in place, a group of people or institutions who are 
also eager that the organization be successful, the so-called stakeholders13. The need for 
information, that all these persons or institutions demonstrate, drives to new forms of 
reporting. The stakeholder theory, or as it’s also currently known as the stakeholder 
approach, focus on the company's need to formulate strategies and establish satisfactory 
arrangements with the various stakeholders to ensure their survival. It begins with the 
                                                 
13
 Freeman (1984: 46) define stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect or be affected by the 
company to achieve its objectives, such as shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, distributors, 
competitors and society in general". 
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assumption that the company is no longer an isolated entity, that the environment is 
unstable and surrounded by uncertainties, and that the objectives can not be understood 
only from the viewpoint of the owners or shareholders.  
 
The stakeholder theory defends the interdependence and integration of agents that compose 
a system. Seeking through this interrelationship to develop a theoretical regard concerning 
the social responsibility of the organization to the environment where it is located 
(Campbell, 1997). In this context, organizations should be considered as belonging to an 
open system with multiple influence relations, because organizations are not self-
independent or self sufficient. Thus, additional disclosure of information by firms makes it 
grow and strengthen the ties between the company and stakeholders.  
 
To Jensen (2000: 3) the stakeholder theory violates the proposition that any organization 
must have a single-valued objective as a precursor to purposeful or rational behaviour and 
“a firm that adopts stakeholder theory will be handicapped in the competition for survival 
because, as a basis for action, stakeholder theory politicizes the corporation, and it leaves 
its managers empowered to exercise their own preferences in spending the firm's 
resources”. 
 
The same author made a proposal to clarify what he believed was the proper relation 
between value maximization and stakeholder theory, which he called enlightened value 
maximization. On one hand, the value maximization states that managers “should make all 
decisions so as to increase the total long-run market value of the firm”. Total value is the 
sum of the values of all financial claims on the firm (including equity, debt, preferred stock 
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and warrants). Stakeholder theory, on the other hand, says that managers “should make 
decisions so as to take account of the interests of all the stakeholders in a firm”. 
Stakeholders include all individuals or groups who can considerably affect the welfare of 
the firm - not only the financial claimants, but also employees, customers, communities, 
and governmental officials, among others (Jensen, 2000: 2). 
 
The enlightened value maximization uses much of the structure of stakeholder theory but 
accepts maximization of the long-run value of the firm as the criterion for making the 
requisite trade-offs among its stakeholders, and specifies long-term value maximization or 
value seeking as the firm's objective. According to its author, this proposal solves the 
problems that arise from the multiple objectives that follow the traditional stakeholder 
theory. 
 
 2.3.3.1.5 Positive theory of accounting  
 
The positive theory of accounting aims to assess the effect of accounting on the various 
users and the effect of those users in accounting. The approach of the theory began with 
studies conducted in the capital market about the relationship between accounting 
information and stock price. For example, Ball and Brown (1968) developed a study to 
assess the market reaction, in relation to the share price, given the different types of 
accounting information.  
 
It is with the work of Watts and Zimmerman (1978) that the further development of the 
positive theory of accounting arises. According to the authors the theory of accounting 
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needs to be positive and not normative, it should explain why some companies use certain 
procedures, while others do not, to be able to understand the pressures companies exert on 
the regulators of accounting standards, which may affect the distribution of wealth.  
 
The study of Watts and Zimmerman’s (1986) prompted several other studies in the context 
of financial accounting and contractual relationships between managers and shareholders. 
Consequently, the hypotheses developed by these works were based on the idea that 
managers select accounting methods in favour of their own interests. Having managers the 
possibility to choose the adoption of certain accounting procedures terms, they will have 
reasons to choose a particular procedure over another. Rational managers will choose the 
procedures that will benefit their management. Similarly, Giner (1995), when referring to 
the positive theory of accounting, argues that rational administrators will seek to maximize 
their benefit, so they will choose the accounting policies that benefit them the most. They 
will also put pressure on the regulators of accounting information in order to achieve their 
objective of maximizing benefits. Therefore, they will choose the accounting procedures 
that maximize profits, including, among other examples, the anticipation of gains and 
delay of costs.  
 
The positive theory of accounting demonstrates its usefulness by allowing investors to 
understand the consequences of accounting decisions, including the distribution of wealth 
of the company, since the choice of accounting methods will determine the wealth of 
shareholders, directors, creditors and other stakeholders that are related to it.  
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The process of creating standards involves a number of different interests. It’s the power of 
each group that will determine the creation of accounting standards and thus the 
modification of them. In this sense, a continuous circle exists between the influence of 
accounting on people's behaviour, and the influence of people’s behaviour in accounting. 
Zimmerman (1979) argues that accounting standards are a political process rather than a 
technical process.  
 
In short, the positive theory of accounting focus on the documentation of the factors, be 
them contractual or political, which might explain the decisions of accounting and 
reporting by the companies. Studies in this area address the incentives that managers have 
to influence the value of the company.  
 
Despite the several supporting theories of disclosure, research on voluntary disclosure also 
focuses on the information role for capital markets (e.g. Healy and Palepu, 1993, 1995, 
2001). This research focus on stock market motives for disclosure decisions. This topic 
will be approached in the following point. 
 
 2.3.3.2 Capital market reasons for voluntary disclosure 
 
Healy and Palepu (2001) summarize six forces that affect manager’s disclosure decisions 
for capital market reasons: capital market transactions, corporate control contests, stock 
compensation, litigation, proprietary costs and management talent signalling. The main 
aspects of each force are provided below.  
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 2.3.3.2.1 Capital market transactions 
 
Healy and Palepu (1993, 1995) hypothesize that investors’ perceptions of a firm are 
important to corporate managers that are expecting to issue public debt or equity or to 
acquire another company in a stock transaction. Myers and Majluf (1984) state that if a 
situation of information asymmetry cannot be resolved, considering a firm whose 
managers have superior information than outside investors regarding the firm’s future 
prospects, this firm will view his public equity or debt offers to be costly for existing 
shareholders. Consequently, managers who anticipate capital market transactions have 
incentives to provide voluntary disclosure to reduce the information asymmetry problem, 
thereby reducing the firm’s cost of external financing. Barry and Brown (1985, 1986) and 
Merton (1987) reach a similar conclusion by modelling the premium that investors demand 
for supporting information risk when there is an information asymmetry between managers 
and outside investors. Managers can reduce their cost of capital by reducing information 
risk through voluntary disclosure.  
 
Lang and Lundholm (1997) analyse the disclosure policies, specifically for firms that make 
equity offerings, and found that there was a significant increase in disclosure beginning six 
months before the offering, particularly for the categories of disclosure over which firms 
have the most discretion. Healy et al. (1999) find that firms with increased analyst ratings 
of disclosure have an abnormal high frequency of subsequent public debt offers. However, 
following Healy and Palepu (2001), debt and equity offers are not isolated events, making 
it difficult to assess whether manager’s disclosure strategies are caused by public capital 
market transactions or by other related factors. 
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 2.3.3.2.2 Corporate control contest 
 
Warner et al. (1988) and Weisbach (1988) show that CEO turnover is associated with poor 
stock performance. Palepu (1986) and Mork et al. (1990) state that poor stock price 
performance is also associated with the probability of hostile takeovers, which results in 
high CEO turnover. Given that the risk of job loss follows poor stock and earnings 
performance, managers use corporate disclosures to reduce the likelihood of 
undervaluation and to explain the poor earnings performance. Healy and Palepu (2001) 
point as one limitation the fact that this analysis does not take account of multi-period 
considerations. For example, “if managers expect that a commitment to provide extensive 
disclosure today could be used to hold them more accountable for any subsequent poor 
performance, managers of firms subject to corporate control actions may not wish to 
expand disclosure in a period of poor performance” (Healy and Palepu, 2001: 421). The 
authors also argue that there has been relatively little research on voluntary disclosures 
accompanying hostile takeover. In this context, we must refer the work of Brennan (1999) 
who found that management is more likely to make earnings forecasts during contested 
takeover bids. The author examined the factors influencing voluntary forecast disclosure 
by target companies, whether good/bad news forecasts are disclosed and the influence of 
forecasts on the outcome of hostile bids. He found that disclosure was significantly more 
likely during contested bids. Moreover, in agreed bids, probability of forecast disclosure 
was greater the shorter the bid horizon. In contested bids, forecasts were more likely 
where there were large block shareholdings, for larger targets and for targets in the capital 
goods industry. The author also stated that there was a clear tendency to disclose good 
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news forecasts and found significant positive association between forecast disclosure and 
increase in offer price. 
 
 2.3.3.2.3 Stock compensation  
 
Watts and Zimmerman (1990) following the theory of the firm, suggest that managers 
make accounting choices that can be considered to be efficient when they maximize the 
value of the firm or opportunistic if they increase the manager’s welfare at the expense of 
other contracting parties. Therefore, the argument of efficiency assumes an alignment 
between organizational and managerial goals. Following arguments that relate disclosure 
policy and management incentives, Noe (1999) provide evidence that the incidence of 
management forecast is positively associated with trading by insiders in the firm’s stock. 
Aboody and Kasznik (2000) find that firms delay disclosure of good news and accelerate 
the release of bad news prior to stock option award periods, consistent with managers 
making disclosure decisions to increase stock-based compensation. According to the 
authors, CEOs make opportunistic voluntary disclosure decisions that maximize their stock 
option compensation. 
 
Also Healy and Palepu (2001) state that managers are rewarded using a variety of      
stock-based compensation plans. According to the authors, these types of compensations 
provide incentives for managers to engage in voluntary disclosures for several reasons. 
Managers interested in trading their stock holdings have incentives to disclose private 
information to increase liquidity of firm’s stock. Managers have also incentives to make 
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voluntary disclosures to correct any perceived undervaluation (relative to their own 
information set) prior to the expiration of stock option award. 
 
 2.3.3.2.4 Litigation costs 
 
The threat of shareholders litigation can have two effects on managers’ disclosure 
decisions. First, legal actions against managers for inadequate or untimely disclosures can 
encourage firms to increase voluntary disclosure. Second, litigation can potentially reduce 
managers’ incentives to provide disclosure, particularly of forward-looking information 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). Skinner (1994) examines the first of these effects and 
hypothesized that managers of firms with bad earnings news have an incentive to pre-
disclose that information to reduce the cost of litigation. Healy and Palepu (2001), about 
the second effect, state that litigation potentially reduces incentives to provide disclosures, 
particularly of forward-looking information, if managers believe that the legal system 
penalizes forecast, made in good faith, because it cannot effectively distinguish between 
unexpected forecast errors due to chance and those due to deliberate management bias. In 
this sense, the decision on disclosure of information by managers may be affected by the 
threat of litigation by shareholders. Shareholders can sue directors for inappropriately 
disclosing the information. This may encourage firms to make a disclosure of superior 
quality. Even the directors of companies can benefit from reporting additional 
information, since their work is evaluated.  
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 2.3.3.2.5 Management talent signalling 
 
The management talent signalling hypothesis considers that disclosure of positive 
information may allow managers to signal their talent to other companies. Trueman (1986) 
argues that talented managers have an incentive to make voluntary earnings forecast to 
reveal their type. According to the author, a firm’s market value is a function of investor’s 
perceptions of its manager’s ability to anticipate and respond to future changes in the 
firm’s economic environment. The earlier those investors infer that the manager has 
relevant information, the more favourable their assessment will be of the manager’s ability 
to anticipate future changes and the higher the firm’s market value will be.  
 
 2.3.3.2.6 Proprietary costs 
 
Firm’s decisions to disclose information to investors are influenced by concern that such 
disclosures can damage their competitive position in product markets (e.g. Verrecchia, 
1983; Darrough and Stoughton, 1990; Feltham and Xie, 1992; Newman and Sansing, 
1993; Daurrough, 1993; Gigler, 1994). The main conclusion of the studies about this topic 
research is that firms have an incentive not to disclose information that will reduce their 
competitive position, even if it makes it more costly to raise additional equity. However, 
according to Healy and Palepu (2001), this incentive appears to be sensitive to the nature 
of the competition, in particular whether firms face existing competitors or merely the 
threat of entry and on whether firms compete primarily on the basis of price or long-run 
capacity decisions. 
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Hayes and Lundholm (1996) argue that proprietary costs induce firms to provide 
disaggregated data only when they have similarly performing business segments. Firms 
with widely varying performance across business segments have incentives to conceal 
these performance differences from competitors by only reporting aggregate performance. 
Piotroski (1999) examines firms’ decisions to provide additional segment disclosures. He 
concluded that firms with declining profitability and with less variability in profitability 
across industry segments are more likely to increase segment disclosures. 
 
Also Verrecchia (1983, 1990) contend that firms will not fully disclose information when 
such disclosure entails proprietary costs. Bamber and Cheon (1998) provide evidence 
supporting this view. They demonstrate that companies with high proprietary information 
costs (i.e. those with few competitors) disclose less precise management earnings forecasts. 
Botosan and Stanford (2005) also find that firms withhold segment information when 
proprietary costs are high.  
 
Finally, and according to Healy and Palepu (2001) the proprietary cost hypothesis can be 
potentially extended to include other externalities from information disclosure. They gave 
as example the work of Watts and Zimmerman (1986). These last argue that firms are 
concerned about potential political and contracting costs from financial disclosures, which 
may in turn affect their voluntary disclosure. 
 
Apart from the described capital markets reasons for voluntary disclosure, several studies 
also examined the economic consequences of voluntary disclosure. Communicating useful 
information can be of considerable benefit to a reporting company because that will 
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enhance the likelihood that investors and other stakeholders will want to continue investing 
in or dealing with the organization. Nonetheless, it is essential to assess the benefits and 
the costs of producing such information, and to make any necessary trade-offs. This 
analysis will be done in the following point.  
 
 2.3.3.3 The economic consequences of voluntary disclosure 
 
Voluntary disclosure of information won’t exclusively be associated to advantages. The 
simple production of such information clearly entails costs to businesses. Furthermore, 
transparency provides benefits but it also involves costs, because it consists of explaining 
or justifying the actions, omissions, risks and constraints, of those that have 
responsibilities, to the people that have legitimate interests in the organization (Rodrigues, 
2008). It becomes necessary to understand the relationship between costs and benefits of 
disclosure. 
 
“The benefits expected to arise from providing information in financial statements should 
exceed the cost of doing so” (CICA, 2008: 11). Despite this, it is impractical, and perhaps 
impossible, to quantify the value of these benefits either to the preparers of corporate 
reports or to the users. Although some of the direct costs of preparation and analysis can be 
measured, it is not practical to quantify these costs in total. According to Leuz and 
Wysocki (2008) both firm-specific and market-wide effects are relevant for evaluating the 
economic consequences of reporting. The authors claim that the firm-specific effects are 
important because the balance of firm-specific costs and benefits of disclosures determines 
whether they are beneficial to the firm, i.e., whether they increase firm value. Otherwise, 
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market-wide effects of firms’ disclosures are relevant because they capture costs and 
benefits that firms may ignore or not fully internalize when making their individual 
disclosure decisions. Knowledge of these market-wide effects and externalities provides a 
basis for identifying the costs and benefits of regulating and enforcing the disclosure of 
information. Nevertheless, the benefits and costs of, for example, applying accounting 
standards may differ between entities depending in part on the nature, number and 
information needs of the users of their financial statements (CICA, 2008). Another 
important aspect to be considered, due to the fact that managers have incentives to make 
self-serving voluntary disclosures, it is not clear whether management disclosures are 
credible. According to Healy and Palepu (2001: 425) “the extent to which voluntary 
disclosure mitigates resources misallocation in the capital market depends on the degree 
of credibility of information on the firm’s economics that is not available from other 
sources, including required disclosures”. However, as stated previously, if the legal system 
cannot differentiate between casual forecast errors from intentional management bias, such 
disclosures can potentially impose significant litigation costs. 
 
Following we present the principal arguments that literature provides referring to the costs 
and the benefits associated with disclosure. 
 
 2.3.3.3.1 Benefits of corporate disclosures  
 
Most of the theories about this subject focus on the direct capital market benefits of firms’ 
disclosure activities. These market benefits include liquidity, cost of capital and firm 
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valuation14. Despite this, the benefit of disclosure best supported by theory is the effect on 
market liquidity (e.g. Verrecchia, 2001).  
 
In relation to market liquidity, the argument is based on the fact that information 
asymmetries among investors introduce adverse selection into share markets, which means 
that uninformed or less informed investors have to worry about trading with privately or 
better informed investors. According to Leuz and Wysocki (2008) uninformed investors 
lower (increase) the price at which they are willing to buy (sell) to protect against the 
losses from trading with informed counterparties. The authors also argue that, in this 
context, the price adjustment reflects the probability of trading with informed traders and 
the potential information advantage of these investors. In the presence of information 
asymmetry and adverse selection, this form of price protection when buying or selling 
shares introduces a bid-ask spread into secondary share markets and, similarly, reduces the 
number of shares that uninformed investors are willing to trade. Both effects reduce the 
liquidity of share markets, i.e., the ability of investors to quickly buy or sell shares at low 
cost and with little price impact. According to Verrecchia (2001) corporate disclosure can 
mitigate the adverse selection problem and increase market liquidity by levelling the 
“playing field” among investors.  
 
Higher liquidity is regarded as an indication that a firm’s shares have became a more 
popular investment object due to the higher level of information disclosed by firms (Leuz 
and Verrecchia, 2000). Several authors argue that it is desirable for a firm that its shares 
are liquid, so the firm is not constrained in its use of the stock market (Lang and 
                                                 
14
 According to Leuz and Wysocki (2008) other potential observable benefits of firms’ disclosure activities 
include changes in analyst following and institutional holdings. However, according to the authors, these 
outcomes are often viewed as indirect measures of access to low cost sources of capital. 
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Lundholm, 1993; Healy et al., 1999; Bloomfield and Wilks, 2000). Trading costs on 
investors arise from the illiquidity and bid-ask spreads and, in these cases, the investors 
need to be compensated. Thus, the required rate of return of a security increases (e.g. 
Constantinides, 1986; Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). In addition, adverse selection can 
distort investors’ trading decisions and result in inefficient and hence costly asset 
allocations for which investors need to be compensated, leading to a higher required rate of 
return or cost of capital (Garleanu and Pedersen, 2004).  
 
Previous empirical research indicates that increased liquidity results in lower information 
asymmetry and cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Botosan, 1997; Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). The benefits related with the cost of capital 
are currently related with the fact that, in a situation of asymmetric information, there may 
be benefits for the company to release a set of information, resulting in the decrease of 
their financial risk. The cost of capital is equal to the risk-free interest rate plus the risk 
premium, the risk premium is greater the higher the risk associated with the company.  
Since the risk is also linked to uncertainty, if the company discloses information the risk 
decreases, also decreasing the risk premium and hence the cost of capital. Furthermore, 
there is a strong belief that a better and more open reporting of risk could lead to a lower 
cost of capital. That would be the consequence of knowing how those responsible for the 
business perceive the risk and manage it. In this case, actual and potential investors could 
evaluate the volatility of the firm's profitability and better assess its value. In this sense, 
additional disclosures may help listed companies to attract new investors, enabling them, 
thereby, to maintain a strong demand for its security titles with effect on market liquidity 
(Marston and Leow, 1998).  
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To Leuz and Wysocki (2008) there are theories that provide a direct link between 
disclosure and the cost of capital or firm value, without reference to market liquidity and 
adverse selection costs. The authors present as example the model developed by Merton 
(1987) where (some) investors have incomplete information and are not aware of all firms 
in the economy. As a result, risk sharing is incomplete and inefficient. Disclosures by these 
lesser known firms can make investors aware of their existence and enlarge the investor 
base, which in turn improves risk sharing and lowers the cost of capital. This effect is 
likely to be less relevant to large firms with a substantial analyst and investor following. 
Moreover, the investor base effect is susceptible to arbitrage if some investors know which 
of the stocks are not known by all investors (Merton, 1987; Easley and O’Hara, 2004). 
 
The benefits of disclosure are also associated with the firm valuation. Many studies in 
agency theory suggested that more transparency and better corporate governance increases 
firm value by improving managers’ decisions or by reducing the amount that managers 
appropriate for themselves (e.g. Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002). There can also be an 
indirect effect on the cost of capital (e.g. Lombardo and Pagano, 2002; Lambert et al., 
2007). For example, Lambert et al. (2007) demonstrate that, if better disclosure reduces the 
amount of managerial appropriation, this effect generally reduces a firm’s cost of capital. 
 
Finally, Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that firms with more informative disclosures have 
larger analysts following, less dispersion in analysts forecast, and less volatility in forecast 
revisions. 
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The biggest difficulty faced by those involved in disseminating information, as stated 
previously, relates to the calculation of whether the cost of providing certain information 
will or not exceed the benefit of supplying it. Various studies conducted in this area 
suggested that companies disclose more information when the benefits of such information 
outweigh the costs associated with it. The several costs associated with increased 
disclosure are discussed below. 
 
 2.3.3.3.2 Costs of corporate disclosures  
 
According to FASB (2010: 21) “cost is a pervasive constraint on the information that can 
be provided by financial reporting”.  
 
For the Australian Accounting Research Foundation (AARF, 1990) there is no universally 
accepted method to measure the costs and benefits of disclosure. The costs of providing 
information initially will be supported by the preparer, but the benefits belong to the 
various parties concerned, either directly or indirectly.   
 
The costs of voluntary reporting can be classified into two broad categories: direct costs 
and indirect costs (Marston and Leow, 1998). The direct costs involve the collection and 
compilation, processing, storage, retrieval, analysis and interpretation, dissemination and 
fees paid to auditors. The indirect costs consist of costs of litigation and costs that occur as 
a result of the influence of disclosure in both the decisions as in the businesses activities of 
the company. 
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Disclosure of information may be constrained by the possibility that the disclosure may 
involve losses in competitive terms. Thus, there may be incentives for non-disclosure of 
information which may endanger the competitive position, even if this implies an increase 
in the cost of capital. Companies that disclose additional information may also incur in 
reputation costs due to failures in the disclosure (emerging news that are on the contrary 
with the ones previously disclosed), discrediting the company. 
 
Information provided to capital market participants can also be used by other parties, e.g. 
competitors, labour unions, regulators, tax authorities, among others (Leuz and Wysocki, 
2008). Detailed information about line-of-business profitability can reveal proprietary 
information to competitors (e.g. Feltham et al., 1992; Hayes and Lundholm, 1996). The 
fact that other parties may use public information to the disclosing firm’s disadvantage can 
reduce its disclosure incentives (Verrecchia, 1983). However, a competitive threat may not 
always induce firms to withhold information. For example, firms may disclose information 
to deter entry by competitors. Firms might also share information about market demand to 
prevent overproduction in the industry (Kirby, 1988). Furthermore, competitors can infer 
information from the fact that a firm does not make certain disclosures. Thus, the relation 
between disclosures and proprietary costs is complex and depends on the type of 
competition threat (e.g. Verrecchia, 1990; Feltham et al., 1992). 
 
A related argument is that more transparency could be costly to existing financing 
relationships, especially with banks (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Leuz and Oberholzer-
Gee, 2006). About this subject Leuz and Wysocki (2008) argue that financing relationship 
may require some private information flows between a firm and its bank in order to protect 
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relationship-specific investments that make financing arrangements viable. Thus, firms that 
have or seek such financing relationships are likely to be reluctant to provide full 
disclosure.  
 
 2.3.3.3.3 Externalities of disclosure 
 
According to Leuz and Wysocki (2008: 11) “an individual firm’s disclosure can have effects 
beyond the firm itself”.  They refer to these kinds of effects as market-wide effects. According 
to the authors, individual firm’s disclosures may have externalities that benefit non-competing 
firms in other industries by revealing relevant information about new consumer trends, 
technology, best operating practices, governance, among others. Their argument is based on 
the thesis that disclosures of operating performance and governance practices provide useful 
benchmarks that help outside investors to evaluate other firms’ managerial efficiency or 
potential agency conflicts and in doing so lower the cost of monitoring. The authors believe 
that “while the incremental contribution of each firm’s disclosure is likely to be small, these 
information transfers could carry substantial benefits for the market or the economy as a 
whole” (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008: 12).  
 
The positive externalities, in the form of information transfers and liquidity in capital 
markets, were analysed by Dye (1990) and Admati and Pfleiderer (2000). Their argument 
was based on the fact that, as firm values and cash flows are likely to be correlated, the 
disclosure of one firm is useful to investors in valuing other firms and increases the 
investors’ demand for shares in other firms. There is also the argument that firm-specific 
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disclosures have market-wide benefits because they eliminate duplicative efforts of 
information to intermediaries and investors and that firms are likely the lowest-cost 
producer for corporate information (e.g. Easterbrook and Fischel, 1984; Diamond, 1985). 
 
Fishman and Hagerty (1989) argue that there can be also negative effects or costly 
externalities to firms’ reporting. They showed that an increase in disclosure by one firm 
can attract investors away from other firms (i.e. if processing information is costly). In 
markets that are not perfectly competitive, this effect lowers the price efficiency of other 
firms and creates a negative externality. This argument can be extended to apply across 
markets or countries.  
 
Also fraudulent disclosures and financial reports can send false signals to industry players 
about new investment opportunities, lead governments to pursue incorrect regulatory 
policies, and cause capital rationing in the industry. This argument is based on the fact that 
individual firm’s misreporting activities may have a negative impact to related firms, 
governments and investors (Sidak, 2003). 
 
In conclusion, there are numerous reasons pointed by the literature why an individual 
firm’s disclosures extend beyond the firm itself. According to Leuz and Wysocki (2008: 
14) the market-wide effects could be large in the aggregate, and impose relatively small 
costs on the disclosing firm. But the authors also recognize that, as individual firms 
generally cannot internalize the market-wide benefits of their disclosure activities, even 
relatively small disclosure costs could discourage additional disclosure activities. For them 
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the problem is that “firms trade-off only the private (or firm-specific) costs and benefits 
and hence do not provide the socially optimal level of disclosure”. 
 
 2.3.3.4 Measures of voluntary disclosure  
 
The narrative communication in annual reports is viewed as the crucial element in 
achieving the desired step-change in the quality of corporate reporting (Beattie et al., 
2004). Accounting researchers have increasingly focused their efforts on investigating 
disclosure, in particular the determinants of disclosure and the capital market 
consequences. Healy and Palepu (2001) observe that one of the limitations of that kind of 
studies was the difficulty in measuring the extent of voluntary disclosure, while Core 
(2001) argues that improved measures of disclosure quality also need to be developed. 
 
Disclosures are often qualitative and narrative in nature which makes objective 
measurement difficult. Moreover, theoretical research provides little guidance on what 
form, quantity and frequency of disclosure is relevant for various stakeholders (Leuz and 
Wysocki, 2008). 
 
According to Beattie et al. (2004) two principal ways of measuring disclosure have been 
employed. The first approach has been to use subjective analysts’ disclosure quality 
ratings. The second approach has been to use researcher constructed disclosure indices 
where the amount of disclosure is used as a proxy for disclosure quality. The principal 
measures of voluntary disclosure are following described. 
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 2.3.3.4.1 Subjective ratings  
 
In the United States, many studies make use of analysts’ scores of disclosure quality 
provided by the Association of Investment Management and Research (AIMR)15 (formerly 
the Financial Analysts Federation, FAF). These reports provide an overall measure of 
corporate communications with investors. According to Beattie et al. (2004) each year an 
average of 27 industries are covered, with an average of 17 companies being evaluated by 
13 analysts in each industry. There are separate ratings for annual published information, 
quarterly and other published information, and investor relations. 
 
Lang and Lundholm (1993: 247) assume that the ratings measure “disclosure 
informativeness”. They acknowledged that “a disadvantage of the FAF data is that they 
are based on analysts’ perceptions of disclosure rather than direct measures of actual 
disclosure”. Healy and Palepu (2001) criticise these rankings on three grounds: the lack of 
clarity whether the analysts on the panels take the ratings seriously, the unclear basis on 
which firms are selected for inclusion and the potential biases that analysts bring to the 
ratings. In some countries, publicly available ratings are not routinely available and so 
researchers have had to approach analysts directly (e.g. Clarkson et al., 1999).  
 
About this subject, Leuz and Wysocki (2008: 24) argue that these ratings “capture the 
usefulness of firms’ disclosures as perceived by expert users of this information”. 
According to the same authors, the limitations of the AIMR rankings are that they are only 
                                                 
15
 Studies that used the AIMR ranking are, for example, Imhoff (1992), Welker (1995), Lang and Lundholm 
(1996), Sengupta (1998), Healy et al. (1999), Bushee and Noe (2000), Gelb and Zarowin (2002), Lundholm 
and Myers (2002), Botosan and Plumlee (2002) and Byard and Shaw (2003). 
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applicable to a subset of large United States. Moreover, there are “questions about 
potential bias in the rankings based on sell-side analysts’ objectives in assigning 
disclosure ratings” (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008: 25). 
 
 2.3.3.4.2 Disclosure indices 
 
According to Beattie et al. (2004: 210), because of the difficulty of assessing disclosure 
quality directly, “disclosure index studies assume that the amount of disclosure on 
specified topics are proxies for the quality of disclosure”. In many cases, a simple binary 
coding scheme is used, whereby the presence or absence of an item is recorded. Other 
coding schemes incorporate ordinal measures (frequently three levels) to allow for the 
“quality” of the specific disclosure to be assessed. 
 
An excellent review of the use of disclosure indices in accounting research, particularly in 
company annual reports, was provided by Marston and Shrives (1991). To measure the 
extent of general disclosure the researcher starts with the definition of items. Weightings 
were typically achieved by conducting surveys among relevant user groups, asking about 
the importance of each item, although it has been found that the weighted and un-weighted 
scores tend to give the same results where there are a large number of items. Scoring can 
take several forms, most commonly either a nominal score to indicate the presence/absence 
of the item or an ordinal level score to capture the degree of specificity of the item. Also 
the importance of clear instructions to achieving satisfactory levels of reliability is 
emphasised by Marston and Shrives (1991). The authors underline that well specified 
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decision categories, with well specified decision rules, may produce few discrepancies 
when used even by relatively inexperienced coders. 
 
In relation to these self-constructed measures of disclosure, Healy and Palepu (2001: 427) 
also argue that these kind of measures face a different set of problems, “because the 
authors have developed their own metric of voluntary disclosure, there is increased 
confidence that the measure truly captures what is intended”. In this sense, the authors 
also argued that if “constructions of the metrics involves judgement on the part of the 
researcher, the findings may be difficult to replicate”. 
 
Marston and Shrives (1991: 195) also emphasise that the index score “can give a measure 
of the extent of disclosure but not necessarily the quality of disclosure”. Nevertheless, they 
concluded that while that construction of disclosure indices inevitably involves subjective 
judgment, it has proved to be a valuable research tool that will continue to be used as long 
as company disclosure is a focus of research. 
 
Botosan (1997)16 constructs her own index to measure the voluntary disclosure level using 
122 companies in the machinery industry, for the year of 1990. She focused on the annual 
report disclosures because annual report disclosure levels are correlated positively with the 
amount of disclosure provided via other media and it is considered by users to be one of 
the most important sources of corporate information (Botosan, 1997: 329-331). The 
selection of items included in the index was guided, principally, by recommendations 
provided in the Jenkins Report (AICPA, 1994), the SRI International (1987) survey of 
                                                 
16
 Botosan (1997) provides a discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of using AIRM disclosure 
index versus a self constructed disclosure index. 
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investor information needs and the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accounts (CICA, 
1991). Also Robb et al. (2001) undertake a topic-based analysis of non-financial 
disclosures, as recommended by the Jenkins Report (AICPA, 1994). The categories used in 
their disclosure scoring sheet are based upon the list of non-financial information items 
desired by users included in the database of materials used by the Jenkins Committee. 
These items were grouped into categories. A total of 65 items were included. For each 
item, a score of 1 (no disclosure), 2 (some disclosure) or 3 (extensive disclosure) was 
awarded. These scores were aggregated to form an overall disclosure score. 
 
Table 2.6 presents a summary of some recent studies using disclosure indices, constructed 
by the authors themselves, as well as the categories used in the construction of such 
indices. 
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Table 2.6 – Categories used to build voluntary disclosure indices 
 
Botosan (1997) Background information (6 items) 
Ten or five year summary of historical results (5 items) 
Key non-financial statistics (8 items) 
Projected information (5 items) 
Management discussion and analysis (11 items) 
Standard & Poor’s (2002) Transparency of ownership (7 items) 
Concentration ownership (4 items) 
Voting and shareholder meeting procedures (8 items) 
Business focus (14 items) 
Accounting policy review (6 items) 
Accounting policy details (3 items) 
Related party structure and transactions (4 items) 
Information auditors (4 items) 
Board structure and composition (8 items) 
Role of the board (12 items) 
Director training and compensations (6 items) 
Executive compensation and evaluation (9 items) 
Chau and Gray (2002) General corporate information (2 items) 
Corporate strategy (6 items) 
Acquisitions and disposals (4 items) 
Research and development (4 items) 
Future prospect (11 items) 
Information about directors (7 items) 
Employee information (22 items) 
Social policy and value-added information (9 items) 
Segmental information (10 items) 
Financial review (25 items) 
Foreign currency information (6 items) 
Stock price information (7 items) 
Eng and Mak (2003) General corporate information (5 items) 
Corporate strategy (5 items) 
Management discussion and analysis (8 items) 
Future prospects (4 items) 
Other useful strategic information 
Employee information (4 items) 
Other useful non-financial information 
Performance indicators (6 items) 
Financial ratios (4 items) 
Other useful ratios 
Projected information (3 items) 
Foreign currency information (3items) 
Other useful financial information 
Petersen and Plenborg 
(2006) 
Strategy (12 items) 
Competition and outlook (13 items) 
Production (13 items) 
Marketing strategy (13 items) 
Human capital (11 items)  
Wang et. al (2008) General corporate characteristics (2 items) 
Corporate strategy (6 items) 
Acquisitions and disposals (6 items) 
Research and development (4 items) 
Future prospects (10 items) 
Employee information (12 items) 
Social responsibility and value-added disclosures ( 4 items) 
Segment information (5 items) 
Financial review information (20 items) 
Foreign currency information (5 items) 
Stock/ price information (3 items) 
Allegrini and Greco (2011) Financial information  (15 items) 
Projected information (8 items) 
Capital market data (5 items) 
Strategic information (12 items) 
Risk information (13 items) 
Sustainability information (7 items) 
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 2.3.3.4.3 Other measures 
 
In countries where publicly available ratings are not routinely available some researchers 
have had to approach analysts directly (e.g. Clarkson et al., 1999). A variant on the use of 
analyst ratings is the use of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) ratings of 
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) compliance, a measure used by Barron et 
al. (1999). We should refer that other studies focus on the timing and frequency of firms’ 
disclosures, such as the frequency and precision of management forecasts of earnings (e.g. 
Hirst et al., 2008) and conference calls with analysts (e.g. Tasker, 1998; Frankel et al., 
1999; Bushee et al., 2003). Although it is difficult to objectively quantify the information 
issued with management forecasts and during conference calls, the studies highlight that 
these disclosure events generally reveal useful qualitative and contextual information to 
outside investors.  
 
Some studies made a direct attempt to measure the “quality” of accounting information by 
analysing the properties of a firm’s reported earnings. Dechow and Dichev (2002) and 
Francis et al. (2004, 2005) model the relation between a firm’s cash flows and accruals to 
derive a measure of earnings quality. The studies used these measures of accruals quality 
as proxies for overall information quality. 
 
Finally, following the suggestions of Core (2001), some studies have recently focused on 
different techniques in natural language processing technologies as measures and proxies 
of disclosure. Li (2008) provides the first large-sample evidence of the determinants and 
implications of the lexical properties of corporate disclosures. He examined the 
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implications of annual report readability and other lexical features of the annual report for 
current performance and earnings persistence. The findings suggested that annual reports 
of firms with poor performance are more difficult to read and that, in turn, the profits of 
firms with annual reports that are easier to read are more persistent.  
 
In the previous points we addressed the main aspects of corporate governance and 
corporate disclosure, given a particular emphasis to the voluntary disclosure literature. In 
the following points we will analyse the previous research about the relation between the 
governance rules, voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry. 
 
2.4 The relation between governance rules, voluntary disclosure and 
 information asymmetry in the market 
 
Corporate governance embraces the controls and procedures that exist to ensure that 
management acts in the interest of shareholders. In this sense, corporate governance affects 
the information disclosed by the firm to its shareholders, making it less likely that 
management, acting in its self-interest, does not fully disclose relevant information to 
shareholders. 
 
There have been several studies testing the relationship between corporate governance and 
voluntary disclosure. On the corporate governance side, most of the research focuses on 
ownership structure and board structure. Specific types of directors and shareholders may 
have the motivation, abilities, and knowledge to voluntarily increase the level of disclosure 
(Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). 
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The relation between corporate governance and information asymmetry has been studied 
through two main points. The relation between the board structure and information 
asymmetry, through the corporate disclosure, and the relation between ownership structure, 
information asymmetry and stock liquidity.  
 
This discussion will be provided below, starting with the concept of information 
asymmetry. 
 
 2.4.1 Information asymmetry 
 
The information asymmetry is the extent to which the amount of information regarding the 
company varies from one group of investors to another and, thus, provides the 
differentiation between the informed and uninformed investors. In this sense, the 
asymmetric information arises when, in the context of market transactions, the two sides 
that deal with the subject or content of information, in terms of quantity and quality, are 
not equal (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). According to Ranaldo (2002) the information 
asymmetry refers to information not yet embodied in the fundamental asset value. To 
Brown and Hillegeist (2007: 444) information asymmetry in the stock market occurs when 
“one or more investors possess private information about the firm while other investors 
are uninformed (i.e. have access only to public information)”. 
 
As stated previously, the separation of ownership and control in publicly listed companies 
gives rise to information asymmetries between managers and investors because managers 
have superior information on the firm's current and future performance than outside 
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investors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers and Majluf, 1984). The literature recognizes 
that firms might find it advantageous to give additional pieces of information to outsiders, 
through the annual report or other communication channels. The information asymmetry 
between firms and potential investors, due to a low level of disclosure, increases the cost of 
capital by introducing the adverse selection between buyers and sellers of the firm’s shares 
(Petersen and Plenborg, 2006). 
 
According to Welker (1995) considerable resources are devoted to establish and enforce 
regulations that improve public perceptions of corporate disclosure practices. Despite these 
regulatory efforts, firms still have considerable discretion in determining the timeless, 
scope, content, and form of disclosure provided to equity market participants, among 
others. According to Welker (1995: 802) “this diversity in disclosure practices produces 
variation in the level of information asymmetry characterizing trade in equity market”. 
 
Welker (1995) also speaks about one persistent component of the adverse selection 
problem that is the possibility that material firm-specific information exists and has not 
been publicly disclosed by the firm. According to the author this “withheld” information 
may be privately available to select traders who invest in costly information acquisition, 
creating an adverse selection problem when uncertainty about the occurrence of 
information events exists and firms follow a policy of providing incomplete disclosures 
with respect to such events. 
 
Past literature has pointed out the adverse effects that information asymmetries have on the 
functioning of markets (Akerlof, 1970). Information asymmetry is thought to promote 
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reluctance to trade and increase the cost of capital as investors “price protect” against 
potential losses from trading with better informed market participants (Bhattacharya and 
Spiegel, 1991). The study of market microstructures formalized this notion of price 
protection and suggested that observable measures of market liquidity can be used to 
identify the perceived level of information asymmetry facing (uninformed) participants in 
equity markets (Lev, 1988).  
 
To Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) investors possess varying degrees of information about the 
companies in which they invest and this may lead to the existence of informed traders, 
which transact with the advantage of superior information. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) 
suggest that earnings releases will reduce information asymmetry as they disseminate 
information to all market participants. However, the same authors also recognized that 
information asymmetry may remain at an elevated level following the earnings release 
because some traders are better able to process the information than others.  
 
Analytically, Barry and Brown (1985), Diamond (1985), Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) 
and Kim and Verrecchia (1994) argue that more information generally reduces information 
risk on prices. Likewise, voluntary disclosure serves to reduce information asymmetry 
among traders. Empirically, Welker (1995), Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Espinosa et al. 
(2008), among others, investigate links between voluntary disclosure and stock liquidity. 
They found that firms with better quality disclosure have lower bid-ask spreads. In 
addition, Botosan and Plumlee (2002) test the capital market effect of voluntary disclosure 
on the cost of capital, and they found that the cost of capital decreases with more 
disclosure. Trabelsi et al. (2004) and Trabelsi et al. (2008) study the incentives of internet 
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financial reporting, and found that internet disclosure helps to reduce analysts’ forecasting 
error. 
 
Most of the above evidences are consistent with the idea that public voluntary disclosure 
serves to reduce information asymmetry. Furthermore, the previous disclosure research 
also demonstrated that the corporate governance quality has a significant impact on both 
the quantity and quality of these corporate information disclosures (e.g. Ho and Wong, 
2001; Chau and Gray, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Kanagaretnam et al., 2007). 
 
 2.4.2 Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that when ownership and control are separated, the 
potential for agency costs arises because of conflicts of interests between contracting 
parties (manager and shareholders). The disclosure of information could efficiently protect 
shareholders’ interests against managers’ behaviour.  
 
The disclosure strategy is greatly influenced by the form of the ownership and 
management structure (Gelb, 2000; Ho and Wong, 2001; Chau and Gray, 2002). Like 
stated previously, specific types of directors and shareholders may have the motivation to 
voluntarily increase the level of disclosure (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). In this sense, in 
what concerns the relation between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure, most of 
the research focused on ownership structure and board structure.  
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-Ownership Structure  
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that when the companies’ capital is widely held, the 
potential of conflicts between principal and agent is greater. To reduce these conflicts some 
shareholders induce managers to disclose more corporate information for the truthful 
evaluation of the firm’s performance. As a result information disclosure is likely to be 
intensive in widely held firms so that principals can effectively insure that their economic 
interests are optimized. Previous empirical evidence also indicates a negative relation 
between ownership concentration and disclosure (e.g. McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993; 
Mitchell et al., 1995; Schadewitz and Blevins, 1998). Also Chau and Gray (2002) suggest 
that voluntary disclosures are positively associated with diffused capital firms. Their 
results show that there is a positive association between wider ownership and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure.  
 
Brown and Higgins (2001) have made a comparative analysis of earnings announcement 
surprises between the United States and 12 other countries. They show that American 
companies manage more earning surprises by issuing frequently earning disclosures than 
their counterparts. This finding may be explained by corporate governance differences, 
mainly in concern with ownership structure which is largely diffused in United States 
firms.  
 
Furthermore, in a more concentrated ownership situation, the impact on voluntary 
disclosures is more complicated. Conflicts of interests are no more between managers and 
shareholders but between large and small shareholders (Ho and Wong, 2001). Under very 
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high ownership concentration, managers are encouraged to behave against the interests of 
small shareholders by retaining information. 
 
The literature also emphasizes the value of the monitoring role played by certain kind of 
shareholders.  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that additional monitoring is required by outside 
shareholders as managerial ownership (i.e. ownership by executive directors) decreases. 
This monitoring puts pressure on managers to disclose more information than is demanded 
by law or regulation. Ruland et al. (1990) provide evidence consistent with Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) by showing that as managerial ownership increases, firms are less likely 
to issue management earnings forecasts. Gelb (2000) shows that companies with lower 
levels of managerial ownership are more likely to receive higher ratings for the disclosures 
provided in their annual and quarterly reports. Eng and Mak (2003) argue that voluntary 
disclosure is a substitute for outside monitoring and so is negatively related to managerial 
ownership. They find evidence consistent with this prediction. More recently, Baek et al. 
(2009) find that there is a negative relationship between the level of managerial ownership 
and the level of disclosure. 
 
Institutional investors are a special group of shareholders. According to Donnelly and 
Mulcahy (2008) the reasons why institutional investors more easily apply their monitoring 
role on firm management is because they are professionals and so their cost of monitoring 
when compared with other small shareholders is significantly reduced.  
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According to the literature, institutional investors who own large blocks of a company’s 
shares:  
(1) have a greater incentive and ability to acquire more timely pre-disclosure 
information than small shareholders (Smith, 1976);  
(2) are better able to evaluate the financial decisions of management (Chung et al., 
2002);  
(3) enjoy greater voting power, making it easier to take corrective action when it is 
deemed necessary (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008).  
 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) find that substantial shareholdings by institutional 
investors may also encourage more disclosure to reduce information asymmetry. Bos and 
Donker (2004) claim that institutional investors have incentives to detect the self-serving 
behaviour of management. Furthermore, these authors claim that institutional investors 
possess financial know-how and are well able to interpret the information disclosed in the 
annual reports. Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that institutional ownership is positively 
associated with managerial earning forecasts. 
 
In relation to family ownership, Chau and Gray (2002) argue that the level of information 
disclosure is likely to be less in family-controlled firms. For the authors, family-controlled 
firms have little motivation to disclose information in excess of mandatory requirements 
because the demand for public disclosure is relatively weak in comparison with companies 
that have wider ownership. Ho and Wong (2001) find a negative relation between family 
controlled firms and the level of voluntary disclosure. Family controlled firms have 
concentrated power and are very reserved in making voluntary disclosures, but tend to 
adhere to rules and regulations (Tan, 2000). 
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Finally, some studies also analyse the relation between government ownership and 
voluntary disclosure. In a greater number of countries the government has shares of some 
companies that are of strategic importance to the state. They are run like other private 
commercial companies but may have to look beyond pure profit goals and consider goals 
related to the interests of the nation. These goals may conflict with the commercial 
objectives of the enterprise (Mak and Li, 2001). According to Eng and Mak (2003) 
enhancing shareholder value may not be the primary objective of these companies. 
Managers are also likely to face less discipline from the market for corporate control 
because the government is expected to be a long term investor and is unlikely that these 
companies support unsolicited takeover offers. Eng and Mak (2003) find a positive 
relationship between government ownership and disclosure. More recently, Wang et al. 
(2008) also find evidence that the level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to the 
proportion of state ownership. 
 
- Board Structure 
 
Fama (1980) suggests that board characteristics are considered as an efficient internal 
monitoring mechanism. What previous studies wanted to know was how these board 
characteristics could constrain managers to work in accordance with shareholders’ 
expectations, by disclosing regular information and thus making the market constantly 
informed. The board of directors, who have been delegated the authority from the 
shareholders to work on their behalf and make decision in the company’s operations, play 
the crucial role in the control mechanism to monitor and supervise the management (Patelli 
and Prencipe, 2007). 
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Voluntary disclosure and independent directors have been viewed as a control mechanism 
in corporate governance to reduce the principal-agent problem between shareholders and 
managers. To Eng and Mak (2003) the higher proportion of independent directors on 
boards, the more information they would like to disclose to outside investors. Also Ajinkya 
et al. (2005) find that companies with more independent directors are more likelihood to 
provide a forecast in their annual reports. Independent directors could mitigate the 
information asymmetry between management and shareholders by providing more 
voluntary disclosure (Lim et al., 2007). Also Arcay and Vázquez (2005) and Patelli and 
Principe (2007) obtain a positive correlation between the proportion of independent 
directors on the board and the amount of voluntary information disclosed by the 
companies. To García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2010) the positive association between 
board independence and voluntary disclosure especially happens in countries with high 
investor protection rights. 
 
To Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) inside directors17 are active participants in firm’s 
decisions, as members of their top management teams, and have access to internal 
information regarding firm resources, projects, and strategic alternatives. To the authors, 
inside directors also play an important role in educating independent directors and in 
providing boards with more detailed information. To Fama and Jensen (1983) inside 
directors potentially want to provide more information to boards as they are familiar with 
company’s operation better than independent directors. Inside directors also have other 
reasons to provide more voluntary disclosure such as their remuneration incentives, to 
                                                 
17
 According to Pfeffer (1972) inside directors are directors who are currently involved in the management of 
the organization and, in some definitions, former executives as well. 
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protect their jobs and to protect their reputation from the firm failure or poor performance 
(Lim et al., 2007).  
 
As suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976) managers who own equity in a firm do not 
have the same incentives to misappropriate a firm’s resources, since they would suffer 
directly from reduced share value while managers who do not own equity in a firm would 
not suffer the same consequences. Prior studies that link stock-based incentives and 
voluntary disclosure have used agency theory to explain the relationship. The work of 
Nagar et al. (2003) examines the association between disclosure activities of managers and 
stock-based incentives of US companies. The results of the study suggest that stock-based 
incentives are able to mitigate the agency problem and enhance alignment of managers’ 
interests with those of shareholders.  Arcay and Vázquez (2005) also find that directors’ 
stock option plans are positively related to voluntary disclosure. 
 
The literature also presents the idea that boards comprising of members who are more 
competent or knowledgeable will do a better job of monitoring the activities of 
management and make better decisions. Klein (1998) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) 
measured board competency or expertise by the percentage of board members that sit on 
boards of other companies. Directorships serve as a measure of a director’s reputation as a 
monitor. In contrast, Ferris et al. (2003) claim that busy boards are as effective as non-busy 
boards at monitoring and find no relation between the average number of directorships 
held by outside directors and the firm’s market-to-book ratio. 
 
Also the separation of CEO and chairman positions is pointed by some studies as a way 
that helps to improve the monitoring function of the board. Firms that have one individual 
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who serves as both chairman and chief executive officer/managing director (CEO duality) 
are considered to be more managerially dominated (Molz, 1988). Otherwise, the person 
who occupies both roles would tend to withhold unfavourable information to outsiders (Ho 
and Wong, 2001). Jensen (1993) argues that conflicts of interests and difficulties in 
performing the monitoring function over management arise when the same individual 
holds both positions. This dual-role situation is quite common in some European countries. 
A number of studies have identified the combining of these two positions with poor 
disclosure practices. For example, Forker (1992) finds a significant negative relationship 
between the combination of the two roles and the extent of disclosure. Furthermore, Ho 
and Wong (2001) also observe a negative relationship, although a non-significant one, 
between corporate disclosure and the presence of a dominant personality on the firm’s 
board.  
 
With respect to the size of the board, John and Senbet (1998) suggest that while the 
board’s monitoring capacities increase as the number of members on the board increases, 
this benefit may be offset by the incremental cost of poorer communication and     
decision-making efficiencies that are often associated with large groups. To Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) a board that is too large may actually have diminished 
monitoring capabilities. Empirically, Yermack (1996) finds that firm valuation is 
negatively related to the size of the board. Recent researches question the view that larger 
boards are disadvantageous to board effectiveness and to shareholders (Coles et al. 2008; 
Di Pietra et al. 2008; Larmou and Vafeas 2010). Coles et al. (2008) find that large and 
diversified firms tend to use a greater number of directors in their boards of both 
monitoring and advising purposes. Also recently, Allegrini and Greco (2011) show 
 109 
empirically that firms with larger boards show greater transparency for outside 
shareholders. Thus, there is no preponderance of theory or empirical evidence to suggest a 
relationship between board size and the level of voluntary disclosure.  
 
Finally, several empirical evidences indicate that voluntary disclosure is positively related 
to the functioning of monitoring and control structures. The audit committee operates as a 
monitoring mechanism to improve the quality of information conveyed to external parties 
(Pincus et al., 1989) and “oversees the preparation and communication of financial 
information to third parties to ensure that such data fulfils the requisites of clarity and the 
completeness of disclosure” (Smith Report, 2003: 12). Empirical evidence indicates that 
voluntary disclosure is positively related to the functioning of an audit committee (e.g. Ho 
and Wong, 2001; Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; Allegrini and Greco, 2011). Furthermore, 
Dechow et al. (1996) and Peasnell et al. (2001) observe that audit committees help to 
reduce the likelihood of accounting fraud. The signalling literature suggests that the choice 
of an external auditor can serve as a signal of firm value. Generally, companies are likely 
to choose a large audit firm since such an action signals to investors their acceptance of the 
auditor’s demands for higher quality disclosure as well as the quality of a firm’s earnings 
performance (Datar et al., 1991). Wang et al. (2008) show that the level of voluntary 
disclosure is positively related to the reputation of the engaged auditor. 
 
Like described previously, several corporate governance structures have been tested in 
order to understand the relation between governance rules and voluntary disclosure. Table 
2.7 summarizes some of the most recent empirical studies about this subject, hypotheses 
tested and main conclusions. 
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Table 2.7 - Recent studies about the relation between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure 
 
Authors Study objectives Measure of 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
Tested Hypotheses Methodology Main results 
Gelb (2000) Examine empirically 
the effect of 
managerial 
ownership on firm’s 
disclosures 
Disclosure 
rankings from 
the AIMR 
Corporate 
Information 
Committee 
Reports 
 
 
Managerial ownership Univariate 
analysis and 
multiple 
regression 
The results show that companies with lower 
levels of managerial ownership are more likely 
to receive higher ratings for the disclosures 
provided in their annual and quarterly reports, 
even after controlling for size, performance, 
volatility of returns, the frequency of securities 
offerings and proprietary costs. 
Ho and 
Wong 
(2001) 
Relate four major 
corporate 
governance 
attributes with the 
extent of voluntary 
disclosure 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
index 
 
Proportion of independent non-
executive directors on the board 
Existence of an audit committee 
Existence of dominant personalities 
Percentage of family members on 
the board. 
Multiple 
regression 
models 
The results indicate that the existence of an 
audit committee is significantly and positively 
related to the extent of voluntary disclosure, 
while the percentage of family members on the 
board is negatively related to the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. 
Chau and 
Gray (2002) 
This study examine 
whether ownership 
structure is 
associated with 
voluntary disclosure  
Voluntary 
disclosure 
index 
 
Wider ownership 
Family or concentrated ownership 
Multivariate 
tests 
The results show that there is a positive 
association between wider ownership and the 
extent of voluntary disclosure. The strong 
prevalence of family-controlled companies is 
likely to be associated with lower levels of 
disclosure. 
Eng and 
Mak (2003) 
Examine the impact 
of ownership 
structure and board 
composition on 
voluntary disclosure 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
index 
 
Managerial ownership 
Large shareholder ownership 
Government ownership 
Proportion of outside directors. 
OLS 
regression 
The results show that ownership structure and 
board composition affect disclosure. Lower 
managerial ownership and significant 
government ownership were associated with 
increased disclosure.  
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Table 2.7 - Recent studies about the relation between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure  (continuation) 
 
Authors Study objectives Measure of 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
Tested Hypotheses Methodology Main results 
Arcay and 
Vázquez 
(2005) 
 
Examine the 
relationships among 
corporate 
characteristics, the 
governance structure 
and disclosure policy 
Actualidad 
Económica 
index 
Proportion of independent directors 
Existence of an audit committee 
Separation of the functions of CEO 
and chairman 
Board participation in the capital  
Stock option plans 
Size of the board 
Adoption of rules of good governance 
Ownership concentration 
Size of the company 
Listing foreign stock exchanges 
Operating in regulated industries 
Univariate and 
multivariate 
analysis 
 
The results show that a firm’s size, along with 
some mechanisms of corporate governance such 
as the proportion of independents on the board, 
the appointment of an audit committee, and 
director’s shareholdings and stock option plans, 
are positively related to voluntary disclosure. 
These governance practices were significantly 
influenced by cross-listings and by ownership 
structure of the firm. 
Patelli and 
Principe 
(2007) 
Investigate 
the correlation 
voluntary disclosure 
and independent 
directors in companies 
characterized by the 
presence of a dominant 
shareholder 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
index 
Proportion 
of independent members on the 
board of directors in companies 
characterized by the presence of a 
dominant shareholder 
 
Multiple 
regression 
The results show that there is a positive 
correlation between the proportion of 
independent directors on the board and the 
amount of voluntary information disclosed by 
the companies in their annual reports. The 
correlation was found through a multivariate 
analysis controlling for residual ownership 
diffusion, size, leverage, profitability and labour 
pressure. 
Wang et al. 
(2008) 
Determinants and 
consequences of 
voluntary disclosure 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
index 
State ownership 
Foreign ownership 
Firm performance 
Auditor type 
Cost of debt 
 
Multiple 
regression 
The results show that the level of voluntary 
disclosure is positively related to the proportion of 
state ownership, foreign ownership, firm 
performance and reputation of the engaged 
auditor. There was no evidence that companies 
benefit from extensive voluntary disclosure by 
having a lower cost of debt capital. 
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Table 2.7 - Recent studies about the relation between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure  (continuation) 
 
Authors Study objectives Measure of 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
Tested Hypotheses Methodology Main results 
Donnelly 
and 
Mulcahy 
(2008) 
Examine the relation 
between board 
structure, ownership, 
and voluntary 
disclosure. 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
index 
Proportion of non-executive 
Directors 
CEO/Chairman duality 
Institutional investors 
Managerial ownership 
Poisson 
regression 
model 
The results show evidence that voluntary 
disclosure increases with the number of non-
executive directors on the board. Firms that have a 
non-executive chairman make greater voluntary 
disclosures than other firms. This finding was not 
robust to the inclusion of other explanatory 
variables. That was no evidence that ownership 
structure is related to voluntary disclosure. 
Baek et al. 
(2009) 
Examine the 
relationship between 
managerial ownership, 
corporate governance 
and voluntary 
disclosure 
Standard and 
Poor’s 
Transparency 
and disclosure 
survey data. 
Managerial ownership 
Executive compensation 
Proportion of outside directors 
Block ownership 
Institutional ownership 
 
 
 
Multiple 
regression 
This study finds that managerial ownership levels 
and other types of governance mechanisms in 
place affect the level and type of corporate 
discretionary disclosure. For firms with low levels 
of managerial ownership, a negative relationship 
between the level of managerial ownership and 
the level of disclosure. In addition, firms with a 
high percentage of outside directors are more 
likely to disclose board and management 
processes information. 
Allegrini 
and Greco 
(2011) 
Relation between 
corporate boards, audit 
committees and 
voluntary 
disclosure 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
index 
Board independence 
Board size 
CEO duality 
Lead independent director (LID) 
Board committees 
Board and audit committee 
diligence 
 
 
Multivariate 
analysis 
The results show that board size and diligence 
show a positive relationship with voluntary 
disclosure. The audit committee meeting 
frequency also showed a positive impact on the 
amount of information voluntarily disclosed. They 
also found that board committees, board 
composition and the presence of a LID have no 
relationship with voluntary disclosure, whilst CEO 
duality shows a negative impact with a poor level 
of significance. 
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 2.4.3 Corporate governance and information asymmetry 
 
Like stated previously, the relation between corporate governance and information 
asymmetry has been studied through two main points. The relation between the board 
structure and information asymmetry, through the corporate disclosure, and the relation 
between ownership structure, information asymmetry and stock liquidity. These two points 
are described below. 
 
-Ownership Structure 
  
The studies that relate ownership structure and information asymmetries focus, essentially, 
on two topics of research:  the effects of large shareholding on information asymmetry and 
the effects of large shareholding on stock liquidity.  
 
In relation to the first topic, Berle and Means (1932) argue that professional managers are 
effectively in control of widely-held firms at the expense of shareholders. However, 
following studies also argued that when one shareholder takes control of management by 
holding a large block of shares, he can exploit other shareholders (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; La Porta et al., 1998, 1999, 2000; Bebchuk and Roe, 1999).  
 
Being inspired by the findings of Claessens et al. (2002), Attig et al. (2006) hypothesize 
that a larger deviation of control from ownership should be associated with more selfish 
behaviour by the ultimate owner. To increase the chance of executing his plans, the 
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ultimate owner would minimize and delay the disclosure of information so that other 
shareholders cannot intervene, or must base their decisions on inadequate information (see 
also Fan and Wong, 2002; Chau and Gray, 2002). Poor disclosure worsens the information 
asymmetry problem and the large shareholder may even trade on his insider information to 
extract the private benefits of control.  
 
In this sense, and keeping other factors constant, Attig et al. (2006) argue that these will 
result in a wider bid-ask spread and lower stock liquidity. Their results are consistent with 
the notion that the ultimate owners of these stocks may have selfish agendas. To increase 
the probability of the agendas being implemented, the firms may have poor information 
disclosure, resulting also in poor stock liquidity.  
 
Recently, Jiang et al. (2011) investigate the impact of different classes of ownership 
concentration on information asymmetry conditional upon corporate voluntary disclosures. 
Their finding supports the adverse selection hypothesis and demonstrates that disclosures 
significantly attenuate information asymmetry risk. The authors show that this effect is 
particularly pronounced for firms with management-controlled ownership structures.  
 
In relation to the second topic, it is generally believed that a dispersed ownership leads to 
better market liquidity (e.g. Booth and Chua, 1996; Bolton and Von Thadden, 1998). 
Bolton and Von Thadden (1998) argue that in a concentrated ownership structure the 
number of shareholders who can trade the stock is smaller and, thus, effective market 
capitalization is lower, which in turn reduces the liquidity of the stock.  
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In this sense, the previous arguments suggest that blockholder ownership affects market 
liquidity. These arguments are also reinforced by the work of Heflin and Shaw (2000). The 
authors argue that in a firm with a concentrated ownership structure, the large shareholders 
have access to private information, and therefore, their trading increases the adverse 
selection risk faced by market makers. Thus, investors are forced to increase the bid-ask 
spreads for this stock and trade less, which reduces the liquidity of the stock (e.g. Glosten 
and Milgrom, 1985; Easley and O'Hara, 1987, 1992).  
 
Both Bolton and Von Thadden (1998) and Heflin and Shaw (2000) imply that ownership 
dispersion affects other aspects of liquidity. Bolton and Von Thadden (1998) argue that the 
effective market capitalization is higher for firms with more trading shareholders and this 
fact also implies a positive relation between the number of shareholders and trading 
volume. The arguments in Heflin and Shaw (2000) suggest that investors increase spreads 
for higher blockholder ownership because of higher probability of informed trading. This 
also implies a negative relationship between blockholder ownership and trading volume 
because higher spreads discourage trading.  
 
Recently, Jacoby and Zheng (2010) examine the relation between ownership dispersion 
and market liquidity of stocks. They found that their ownership concentration variables 
have an adverse impact on trading volume. Overall, the results of their work supported the 
notion that a dispersed ownership structure improves market liquidity. 
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-Board Structure 
 
The relation between the board structure and information asymmetry have been done 
through the corporate disclosure A considerable number of prior research indicates that 
boards that do a more efficient task of monitoring management improve the quality and the 
frequency of information released by management (Klein, 2002; Ajinkya et al., 2005; 
Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). These information releases include not only actual reported 
earnings but also voluntary disclosures such as management forecasts and other kinds of 
information. Diamond (1985) and Verrecchia (2001) demonstrate that increased disclosure 
reduces the incentive for private information search. This suggests that information 
asymmetry, on average, is lower for firms whose boards are more effective. 
 
The works of Ajinkya et al. (2005) and Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) focus on the impact 
of board structure on both the quality and quantity of corporate information disclosures. 
Both studies reported that companies with more effective boards issued more frequent 
earnings forecasts and that these forecasts were more accurate. In this sense, higher board 
quality should be associated with both more frequent and more accurate earnings forecasts 
and lower information asymmetry around earnings announcements.  
 
Other studies considered the relationship between board quality and investor perception of 
reported earnings. Vafeas (2000) finds that earnings are more informative for companies 
with more effective boards, while Dey (2006) reports that earnings credibility increases 
with board quality. These findings suggest that higher corporate governance quality should 
be associated with less information asymmetry. 
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Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) examine the relationship between the quality of corporate 
governance and information asymmetry in the equity market around quarterly earnings 
announcements. The authors use the change in market liquidity around the announcements 
as a proxy for information asymmetry and analysed the board independence, the board 
structure and the board activity. The results demonstrate that average spread decreases 
significantly with board independence, board activity, and the percentage stock holdings of 
directors and officers. Their results were consistent with their hypotheses and suggested 
that good corporate governance reduces information asymmetry around quarterly earnings 
announcements. According to the authors, the quality of corporate governance ‘‘levels the 
playing field’’ for all investors around what is arguably the most significant corporate 
information event.  
 
Finally, companies which disclose less information are also more likely to manage 
earnings (Lobo and Zhou, 2001). Richardson (2000) demonstrates that there is a positive 
relationship between information asymmetry and the level of earnings management. It 
follows that higher board quality should reduce the level of earnings management and 
thereby lower information asymmetry. 
 
 2.4.4 Disclosure quality and information asymmetry 
 
Literature provides, essentially, two potential mechanisms through which disclosure 
quality was expected to reduce information asymmetry: by altering the trading incentives 
of informed and uninformed investors so that there is relatively less trading by privately 
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informed investors; and by reducing the likelihood that investors discover and trade on 
private information (Brown and Hillegeist, 2007).  
 
In relation to the first mechanism, Merton (1987) argues that investors are more likely to 
invest and trade in firms that are well known or that they judge favourably. If higher 
disclosure quality increases a firm’s visibility and/or reduces the costs of processing firm 
specific public information, then higher disclosure quality will induce more trading in 
firm’s stock by uninformed investors. Also Fishman and Hagerty (1989) use a similar 
argument. So, quality will be associated with relatively less informed trading, which in turn 
will reduce information asymmetry. 
 
To Brown and Hillegeist (2007: 444) the presence of information asymmetry creates “an 
adverse selection problem in the market when privately informed investors trade on the 
basis of their private information”. In this sense, there is the risk that an uninformed 
investor will trade against a privately-informed investor. For the authors a firm’s choice of 
disclosure quality affects this information risk by altering the distribution of public and 
private information among investors. 
 
In relation to the second mechanism, Verrecchia (1982) examines a setting where public 
information disclosed by the firm is a perfect substitute for private information. He shows 
that the amount of costly private information that investors choose to acquire is generally 
decreasing in the amount of firm-disclosed public information. Diamond (1985) also finds 
that the incentives for investors to acquire private information are reduced when firms 
disclose information publicly. Gelb and Zarowin (2002) and Lundholm and Myers (2002) 
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find that current stock returns reflect more information about future earnings when 
disclosure quality is higher. Also Brown and Hillegeist (2007) state that firms with high 
disclosure quality are more likely to publicly release material information promptly and 
provide forward-looking information. As such, the authors argue that higher disclosure 
quality reduces private information search incentives and that more informativeness 
disclosures reduce the total set of information about future earnings that can be privately 
discovered about a firm. Since there is less information available to be discovered, in 
addition to the reduced search incentives, the authors expect that the frequency of private 
information events will be declining in disclosure quality.  
 
Admati (1985) , Wang (1993), Dow and Gorton (1995) and Easley and O’Hara (2004) all 
model the activities of informed and uninformed traders, and they found that, because of 
the different degree of available information, informed traders and uninformed traders 
invest in different portfolios. Specifically, informed traders construct their portfolios on the 
efficient frontier associated with their superior information. Since uninformed traders have 
inferior information, they cannot “replicate” the informed traders’ portfolios, thus their 
portfolios will always locate below the informed traders’ efficient frontier. As selective 
disclosure causes information asymmetry, it makes informed traders better at the expense 
of uninformed traders. 
 
The framework developed by Easley and O’Hara (2004) consider both public information 
and private information together. They provide an analytical model to demonstrate how a 
firm’s information structure affects its capital market behaviour. Their findings suggest 
that for stocks with more private information and less public information, uninformed 
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investors require a higher rate of return as compensation because more private information 
increases information asymmetry and the information risk uninformed investors face. 
 
Finally, and in addition to disclosure’s effect on information asymmetry, the previous 
arguments also show that the level of information asymmetry is likely to influence the 
firm’s choice of disclosure quality, because the firm may choose a higher level of 
disclosure quality when the current level of information asymmetry is high. 
 
 2.4.5 Measures of information asymmetry 
 2.4.5.1 The bid-ask spread and trading volume  
 
The literature indicates that bid-ask spread is commonly used as a proxy to measure 
information asymmetry. “Bid-ask spread is the difference between bid price a dealer is 
willing to pay for a security and the higher ask price at which the dealer is willing to sell 
the security” (Almutari, et al., 2009: 602). 
 
In this sense, the bid-ask spread is a measure of the liquidity degree of firms’ securities 
which was proposed by Demsetz (1968). The bid-ask spread addresses the adverse 
selection problem that arises from transacting in firm shares in the presence of 
asymmetrically informed investors. Less information asymmetry implies less adverse 
selection, which implies in turn a smaller bid-ask spread (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). 
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Welker (1995: 803) suggests the bid-ask spread as a measure of market liquidity, because 
it provides a direct measure of the price protection that uninformed market participants 
demand as compensation for the perceived information risk associated with trading in 
equity markets. According to the author, “if corporate disclosure policy is indeed effective 
in mitigating adverse selection, then the empirical prediction is that the bid-ask spread, 
which decreases in a liquid market, will be negatively related to disclosure policy”. Also to 
Stoll (2000) an important dimension of stock liquidity is the bid–ask spread. Attig et al. 
(2006), studying the effects of large shareholding on information asymmetry and stock 
liquidity, computed a measure of stock liquidity and information asymmetry. According to 
the authors, liquidity is maximal when traders can transact without a time delay or price 
concession. They use as a measure of stock liquidity the average of daily closing bid–ask 
spreads. 
 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000: 91) examine the relation between disclosure, information 
asymmetry and the cost of capital. According to the authors “a firm’s commitment to 
greater disclosure should lower cost of capital that arise from information asymmetries”. 
These authors suggest the bid-ask spread and the turnover ratio as two complementary for 
information asymmetry.  The trading volume is an alternative proxy for adverse selection 
but, according to the authors, less explicit. Trading volume is a measure of liquidity and 
captures the willingness of some investors who hold firm shares to sell and the willingness 
of others to buy. This willingness to transact in firm shares should be inversely related to 
the existence of information asymmetries. Despite this, the authors recognize that the 
trading volume can be influenced by a host of other factors unrelated to information. These 
factors include portfolio rebalancing, changes in risk preferences, among others. There is, 
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however, some empirical evidence supporting the authors’ choice of trading volume as an 
inverse proxy for information asymmetry. Easley et al. (1996), for example, show that the 
probability of information-based trading is decreasing in trading volume.  
 
More recently, Petersen and Plenborg (2006) find that the turnover ratio increases with the 
level of disclosure and that the bid-ask spread decreases with the level of disclosure. To the 
authors, both the bid-ask spread and turnover ratio seem to be appropriate measures for 
information asymmetry. Also Espinosa et al. (2008) find that more transparency reduces 
the bid-ask spread. 
 
 2.4.5.2 Other measures used as proxies of information asymmetry 
 
Share price volatility has been used by prior studies as a proxy for information asymmetry 
(e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1993). According to Leuz and Verrecchia (2000: 99) “to the 
extent that smooth transitions in share prices suggest the absence of information 
asymmetries between the firm and shareholders, or among investors, low levels of 
volatility suggest fewer information asymmetries”. However, volatility is also influenced 
by many factors unrelated to information asymmetry. Moreover, Bushee and Noe (2000) 
demonstrate that the effect of disclosure on volatility is complex and may depend on the 
type of investors attracted to the firm. In this sense, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) assume 
that, as a measure of information asymmetry, volatility is likely to be least reliable.  
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Some authors use insider trading profits as a proxy for information asymmetry. According 
to Frankel and Li (2004: 232) “insiders’ profit, when they trade on value-relevant 
information before public disclosure leads to its full incorporation into stock prices”. Thus, 
insider trading profits are related to the degree of information asymmetry between 
managers and outside investors. Intuitively, insider trading profit should be zero if market 
participants have the same information as managers.  
 
Kyle (1985) demonstrates that insider profits increase in insiders’ information advantage. 
Baiman and Verrecchia (1996) show that insider profits decrease as public information 
becomes more precise. Their model explicitly links disclosure incentives, information 
asymmetry and insider trading profits. 
 
However, Frankel and Li (2004) argue that Kyle’s model does not fully capture market 
characteristics that limit insider profits. They give as an example, the fact that uninformed 
traders, aware of information asymmetry, may limit their losses. According to Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1988) uninformed traders are likely to alter their trading behaviour, or in 
extreme, as stated by Merton (1987), leave the market. Uninformed traders can also 
respond to information asymmetry by gathering information either themselves or via 
intermediaries. For example Barth et al. (2001) suggest that high information asymmetry 
makes private information acquisition more profitable. Although, Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) and Verrecchia (1982) state that the incentive to gather information reduce the 
profits of information gathering so, in equilibrium, the degree of information asymmetry 
and the amount of information gathering are such that information gatherers earn only a 
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normal rate of return on their activities. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) find that 
competition among insiders also reduces the profitability of their trades. 
 
Other actions limit the profits of insiders with superior private information, aside from 
private information acquisition and trader competition, such as corporate policies or 
governmental regulations because it can restrict inside trades. The literature presents 
numerous factors that can affect manager’s ability to garner profits from private 
information. Nonetheless, some previous studies found that insider trades are profitable. 
For example, the work of Seyhun (1986, 1992) and the work of Rozeff and Zaman (1988) 
show that insiders earn abnormal returns. 
 
In the following point we will address the development of governance and disclosure rules 
for the cases of the countries under study, Portugal and Spain. 
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2.5 The development of governance and disclosure rules: the cases of Portugal 
and Spain 
 
The law and the regulation of a country can represent a potential obstacle to the exercise of 
the discretional power of managers and to the expropriation by control shareholders, given 
the possibility to regulate the transactions involving conflicts of interests (Djankov et al., 
2008). In the following points we will approach the development of the corporate codes, 
the implementation of the international financial reporting standards and the main 
corporate governance recommendations for the countries under study. 
 
 2.5.1 The corporate governance codes 
 
Following Câmara (2003), we should start by enhancing the pioneer role of the North 
American contributions. The Committee on Corporate Laws of American Bar Association 
disclosed in 1954 the first Model Business Corporation Act, for the Federal States to use as 
reference at a time when the corporative laws were being updated. More significant in the 
perspective of governance, they would become the Principles of Corporate Governance 
elaborated by the American Law Institute. In this document there are, as recommendations, 
guidelines regarding the internal organisation of administration. The objective to reinforce 
the North American market confidence took various steps, such as the publication of 
Sarbanes Oxley Act, in 2002, with important reforms in the practices of information 
disclosure, managers’ compensations and supervision. 
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The problems of corporate governance were imported to Europe through the United 
Kingdom. The feeling of scepticism towards the credibility of the listed companies’ 
financial reports in London, which was related to the bankruptcy of some of them, 
encouraged the London Stock Exchange, the Financial Reporting Council (private entity 
responsible for the accounting standards) and the sector of accounting professionals to 
promote, at the beginning of the 90’s, the constitution of a commission, led by Sir Adrian 
Cadbury, on the financial aspects of corporate governance. This commission was expected 
to gather proposals of good practices on governance, aiming at recovering the confidence 
in companies’ financial information and therefore preserve the reputation of the British 
financial market. The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
published the final product which became popular with “Cadbury Report” (Cadbury 
Committee Report, 1992). This document included a Code of Best Practice destined to 
listed companies in the United Kingdom, which condensed the fundamental good practices 
according to the Cadbury committee (Câmara, 2003). 
 
Indeed, in the 90’s, the codes of governance had a vigorous expression in Europe. This 
international extension of the debate was largely caused by the Principles of OCDE on 
Corporate Governance. Approved in 1999, they demonstrated that the imperfections of 
corporate governance could have a negative impact on the world economy. Although they 
were not binding for the adhering states, the Principles contained, in a flexible formulation, 
indications directed to the states to introduce legal adjustments regarding the mechanisms 
of corporate governance.  
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According to Franks and Mayer (1994) the differences in corporate governance models 
between countries occur mainly because of the way in which ownership and control are 
organized. Two main models are distinguished: the Anglo-Saxon model, which is typical 
in Anglo-Saxon countries and is known as the shareholder model; and the Continental 
European model, which adopts the characteristics of German and Latin countries and is 
known as the stakeholder model. Anglo-Saxon countries have a low concentration of 
shareholders and liquid capital market whereas in Continental Europe fewer companies are 
publicly trade and shareholder groups hold large percentages of the total number of shares 
that are publicly traded.  
 
Following the European context, it was during the 90’s that the problem inherent to 
corporate governance also emerged in Portugal and Spain, following efforts deployed by 
leading organisms linked to the functioning of financial markets. In the case of Portugal, 
the lead was played by the Portuguese Securities Market Commission (CMVM). This 
commission is represented in the major international financial and accounting bodies and 
entities such as International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European 
Union (EU).  
 
Among the different participations of the CMVM, should be underlined the participation in 
the drafting of the principles that the OECD adopted in May 1999, in collaboration with 
other officials entities of various countries in its membership. In the document “OECD – 
Principles of Corporate Governance” were established the guiding principals for the 
different country members to do the evaluation of the legal, regulatory and institutional 
 128 
mechanisms existing at the domestic level, as well as promoting  of more appropriate 
measures to improve the corporate governance.  
 
By virtue of the increased importance of international concerns relating to corporate 
governance, the CMVM (1999) approved a set of “Recommendations on Corporate 
Governance”. In this document, the CMVM sets the theme of corporate governance as the 
system of rules and conduct on the exercise of direction and control of listed companies. 
This document establishes a set of 17 recommendations that must be followed by 
companies with listed shares and by institutional investors. 
 
As a result of criticisms to the first document on corporate governance, in 2001 it was 
replaced by the "CMVM Regulation nº 07/2001 - Corporate Governance", which is largely 
based on the document issued in 1999. The purpose of this new document was to increase 
the maximum transparency of information provided by companies. The way to materialize 
the increase of maximum transparency was through mandatory disclosure practices relating 
to corporate governance when previously there was only a recommendation. The country 
has continued to regularly improve its legislative framework through a process of bi-annual 
amendments. In a 2007 update, the Recommendations were renamed the “CMVM Code of 
Corporate Governance”. 
 
In February 2006 emerges the White Paper on Corporate Governance, published by 
Portuguese Institute of Corporate Governance (IPCG, 2006). It is also worth noting that, in 
the Portuguese case, the large changes introduced by the Law-Decree nº 76-A/2006, 29th 
March, in the Commercial Companies Code (Código das Sociedades Comerciais). 
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According to Câmara et al. (2008) the Portuguese law before then was aware of the 
problems related to the management and supervision of companies, but in 2006 the 
corporate governance is for the first time recognised as principal object of a legal reform. 
 
Spanish corporate governance code has traditionally been characterized by general 
principles of law set forth in the Spanish Commercial Code (Código de Comercio). To 
improve the corporate governance rules, the Spanish government chose, like many other 
countries, the adoption of reports, done by academics and professionals: the Olivencia 
Code (and Report) (1998) and the Aldama Report (2003). 
 
In 1997 the Spanish government created a commission of experts (Olivencia Commission) 
to draft a code of ethics for the board of directors of companies. The commission submitted 
the report (Report Olivencia) and the code of ethics in February of 1998 (the Code of Good 
Governance, also known as the Olivencia Code). 
 
In July of 2002, the Government created a commission giving them the task of analyzing 
the necessary means to promote transparency and security in the financial market: the 
Aldama Commission. This commission submitted its final report in January 2003. This 
Aldama Report continued on the same line as the Olivencia commission, although there 
were some differences, such as: due to the fact that the information that companies 
disseminate into the market was insufficient, it was necessary to dictate standards that 
would require the companies to publish an Annual Report of the Corporate Governance in 
a predetermined format; and the need to have a legislation that, in a more effective way, 
regulates the duties of the directors. 
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One of the fundamental elements of the Spanish reform, referring to listed companies, has 
been the increase in the disclosure of the companies. The origin of this reform can be 
traced back to the recommendations proposed by the Olivencia and Aldama Reports, which 
particularly insisted on this issue. The modifications in this field are also related with the 
fact that the government of Spain aproved the Law on Transparency of Listed Companies 
nº 26 of 2003, modifying the Securities Market Law nº 24 of 1988. This modification was 
seen as a further step to protect minority shareholders and strengthen corporate 
governance. It has established the requirement of drawing up an annual report of the 
corporate governance and the requirement of transmitting shareholder information through 
the company website.  
 
The co-existence of two good governance texts – the Olivencia Code and the Aldama 
Report – complicated the task of compliance with their recommendations. On May 2006, 
the Special Working Group on the Good Governance of Listed Companies concluded its 
deliberations with the approval of a single document consolidating corporate governance 
recommendations, the “Unified Good Governance Code” (CNMV, 2006). The Unified 
Code, applicable from 2007 onwards, provided a common yardstick for the good 
governance practices of all listed firms. 
 
The article 116 of the Securities Markets Law requires that all companies publish an 
Annual Corporate Governance Report and disclose it as price sensitive information. This 
report must “provide comprehensive and reasoned information on listed companies’ 
corporate governance structures and practices, enabling investors and other users a 
founded judgement on the same” (CNMV, 2008: 15). Spanish legislation leaves it up to 
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each company to decide whether or not to follow the recommendations of the Unified 
Code, but requires them to give a reasonable explanation for any departure from the same. 
 
The corporate governance codes of Portugal and Spain are adopted at national level, but 
the European Union directives also promote their application by requiring that listed 
companies refer in their corporate governance statement to a code and that they report on 
their application of that code on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. 
 
Both countries developed studies with the purpose of analyse the degrees of compliance 
with the governance codes. In 2008, the CMVM carried out a questionnaire regarding the 
governance of the Portuguese listed companies. Besides the questionnaire, were analysed 
the reports of corporate governance for the year ended on the 31st of December of 2007. 
The main conclusions presented in this report were that Portuguese companies have, in 
general, a limited dispersal of its share capital, combined with a high stability of its capital 
structure, in many companies the share capital is highly concentrated and the proportion of 
independent directors is still reduced. 
 
Regarding the compliance of the CMVM recommendations on corporate governance, the 
document states that the average overall degree of fulfilment of these recommendations 
amounted to 62,5% in 2007, a figure that is higher than the 59,1% recorded in 2006. 
Although slight, this growth is the visible mark of the effort the Portuguese issuers have 
shown in order to adapt their structures of corporate governance to the best international 
practices. Although improvements are detected in the governance practices established in 
Portuguese firms, the study still detects multiple aspects that seem far from the “good 
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governance rules”, with the need for shareholders to reflect on the reasons for these 
differences and conclude if the mechanisms established are in fact best suited to their 
company (CMVM, 2008: 112). 
 
Also in 2008 the Spanish Securities Market Commission (Comisión Nacional del Mercado 
de Valores - CNMV) presented in the “Corporate Governance Report of Entities with 
Securities Admitted to Trading on Regulated Markets 2007” the main conclusions of the 
review of the Annual Corporate Governance Report of 174 Spanish listed companies, 
indicating degrees of compliance with the Code’s recommendations. According to the 
results presented by CNMV, the Annual Corporate Governance Report transparency and 
compliance were within the realms of acceptable. Listed companies abide in full by an 
average 75,1% of Code recommendations and are partly compliant with a further 10,2% of 
those applicable to their circumstances. On aggregate, this leaves 14,7% of 
recommendations which are not being applied. Compliance is significantly greater among 
the companies with the largest market capitalization. Furthermore, the conclusions of the 
CNMV (2008) report reinforce the high ownership concentration of Spanish listed 
companies. 
 
From the analysis of the Annual Corporate Governance reports, CNMV concluded that “it 
is clear that companies have made great efforts to accurately reflect their degree of 
compliance with Code recommendations and to explain those cases where they depart 
from or only partially fulfil them”. (CNMV, 2008: 21) 
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Despite this, and considering the recent impact of the financial crisis, it seems consensual 
that the corporate governance, until now usually based on self-regulation, was not as 
effective as it could have been. On April 2011, the European Union Commission launched 
a public consultation on possible ways forward to improve existing corporate governance 
mechanisms. According to the European Union Commission, the objective of this Green 
Paper is to have a broad debate on the ways in which corporate governance of European 
companies can be improved, namely on issues such as “how to improve the diversity and 
functioning of the boards of directors and the monitoring and enforcement of existing 
national corporate governance codes, and how to enhance the engagement of 
shareholders” (European Commission, 2011). 
 
 2.5.2 International Financial Reporting Standards 
 
Over the last few years the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
has become a very relevant issue for researchers, practitioners and regulators. In Europe, 
all listed firms are required to report consolidated financial statements prepared according 
to IFRS since 2005. Recent research seems to support that this adoption of IFRS has 
improved financial reporting (e.g. Barth et al., 2005). Ball et al. (2005) point as immediate 
advantages the uniformity of the accounting standards and the elimination of informational 
externalities that arise from the lack of comparability. Otherwise, to Major and Marques 
(2008), the IFRS are much more directed to the investor. 
 
In the case of Portugal, primarily the Portuguese Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) were derived from the following rules in the given order of priority: (1) 
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the Portuguese Accounting Plan (POC); (2) the Accounting Directives issued by the 
Portuguese Accounting Standards Board (CNC); and (3) the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) pronouncements in the absence of national rules and guidelines. 
However, a 2009 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) report entitled “Adoption of the System 
of International Accounting Standards” explains that it was widely felt that the POC was 
no longer sufficient to meet increasingly demanding international reporting requirements 
and that this situation was putting Portuguese companies at a competitive disadvantage. 
 
The European Commission (EC) Regulation nº.1606/ 2002 (European Commission, 2002) 
lead to the Portuguese Decree-Law nº. 35/2005. Portuguese listed companies must apply 
the IFRS as endorsed by the EC in the preparation of their consolidated accounts. Unlisted 
companies are also permitted to apply IFRS in their consolidated and annual accounts 
except for unlisted banks and financial institutions, which are mandated to apply IFRS in 
their consolidated accounts since 2005. Finally, Portuguese companies that do not apply 
IFRS, follow national generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) primarily 
contained in a newly established Accounting Standards System (SNC). The SNC was put 
in place in January 2010. 
 
In relation to Spain, in line with the European Commission Regulation nº. 1606/2002, 
since January 1, 2005 listed companies in Spain have been required to prepare consolidated 
accounts following IFRS as endorsed by the EU. In addition, according to a 2008 European 
Commission report (European Commission, 2008) on the implementation of the directive, 
Spain opted for the extended use of IFRS allowing unlisted groups to apply either Spanish 
GAAP or IFRS. Financial institutions are required to follow the rules set by the Central 
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Bank of Spain, which are in conformity with the EU-based IFRS. Other companies must 
follow Spanish GAAP which, according to a PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) 2010 
publication, was revised as a result of corporate and accounting law reforms in 2006 
effective for application by individual companies and unlisted consolidated groups since 
2008.  
 
 2.5.3 Corporate Governance recommendations 
 
The development of the recommendations and legislation on corporate governance in 
Spain after the 1998 Olivencia Report has required Spanish listed companies to make a 
great effort to adjust their structures and policies. 
 
Vives (2007) analysed the 2006 annual corporate governance reports published by the 
IBEX-3518 companies. The author concluded that over 95% disclosed their corporate 
governance structures in the annual report in sufficient terms for the market to be able to 
evaluate their practices correctly. To the author this is remarkable because one of the key 
features in any corporate governance system is the transparency of the practices followed. 
 
In May 2006, Spain approved the Unified Corporate Governance Code, which listed 
companies must use as a reference in the corporate governance annual reports regarding 
fiscal year 2007. The main objective when preparing the Unified Code was to draw up a 
document (i) to unify the recommendations of the Olivencia Report (1998) and the Aldama 
Report (2003) and (ii) to bring their recommendations in line with the new international 
                                                 
18
 The IBEX-35 is a stock index formed by the 35 more representative Spanish listed companies. 
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trends. The new document shares in the growing harmonization of the recommendations of 
neighbour countries as a consequence of the development of corporate governance codes 
within the OECD and the European Union. The main feature of the Unified Code is that it 
maintains the comply or explain principle, which gives a specific definition of independent 
directors19 for company evaluation. The Unified Code particularly refers to the following 
aspects, presented in table 2.8. 
 
Table 2.8 - Main aspects of Spanish Unified Corporate Governance Code 
 
(i) 
The role of the shareholders' meeting, as the decision-making body, in transactions 
that involve a structural change in the company; 
(ii) 
the recommendation for companies not to include restrictions in their by-laws that 
hinder the control of companies; 
(iii) 
the assumption that the board, as the core of its duties, have the responsibility for 
approving the general policies and strategies of the company, related-party 
transactions and relevant investments or transactions; 
(iv) 
the board should have a wide majority of non-executive directors and that 
independent directors should represent, at least, one third of the directors, with a 
diversity of gender; 
(v) instruments should be provided to avoid the concentration of powers in the chairman; 
(vi) 
the boards of directors, the audit committee and the remunerations committee should 
have a majority of non-executive directors20 and be presided over by independent 
directors, reinforcing their duties; and 
(vii) 
the greater remuneration transparency should be achieved, recommending that a 
report on the remuneration policy should be submitted to the shareholders' meeting, 
for purposes of consultation, and that the financial statements should record the 
individual remuneration of each director. 
Adapted from Vives (2007) 
                                                 
19
 The Unified Code (CNMV, 2006: 48) defines independent directors as “directors appointed for their 
personal or professional qualities who are in a position to perform their duties without being influenced by 
any connection with the company, its shareholders or its managers”. Following this definition, the Unified 
Code describes the circumstances where a director can not be qualified as independent (CNMV, 2006: 48-
49).   
20
 The Spanish Unified Code maintains the distinction between internal (executive) and external (proprietary 
and independent) directors (CNMV, 2008:37). 
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In Portugal firms’ official structure of governance can follow only one of the alternatives 
described in the corporate law (Código das Sociedades Comerciais). The recommendations 
about good governance practices are made public by the CMVM. In 1999 the CMVM 
elaborated its first package of recommendations regarding corporate governance. Two 
years later, it issued Regulation nº. 7/2001, which brought significant changes to the 
national corporate governance settings, as it required the transparency of ownership 
structures and determined that listed firms, from then on, had to disclose their degree of 
compliance with the recommendations, in a “comply or explain” mode. Thus, firms either 
make the suggested disclosures in their annual reports (comply) or they need to justify their 
deviation from the recommendation (explain). In 2003, although maintaining the 
fundamental aspects of Regulation 7/2001, in particular the comply or explain viewpoint, a 
further update was published, so as to make the annual report on corporate governance 
more complete. In 2005, the dominant tone of the amendments introduced was related to 
the improvement of the internal control systems of companies (CMVM, 2005). Table 2.9 
summarizes CMVM recommendations into four main topics. 
 
Table 2.9 - Main aspects of Portuguese CMVM recommendations 
 
(i) 
The first one is the disclosure of information and includes recommendation 1, which 
says that firms should have an investor support office to ensure equality among 
shareholders in terms of access to information. 
(ii) 
The second one respects to the exercise of voting rights and representation rights by 
shareholders, in which there is the recommendation 2. It states that the exercise of 
voting rights directly, by post or by representation, should not be restricted. 
(iii) 
The third field leads with corporate rules, and encloses recommendation 3 and 4. Thus, 
it is recommended that firms have an internal control system to detect risks inherent to 
their activity. Recommendation 4 is an anti-takeover measure that concerns to the 
transferability of shares and states that the measures adopted to prevent the success of 
takeover bids should respect the interests of the company and its shareholders. 
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(iv) 
The fourth field respects to the effective monitoring of the board of directors’ function. 
Thus, recommendation 5 states that the board should be composed by a plurality of 
people who provide effective guidance for the management of the company, and 5-A 
was after added to advise to include a sufficient number of non-executive directors21. 
Number 6 refers to the inclusion of a sufficient quantity of independent22 administrators 
in the nonexecutive members. Recommendation number 7 advises for the creation of 
internal audit committees, with power to assess the corporate structure and its 
governance. Recommendation 8 states the definition of the board members’ 
remuneration in line with the company and its annually individual disclosure. 
Recommendation 8-A was therefore added to advise for the submission to the 
shareholders of a declaration on the board’s remunerating policy. The recommendation 
9 regards the committee independence, advising that members of the remuneration 
committee should be independent as regards of the board of directors. Recommendation 
10 counsels for the approval by shareholders of a plan of shares and/or options to 
members of the board and/or employees. 
Recommendation 10-A accounts for a communication and reporting policy over alleged 
irregularities. 
Adapted from Major and Marques (2008) 
 
 
In September of 2007, a new list of recommendations was made public by the CMVM. 
The current version of these set of recommendations is now known as “CMVM Corporate 
Governance Code”. According to the CMVM, the progress that has been achieved in the 
                                                 
21
 The members of the administrative board do not have to be all “executive” (...). The Code of Corporate 
Governance recommends the inclusion of non-executive administrators for the “supervision, auditing and 
evaluation of the activity of the executive members” (Abreu et al., 2010: 19). 
22
 CMVM felt the need for defining a clear and objective concept for independent director and in its 
Regulation nº 11/2003 (CMVM, 2003), article 1, it defines that “administrators associated with specific 
interest groups in the company shall not be considered independent officers, namely: a) Members of the 
board of directors who are also members of the board of directors of the controlling company, as set forth in 
the Portuguese Securities Code; b) Members of the board of directors who are holders of qualified holdings 
in an amount equal to or larger than 10% of the share capital or of the voting rights in the company, or an 
identical percentage in a controlling company, as set forth in the Portuguese Securities Code; c) Members of 
the board of directors who hold management position or have contractual ties with a competing company; d) 
Members of the board of directors who receive compensation from the company, or from any parent 
company or affiliates within the same group other than in the form of compensation for their role as 
corporate officers; e) Members of the board of directors who are spouses, family or direct kin through third 
lineage, including those persons referred to in the paragraphs above. In addition to checking the 
circumstances described above, the board must ensure, in a well founded manner, the independence of the 
directors in light of other pertinent circumstances”. 
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contents of these recommendations has originated from amendments made to the 
regulatory framework of the public governance format under Decree-Law nº. 76-A/2006 of 
29 March. In this new list, recommendations are organised under three topics: (i) general 
shareholders’ meetings, (ii) boards and committees and (iii) information and auditing. 
Overall, there are 16 recommendations and many of them have several points. An 
interesting issue is that in the introduction to the new code’s recommendations it is stated 
that the recommendations can be followed by non listed firms.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we began by conducting a general review of the concept of corporate 
governance and its most important attributes. The agency problem was also analysed, with 
emphasis on internal and external mechanisms for controlling agency costs. Within theses 
mechanisms, we highlighted the disclosure policy, focusing primarily on a literature about 
the voluntary disclosure of information. Following this, we analysed the previous 
investigation about the relation between the governance rules, voluntary disclosure and 
information asymmetry. Finally, we summarized the main aspects related with the 
development of the governance and disclosure rules in Portugal and in Spain. 
 
With the above literature review it became clear that, because capital markets are 
becoming increasingly global and integrated, organizations have to adopt mechanisms of 
corporate governance that are more or less standard, based on two main pillars: 
transparency and accountability to shareholders. In addition, these mechanisms promote 
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the balance of power among stakeholders and are vital to ensure the strong development of 
the organization.  
 
Corporate governance involves a vast number of aspects, making the attribution of one 
unique definition impossible. Nevertheless, all the definitions refer to the existence of 
conflicts of interest between insiders and outsiders, with an emphasis on those arising from 
the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, there 
is a consensus regarding the assumption that the corporate governance problem cannot be 
satisfactorily resolved by complete contracting because of significant uncertainty, 
information asymmetries and contracting costs in the relationship between capital 
providers and insiders (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995). 
Finally, the governance of each company should contemplate the mechanisms that lead to 
an efficient allocation/production/development of resources.  
 
Several external and internal controlling mechanisms have been addressed in the literature. 
An increasing number of studies have been recognising the simultaneous nature of many of 
the corporate governance mechanisms, suggesting that single-handed interventions on a 
particular mechanism may not be feasible or effective. In this sense, the set of mechanisms 
has to be defined in accordance with the context that surrounds the organization (Dey, 
2008). 
 
The companies’ disclosure policy is one of the internal mechanisms of construction of the 
public perception of corporate governance quality and also a way to ensure the efficient 
functioning of capital markets by reducing the information asymmetry. The existence of 
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information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders of companies generates agency 
costs that should be minimised. The agency theory assumes the existence of agency costs 
arising from the contractual relationship between parties. The signalling theory predicts 
that managers of higher quality companies are encouraged to transmit to the market the 
information supplements they possess, thus contributing to the reduction of agency costs 
and obtaining finance on more favourable terms. On the other hand, according to 
legitimacy theory, companies use the disclosure to communicate with their stakeholders, 
informing them that they are complying with the terms of the social contract. However, we 
must consider that disclosure may increase, among others, the proprietary costs associated 
with the disclosure of valuable information to competitors. So, companies need to consider 
a variety of costs and benefits associated with disclosure. However, the costs and benefits 
to disclosure vary across companies. In this sense, their disclosure policy will be 
formulated with reference to the overall marginal costs and marginal benefits (Donnelly 
and Mulcahy, 2008) 
 
Nevertheless, a strong system of information dissemination is recognized to be a key 
feature of the surveillance of the organizations by the markets and it’s fundamental to 
enabling shareholders to exercise their rights. The studies, especially those that have been 
made in countries with stock markets of high liquidity and size, show that the 
dissemination of information can have a powerful influence on the behaviour of the listed 
organizations and investor protection. A demanding system of disclosure of information 
encourages the inflow of new investment and ensures confidence in capital markets. 
Insufficient or unclear information may hinder the ability of the functioning of markets 
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because of information asymmetries between players which might imply a misallocation of 
resources.  
 
The law and the regulation of a country are a potential obstacle to the exercise of the 
discretional power of managers and to the expropriation by control shareholders, given the 
possibility to regulate the transactions involving conflicts of interests (Djankov et al., 
2008). In this sense, governance and disclosure rules or recommendations, given their 
contents and features, should be continuously developed to achieve their best possible 
adaptation to corporate and market realities. 
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Chapter 3 - Research model 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
After revising the literature, this chapter presents the proposed model of investigation. We 
intend to examine the corporate governance determinants of voluntary disclosure and its 
impact on the reduction of information asymmetry for the Iberian Peninsula listed 
companies.  
 
In our study we will proceed to the test of two groups of hypotheses. The first group 
presented will aim to study the determinants of voluntary corporate disclosure, using the 
multiple regression methodology. The second group will be tested using the methodology 
of structural equation models. We intend to study the direct and indirect relations between 
governance rules and information asymmetry, through the voluntary disclosure of 
information and the organizational performance,  
 
Thus, this chapter presents the two sets of research hypotheses to be tested and the 
reasoning that led to its formulation. For each hypothesis we will summarize the main 
arguments found in the literature. 
 144 
3.2 Research hypotheses 
 3.2.1 The corporate governance determinants of voluntary disclosure  
 
Our first group of hypotheses, tested through multiple regression models, will allow us to 
draw conclusions about the determinants of voluntary disclosure. On the corporate 
governance side, and as described previously, most of the research focuses on ownership 
structure and board structure (in a broad sense, governance rules). Researchers using 
ownership structure as measurement proxies focused mainly on management ownership, 
large shareholder ownership, institutional ownership, government ownership and family-
controlled firms. While researchers using board composition as measurement proxies focus 
on the proportion of independent and non-executive directors on the board, the board size,  
CEO duality/dominant personalities, the existence of board committees, management 
compensation, external auditor type, percentage of family members on the board. Previous 
studies have also examined how general corporate characteristics influence the firm’s level 
of voluntary disclosure of information. These characteristics are commonly included in the 
studies of voluntary disclosure and are often used as controlling variables. 
 
We are conscious of the impossibility of inclusion of all variables that potentially influence 
the level of voluntary disclosure by Iberian Peninsula listed companies. So, following the 
work of Eng and Mak (2003), we will examine the impact of three attributes of ownership 
structure on voluntary disclosure: managerial ownership, government ownership and large 
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shareholder ownership23. In relation to directors’ and supervisors’ structures we will 
analyse: the proportion of non-executives and independent members on the board (e.g. 
Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; Patelli and Principe, 2007); the size of the board (e.g. Di Pietra 
et al., 2008; Allegrini and Greco, 2011); the existence of monitoring and control structures 
(e.g. Ho and Wong, 2001; Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; Wang et al. 2008); the board 
compensation (e.g. Nagar et al., 2003; Arcay and Vázquez, 2005); and the board expertise 
(e.g. Klein, 1998; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006 ).  
 
We will also analyse the following general corporate characteristics: firm performance 
(e.g. Raffournier, 1995; Ho and Wong, 2001; Eng and Mak, 2003; Petersen and Plenborg, 
2006; Wang et al. 2008; Baek et al. 2009); debt (e.g. Wang et al. 2008; Allegrini and 
Greco, 2011); growth opportunities (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003); and size (e.g. Meek et al., 
1995, Beattie et al., 2004; Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; Allegrini and Greco, 2011). 
 
We present for each one of the hypotheses, in a summarized form, the main arguments 
found in the literature. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 Not taking into account the institutional investors follows Abreu’s (2010: 18) arguments, which consider 
the importance of this type of investors in Continental Europe to be far from the one in United Kingdom or in 
United States of America. Furthermore, for the author “institutional investors do not seem to be the most 
capable group to solve the problems of corporate governance (...) taking into consideration that they cannot 
and/ or do not want to get involved decisively in the administration and control of companies”. Furthermore, 
we do not consider the family ownership variable because, in general, companies present a considerable 
ownership concentration. According to Faccio and Lang (2002) most continental European companies 
present a large and dominant shareholder who exerts considerable control. We chose to analyse this last 
aspect. 
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 3.2.1.1 Relation between ownership structure and voluntary disclosure 
 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) directors’ shareholdings constitute a relevant 
vehicle for monitoring the management, as it tends to restrain managerial incentives to 
divert resources that may ultimately put at risk the attainment of shareholder value 
maximization. Directors’ shareholdings help to align goals and financial incentives of 
board members with those of outside shareholders (Bushman et al., 2004). Eng and Mak 
(2003) argue that when managerial ownership is low, there is a greater agency problem, 
meaning that managers have greater incentives to consume shareholders wealth, and 
reduced incentives to maximize organizational performance. Hence, outside shareholders 
will increase monitoring of manager’s behaviour to reduce the agency problem (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Eng and Mak (2003) also argue that monitoring by outside shareholders 
increases costs of the firm. However, monitoring by outside shareholders may be reduced 
if managers can provide voluntary disclosure. That is, voluntary disclosure is a substitute 
for monitoring.  
 
Empirical evidence in Ruland et al. (1990) work shows that managerial ownership to be 
negatively related to voluntary disclosure. In cases of low levels of director ownership, the 
monitoring role of the board is strengthened, which has a positive effect on voluntary 
corporate disclosure. Gelb (2000) shows that companies with lower levels of managerial 
ownership are more likely to receive higher ratings for the disclosures provided in their 
annual and quarterly reports. More recently, Baek et al. (2009) find that, for firms with low 
levels of managerial ownership, there is a negative relationship between the level of 
managerial ownership and the level of disclosure. 
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In this context, it’s expected that voluntary disclosure increases with decreases in 
managerial ownership.  
 
 H1a: Voluntary disclosure is negatively related to managerial ownership. 
 
The relation between government ownership of private sector firms and disclosure has not 
been subject of many studies. In a greater number of countries the government has a capital 
participation in some companies that are of strategic importance to the state. These 
companies are run like other private commercial enterprises, but may have to look beyond 
pure profit goals and consider goals related to the interests of the nation. These goals may 
conflict with the commercial objectives of the enterprise (Mak and Li, 2001). According to 
Eng and Mak (2003) enhancing shareholder value may not be the primary objective of 
these companies. Managers are also likely to face less discipline from the market for 
corporate control because the government is expected to be a long term investor. 
 
Eng and Mak (2003) and Wang et al. (2008) find a positive relationship between 
government ownership and voluntary disclosure. These results are consistent with the 
argument that government ownership increases moral hazard and agency problems, and 
disclosure is a mean of mitigating these problems. Because of the government’s interest in 
these companies and the conflicting objectives faced by these firms, there may be a greater 
need for communication with other shareholders of the firm.  
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In this context, it’s expected that voluntary disclosure increases with increases in 
government ownership. 
 
 H1b: Voluntary disclosure is positively related to government ownership. 
 
 
According to Raffournier (1995) the ownership structure of a firm may be a possible 
determinant of organizational disclosure. The presence of a large shareholder may be 
accompanied by the owner’s considerable involvement in the firm’s management. Under 
these circumstances, the demand for information would be very low. On the other hand, in 
cases of ownership dispersion, investors don’t have first-hand access to information, and 
this may lead to increased demands for organizational information that can be used to 
monitor management (Gelb, 2000). Fama and Jensen (1983) propose that where share 
ownership is widely held, the potential for conflicts between principal and agent is greater 
than in more closely held companies. As a result, information disclosure is likely to be 
greater in widely held firms.  
 
For Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) if a shareholder owns a large stake in a company, the 
dependence on public disclosure is likely to be smaller, because he can directly monitor 
management. Furthermore, the ownership structure may have a significant impact on the 
adoption of rules of good governance which, in turn, will affect corporate disclosure 
(Arcay and Vázquez, 2005). As suggested by Wymeersch (2002), compliance with the 
recommendations of codes of good governance is more difficult when a significant 
proportion of a firm’s equity is held by a majority shareholder. 
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In this context, it’s expected that companies with a large shareholder provide less voluntary 
disclosures. 
 
 H1c: Voluntary disclosure is negatively related to with a presence of a large 
shareholder. 
 
 
 3.2.1.2 Relation between directors’ and supervisors’ structures and voluntary 
  disclosure 
 
In large companies, shareholders are not involved in the management and control of the 
company, but delegate such responsibilities to the board of directors to ensure goal 
similarity between shareholders’ interests and management actions. The board’s role of 
administration is particularly relevant in protecting the interests of minority shareholders. 
Outside non-executive directors are perceived as a tool for monitoring management 
behaviour (Rosenstein and Wayatt, 1990), resulting in more voluntary disclosure of 
corporate information. Lefwich et al. (1981) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the 
larger the proportion of independents on the board, the more effective it will be in 
monitoring management acts, and companies can be expected to have more voluntary 
disclosures. According to several authors, independent directors are supposed to mitigate 
the agency conflicts between large controlling shareholders and minority outsider 
shareholders (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Park and Shin, 2004; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007).  
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A non-executive director is defined as a director who is not employed in the company’s 
business activities and whose role is to provide an outsider’s contribution and oversight to 
the board of directors (Hanrahan et al., 2001). A non-executive director who is entirely 
independent from management is expected to offer shareholders the greatest protection in 
monitoring management (Baysinger and Butler, 1985). Fama and Jensen (1983) posit that 
the superior monitoring ability of non-executives can be attributed to the incentive to 
maintain their reputations in the external labour market. Gregory and Simmelkjaer (2002) 
argue that the codes of good governance include a number of recommendations, one of 
them being the appointment of non-executive and independent directors, an inclusion 
designed to reduce agency conflicts between managers and shareholders.  
 
Chen and Jaggi (2000), Arcay and Vázquez (2005) and Patelli and Principe (2007) 
empirical results show a positive relation between the proportion of independent directors 
on the board and the amount of voluntary information disclosed by the companies. The 
proportion of outside directors on corporate boards was also negatively associated with 
indicators that measured the (poor) quality of the information disclosed, such as the 
publication of fraudulent or defective financial statements (Beasley, 1996; Peasnell et al., 
2001), as well as measures of earnings management (Peasnell et al., 2000). 
 
In this context, a positive association is expected between the proportion of non-executives 
and independents on the board and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
 
 H2a: Voluntary disclosure is positively related to the proportion of non- 
 executives and independents directors on the board. 
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The board size may influence the level of voluntary disclosure. The level of disclosure is a 
strategic decision made by the board of directors. According to Allegrini and Greco (2011) 
an important factor perceived to affect the board effectiveness is the size. The size of the 
board is believed to affect the ability of the board to monitor and evaluate management.  
 
The codes of good governance usually recommend limitations to the size of the board. By 
restricting the number of directors, it is believed that the exchange of ideas between board 
members will be enhanced, as well as flexibility in the decision-making process.  Jensen 
(1993) argues that small boards are more effective in monitoring the CEO and are more 
difficult for the CEO or the chairman to manipulate. Yermack (1996) shows that firms with 
smaller boards are valued more highly by the market than other companies with larger 
boards. Also Vafeas (2000) argues that investors place higher value on earnings 
information when provided by firms with smaller boards. 
 
However, and because outside directors are considered to be more effective monitors of 
managers, the literature on board effectiveness also predicts that as the proportion of 
outside directors on the board increases, firm performance should increase. Some authors 
argue that larger boards may be beneficial because, for example, they increase the 
expertise and resources available, namely, to monitor the managers’ actions (e.g. Dalton et 
al., 1999). Di Pietra et al. (2008) argue that in firms with ownership concentration and high 
insider shareholders representation in the board, larger boards do not necessarily imply less 
effective governance structures. A larger board can offer “more knowledge and expertise, 
as well as more capacity for monitoring and sharing the workload” (Larmou and Vafeas, 
2010: 62). Allegrini and Greco (2011) show empirically that companies with larger boards 
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show greater transparency for outside shareholders and, in this sense, could better 
contribute to mitigate conflicts among insiders and minority outsiders shareholders  
 
In this context, an association between the size of the board and the extent of voluntary 
disclosure is expected (with no predicting sign). 
  
 H2b: Voluntary disclosure is related to the size of the board. 
 
 
A key role in the board monitoring activities is played by the audit committee (Blue 
Ribbon Report, 1999). The audit committee operates as a monitoring mechanism to 
improve the quality of information conveyed to external parties (Pincus et al., 1989) and 
“oversees the preparation and communication of financial information to third parties to 
ensure that such data fulfils the requisites of clarity and the completeness of disclosure” 
(Smith Report, 2003: 12). 
 
Empirical evidence indicates that voluntary disclosure is positively related to the 
functioning of an audit committee (e.g. Ho and Wong, 2001; Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; 
Allegrini and Greco, 2011). Furthermore, Dechow et al. (1996) and Peasnell et al. (2001) 
observe that audit committees help to reduce the likelihood of accounting fraud. By 
ensuring objective disclosure, the audit committee allows an accurate assessment of the top 
management decisions and performance. Dominance of a board by executives and insiders 
can deter the creation of active and independent audit committees (Klein, 1998; Méndez 
and García, 2007). 
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To Méndez and García (2007) audit committees can be defined as boards’ delegate 
committees whose main aim is to guarantee the reliability of the accounting information 
issued by firms. Their principal task is therefore to evaluate companies’ internal audit 
systems, to safeguard the independence of external auditors and to evaluate and to control 
the processes of corporate governance, informational transparency and conflicts between 
shareholders and managers. 
 
In addition to the audit committee, firms can voluntarily establish an internal audit 
function. Davidson et al. (2005) argue that this function can improve the effectiveness of 
governance procedures. An internal audit function is also expected to facilitate the 
operation and effective functioning of the audit committee, as the goals of the audit 
function are closely aligned with the financial reporting oversight responsibilities of the 
audit committee (Goodwin and Yeo, 2001; Goodwin, 2003). 
 
The signalling literature suggests that the choice of an external auditor can serve as a signal 
of firm value. Generally, entrepreneurs are likely to choose a large audit firm since such an 
action signals to investors their acceptance of the auditor’s demands for higher quality 
disclosure as well as the quality of a firm’s earnings performance (Datar et al., 1991). 
Several studies argue that the big audit firms risk damage to the value of their reputation if 
they are associated with clients whose reporting practices are perceived as lower quality. 
Hence, they encourage clients to disclose more information (Hossain et al., 1994; 
Raffournier, 1995; Chau and Gray, 2002; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002). Wang et al. 
(2008) show that the level of voluntary disclosure is positively related to the reputation of 
the engaged auditor.   
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The remuneration committee or the corporate governance commission can also play a 
positive role in the top management control. The remuneration committee contribute to 
define the remuneration mechanisms and to align the management’s and the shareholders’ 
interests (Main and Johnston, 1993; Conyon and Peck, 1998; Laksmana 2008).  
 
In this sense, the existence of an audit committee, a remuneration committee, an internal 
audit function, a reputed external auditor and other monitoring and control structures have 
the function of ensuring the quality of financial accounting and control system. According 
to Denis (2001: 195) “they reduce the manager’s latitude to act opportunistically and 
contribute to the alignment of internal and external interest of the organization”. In this 
context, a positive association is expected between the monitoring and control structures 
and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
 
 H2c: Voluntary disclosure is positively related with the existence of monitoring 
and control structures. 
 
 
Management incentives have the objective of compensating board members by aligning 
their interest with the firm’s performance. According to Jensen and Murphy (1990) and to 
Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) increases in share price lead to greater compensation for 
board members. Gutiérrez et al. (2000) argue that the linkage of management 
compensation to performance results is a transfer of risk to management and acts as a 
deterrent to opportunistic behaviour. Several studies examined the relationship between 
stock options and disclosure practices. According to Perry (2000) stock option plans for 
 155 
outside directors increases the monitoring role played by the board and improves firm’s 
value (Fich and Shivdasani, 2005).  
 
Also Nagar et al. (2003) argue that general stock-priced-based incentives represent an 
effective mean of encouraging both good and bad news disclosures. These authors report a 
positive association between corporate disclosure and the proportion of CEO compensation 
affected by stock price. Arcay and Vázquez (2005) also find that directors’ stock option 
plans are positively related to voluntary disclosure. The study of Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) pointed out that a remuneration contract with a strong benefit plan will cause 
management’s interest to be consistent with those of the investors. As a result, 
management’s actions will work to benefit investors. 
 
In this context, it’s expected that voluntary disclosure increases with increases in 
management incentives. 
 
 H2d: Voluntary disclosure is positively related to management incentives. 
 
 
The literature presents the idea that boards comprising of members who are more 
competent or knowledgeable will do a better job of monitoring the activities of 
management and make better decisions. Klein (1998) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) 
measure board competency or expertise by the percentage of board members that sit on 
boards of other companies.  
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There is substantial evidence supporting the view that directorships serve as a measure of a 
director’s reputation as a monitor. Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the 
market for directors serve as an important source of incentives for them to be good 
monitors because being directors of well-run companies signals value to the external 
market, which rewards them with additional directorships.  
 
Despite this, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) suggest that the benefits of outside 
directorship may be non-linear, declining for the highest directorship levels as busy 
directors have less available time to monitor management properly. There is evidence for 
the costs associated with serving on multiple boards. These studies suggest that too many 
directorships may lower the effectiveness of directors as corporate monitors.  
 
In contrast, Ferris et al. (2003) claim that busy boards are as effective as non-busy boards 
at monitoring and find no relation between the average number of directorships held by 
outside directors and the firm’s market-to-book ratio. 
 
In this context, it’s expected that voluntary disclosure is related with the level of expertise 
of the board (with no predicting sign). 
 
 H2e: Voluntary disclosure is related to management expertise. 
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 3.2.1.3 Relation between corporate characteristics and voluntary disclosure 
 
According to Wallace et al. (1994) firm performance represents information that may be of 
interest to accounting information users. Profitability ratios are usually used in empirical 
research on voluntary disclosure (Raffournier, 1995; Meek et al., 1995; Ahmed and 
Courtis, 1999; Ho and Wong, 2001; Camfferman and Cooke 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Petersen and Plenborg, 2006). 
 
Lang and Lundholm (1993) argue that disclosure is influenced by a company’s relative 
performance but the direction of the relationship between the performance and disclosure 
is rather unclear. For example, firms with negative information (particularly earnings 
information) might wish to convey more information to enhance creditability or to reduce 
the likelihood of legal liability.  
 
Despite this, the positive relation between disclosure and firm performance is implied by 
theoretical models of voluntary disclosure in the face of adverse selection. According to 
Meek et al. (1995) companies that are performing well tend to voluntarily disclose more 
information. In general, in the presence of disclosure costs, firms whose performance 
exceeds a certain threshold will disclose, while those below the threshold will not. 
Raffournier (1995) and Wang et al. (2008) found empirical evidences of the positive 
relation between the extent of disclosure and profitability. According to Wang et al. (2008) 
as the firm’s earnings increase, managers have incentives to supply more information to 
the market in order to signal quality and legitimate their activities. 
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In this context, it’s expected voluntary disclosure to be positively related with company’s 
performance. 
 
 H3a: Voluntary disclosure is positively related to companies’ performance. 
 
 
A higher level of debt could lead to higher levels of agency costs, which could be 
eliminated by higher levels of disclosure. However, several studies support a negative 
relationship between the level of debt and disclosure practices, as is the case of Zarzeski 
(1996), Abd-Elsalam and Weetman (2003). The argument is sustained by the so-called 
signalling factors that support that companies with high leverage ratio belong to the    
bank–oriented financial system, where capital markets are no longer seen as the main 
source of finance and corporate information becomes more private than public. Otherwise, 
according to the signalling theory, firms with low leverage ratio are motivated to send 
signals to the market about their financial structure (Khlifi and Bouri , 2010).To Jensen 
(1986) increased leverage is expected to reduce disclosure because leverage helps control 
the free cash flow problem and the agency costs of debt are controlled through restrictive 
debt covenants in debt agreements rather than increased disclosure of information in 
annual reports. The study of Eng and Mak (2003) follow the idea that the inverse 
relationship between debt and disclosure is consistent with debt being a mechanism for 
controlling the free cash flow problem, reducing the need for disclosure.  
 
To Jensen and Meckling (1976) companies with a high level of debt try to reduce 
monitoring costs by disclosing more information. Tarca et al. (2005), based in Nobes 
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(1998), argue that firms with higher levels of debt to public agents tend to follow more the 
IAS/IFRS in their disclosure practices. According to the authors, and following the premise 
of agency theory, firms tend to disclose more information in case of debt to public agents, 
thereby enhancing the importance of identifying the level of inside and outside debt. Wang 
et al. (2008) and Allegrini and Greco (2011) predict a positive relation between debt and 
voluntary disclosure.  
 
In this context, it’s expected voluntary disclosure to be related with the level of debt (with 
no predicting sign). 
 
 H3b: Voluntary disclosure is related to the level of companies’ debt. 
 
 
Literature find evidence that larger firms disclose more information (e.g. Cooke, 1989a,b;  
Meek et al., 1995; Hossain et al., 1995; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 
2003; Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; Wang et al., 2008; Allegrini and Greco, 2011). Also 
Beattie et al. (2004) find a positive relation between the size and the reporting of British 
companies. Hope (2003) emphasizes the need of increasing the quality of accounting 
information available abroad due to high demand of this information.  
 
To Jensen and Meckling (1976) large companies face greater agency costs because they 
require large volumes of external capital to finance their investments. Large companies 
also attract more attention from various stakeholders and, therefore, would be more 
exposed to so-called political costs and have more willingness to adopt certain strategies to 
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reduce those costs. Watts and Zimmerman (1990) also argue that the political costs are 
greater in large organizations. Consequently, large firms tend to disclose more information 
to reinforce confidence and to reduce such costs.  
 
To Schipper (1981) and Lang and Lundholm (1993) larger firms have greater impact on 
society, making extensive use of capital markets and having a greater number of analysts 
following them. These facts make these companies willing to provide more information to 
the market.  
 
According to Land and Lundholm (1993) the cost of disseminating disclosures may be 
higher for small firms because the news media are more likely to carry stories about large 
firms and analysts are more likely to attend their meetings. Empirical evidence on the 
relation between firm size and earnings forecasts (e.g. Cox, 1985; Waymire, 1985; Lev and 
Penman, 1990) indicates that more earnings forecasts are reported in the financial press for 
large firms than for small firms. Atiase (1985) and Freeman (1987) provide evidence that a 
greater proportion of earnings information is impounded in stock prices prior to earnings 
announcements for large firms than for small firms, suggesting that the amount of 
information provided by and about firms is increasing in firm size. 
 
In this context, it’s expected that the amount of information provided by and about firms is 
increasing in firm size. 
 
 H3c: Voluntary disclosure is positively related with the size of the company. 
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For a firm without growth opportunities, mandated disclosure might be of sufficiently high 
quality to produce low information asymmetry. Because this firm has no need for external 
finance and has low litigation, incentive, and proprietary costs, it has little need for 
voluntary disclosure (Core, 2001). Growth firms have greater information asymmetry and 
agency costs (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993) and, according to Eng and 
Mak (2003), growth firms are expected to disclose more information than non-growth 
firms.  
 
Hossain et al. (2005) argue that high growth firms need external equity to stimulate their 
growth and equity providers require oriented information for the estimation of equity risks. 
Consistent with this argument, some studies document that disclosure is associated with a 
lower cost of equity (Botosan, 1997; Healy et al.,1999; Lang and Lundholm, 2000; and 
Botosan and Plumlee, 2002) and with a lower cost of debt (Sengupta, 1998), which in turn 
stimulates firms’ growth opportunities through the availability of finance to fund their 
acquisition and development. Otherwise, Myers and Majluf (1984) analytically show that 
if managers or insiders possess more information about the firm than investors, then equity 
may be ‘under-priced’ by the market. They suggest that the firm could mitigate this 
problem by releasing information to outside.  
 
Following this point of view, it’s expected that voluntary disclosure is positively related 
with growth opportunities. 
 
  H3d: Voluntary disclosure is positively related with growth opportunities. 
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The various hypotheses presented before are summarized in table 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 – Summary of the first group of hypotheses 
 
Ownership structure Predicted 
sign 
H1a: Voluntary disclosure is negatively related to managerial ownership. 
- 
H1b: Voluntary disclosure is positively related to government ownership. + 
H1c: Voluntary disclosure is negatively related to the presence of a large 
shareholder. 
- 
Directors’ and Supervisors’ structures 
 
H2a: Voluntary disclosure is positively related to the proportion of             
non-executives and independents directors on the board. 
+ 
H2b: Voluntary disclosure is related to the size of the board. +/- 
H2c: Voluntary disclosure is positively related with the existence of 
monitoring and control structures. 
+ 
H2d: Voluntary disclosure is positively related to management incentives. + 
H2e: Voluntary disclosure is related to management expertise. +/- 
General corporate characteristics 
 
H3a: Voluntary disclosure is positively related to companies’ performance. + 
H3b: Voluntary disclosure is related to the level of companies’ debt. +/- 
H3c: Voluntary disclosure is positively related with the size of the company. + 
H3d: Voluntary disclosure is positively related with growth opportunities. + 
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 3.2.2 The direct and indirect relation between corporate governance rules and 
           information asymmetry 
 
The second group of hypotheses will be tested using a structural equation model. We 
intend to study the direct and indirect relation between governance rules and information 
asymmetry, through the voluntary disclosure of information and organizational 
performance.  
 
As stated previously, the accounting report is the most affirmative way to give visibility to 
the activity and to the organizational performance. Because of this, it works as a sign of the 
governance of the company but also as a measure of the management quality. Corporate 
disclosure has a major role to ensure the efficient functioning of capital markets. Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) argue that firms with high disclosure ratings tend to show high 
contemporaneous earnings performance. Also Petersen and Plenborg (2006) state that 
firms may increase disclosure when they are performing well. In this sense, and as 
explained previously, the inclusion of organizational performance in the proposed model is 
explained by the fact that disclosure is a channel through which existing and potential 
shareholders obtain valuable information about the firm, namely about the company’s 
performance. A higher profitability might induce management to supply more information 
to illustrate its ability to maximize the shareholder’s value (Singhvi and Desai, 1971).  In 
this sense, and according to Healy and Palepu (2001: 431), “the association between 
capital market variables and disclosure may be driven by firm performance rather than 
disclosure per se”. Our model followed the arguments of the authors by considering that 
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“disclosure changes are unlikely to be random events: they are likely to coincide with 
changes in firm economics and governance characteristics”.  
 
With the proposed model we want to understand how corporate governance rules affect the 
level of information asymmetry in the capital market, directly and indirectly. For that we 
divided the governance rules in two major constructs: the ownership structure and the 
directors’ and supervisors’ structures. We hypothesized that directors’ and supervisors’ 
structures can influence the organizational performance and the information disclosed by 
firms to its shareholder and this, in turn, would affect the level of information asymmetry 
between management and shareholders. In relation to ownership structure, it is expected to 
exert an indirect influence on the level of information asymmetry, but the previous 
research showed us that a direct influence can also be expected. 
 
Like stated previously, the Spain and Portugal institutional setting has in common with 
other European Continental countries a relatively low number of listed companies, an 
illiquid capital market and, above all, a high level of concentration in corporate 
shareholdings. Following these arguments, will be included in the construct “ownership 
structure” variables that characterize the ownership concentration of the companies under 
study. The research model is presented in figure 3.1. The hypotheses, as well as the 
arguments of its formulation, are following presented. 
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Figure 3.1 – Path graphic of the proposed model 
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 3.2.2.1 Directors’ and supervisors’ structures 
 
According to Dehaene et al. (2001) the board of directors is an important entity in a 
company, creating a link between shareholders and managers and therefore playing an 
important role in the governance of a firm. To the authors, the board of directors is the 
most important and frequently used supervisory mechanism for management actions and, 
from a governance point of view, board composition thus has an impact on corporate 
performance. For example, Baysinger and Butler (1985) find that companies where the 
board is dominated by non-executive directors perform better than boards that are not. Lee 
et al. (1992) report that the shareholders’ value is best served when the board contains a 
substantial number of independent directors. Klein (1998) demonstrates a linkage between 
firm performance and board composition by examining the committee structures of boards 
and directors’ roles within these committees. She was able to find significant ties between 
firm performance and how boards are structured. 
 
Cai et al. (2006) and Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) assert that firms with boards that are 
effective in monitoring management activities tend to be associated with more frequent 
disclosures of quality information which in turn reduces information asymmetry. Firms 
with such effective boards also provide additional voluntary disclosures apart from those 
required by mandatory regulation. The literature also recognize that a key role in the board 
monitoring activities is played by supervising structures, like the audit committee, the 
remuneration committee or the external auditor (Laksmana, 2008; O’Sullivan et al., 2008). 
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In this sense, we can hypothesize that effective directors and supervisors structures are 
factors that function as tools that enhance organizational performance and exert a direct 
and determinant influence on the level of voluntary information disclosed. 
 
In this context, we established the following relations: 
 
 H4a: There is a positive relation between directors’ and supervisors’ structures and 
 voluntary disclosure. 
 H4b: There is a positive relation between directors’ and supervisors’ structures and 
 the level of organizational performance. 
 
 3.2.2.2 Ownership structure 
 
The structure of ownership determines the level of monitoring and thereby the level of 
disclosure. Fama and Jensen (1983) propose that where share ownership is widely held, the 
potential for conflicts between the principal and the agent is greater than in more closely 
held companies. As a result, more information is disclosed in widely held firms so that 
principals can effectively monitor that their economic interests are optimized and agents 
can signal that they act in the best interests of the owners. In the same sense, Petersen and 
Plenborg (2006) argue that firms with a high ownership concentration may be reluctant to 
provide voluntary disclosure since shareholders have alternative ways (inside) of getting 
information. Previous empirical evidence also indicates a negative relation between 
ownership concentration and disclosure (McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993; Mitchell et al., 
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1995; Schadewitz and Blevins, 1998). Also Chau and Gray (2002) show that there is a 
positive association between wider ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure.  
 
High levels of concentration of capital are accompanied by the owner’s considerable 
involvement in the firm’s management, which, in turn, lead to unrestricted access to 
information by “insiders” and less available information to “outsiders” (Raffournier, 1995). 
According to Heflin and Shaw (2000) in the case of ownership concentration, large 
shareholders may have access to private, value-relevant information about the firm. In this 
situation, market makers mitigate losses to informed traders by charging wider spreads and 
reducing the number of shares they offer in response to increases in the probability of 
informed trading. Also, Bolton and Von Thadden (1998) suggest that in a concentrated 
ownership structure the number of shareholders who can trade the stock is smaller which 
reduces the liquidity of the stock. Recently, Jacoby and Zheng (2010) find that their 
ownership concentration variables have an adverse impact on trading volume. Jiang et al. 
(2011) results reveal that ownership concentration in general is significantly positively 
associated with bid-ask spreads observed around annual report releases dates.  
 
To Berle and Means (1932) diffuse ownership yields significant power in the hands of 
managers whose interests do not coincide with the interest of shareholders. As a result, 
corporate resources are not used for maximization of shareholders’ value. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Megginson et al. (1994) and Zingales 
(1994) find a strong positive relation between ownership concentration and corporate 
performance and attribute it to the impact of better monitoring. 
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In this context, we established the following relations: 
 
 H5a: There is a negative relation between ownership concentration and voluntary 
 disclosure. 
 H5b: There is a negative relation between ownership concentration and the 
 turnover ratio. 
 H5c: There is a positive relation between ownership concentration and the bid-ask 
 spread in the market. 
 H5d: There is a positive relation between ownership concentration and 
 organizational performance. 
 
 3.2.2.3 Organizational performance 
 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) claim that in face of adverse selection, higher profitability might 
induce management to supply more information to illustrate its ability to maximize the 
shareholder’s value and to increase its managerial compensation. In this sense, the authors 
also argue that the management of a profitable firm may feel proud of its achievement and 
wish to disclose more information to the public to promote a positive impression of its 
performance. Some research on management earnings forecasts (e.g. Patell, 1976; Penman, 
1980; Lev and Penman, 1990) suggest that firms tend to disclose more frequently when 
they are experiencing favourable earnings results and that earnings forecasts are, on 
average, associated with positive returns.  
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According to Amihud and Mendelson (1986) stocks of firms with higher returns are 
allocated in equilibrium to portfolios with longer expected holding periods. In this sense, 
the authors claimed that observed asset return must be an increasing function of the 
expected holding periods, it also implies that the observed asset return must be a 
decreasing function of the turnover rate of that asset. More recently, Petersen and Plenborg 
(2006: 134) test, through regression models, the relation between the firm’s return on 
invested capital and the turnover ratio, with no predicted sign. According to the authors 
“the sign of the association between ROIC (return on invested capital) and information 
asymmetry is undeterminable”. Their results show a negative relation between the 
variables, but with no statistical significance. 
 
In this context, we established the following relations: 
 
 H6a: There is a positive relation between organizational performance and  voluntary 
 disclosure. 
 H6b: There is a relation between organizational performance and the turnover ratio 
 (no predicted sign) 
 
 3.2.2.4 Voluntary disclosure 
 
Merton (1987) argues that investors are more likely to invest and trade in firms that are 
well known or that they judge favourably. If higher disclosure quality increases a firm’s 
visibility and/or reduces the costs of processing firm specific public information, then 
higher disclosure quality will induce more trading in firm’s stock by uninformed investors. 
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Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and Kim and Verrecchia (1994) argue that voluntary 
disclosure reduces information asymmetries among informed and uninformed investors. 
Thus, it’s expected that voluntary disclosure promote more efficient prices and increase 
stock transactions. 
 
Several studies document a relation between the level of disclosure and the proxies of 
information asymmetry. Lang and Lundholm (1996) provide evidence that potential 
benefits of increased disclosure include reduced estimation risk and reduced information 
asymmetry. Welker (1995) documents a significant negative relation between analyst’s 
ratings of firm’s disclosures and bid-ask spreads. Healy et al. (1999) find that firms with 
increased analysts’ ratings of disclosure had significantly higher bid-ask spreads than their 
industries prior to the disclosure change. After the disclosure increase, bid-ask spreads for 
the sample firms reverted to the same levels as their industry peers. Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000) study German firms that switched from German to an international accounting 
regime, IAS or United States GAAP, thereby committing themselves to increased levels of 
disclosure. They find that firms that switch to an international accounting regime, in 
general, experience lower bid-ask spreads and higher trading volume. 
 
Petersen and Plenborg (2006) find a negative and statistical significant association between 
the level of voluntary disclosure and the bid-ask spread and positive and statistical 
significant association between the level of voluntary disclosure and the turnover ratio. 
This result is generally supported through year-by-year regressions. This coherence 
indicates that if firms focus on improving the level of disclosure, they attract investors’ 
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attention. As a result they may experience more efficient prices on shares. Also Espinosa et 
al. (2008) find a negative relation between their disclosure index and the bid-ask spread. 
 
In this context, we established the following relations: 
 
 H7a: There is a negative relation between voluntary disclosure of information and 
 the bid-ask spread. 
 H7b: There is a positive relation between voluntary disclosure of information and 
 the turnover ratio. 
 
 The various hypotheses presented before are summarized in table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2 – Summary of the second group of hypotheses 
 
Directors’ and supervisors’ structures Predicted 
sign 
H4a: There is a positive relation between directors’ and supervisors’ 
structures and voluntary disclosure. 
+ 
H4b: There is a positive relation between directors’ and supervisors’ 
structures and the level of organizational performance. 
+ 
Ownership structure  
H5a: There is a negative relation between ownership concentration and 
voluntary disclosure. 
- 
H5b: There is a negative relation between ownership concentration and the 
 turnover ratio. 
- 
H5c: There is a positive relation between ownership concentration and the 
bid-ask spread in the market. 
+ 
H5d: There is a positive relation between ownership concentration and 
 organizational performance. 
+ 
Organizational performance  
H6a: There is a positive relation between organizational performance and 
 voluntary disclosure. 
+ 
H6b: There is a relation between organizational performance and the turnover 
ratio (no predicted sign) +/- 
Voluntary disclosure  
H7a: There is a negative relation between voluntary disclosure of information 
and the bid-ask spread. 
- 
H7b: There is a positive relation between voluntary disclosure of information 
and the turnover ratio. 
+ 
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3.3 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we presented the two sets of research hypotheses to be tested, and the 
arguments that led to its formulation. 
 
The first group of hypotheses is aimed at studying the corporate governance determinants 
of voluntary disclosure. These hypotheses are tested through multiple regression models. 
The second group of hypotheses is intended to study the direct and indirect relations 
between governance rules and information asymmetry, through the voluntary disclosure of 
information and the organizational performance. In this case we presented the theoretical 
model of relations (path graphic) which will be tested using the structural equations 
methodology. 
 
The following chapter presents the sample, the analysis method, the definition of the 
variables and the descriptive statistics. 
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Chapter 4 –Research method 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter we begin by examining the composition of the sample that will serve as the 
basis for our study. Following this we describe the methodology used in our data analysis 
and present some of the most relevant aspects of the Structural Equation Model (SEM) 
methodology. After that we discuss the definition of the variables: the construction of the 
voluntary disclosure index, the variables related with corporate governance, the general 
corporate characteristics and the proxies of information asymmetry.  
 
Finally, we make the presentation and interpretation of the descriptive statistics for all 
variables. We proceed to an interpretation of the results of applying the voluntary 
disclosure index and assess the validity of this measure. In the last point we analyse 
separately the descriptive statistics for the Portuguese and for the Spanish companies. 
 
4.2 Sample 
 
Our sample consists of 140 listed companies from the Iberian Peninsula. Portugal has 38 
companies included in this study, which represents 27,14% of the total sample and Spain 
has 102 companies included, which represents 72,86%. The sample consists of non-
financial Iberian companies listed in the market in the year of 2007. Disregarding financial 
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firms, insurance companies and those that have different accounting years than that of the 
calendar year (e.g. football clubs), it’s justified because they differ, by their special nature, 
in the specificity of their activities.  
 
Our sample shall work as a whole, not being our purpose to make of the comparative 
analysis our subject of study, but rather to examine the group of companies of Iberian 
Peninsula. We made an initial selection of Portuguese and Spanish companies listed in the 
stock market, extracting from the universe of listed companies in both countries those that 
checked the situation described above. However, the lack of data, especially with regard to 
variables related to information asymmetry, coming from Thomson Datastream database, 
led to a reduction of the initial sample to 140 companies. The list of companies in the 
sample is found in appendix 1. 
 
The consolidated accounts of the selected companies are analysed, when these companies 
are required to consolidate, and not the individual accounts, since for the study it makes 
more sense to analyse all the data of the group, due to the fact that all businesses contribute 
to the performance of the mother company. The data used in the research was collected 
from the Thomson Datastream database as well as from the analysis of reports and 
accounts of the companies and the information disclosed by companies in their official 
websites, being for this reason a large part of the information hand collected. We also 
collected data from the annual reports about the corporate governance of listed companies, 
made by the Portuguese Securities Market Commission (CMVM, 2008) and the Spanish 
Securities Market Commission (CNMV, 2008) for the year of 2007. 
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Given the lengthy analysis of the variables related to voluntary disclosure of information, 
which involved the reading and classification of information contained in voluntary 
reporting of annual accounts and the official websites of companies, was not considered 
practicable to extend this analysis to a broader horizon. In this manner, and following a 
series of studies in this area that analysed one year of disclosure24, we choose to analyse 
the year of 2007. In this sense, we analysed the information disclosed by Iberian Peninsula 
non-financial listed companies few time after the obligation of following the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and after a set of amendments on the corporate 
governance recommendations adopted in both countries. In Spain, the Unified Good 
Governance Code, applicable from 2007 onwards, provided a common standard for the 
good governance practices of all listed firms. In Portugal, the recommendations on 
Corporate Governance were implemented on a comply-or-explain basis in 2001, 
continuing to be regularly improved through a process of bi-annual amendments.   
 
4.3 Data analysis 
 
We are going to employ univariate and multivariate techniques for data analysis in our 
study. We start with the analysis of the correlations between corporate governance 
characteristics, voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry proxies. After that we 
employ multiple regression equations to examine the relationship between voluntary 
disclosure, the governance rules and corporate characteristics. The analysis of the 
regressions results will help us to confirm the previous developed hypotheses about the 
                                                 
24
 See, for example, the work of Botosan (1997), Eng and Mak (2003), Chau and Gray (2002), Wang et al. 
(2008) or Allegrini and Greco (2011). 
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determinants of voluntary disclosure. To extend the analysis we use the methodology of 
structural equation models.  
 
Multiple regression equations are widely used in research on corporate governance, but it 
can only process one dependent variable at a time. Structural Equation Model (SEM) can 
check the dependant relationship of two or more variables at the same time. According to 
Hair et al. (1998) SEM is more appropriate in an examination of multi-dimensional issues. 
Thus, we applied the technique of structural equation modelling, path analysis, to test 
simultaneously for existing relationships among the variables included in our study. 
Structural equations are particularly suitable because they allow us to do simultaneous 
analysis of a series of multiple regression equations and are particularly useful when the 
dependent variable in one equation becomes an independent variable in the subsequent 
ones. Also the path analysis allows us to do the confirmatory factor analysis, facilitating 
the introduction of non-observed concepts (latent constructs). For not being a methodology 
so frequently used in this research area, we will approach in the following points some of 
the main aspects related with its implementation. 
 
 4.3.1 Main aspects of SEM 
 
According to Hair et al. (1998) SEM techniques are distinguished from others by two 
characteristics: (1) estimation of multiple and interrelated dependence relationships, and 
(2) the ability to represent unobserved concepts in these relationships and account for 
measurement error in the estimation process.  
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The SEM is the result of the evolution that the multiequation modelling has suffered in 
recent years to adapt itself to solve problems that arise in the social sciences, particularly 
associated with the difficulty of measuring variables. The SEM enfolds an entire family of 
models with many designations, among them covariance structure analysis, latent variable 
analysis and confirmatory factor analysis. Following Hair et al. (1998) SEM, in their 
simplest sense, provide an estimation technique to proceed to a better and more efficient 
estimation of simultaneous equations through multiple regressions.  However, these 
models extend the field of analysis of simultaneous equations, while acknowledging that 
the variables we want to analyse can not be observed directly. SEM involves two types of 
variables: observed and latent variables. The SEM assumes that the latent variables can not 
be observed directly but only through indicators that are partial and imperfect measures of 
these variables. 
 
Thus, in building a structural equation model we shall have indicators and constructs. 
Indicators are observed variables, sometimes called “manifest variables” or “reference 
variables”. Four or more are recommended, but three is acceptable and common practice. 
However, two indicators or even a single indicator may be acceptable if the researcher is 
confident in the measure's validity and reliability. In fact, the prime consideration in 
selecting indicators is whether they are theoretically and reliably measured (Hair et al., 
1998). Latent variables are the “unobserved variables” or “constructs” which are 
measured by their respective indicators25. 
 
                                                 
25
 During our work we will use the term “indicators” for observed variables and the terms “latent variable” or 
“construct” for unobserved variables. 
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Duarte (2000) emphasizes the ability of these models to incorporate, in the analysis, 
concepts that can not be directly observed (latent variables), taking into account its 
previous measurement by indicators selected for this purpose. This is further boosted by 
the possibility offered by this type of modelling, to study the direct and indirect relations 
between variables in the model. In this sense, and following Hoyle (2005), we can say that 
these kinds of models, by allowing the calculation of direct, indirect and total effects when 
studying causal relationships between variables, provide a more comprehensive approach 
in terms of defining our process of data analysis. 
  
 4.3.1.1 The measurement model and the structural model 
 
Both the measurement model and the structural model are part of the structural equation 
model. The measurement components of the structural equation models show the 
relationship between the latent variables and indicators selected for the purpose of their 
measurement. According to Hair et al. (1998: 581) “the measurement model is a sub model 
in SEM that (1) specifies the indicators for each construct, and (2) assesses the reliability26 
of each construct for estimating the casual relationships”. 
 
Each latent variable is usually associated with one or more indicators of 
measurement. However, multiple indicators are preferable to a single one. Although it be 
noted that there is no consensus in the literature about the ideal number of indicators for 
each latent variable. 
                                                 
26
 Also according to Hair et al. (1998: 583) reliability is the “degree to which a set of a latent construct 
indicators are consistent in their measurements”. 
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This allocation of indicators to measure latent variables should be based on the hypothesis 
raised by the theory, through the matrix of restrictions (Λx and Λy) included in the model, 
that specifies which indicator or indicators measure a particular latent variable. The 
elements of the matrices Λx and Λy specify the relationship between the observed and 
latent variables, those being designated as factor loadings. According to Schumacker and 
Lomax (1996) each factor loading provides information about how a particular indicator is 
measuring a given latent variable. 
 
By recognizing explicitly that the indicators are partial and imperfect measures of that 
variable and through the inclusion of the error term (ε and δ), we combine the concerns of 
measurement with the development of the model. Measurement errors represent the 
proportion of variance of the observable variable which is not explained by the latent 
variables that are supposed to be measured by that variable (Schumacker and Lomax, 
1996). 
 
According to Hair et al. (1998) the measurement model is similar in form to factor 
analysis. The major difference lies in the degree of control provided by the researcher. In 
factor analysis, the researcher can specify only the number of factors, but all variables have 
loadings (i.e. they act as indicators) for each factor. In the measurement model the 
researcher specifies which variables are indicators of each construct, with variables having 
no loadings other than those on its specified construct. 
 
In summary, the formulation of the measurement model specifies the selected indicators 
for each latent variable and its estimation and evaluation allows the analysis of the 
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following aspects: the analysis of the reliability allows us to check if the chosen indicators 
selected measure accurately the latent variables; the analysis of the statistical significance 
of the estimated coefficient that relates the latent variable to the indicator in question 
allows us to check what is the best indicator to measure the latent variable in question; and 
the analysis of the "dimension" of the error term of each measurement equation allows us 
to verify in what extent the observed variables are measuring something different from the 
latent variables. 
 
In relation to the structural model Hair et al. (1998: 583) state that it’s a “set of one or 
more dependence relationships linking the hypothesized model’s constructs”. In this way, 
the structural model becomes one of the most useful in representing the interrelationships 
of variables between dependence relationships. 
 
The estimation of this model allows us to determine the interrelationship between the 
endogenous variables and the impact of each of the exogenous variables in those variables. 
Simultaneously it is recognized, by the inclusion of the error term (ζ), the possibility that 
there were other exogenous variables beyond those considered as possible determinants of 
the variables to explain. 
 
 4.3.1.2 Mathematical formulation of the path diagram 
 
A path diagram is a schematic representation of the relations between the set of variables 
under study, which may include not only the causal relationships between the constructs 
(i.e. relations between the independent and dependent variables) but also the relations of 
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association (correlations), which can be considered either among the constructs or among 
their indicators.  
 
According to Hair et al. (1998) the term construct is used to represent a theoretical concept 
that cannot be measured directly, for this reason it’s necessary to measure it indirectly 
through indicators. In a path diagram it’s usually represented by an oval. Besides the 
constructs, arrows are also necessary in order to construct a path diagram. These arrows 
indicate the type of relations established between the constructs (a right arrow indicates a 
direct link of causality; a curved arrow, or a line without arrows at its end, simply indicates 
the existence of a correlation between the constructs). 
 
After developing the theoretical model, and having proceeded to its schematic 
representation in the form of a path diagram (see figure 3.1, chapter 3), we can think of it 
in its more formal specification using to that end a series of equations that define it: (A) the 
measurement model specifying which variables measure which constructs, (B) the 
structural equations linking constructs, and (C) a set of matrices indicating any 
hypothesized correlations among constructs or variables (Hair et al., 1998). 
 
The conversion of a path diagram led to the specification of a set of equations for both the 
structural model and the measurement model. Below we present, even though in a reduced 
form, the model that is going to be used as basis in our analysis. As stated previously, the 
structural equation models consist of two parts: the measurement model and the structural 
model. Following the notation of Hair et al. (1998) the model to be used can be presented 
in its matrix form, by the following system of equations: 
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Measurement Models: 
 Y =       Λy       η    +    ε 
 (p x 1)     (p x m)   (m x 1)        (p x 1)  
 
 X =       Λx       ξ    +    δ 
 (q x 1)     (q x n)   (n x 1)        (q x 1)  
 
 
Structural Model: 
 η =         B         η    +    Г       ξ     +  ζ 
 (m x 1)     (m x m)   (m x 1)     (m x n)   (n x 1)      (m x 1) 
  
Where: 
 
Y – vector of the endogenous indicators; 
X – vector of the exogenous indicators; 
η – vector of the endogenous constructs; 
ξ – vector of the exogenous constructs; 
 
Λx and Λy – matrices  of the regression coefficients of X on ξ and of Y on η, respectively; 
B – matrix of the relationships of endogenous to endogenous constructs; 
Г – matrix of the relationships of exogenous to endogenous constructs; 
Φ  - matrix of correlation among exogenous constructs; 
Ψ - matrix of correlation among endogenous constructs 
ζ – vector of residuals of the structural model; 
ε and δ – residuals of the Y and X vectors, respectively. 
 
Minimum allowed hypotheses in the estimation of the complete model: 
 
(1) ε is not correlated with η; 
(2) δ is not correlated with ξ; 
(3) ζ is not correlated with ξ; 
(4) ζ, δ and ε are not correlated with each other, but, there may however, exist correlation between the error 
terms of equations of each of the measurement and structural models, which is calculated when estimating 
these models; 
(5) E (ζ) = E (δ) = E (ε) = 0 
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Matrices sizes: 
 
 n - number of exogenous constructs; 
 m – number of endogenous constructs; 
 q – number of exogenous constructs indicators; 
 p – number of endogenous constructs indicators. 
 
 4.3.1.3 Aspects that affect the estimation of SEM 
 
In the literature different aspects have been identified that affect the estimation of 
structural equation models and the performance of each precision measure index of the 
adjustment. Among these issues we can highlight: model misspecification, sample size, 
departures from normality and estimation procedure and complexity model (Byrne, 1998). 
 
-Model Misspecification 
 
According to Hair et al. (1998: 604) “model misspecification refers to the extent that the 
model suffers from specification error. (…) specification error is the omission of relevant 
variables from the specified model”.  
 
According to the authors, it’s commonly accepted that all models suffer from specification 
errors. The structural equation models are no exception, as they don’t include all potential 
variables. However, specification errors can be more or less depending on if the researcher 
has included all constructs and indicators that are relevant to the theory. A well-fitting 
model will have small residuals. Large residuals suggest model misspecification. Also 
sample size can affect the ability of the model to be correctly estimated. Thus, the greater 
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the possibility of not having a completely specified model, the greater the number of 
elements in the sample should be. 
 
-Sample size 
 
The sample size is one of the aspects which affect the estimation results of SEM and its 
evaluation. There is a unanimous view among researchers that the greater the number of 
parameters of the model to estimate, the greater the size of the sample should be. However, 
there remains the discussion of what should be considered a reasonable sample size. Kline 
(1998) considers that a sample with fewer than 100 cases doesn’t provide a stable analysis, 
unless the model to be estimated is too simple. In this sense, the author classifies samples 
with fewer than 100 cases as small, those between 100 and 200 cases as medium and those 
that exceed the 200 cases as large, by advocating the use of the latter.  Resinger and Turner 
(1999) advocate the use of a sample of between 100 and 400 cases.  
  
However, it’s important to note that the values mentioned can not be regarded as absolute, 
since other aspects must be taken into account. According to Hair et al. (1998) as model 
complexity increases, so do the sample size requirements. It should also be noted that, on 
one hand, the increase in sample size leads to a more stable solution, on the other hand, this 
may lead to a factor of instability, namely when using the method of maximum likelihood 
estimation (being the most common estimation procedure), for it is very sensitive when in 
the presence of a very small samples (less than 50 cases) or very large (over 500 cases). 
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-Estimation procedure and departures from normality 
 
Early attempts at structural equation model estimation were performed with ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression. But these efforts were quickly supplanted by maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimation. This method is efficient and unbiased when the assumption of 
multivariate normality is met (Hair et al., 1998). The sensitivity of ML estimation to no 
normality, however, created a need for alternative estimations techniques like the 
generalized least squares (GLS), asymptotically distribution free (ADF), among others. 
 
Chou and Bentler (1995) consider that it is difficult to find recommendations in the 
existing literature regarding the estimation method to use when working with SEM. The 
method of maximum likelihood is that which has been widely used, being used by defect in 
many of the software programs (i.e. LISREL, AMOS, EQS, among others). However, this 
estimation method assumes, as stated above, that the observed variables follow a normal 
distribution, an assumption that is often violated in many applications of SEM. Despite this 
fact, there are arguments in the literature that hang on to this method even when the 
variables deviate from the hypothesis of normal distribution. Hoyle (1995) argues that the 
ML method is reasonably robust against modest violations of the assumption of normality 
of the observed variables. Along these lines, Jaccard and Wan (1996: 74-75) argue that 
“there is a growing body of literature suggesting that maximum likelihood estimation is 
reasonably robust to many types of violation of multivariate normality. The issue, then, is 
not whether non normality exists, but rather whether the degree of non normality is 
sufficient to disrupt effective data analysis”. 
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A summary of the main methods of estimation used in SEM, as well as a short approach of 
the advantages and disadvantages of using one in detriment of the other, is present in 
appendix 2. 
 
Chou and Bentler (1995), when conducting a review of previous studies, argue that the 
estimates for the parameters, obtained by the ML method, are good even when the 
variables do not follow a joint normal distribution, but are continuous. Olsson et al. (2000) 
comparing the performance of estimation methods such as ML, GLS and WLS (weighted 
least square), using a simulation study, conclude that of the three methods the ML is more 
insensitive than the others to variations in sample size and kurtosis. 
 
-Overall model fit  
 
To assess the overall model fit the researchers can use several goodness-of-fit measures. 
This goodness-of-fit measure the correspondence of the actual observed input matrix with 
that predicted from the proposed model. These measures can be of three types: (1) absolute 
fit measures, (2) incremental fit measures, or (3) parsimonious fit measures. Absolute fit 
measures assess only the overall model fit (both structural and measurement models 
collectively). The incremental fit measures the proposed model with a base model, 
commonly referred to as null model. Finally, parsimonious fit measures the “adjust” 
measures of fit to provide a comparison between models with differing numbers of 
estimated coefficients (Hair et al., 1998: 611). Given the multiplicity of measures that have 
been proposed in literature, the question is what kind of measures should be used in the 
assessment of adjusting the full model to the data. In the case of SEM, unlike the case with 
 189 
other multivariate analysis, there are no unique statistical tests accepted, by consensus, as 
being those that better assess the adjustment of the complete model to the data.  
 
Jaccard and Wan (1996) argue that the researcher should use measures of the three classes 
mentioned above, to evaluate their model. If the model shows a good performance in terms 
of adjustment to the data when we are using measures of the three classes, it adds 
significantly to the confidence of the proposed model. A brief description of some 
goodness-of-fit tests that have been suggested in the literature, and the level of acceptance 
recommended for each one of them, is presented in appendix 3. 
 
Regarding the evaluation of the model, some proposed measures are also greatly affected 
by sample size, as is the case of the chi-square statistic27. This measure of model fitting to 
data is only recommended when working with samples comprising between 100 and 200 
cases (Hair et al., 1998). According to Fan et al. (1999) measures overestimate all 
goodness of fit for small samples (< 200) though the Root Mean Square Error 
Approximation (RMSEA) and the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) are less sensitive to sample 
size than others, and are therefore best suited as a measure of overall adjustment and 
increment. According to those authors, the Goodness-of-Fit Index (GFI) and the Adjusted 
Goodness-of-Fit Index (AGFI) indices have, in this regard, a worse performance. 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 Among other reasons that have been mentioned in the literature, so that the χ ² statistic is interpreted with 
caution, it’s particularly important its sensitivity to the size of the sample. Wheaton (1987) argues that the χ ² 
depends directly on the sample size, meaning that large samples may lead to the rejection of the model. 
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-Complexity of the Model 
 
The aim of the researcher should always be to find a compromise between the concern 
about specification errors, which the model may contain, and the benefits of building a 
concise and parsimonious model (Augusto, 2003). It’s commonly accepted that the greater 
the number of variables presented in the model or relationship established, the greater the 
practical problems in terms of model estimation and interpretation of results. The 
complexity of the formulated model strongly affects the required sample size. Having more 
parameters to estimate, the sample size should be increased in order to obtain a stable 
solution (Duarte, 2000). Moreover, a greater complexity of the formulated model obstructs 
their assessment. Some measures for evaluating the models are sensitive to the same levels 
of complexity. The AGFI index is simply the index adjusted GFI facing an increasing 
complexity of the model. The index CFI has been considered the least affected by the 
complexity of the model (Hulland et al., 1996). 
 
4.4 Variables definition 
 4.4.1 The construction of a voluntary disclosure index for our study 
 
The construction of the voluntary disclosure index used in this study was based on the 
information firms provided in their annual reports to shareholders and information 
disclosed in their official website.  
 
According to Botosan (1997: 326) “existing evidence indicates that firms coordinate their 
disclosure policies across different media”. Lang and Lundholm (1993), using the set of 
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corporate disclosure rankings produced by the Association of Investment Management and 
Research (AIRM), document a significant rank-order correlation between annual report 
and other publication disclosure rankings (coefficient of 0,62) and between annual report 
and investors relations disclosure rankings (coefficient of 0,41).  
 
This suggested, according to Botosan (1997: 326), “that a measure of disclosure level 
produced by examining any one aspect of corporate reporting could proxy for the general 
level of disclosure provided by a firm”. We relied on this assumption when we used the 
voluntary information found in the firm’s annual report and official website to serve as a 
proxy for the voluntary disclosure provided by a firm across all venues.  
 
To Botosan (1997) the annual report is generally considered to be one of the most 
important sources of corporate information. For example, Knutson (1992: 7) states that “at 
the top of every analyst’s list (of financial reports used by analysts) is the annual report to 
shareholders. It is the major reporting document and every other financial report is in 
some respect subsidiary or supplementary to it”. Also Standard & Poor’s (2002) analysis 
focused on annual reports. According to Standard & Poor’s (2002: 6) “a focus on annual 
reports facilitates analysis and comparison of companies around the globe (…) academic 
researchers have identified annual reports as the principal communication device 
available to companies”.  
 
Despite this, we also considered in the construction of our voluntary disclosure index the 
information that companies provided in their official sites. As explained previously, the 
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internet is now considered an important medium for communicating corporate financial 
and business information (CICA, 2008). 
 
We constructed the voluntary disclosure index for 140 non-financial Iberian Peninsula 
companies listed in the market in the year of 2007. Following the argument of Botosan 
(1997: 327) “disclosure policies appear to remain relatively constant over time”. For 
example, Haely et al. (1995) are able to identify only 90 large and sustained increases in 
AIRM disclosure rankings in a sample of 595 firms in 23 industries over the period of 
1980 to 1990. Following Botosan (1997: 327) this suggests that “year-to-year disclosure 
observations for a given firm are not independent”.  
 
Our study is similar to other disclosure studies using self-constructed voluntary disclosure 
indices and one year of disclosure, like for example: Botosan (1997) considered a sample 
of 122 companies for the year of 1990; Eng and Mak (2003) used a sample of 158 
companies for de year of 1995; Chau and Gray (2002) used a sample of 60 companies for 
de year of 1997; Oliveira et al.(2006) considered a sample of 56 companies for the year of 
2003; Wang et al. (2008) analysed a sample of 110 companies for de year of 2005 and, 
more recently, Allegrini and Greco (2011) considered a sample of 177 companies for the 
year of 2007. 
 
Our self-constructed index is also similar to that in Eng and Teo (1999), Eng et al. (2001) 
and Petersen and Plenborg (2006). The design of our index was also inspired by AICPA 
(1994) study of business reporting (i.e. the Jenkins Committee Report), the PwC Value 
Reporting (1999), the Business Reporting Research Project by the Steering Committee 
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Report (FASB, 2001b) and the report of CICA (2008). Common to these reports is the fact 
that they focus on investors’ needs. 
 
The technique used was the content analysis. This technique is increasingly used in studies 
about the content of business reporting. Beattie et al. (2004) describes in her study various 
forms of corporate reports analysis, using content analysis. Bardin (2004) sustains that the 
content analysis is a set of techniques for communication analysis in order to obtain, 
through a systematic and objective description of the contents of messages, indicators 
(quantitative or not) that allow the inference of knowledge concerning the conditions of 
production/reception (inferred variables) of the messages. Although this type of 
methodology presents a certain nature of subjectivity, the results of several previous 
studies give us assurance to use the content analysis methodology. 
 
For Jones and Shoemaker (1994) content analysis is the method of research that formulates 
inferences from information, through the systematic identification of the characteristics 
contained in the information analysed. It is a discrete analysis because the documents can 
be evaluated without the knowledge of the communicator, in this aspect it differs 
significantly from other forms of scientific evaluation, such as questionnaires, laboratory 
experiments, or even field studies. 
 
These authors consider the possibility of identifying two main approaches to complement 
the textual analysis, with distinct objectives, using the content analysis: the thematic 
approach, that aims to extract and analyse themes within the message, and the syntactic 
approach, whose aim is to analyse and quantify the cognitive impairment to read the 
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message. While the first identifies specific trends, attitudes or categories of content from 
the text and infers from them, the second focuses on the analysis of the readability of the 
text using textual syntactic features (such as length or number of syllables). 
 
Smith and Taffer (1999) also note the existence of two broad approach alternatives to 
content analysis: “oriented by form” analysis (objective), which involves routine counting 
of words or concrete references, and the “oriented by meaning” analysis (subjective), 
which focuses on the analysis of the underlying themes in the research texts. 
 
It seems to us that our content analysis falls within the orientated by meaning analysis of 
Smith and Taffer (1999) and the thematic approach of content analysis, as defined by Jones 
and Shoemaker (1994). 
 
Wang et al. (2008) identify two steps in the process of constructing the index of disclosure: 
(1) create a preliminary list of items based on previous studies, (2) determine the 
appropriateness of each item in the sample to be studied and, if necessary, change the 
preliminary list of items. The author followed Cooke (1989b) regarding the score to be 
allocated according to the verification of each item of disclosure: if the company released 
an information item included in the index it would score 1 for that item, if not disclosed it 
would obtain a score of 0. 
 
Typically the extent of voluntary disclosure depends largely on the items of information 
included in the disclosure checklist. The selection of information items is thus a very 
critical factor in the measurement of corporate disclosure. A disclosure checklist 
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incorporates significant items of information that managers are expected to provide in 
order to satisfy the information needs of different user groups (Ho and Wong, 2001; Chau 
and Gray, 2002).  
 
To FASB (2001b) companies that make voluntary disclosures have chosen to differentiate 
themselves by enhancing the amount of business information they provide. In the PwC 
Value Reporting (1999) the most important value driver is the information regarding firm’s 
strategic circumstances such as the future strategic direction and actions during the fiscal 
year, aimed at promoting strategic and financial objectives. They also found that 
information about market growth, market size, market share and competitiveness are 
among the ten most important value drivers. Botosan (1997), Jenkins Report (AICPA, 
1994) and CICA (2008) find that information about production is important for investors. 
According to FASB (2001b) company should disclose forward-looking information 
including management’s plans and including critical success factors. 
 
Information about marketing strategy is only addressed to a limited extend in the reports. 
PwCs (1999) consider information about brands and customers as key drivers of value. 
Botosan (1997) includes some areas within marketing strategy. In the marketing strategy 
literature, like for example Doyle (2000) and Porter (1996), this area is considered 
important for the future success of a firm. To AICPA (1994) reports should include 
information related to the amount and quality of key resources, including human resources. 
FASB (2001b) identified as important disclosure the information about intangible assets 
that have not been recognized in the financial statements. 
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Following the previous arguments, we believe that informative disclosures should help 
investors to better understand: the company’s strategy, including how it addresses 
opportunities and risks; the competitive environment within which the company operates; 
the information about management and production; forward-looking information and the 
framework within which decisions are made; and information about intangible assets. In 
this sense, our disclosure index includes six categories of voluntary disclosure: strategy, 
market and competition, management and production, future perspective, marketing and 
human capital.  
 
The definition of the items included in each category followed some of the disclosure 
studies described previously (see chapter 2, table 2.6) that also used self-constructed 
indices of voluntary disclosure through the content analysis methodology. 
 
In addition, we also analysed in a particular way the following research studies: 
“Improving business reporting – a costumer focus (the Jenkins report)”, developed by 
AICPA (1994); the research study “Improving business reporting: insights into enhancing 
voluntary disclosures” (Steering Committee Report), developed by FASB (2001b); and the 
research study “Corporate reporting to stakeholders”, developed by CICA (2008).  
 
The Jenkins Committee undertook a comprehensive study to determine the information 
needs of users to identify the types of information most useful. The Committee designed 
the study to ensure that the findings were representative of a broad group of users and to 
distinguish between the types of information users really need and the types that are 
interesting but not essential.  
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The objective of the Steering Committee Report was to help companies improve their 
business reporting. By providing evidence that many companies are making extensive 
voluntary disclosures and by listing examples of those disclosures, the Steering Committee 
expected that more companies will undertake or expand their efforts of providing voluntary 
disclosures. The examples in this report provided helpful illustrations of such voluntary 
disclosures.  
 
For the Steering Committee, the term “voluntary disclosure” describes disclosures, 
primarily outside the financial statements, that are not explicitly required by regulation 
rules. However, it is recognized that many of these “voluntary disclosures” are made to 
comply with the regulation requirements concerning description of a business and 
management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations. The 
Committee did not believe that a debate about the degree to which some disclosures are 
already required would be useful to this process and, instead, focused on the primary 
objective of identifying disclosures believed to be especially helpful for investors. 
 
In the same line, the purpose of the study developed by CICA (2008) was to promote 
effective communication by providing helpful guidance for comprehensive and integrated 
corporate reporting. A secondary purpose was to suggest which useful information can be 
communicated. Although this research focused primarily on information disclosures in 
corporate annual reports and on company websites, the analyses carried out also largely 
apply to corporate reporting overall. 
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In this sense, the items selected for inclusion in our voluntary disclosure index followed 
the previous described research studies, but they also had to converge with the type of 
items reported by Iberian Peninsula listed companies. Furthemore, we focus on the 
objective of identifying disclosures believed to be helpful for information users.  
 
In table 4.1 we describe a total of 60 items considered within the six categories. 
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Table 4.1 – Items of Voluntary Disclosure 
  
 
Category Voluntary disclosure items 
General presentation of the company’s strategy 
Main corporate goals or objectives 
Main actions taken to achieve the corporate goals 
Definition of the deadline for each corporate goal 
Corporate position related to ethic/social questions 
Corporate position related to environment issues 
Detailed segment/unit performance 
Evaluation of the commercial risk 
Evaluation of the financial risk 
Evaluation of other risks 
Corporate I&D/Innovation policy 
Organizational Culture 
Main events of the current year 
Information about analysts 
Strategy  
15 items 
Other important strategic information 
Identification of the principal markets 
Specific characteristics of these markets 
Dimension of the markets 
Identification of the main competitors 
Market shares 
Forecast of market growth  
Forecast of share market growth 
Impact of competition on profits 
Identification of markets’ barriers to entry 
Impact of markets barriers to entry on future profits 
Market and Competition 
11 items 
Impact of competition on future profits 
Identification of the principal products/ services 
Specific characteristics of these products/services 
Proposal for new products/services 
Changes in production/services methods  
Investment in production/services 
Norms of the quality of the product/service 
Rejection/defect rates (when applicable) 
Input/output rates (when applicable) 
Volume of materials consumed (when applicable) 
Change in product materials (when applicable) 
Management and 
Production 
11 items 
Life cycle of the product (when applicable) 
New action/initiative/event 
Forecasts of sales/results/cash flows 
Investment forecasts 
Return rates for each investment project  
Hypotheses considered in forecasts 
Result application proposal  
Dividend policy 
Future perspective 
8 items 
Macroeconomic background  
Disclosure of marketing strategy  
Disclosure of sales strategy 
Disclosure of  distribution channels 
Disclosure of  sales and marketing costs 
Disclosure of brand equity/visibility ratings  
Disclosure of the customer satisfaction level 
Marketing 
7 items 
Disclosure of customer mix 
Description of workforce 
Description of the remuneration/compensation system 
Qualification policy of workers 
Value created by worker 
Employee retention rates 
Productivity indicators 
Strategies to measure human capital 
Human capital 
8 items 
Other measures of human capital 
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We read the annual reports of 2007 for the sample firms and assessed each annual report 
on the six disclosure categories. Following Gray et al. (1995), our disclosure index is 
unweighted as it assumes that each indicator of each disclosure category is equally 
important. Cooke (1989b) suggests that unweighted indices are an appropriate research 
instrument in disclosure studies when the focus of the research is directed at all users of 
corporate annual reports rather than the information needs of any specific user group. 
Some authors criticise the assignment of different scores, using as argument the fact that 
there is considerable subjectivity in assigning weights to different disclosure items (Chow 
e Wong-Boren, 1987; Babio and Muiño, 2001).  
 
Despite the use of an unweighted index, we use a scale, of zero to two, to score the level of 
detail of the information disclosed about each indicator inside the six categories, following 
the approach of Robb et al. (2001). The firms’ score was 0 if the company did not disclose 
anything about that indicator, the score was 1 if the company disclosed without detail and, 
finally, the score was 2 if the company disclosed with detail. We considered that 
information was disclosed with detail if it can help it’s users in their decision-making. This 
seems important because we can score a company if the company discloses something 
about that indicator, but if that information doesn’t have the necessary detail it will not be 
useful to users. So, it is important to disclose, but it is also important to disclose with 
usefulness detail, so that information can provide investors with a better understanding. 
According to Botosan (1997) precise information is more useful and will enhance 
management’s reputation and credibility. In short, our methodology is not to count 
sentences or paragraphs that refer to a particular item in a given category, but instead to see 
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whether there is information disclosed about the item and the degree of detail of that 
information.  
 
One potential problem pointed to this methodology is that a firm may be penalised for not 
disclosing an item of information although there is no information to disclose on it. In 
order to overcome this problem, some voluntary information items were coded as “not 
applicable”. For firms having “not applicable” items, the use of a relative index is 
suggested (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). The relative index approach is the ratio of what a firm 
actually disclosed to what the firm is expected to disclose. This approach has been used in 
several prior studies (Cooke, 1989b; Wallace et al., 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995; 
Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Ho and Wong, 2001; Chau and Gray, 2002). The voluntary 
disclosure indices by category are the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score 
on a category’s issues to the maximum possible score applied in those issues. Thus, the 
voluntary disclosure index for the company i, in the category j, will be equal to the sum of 
the total number of points awarded by the firm i, for the category j, divided by the 
maximum score that the company i can achieve in the category j. So, the voluntary 
disclosure indices by category are calculated according to the following formula: 
ji
ji
ji
score
score
ndexisclosureIVoluntaryDCategory
,
,
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∑
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The total voluntary disclosure index is the sum of the total number of points awarded by 
the firm i, for all categories, divided by the maximum score that the company i can achieve 
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in all categories. Thus, the total voluntary disclosure index is calculated according to the 
following formula28: 
i
i
i
score
score
ndexisclosureIVoluntaryDTotal )max(_
∑
=  
 
A scoresheet was designed for scoring firms on the amount and the level of detail of 
disclosures. Appendix 4 contains a scoresheet that illustrate, for one of the companies in 
our sample, the process of scoring the information provided in a category of voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
 4.4.2 Corporate governance characteristics and control variables 
 
The data about corporate governance and general corporate characteristics (control 
variables) were collected from the reports and accounts of the companies and from the 
annual reports about the corporate governance of listed companies, made by the 
Portuguese Securities Market Commission (CMVM, 2008) and the Spanish Securities 
Market Commission (CNMV, 2008) for the year of 2007. We divided the corporate 
governance characteristics in two major categories: equity ownership structure and 
directors’ and supervisors’ structures, as explained previously. To characterize the equity 
ownership structure we analyse the ownership concentration, namely through the analysis 
of the biggest shareholder, the biggest five shareholders and the significant participations29. 
To examine the level of management ownership we analysed the capital owned by the 
                                                 
28
 As explained previously, we followed the same disclosure index calculation method employed in other 
disclosure studies, such as Ho and Wong (2001) and Chau and Gray (2002). 
29
 We considered significant participations as: shareholders that have, direct or indirectly, more than 2% of 
share capital and the shares hold by other shareholders that exercise significant influence on company’s life. 
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board and, finally, we analysed the presence of the state in the companies’ capital. To 
characterize the directors’ and supervisors’ structures we used variables that are related 
with the board composition, the management incentives and the monitoring and control 
structures.  
 
To characterize the board composition we analysed the number of independent directors, 
the number of non-executive directors, the size of the board and the board competency or 
expertise. To characterize the management incentives we used variables related with the 
board remuneration. We examined the variable part of the remuneration, as well as other 
kinds of remuneration incentives like funds and pension plans, share option plans, health or 
life insurances or other financial instruments. Related with the monitoring and control 
structures we assemble information about the existence of an audit committee, of a 
remuneration committee, of an internal audit function, of a corporate governance 
commission and, finally, we verified if the external auditor was one of the “Big 4”30 audit 
firms. To create a continuous variable related to the monitoring and control structures of 
the firm, we built an index, that we call a ‘control and monitoring index’, measured by the 
firm's individual score on monitoring and control issues (5 indicators: Remuneration 
committee, Corporate governance commission, Audit committee, Internal audit function 
and Big 4)31.  
 
A summary of the used variables to characterize the corporate governance is provided in 
table 4.2. We also identified some recent studies that used similar measures. 
                                                 
30
  “Big 4”: PriceWaterHouseCoopers; Deloitte; KPMG; Ernst&Young. 
31
 If all 5 structures of monitoring and control exist in the company, the company will recieve a score of 5, 
which corresponds to a value of 1 or 100% on the index.  
 204 
 
 
                                                 
32
 Sum between the value of variable remuneration and the value of other types of remuneration, divided by the total remuneration. 
Table 4.2 Variables that characterize the ownership structure and the directors’ and supervisors’ structures 
 
                                       Variable                                                                   Definition                                                                                               Studies 
Equity ownership structure 
(MAINSHARE) Proportion of capital owned by the biggest shareholder 
(MAINFIVE) Proportion of capital owned by the biggest five shareholders 
Ownership 
concentration 
(SIGNIFICANT) Proportion of capital owned by significant participations 
Management 
ownership 
(DIRCAP) 
(DIROWNER) 
Proportion of capital owned by members of the board 
Binary variable which took the value of 1 if directors own shares of the company and 0 if otherwise 
State 
ownership 
(STATEOWNER) 
(CAPSTATE) 
Binary variable which took the value of 1 if the state owned shares of the company and 0 if otherwise 
Proportion of capital owned by the state 
Eng and Mak (2003) 
Davidson et al. (2005) 
Arcay and Vázquez (2005) 
Petersen and Plenborg (2006) 
Wang et al. (2008) 
Lazarides et al. (2009) 
Director’s and supervisors’ structures 
(INDEP) Number of independent members of the board divided by the total number of members 
 
(NONEXEC) Number of non-executive members of the board divided by the total number of members 
 
(BSIZE) Number of members of the board divided by the natural logarithm of total assets 
(EXPERTISE) Average number of other societies in which board members exercise management functions 
  
(VARREM) Variable remuneration of the board divided by the total remuneration 
(OTHERREM) 
Value of other types of remuneration (stock option plans, insurances,…) divided by the total 
remuneration of the board 
Board 
characteristics 
(DIRCOMP) Proportion of board’s remuneration that is not fixed32  
Yermack (1996) 
Peasnell et al. (2001) 
Ho and Wong (2001) 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) 
Eng and Mak (2003) 
Ferris et al. (2003) 
Anderson et al. (2004) 
Arcay and Vázquez (2005) 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) 
Chung-Cheng Hsu (2007) 
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Table 4.2 - Variables that characterize the ownership structure and the directors’ and supervisors’ structures (continuation) 
 
                                      Variable                                                                      Definition                                                                                               Studies 
(AUDCOM) Binary variable which took the value of 1 if a audit committee exists and 0 if  otherwise 
(REMCOM) Binary variable which took the value of 1 if a remuneration committee exists and 0 if otherwise 
(INTAUD) Binary variable which took the value of 1 if a internal audit function exists and 0  if otherwise 
(CORPGOVCOM) 
Binary variable which took the value of 1 if a corporate governance commission exists and 0 if 
otherwise 
(BIG 4) Binary variable which took the value of 1 for Big 4 audit firms and 0 for non-Big 4 audit firms 
 
Monitoring 
and control 
structures’ 
(CONTROLINDEX) 
Firm's individual score on monitoring and control issues divided by the total score (5 indicators: 
Remuneration committee, Corporate governance commission, Audit committee, Internal audit 
function and Big 4) 
 
Ho and Wong (2001) 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) 
Davidson et al. (2005) 
Arcay and Vázquez (2005) 
Wang et al (2008) 
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We also examined the impact of the following corporate characteristics: firm size, 
leverage, performance and growth opportunities. Firm performance is measured through 
the return on equity (ROE) that is the net income divided by the shareholders’ equity (Eng 
and Mak, 2003); through a second variable (PERFOR1) measured by the earnings before 
interests and taxes divided by total assets (Petersen and Plenborg, 2006); and a third 
variable (PERFOR2) measured by the earnings before interests, taxes depreciations and 
amortizations divided by the total assets (Ho and Wong, 2001). Company size (FSIZE) 
was measured in this study by the natural logarithm of total assets (Davidson et al., 2005; 
Ho and Wong, 2001); Leverage (LEVERAGE) is the long term liabilities divided by total 
assets (Chau and Gray, 2002); and growth opportunities are measured by price earnings 
ratio (PER) that is the year-end price of ordinary shares divided by earnings per share (Eng 
and Mak, 2003). 
 
 4.4.3 Proxies for information asymmetry 
 
Since the asymmetry of information of a company cannot be directly observed, literature 
offers a variety of ways to measure this variable. There are several studies (e.g. Glosten 
and Milgrom, 1985; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Amihud and Mendelson, 1986, 1989; 
Welker, 1995; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Petersen 
and Plenborg, 2006) that look into this issue. In our study we followed, in a particular 
manner, the work of Welker (1995), Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Petersen and 
Plenborg (2006). 
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Welker (1995) applies a bid-ask spread as a proxy for information asymmetry. Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000) suggest a bid-ask spread and trading volume in firm’s shares as proxies 
for the information asymmetry. Also Petersen and Plenborg (2006), following the studies 
of Welker (1995) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), apply the bid-ask spread and turnover 
ratio as two complementary proxies for information asymmetry.  
 
The bid-ask spread is commonly thought to measure information asymmetry explicitly. 
The reason for this is that the bid-ask spread addresses the adverse selection problem that 
arises from transacting in firm shares in the presence of asymmetrically informed 
investors. Less information asymmetry implies less adverse selection, which, in turn, 
implies a smaller bid-ask spread (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). The turnover ratio reflects 
the willingness of some investors to sell shares and others to buy. This willingness to trade 
shares should be inversely related to the level of information asymmetry (Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000).  
 
Following Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Petersen and Plenborg (2006), in our study the 
bid-ask spread and the turnover ratio are assumed to be proxies for information asymmetry. 
We followed Welker (1995) by considering a “baseline” spread (not conditioned on the 
occurrence of an information release). So, in our study the bid-ask spread (BIDASK) is the 
daily bid-ask spread (difference between the ask price and the bid price) average of the 
company in the year of 2007. The turnover ratio (TURNOVER) is the value of shares 
traded during the year of 2007 divided by the firm's market value of equity at the end of 
the year. 
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These proxies are averaged over a 12 month period. Thus, it covers one reporting period. 
This is the same procedure as adopted by Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Petersen and 
Plenborg (2006). The market data were obtained from Datastream database. 
 
4.5 Descriptive statistics 
 4.5.1 Variables that characterize the ownership structure, directors’ and  
            supervisors’ structures and the corporate characteristics 
 
In table 4.3 we show the descriptive statistics of the continuous variables, in table 4.4 of 
the dichotomous variables and in figure 4.1 we present the economic sector distribution.  
 
Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables show that companies in our study are 
widely distributed regarding to corporate size, measured by total assets, ranking from 26 
millions of euros to 105 873 millions of euros. We employed the natural logarithm to 
account for this difference. There are also large differences in growth opportunities, 
measured by the price earnings ratio, and also between the leverage ratio that shows a 
mean of nearly 30%. 
  
When we analyse the variables that characterize the management incentives we can see 
that the variable remuneration average is nearly 16% of the total board remuneration, but 
we observe that the minimum is nearly zero and the maximum is 73%. 
 
 
 209 
 
 
Where:  
INDEP is the number of independent members of the board divided by the total number of members; 
NONEXEC is the number of non-executive members of the board divided by the total number of members;  
BNUMBER is the number of members of the board;  
BSIZE is the number of members of the board divided by the natural logarithm of total assets; 
EXPERTISE is the average number of other societies in which board members exercise management 
functions;  
PERFOR1 is the earnings before interests and taxes divided by year-end total assets;  
ASSETS is the total assets (millions of euros); 
FSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; 
LEVERAGE is the long term liabilities divided by total assets; 
PER is the year-end price of ordinary shares divided by earnings per share;  
VARREM is the value of the variable remuneration of the board divided by the total remuneration; 
OTHERREM is value of other types of remuneration to the board divided by the total remuneration;  
CAPSTATE is the proportion of the shares of the company own by the state; 
MAINFIVE is the proportion of the shares of the company own by the biggest five shareholders; 
MAINSHARE is the proportion of the shares of the company own by the biggest shareholder; 
DIRCAP is the proportion of capital owned by the board; 
SIGNIFICANT include the significant participations of shareholders that have, direct or indirectly, more than 
2% of share capital and the shares held by other shareholders that exercise significant influence on 
company’s life;  
TURNOVER is the value of shares traded during the year divided by the firm's market value of equity at the 
end of the year; 
Table 4.3 – Continuous variables 
 
  N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max 
INDEP 140 0,262 0,273 0,187 0,000 0,750 
NONEXEC 140 0,674 0,721 0,261 0,000 1,000 
BNUMBER 140 10,057 9,000 4,001 3,000 22,000 
BSIZE 140 0,476 0,462 0,162 0,152 0,944 
EXPERTISE 140 4,107 3,000 4,619 0,000 25,000 
PERFOR 1 135 0,056 0,060 0,058 -0,195 0,233 
ASSETS 140 5 743  948 1,423 26 105 873 
FSIZE 140 20,778 20,670 1,851 17,085 25,386 
LEVERAGE 140 0,298 0,292 0,188 0,000 0,822 
PER 133 25,940 18,580 26,094 2,070 170,000 
VARREM 138 0,157 0,090 0,190 0,000 0,730 
OTHERREM 138 0,311 0,255 0,294 0,000 1,000 
CAPSTATE 140 0,008 0,000 0,045 0,000 0,327 
MAINFIVE 138 0,605 0,630 0,229 0,001 0,994 
MAINSHARE 138 0,390 0,325 0,246 0,050 0,993 
DIRCAP 130 0,230 0,110 0,264 0,000 0,993 
SIGNIFICANT 137 0,624 0,650 0,213 0,000 0,990 
TURNOVER 140 1,652 1,056 2,319 0,004 19,254 
BIDASK 140 0,10 0,04 0,20 0,01 1,88 
CONTROLINDEX 140 0,680 0,800 0,198 0,200 1,000 
ROE 139 0,097 0,140 0,292 -1,854 1,233 
PERFOR 2 139 0,106 0,094 0,105 -0,481 0,588 
DIRCOMP 140 0,460 0,465 0,292 0,000 1,000 
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BIDASK is the daily bid-ask spread (difference between the ask price and the bid price) average of the 
company in the year of 2007; 
CONTROLINDEX is the firm's individual score on monitoring and control issues divided by the total score 
(5 indicators: Corporate governance commission, Big 4, Internal audit, Audit committee and Remuneration 
committee);  
ROE is the net income divided by the shareholders’ equity;   
PERFOR2 is the earnings before interests, taxes, depreciations and amortizations divided by year-end total 
assets; 
DIRCOMP is the proportion of board’s remuneration that is not fixed. 
 
 
The other kind of remuneration (insurances, stock options, among others) shows us a 
considerable mean of 31% of total remuneration and we can observe the extreme cases of 
zero and 100% of the board remuneration through this kind of payment. Despite this, the 
results show us that the part of the remuneration that is not fixed present a mean of 46% of 
the total board remuneration. 
 
The average board has approximately 10 members and includes a mean of 67% of        
non-executives, but only 26% are considered independent33. In our sample, 4 is the average 
number of other societies in which board members exercise management functions. 
 
The analysis of ownership structure through the continuous variables showed us that the 
proportion of shares owned by the state have a low average of 0,8%, being the biggest 
participation in 32% of the company’s shares. The mean level of ownership concentration, 
studied by the proportion of the shares of the company owned by the biggest shareholder, 
is 39%, with a minimum of 5% and a maximum of 99%. The shares held by the main five 
                                                 
33
  Anderson et al. (2004) reported, for a sample of US firms from 1993 to 1998, approximately 12 directors, 
57% of whom were independent. Asbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), who study US firms in 2002, reported a mean 
of 10 board members and 70% of independent directors. In contrast, Morales et al. (2010) also reported a 
average board of 10 members but only 29,64% of independent directors, for a sample of Spanish non-
financial listed firms during 2004-2007. CMVM (2008) reported, for Portuguese listed companies in the year 
of 2007, 19,2% of independents members on the board. CNMV (2008) reported, for Spanhish listed 
companies in the year of 2007, 28,32% of independents. These data confirm that low independence is a 
predominant characteristic of Iberian Peninsula listed companies. 
 211 
shareholders and the significant participations present a mean close to 60%. The 
management ownership, measured by the proportion of capital owned by the board, has a 
mean of 23%, but it is also widely distributed. 
 
The mean of bid-ask spread is € 0,10, with a minimum of € 0,01 and a maximum of nearly 
€ 1,88. The turnover ratio shows us a mean of 1,652, a value bigger than the unity. This 
represents that, in mean, companies’ value of shares traded overcame their market value of 
equity. 
 
By the analysis of the dichotomous variables we can conclude that the majority of 
companies in our study have an audit committee, a remuneration committee, an internal 
audit function and have one of the Big 4 external auditors. Otherwise, the majority of 
companies don’t have a corporate governance commission. We can also confirm that a big 
number of companies have management ownership (95%) and that only 6% of the 
companies have state ownership. 
 
Table 4.4 – Dichotomous variables   
 
 
N 0 % 1 % 
BIG 4 140 18 12,90 122 87,10 
AUDCOM 140 24 17,10 116 82,90 
REMCOM 140 11 7,90 129 92,10 
INTAUD 140 49 35,00 91 65,00 
DIROWNER 140 7 5,00 133 95,00 
STATEOWNER 140 131 93,60 9 6,40 
CORPGOVCOM 140 122 87,10 18 12,90 
 
 
Where: 
BIG 4 is a binary variable which took the value of 1 for Big 4 audit firms and 0 for non-Big 4 audit firms;  
AUDCOM is a binary variable which took the value of 1 if a audit committee exists and 0 if otherwise; 
REMCOM is a binary variable which took the value of 1 if a remuneration committee exists and 0 if 
otherwise; 
INTAUD is a binary variable which took the value of 1 if an internal audit function exists and 0 If otherwise;  
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DIROWNER is a binary variable which took the value of 1 if directors own shares of the company and 0 if 
otherwise;  
STATEOWNER is a binary variable which took the value of 1 if a the state own shares of the company and 0 
if otherwise;  
CORPGOVCOM is a binary variable which took the value of 1 if a corporate governance commission exists 
and 0 if otherwise. 
 
 
The figure 4.1 shows us that the three main economic sectors are industrial goods, 
construction and materials, consumer goods and consumer services, which represent 75% 
of the sample34. 
 
Figure 4.1 – Economic sector distribution 
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 4.5.2 Disclosure variables 
 4.5.2.1 The voluntary disclosure index results 
 
For Meek et al. (1995) it is likely that the relevance of information varies by type. Through 
the analysis of the disclosure variables, which result from the application of the voluntary 
                                                 
34
 For Portuguese companies we used the economic sector distribution available at the Euronext Fact Book 
2007 (www.euronext.com). For Spanish companies we used the economic sector distribution available at the 
Spanhish stock market website (www.bolsamadrid.es ). 
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disclosure index, we can see that the score for strategy and management and production 
categories is significantly higher than that for marketing and human capital categories. 
 
Table 4.5 shows us the results of the disclosure variables. 
 
 
Table 4.5 – Disclosure variables 
 
 
N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max 
INDTOTAL 140 0,470 0,475 0,152 0,109 0,850 
INDMARK 140 0,315 0,250 0,235 0,000 0,929 
INDSTRA 140 0,672 0,733 0,190 0,133 1,000 
INDCOMP 140 0,369 0,364 0,164 0,045 0,727 
INDMANAG 140 0,577 0,583 0,197 0,182 1,000 
INDFUT 140 0,383 0,375 0,180 0,000 0,813 
INDHCAP 140 0,353 0,313 0,254 0,000 1,000 
 
 
Where: 
INDTOTAL is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure total score on the six categories to the 
maximum possible score applied in those categories; 
INDMARK is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on marketing issues to the maximum 
possible score applied in those issues (7 indicators);  
INDSTRA is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on strategic issues to the maximum 
possible score applied in those issues (15 indicators);  
INDCOMP is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on market and competition issues to the 
maximum possible score applied in those issues (11 indicators);  
INDMANAG is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on management and production 
issues to the maximum possible score applied in those issues (11 indicators);  
INDFUT is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on future perspective issues to the 
maximum possible score applied in those issues (8 indicators);  
INDHCAP is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on human capital issues to the 
maximum possible score applied in those issues (8 indicators). 
 
 
The total voluntary disclosure index presents a mean of 47% on the six categories included 
in our index. The descriptive statistics also show that companies in our study are widely 
distributed regarding the provision of voluntary information, with a minimum of 10,9% 
and a maximum of 85%.  
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The score for strategy is the highest score, suggesting that management considers strategy 
information an important issue. This result shows that strategic information has an obvious 
decision relevance to investors. Also Petersen and Plenborg (2006) obtained a similar 
result. They find strategy category to be the one with the highest score on their voluntary 
disclosure self constructed index for Danish listed companies. 
 
Our results are also consistent with the work of Meek et al. (1995). The authors analysed 
the factors influencing voluntary annual report disclosures by United States, United 
Kigdom and Continental European multinational companies. They concluded that the 
disclosure of strategic information seems to reflect national or regional influences. 
Specifically, Continental European companies voluntarily disclose more of this type of 
information than either American or British companies. The authors refer that, in general, 
the measurement practices in most Continental European countries are conservative and 
often tax-determined. In this sense, Meek et al. (1995: 566) argue that “perhaps these 
companies view disclosures of strategic information as a way to overcome a conservative 
bias in their measurement practices”.  
 
Although the disclosure of strategic information was firstly focused on revealing the firms’ 
general mission, currently its content has been expanded to corporate strategy and 
information on the companies’ future. Also Domínguez et al. (2010) state that, within the 
information voluntarily disclosed by companies, strategic stands out. This kind of 
information is also widely used by finance professionals for valuation processes (Higgings 
and Diffenbach, 1985; AICPA, 1994). In this sense, we can state that this information can 
be distinguished by its capacity to differentiate the companies that act on the market.  
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Even though the firms of today are increasingly dependent upon intangible resources, 
disclosure on human capital is still one of the lowest scores (mean of 35,3%). Marketing is 
the category with the lowest score (mean of 31,5%). Oliveira et al. (2006), that constructed 
a voluntary disclosure index for intangibles, using Portuguese listed companies, obtained a 
mean of 30,3% for their index. 
 
 
 4.5.2.2 Description of the results of the six categories of voluntary disclosure  
 
As explained previously, a total of 60 indicators within the six voluntary disclosure 
categories have been identified. By analysing the following graphics we can understand 
which items inside each category are more disclosed by companies.  
 
Figure 4.2 shows the results of the 14 items considered in the strategy category. In this 
category the most disclosed items are the main corporate goals or objectives, detailed 
segment/unit performance, evaluation of the commercial risk, evaluation of the financial 
risk and the main events of the current year. The less disclosed items are the definition of 
the deadline for each corporate goal and the evaluation of other risks. These last results 
allow us to conclude that companies have some difficulties with the definition of schedules 
that can compromise the company with the users of the information. Besides that, 
companies don’t analyse scenarios that are very different from their present reality. The 
results from the most disclosed strategic items show that companies attempt to give outside 
information that might promote the understanding of their most important success factors 
as well as their future strategic direction and actions. 
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Figure 4.2 - Strategy category 
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Figure 4.3 shows the results of the 11 items considered in the market and competition 
category. In this category the most disclosed items are the identification of the principal 
markets, the specific characteristics of these markets and their dimension. The less 
disclosed items are the identification of the main competitors, the analysis of the impact of 
competition on profits and also their impact on future profits. As we can see, the 
competitive issues, although considered by the PwC (1999) as an important value driver, 
aren’t much disclosed. In general, companies disclose very little information about their 
main competitors, and most of them don’t even attempt to identify them. In this manner, 
disclosure of information about the impact of competitors’ activity on the companies’ 
profits is near to residual. 
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Figure 4.3 - Market and Competition Category 
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Figure 4.4 shows the results of the 11 items considered in the management and production 
category. In this category the most disclosed items are the identification of the principal 
products or services, the specific characteristics of these products or services and 
information about investments on production or services. The less disclosed items are the 
rejection/defect rates; input or output rates and the life cycle of the product (these items are 
considered for firms in the production industry). We can conclude that the basic aspects of 
production are considered by companies as issues that have a limited interest to the 
information users. Companies are more interested in disclosing information about possible 
changes in their production or services methods, in presenting new investments and 
attesting the norms of quality used in their production or service process. 
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Figure 4.4 - Management and production Category 
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Figure 4.5 shows the results of the 8 items considered in the future perspective category. In 
this category the most disclosed items are new actions/initiative/event, investment forecast 
and information about the dividend policy of the company. The less disclosed items are the 
return rate for each investment project and the information about the hypotheses 
considered in the forecast. In fact, companies disclose a considerable amount of 
information about their future prospects but only in a descriptive way, which means that 
they don’t want to assume a very stingy compromise in terms of values. Despite this, 
almost all the companies analysed show a common factor: they don’t disclose the bases of 
their forecast analysis, which leaves the information users with a feeling of uncertainty. 
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Figure 4.5 - Future Perspective Category 
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Finally, figures 4.6 and 4.7 show the results of the 7 items considered in the marketing 
category and the results of the 8 items considered in the human capital category, 
respectively. These two categories are the ones with the lowest scores. In the category of 
marketing the most disclosed items are the marketing strategy, the sales strategy and the 
distribution channels; the less disclosed items are the customer mix and the marketing 
costs. This category highlights the increasing dissemination of information about brand 
investments in order to secure the brand image of the company or product on the market. 
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Figure 4.6 - Marketing Category 
 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Disclosure of  sales and marketing costs
Disclosure of customer mix
Disclosure of the costumer satisfaction level
Disclosure of brand equity/v isibility  ratings 
Disclosure of marketing strategy 
Disclosure of sales strategy
Disclosure of  distribution channels
 
 
 
In the category of human capital the most disclosed items are the description of the 
workforce, the remuneration or compensation system and the qualification policy of 
workers. The less disclosed items are the values created by the worker and the way to 
measure the company’s human capital. Although this category shows one of the lowest 
scores, companies start to recognize that these kinds of assets, of intangible nature, need to 
be effectively managed to deliver future benefits and thus enable business continuity. For 
the management process to be developed with efficiency, companies are beginning to see 
that these resources should be identified, measured, recognized and disclosed.  
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Figure 4.7 - Human Capital Category 
 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Value created by worker
Other measures of Human capital
Strategies to measure human capital
Employee retention rates
Productiv ity  indicators
Description of the remuneration/ compensation system
Qualification policy of workers
Description of workforce
 
 
 4.5.2.3 Assessment of validity of the voluntary disclosure index 
 
Prior studies that used disclosure indices to investigate the determinants of corporate 
disclosures levels have documented consistently strong and corroborative results35. These 
prior works demonstrate that disclosure indices are a useful research tool. However, and as 
stated previously, disclosure level is not easily measured because the development and 
application of a disclosure index requires subjective assessments by the researcher when he 
is applying the technique (Botosan, 1997). As a result, it is important to assess the validity 
of the resulting measure.  
 
Botosan (1997) supports the validity of her disclosure index, created for a sample of 122 
manufacturing firms, mainly on four different sets of analyses: (1) the positive correlation 
                                                 
35
 For example, Buzby (1975), Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), Lang and Lundholm (1993) and Eng and Teo 
(1999). More recently, Eng et al. (2001), Eng and Mak (2003), Petersen and Plenborg (2006), Wang et al 
(2008) and Allegrini and Greco (2011). 
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between the categories of the disclosure index and the number of  analysts following the 
firm during the year, considering the latter a potential proxy for the availability of 
corporate information; (2) the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (Cronbach, 1951), because it’s 
a measure of internal consistency that uses repeated measurements (in this case the various 
categories of the disclosure index) to assess the degree to which correlation among the 
measurements is attenuated due to random error; (3) the correlation between the disclosure 
score and firm characteristics identified in prior research  to be associated with disclosure 
level; and (4) the correlation between the disclosure score and the annual report disclosure 
score assigned by the AIRM, with only 24 firms that appear in both samples36 .  
 
Because no disclosure score was available for the sample firms, this last analysis is not 
possible to do in our case. Despite this we compared our results with voluntary disclosure 
indices used in previous studies. For example, Arcay and Vázquez (2005) examined the 
relation between corporate characteristics, governance rules and voluntary disclosure in 
Spain. The authors used a voluntary disclosure index prepared by Actualidad Económica37. 
The mean of the disclosure index, for a sample of 91 Spanish listed companies, was 
48,24%. Furthermore, and as described previously, the results from the different voluntary 
disclosure categories are similar with the ones found by Petersen and Plenborg (2006). 
Oliveira et al. (2006) obtained a similar result concerning the voluntary disclosure index 
for intangibles information. 
                                                 
36
  According to Botosan (1997: 336) the results of the correlation between the disclosure score and the 
annual report disclosure score assigned by the AIRM “should be interpreted cautiously for several reasons. 
First, statistical power is limited by the small number of firms common to both groups. Second, there is no 
basis for judging what the magnitude of the correlation should be (…). Finally, the analysis assumes that the 
AIRM score is an appropriated benchmark which may not be the case”. 
37
 This business magazine publishes each year a ranking of the annual reports of the companies that trade on 
the Madrid Stock Exchange. Also Espinosa et al. (2008) used a measure of disclosure quality base on the 
information taken from Actualidad Económica.  
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Following Botosan (1997), we analysed the correlation of the number of analysts with the 
total voluntary disclosure score, as well with the six categories. The variable ANALYST is 
the number of analysts that followed the company during the year of 200738. This number 
was disclosed by the companies in their annual report or in their official sites. The results 
are shown in table 4.6. Each of these correlations coefficients, Pearson or Spearman, is 
positive and statistically significant at 0.01 level. 
 
Table 4.6 – Correlations with  analysts, with Pearson (Spearman) correlations 
below (above) the diagonal 
 
 INDTOTAL INDMARK INDSTRA INDCOMP INDMANAG INDFUT INDHCAP ANALYST 
INDTOTAL 1 0,702*** 0,890*** 0,672*** 0,687*** 0,640*** 0,834*** 0,565*** 
INDMARK 0,746*** 1 0,519** 0,406*** 0,563*** 0,278*** 0,571*** 0,408*** 
INDSTRA 0,893*** 0,535*** 1 0,544*** 0,564*** 0,528*** 0,722*** 0,641*** 
INDCOMP 0,693*** 0,407*** 0,548*** 1 0,252*** 0,497*** 0,457*** 0,385*** 
INDMANAG 0,659*** 0,547*** 0,538*** 0,230*** 1 0,299*** 0,491*** 0,380*** 
INDFUT 0,643*** 0,302*** 0,531*** 0,488*** 0,286*** 1 0,412*** 0,309*** 
INDHCAP 0,822*** 0,639*** 0,685*** 0,440*** 0,454*** 0,402*** 1 0,420*** 
ANALYST 0,597*** 0,536*** 0,540*** 0,416*** 0,385*** 0,351*** 0,458*** 1 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient takes on a maximum value of one when the correlation 
between each pair of variables is one. Computed with standardized data, the Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient for the six categories of disclosure index is 0,841. There is no standard 
test of significance for this statistic. As a general rule, an alpha of 0,7 or 0,8, depending on 
the author, indicates that the correlation is attenuated very little by random measurement 
error (Carmines and Zellner, 1979). Thus, a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0,841 suggests 
that random measurement error could not reduce the power of the empirical tests that 
follow. 
                                                 
38
 The descriptive statistics of the variable ANALYST are: N =140; Mean = 7,46; Std. Dev. = 11,73; Min = 
0; and Max = 52. 
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Ahmed (1995), cited by Botosan (1997), provides a meta-analysis of the results of 23 
studies of the association between annual report disclosure level and firm characteristics.  
He found that the following four variables have a statistically significant positive 
association with disclosure level: firm size, leverage, exchange listing status and audit firm 
size. Also, Ahmed and Courtis (1999) develop a meta-analysis of 29 studies confirming the 
previous results. Eng and Mak (2003) find statistical significant correlations between the 
voluntary disclosure score and firm characteristics such as the return on equity, the firm 
size and leverage. Petersen and Plenborg (2006) find a negative statistical significant 
correlation between the voluntary disclosure score and the level of solvency. Wang et al. 
(2008) find positive statistical significant correlation with return on equity and Big 4. In 
our study the results from the Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlations are very similar to 
those reported by some of the previous studies (see the correlations matrices in chapter 5 in 
terms of direction and magnitude). Firm characteristics like firm size, leverage, 
performance and growth opportunities are positively correlated, with statistical 
significance, with the total voluntary disclosure score.   
 
In summary, the validity of our voluntary disclosure index is based on the following 
points: comparison with similar studies using voluntary disclosure indices; positive 
statistically significant correlations between the number of analysts and the voluntary 
disclosure scores; an accepted value for the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient; and similar 
results with previous studies of the correlation between the voluntary disclosure level and 
firm characteristics. 
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4.6 Descriptive statistics for Portugal and Spain  
 
In this point we present separately the descriptive statistics for Portugal and Spain. Due to 
the fact that the two countries belonging to the Iberian Peninsula are part of our sample, it 
would be sensible to make a brief analysis of the descriptive statistics of each country in 
order to understand the greater or lesser homogeneity of our sample. Thus, we analyse the 
descriptive statistics of the Portuguese and Spanish companies by groups of variables: 
general corporate characteristics, director' and supervisors’ structures, ownership structure, 
voluntary disclosure variables and, finally, information asymmetry proxies. The results are 
presented in table 4.7.  
 
The results from the general corporate characteristics show us that the Spanish companies 
included in our sample are slightly bigger, have a bigger rate of performance and growth 
and a smaller debt level. In relation to the directors’ and supervisors’ structures, Spanish 
companies have bigger boards and almost double of the proportion of independent and 
non-executives members in relation to the Portuguese companies. The number of other 
societies in which board members exercise management functions (board expertise) are 
nearly five to Spanish companies and nearly three to Portuguese companies. The 
proportion of board remuneration that is not fixed (board’s compensation) is 53% for 
Spanish companies and only 30% for Portuguese companies.  There is a bigger ownership 
concentration in Portuguese companies, where the main shareholder has near 46% of the 
company shares compared to the 36% for Spanish companies. The results also show us that 
the presence of state is much more expressive in Portuguese companies but, on the 
contrary, the management ownership is bigger in Spanish companies. 
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Table 4.7 - Descriptive statistics for Portugal and Spain 
 
 
Country 
Identification Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
PER  Portugal  25,853 32,928 
 
Spain 26,256 23,740 
Leverage Portugal  0,332 0,167 
 
Spain 0,289 0,188 
Performance 1 Portugal  0,062 0,033 
 
Spain 0,072 0,042 
Firm size Portugal  20,627 1,704 
 Spain 21,134 1,864 
Proportion of independent members of the board Portugal  0,162 0,193 
 Spain 0,301 0,172 
Size of the board Portugal  0,386 0,171 
 Spain 0,509 0,147 
Proportion of non-executive members of the board Portugal  0,362 0,254 
 Spain 0,788 0,141 
Monitoring and control index Portugal  0,605 0,280 
 Spain 0,712 0,145 
Board expertise Portugal  2,870 2,952 
 Spain 4,620 5,067 
Board’s compensation  Portugal  0,297 0,226 
 Spain 0,531 0,285 
Main shareholder Portugal 0,459 0,237 
 Spain 0,359 0,243 
State ownership Portugal 0,032 0,090 
 Spain 0,003 0,021 
Directors ownership Portugal 0,101 0,189 
 Spain 0,271 0,272 
Total disclosure index Portugal  0,415 0,143 
 Spain 0,490 0,150 
Marketing disclosure index Portugal  0,210 0,192 
 Spain 0,354 0,238 
Strategy disclosure index Portugal  0,618 0,206 
 Spain 0,691 0,180 
Market and competition disclosure index Portugal  0,360 0,186 
 Spain 0,372 0,155 
Management and production disclosure index Portugal  0,498 0,215 
 Spain 0,606 0,181 
Future perspective disclosure index Portugal  0,388 0,193 
 Spain 0,381 0,175 
Human capital disclosure index Portugal  0,264 0,184 
 Spain 0,386 0,268 
Turnover ratio Portugal  0,783 0,731 
 
Spain 1,976 2,610 
Bid-ask spread Portugal  0,08 0,17 
 
Spain 0,11 0,21 
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The total voluntary disclosure index shows some difference between the countries, with a 
result of 49% for Spanish companies and 42% for Portuguese companies. The biggest 
differences are in the voluntary disclosure of information about marketing or management 
and production. 
 
Finally, we analysed the results in what concerns to the information asymmetry proxies. 
We can see that the value of the turnover ratio for Spanish companies is bigger than the 
unity (1,98) which represents that companies’ value of shares traded overcame their market 
value of equity.  The value for Portuguese companies is lower than the unit (0,78), which 
reveals a less liquid market. In relation to bid-ask spread, the value for Spanish (0,11) 
companies is slightly bigger than the value for Portuguese companies (0,08). 
 
We also examined whether there are statistical significant differences between the 
companies from both countries by conducting several multivariate analysis of variance. 
MANOVA is an extension of analysis of variance for use when we have more than one 
dependent variable. These dependent variables should be related in some way, or there 
should be some conceptual reason for considering them together39. MANOVA compares 
groups and the results show us if there is a significant difference between them40. Thus, we 
compared the Portuguese and Spanish companies by groups of variables41: corporate 
                                                 
39
 MANOVA works best when the dependent variables are only moderately correlated. When the dependent 
variables are highly correlated this is referred to as multicollinearity. Correlations up around 0,8 or 0,9 are 
considered a reason for concern. Because of this, we analysed the correlations between the group of 
dependent variables used in each MANOVA. The results showed us that we don’t have any high correlation. 
40
 Although the significance tests of MANOVA are based on the multivariate normal distribution, in practice 
it is reasonably robust to modest violations of normality (Pallant, 2001: 219).  
41
 In this analysis the country variable (categorical variable) is the independent variable and the variables 
considered in each group will be dependent variables (continuous variables). 
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characteristics; director' and supervisors’ structures; ownership structure: disclosure; and 
information asymmetry. A set of multivariate tests of significance indicate whether there 
are statistically significant differences among the groups on a linear combination of the 
dependent variables. In our case, the results relate to the test Pillai’s Trace. This test 
checks whether there are significant differences between the group as a whole. Later, 
through Test of Between Subjects Effects, we analyse the statistical significance for each of 
the variables alone. The results are presented in appendix 5. 
 
To analyse the governance characteristics, we tested the differences between countries on 
seven indicators of the directors’ and supervisors’ structures. The Pillai’s Trace statistic 
showed that there are statistical significant differences in this group. The Test of Between 
Subjects Effects show statistical significant differences in all indicators. In relation to 
ownership structures, the Pillai’s Trace statistic also showed that there are statistical 
significant differences in this group and, also here, the Test of Between Subjects Effects 
shows statistical significant differences in all indicators.  
 
To analyse the differences in voluntary disclosure practices, we tested the total voluntary 
disclosure index as well as the six categories indices. The Pillai’s Trace statistic showed 
that there are statistical significant differences in this group. Despite this, the Test of 
Between Subjects Effects for the six categories of voluntary disclosure show that there are 
two categories that don’t present statistical significant differences: market and competition 
index and future perspective index.  
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We also analysed the differences in what concerns to the information asymmetry proxies. 
The Pillai’s Trace statistic showed that there aret statistical significant differences in this 
group, but the Test of Between Subjects Effects show that only the turnover ratio shows a 
statistical significant difference between the two countries.  
 
Finally, the Pillai’s Trace statistic showed that there aren’t statistical significant differences 
between the Spanish companies and the Portuguese companies in what concerns to general 
corporate characteristics, the so called “control variables". These last results give us a 
better confidence in using the companies of both countries as one single sample. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we began by examining the composition of the sample, following the 
description of the methodology used in our data analysis. For not being a methodology so 
frequently used in this research area, we approached some of the main aspects related with 
the implementation of structural equation models. 
 
This chapter also discussed the construction of the voluntary disclosure index. Our index 
included six categories of voluntary disclosure: strategy, market and competition, 
management and production, marketing, future perspective and human capital and we 
described a total of 60 items considered within the six categories. Moreover, we described 
the way to measure the variables related with corporate governance, general corporate 
characteristics and the proxies for the information asymmetry. 
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Following this, we made the presentation and interpretation of descriptive statistics for all 
variables. We proceeded to the interpretation of the results of applying the voluntary 
disclosure index. Through the analysis of the disclosure variables, we saw that the scores 
for strategy and management and production categories were significantly higher than that 
for marketing and human capital categories. After that we made the description of the 
results of the six categories of voluntary disclosure to understand which items inside each 
category are more disclosed by firms. Following the work of Botosan (1997), we assessed 
the validity of the disclosure index. Finally, we analysed separately the descriptive 
statistics for the Portuguese and Spanish companies.  
 
In the following chapter we will proceed with univariate and multivariate data analysis. 
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Chapter 5 - Analysis and Results 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter we present and discuss the results of the univariate and multivariate data 
analysis. 
 
We start with the analysis of the results from Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlations.  After 
that we apply the technique of multiple regression equations to test the first group of 
research hypotheses about the corporate governance determinants of voluntary disclosure.  
Firstly, we will use the total voluntary disclosure index as the dependent variable and, 
secondly, we will make the same analysis using the six categories of the voluntary 
disclosure index. Since these six categories of voluntary disclosure reveal different aspects 
of the company and can be directed at different users, the variables affecting each type of 
disclosure are expected to differ. Consequently, it is also appropriate to examine these six 
categories of disclosure separately. 
 
To test the second group of hypotheses we use a structural equation model. We intend to 
study the direct and indirect relation between the governance rules and information 
asymmetry, through the voluntary disclosure of information and organizational 
performance. In this point we describe the steps to the development of the proposed model. 
Following, we present and discuss the results from the second group of research 
hypotheses and analyse the decomposition of structural effects for the proxies of 
information asymmetry. 
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Finally, we analyse the impact of the different categories of voluntary disclosure on 
information asymmetry, with the objective of understanding if the effect of providing one 
type of information has a different impact on the level of information asymmetry than 
other type of information category. We are going to use the same structural equation 
model, developed previously, by modifying the voluntary disclosure construct. 
 
5.2 Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlations  
 
Table 5.1 provides the Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the total voluntary 
disclosure score, the proxies of information asymmetry, the corporate governance variables 
and the corporate characteristics.  
 
As we can see, the total voluntary disclosure score shows statistical significant correlations 
with most of the variables that characterize the directors’ and supervisors’ structures and 
with all corporate characteristics. We found significant positive correlations with the 
proportion of independent members on the board (0,213), proportion of non-executives 
(0,231), the board size (0,455) the board expertise (0,204), the board’s compensation 
(0,352) and the existence of some supervising structures like the audit committee (0,323), 
the remuneration committee (0,254) or the Big 4 (0,303). In line with the results of Arcay 
and Vázquez (2005), we found that the voluntary disclosure index is associated with the 
adoption of some practices of good governance. 
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Table 5.1 – Pearson’s correlations 
 
 INDTOTAL 
TURN 
OVER BIDASK PERFOR1  FSIZE PER LEVERAGE INDEP 
NON 
EXEC BSIZE  
EXPERTI
SE BIG 4  
AUD 
COM REMCOM VARREM  
OTHER 
REM DIRCAP 
STATE 
OWNER 
MAIN 
SHARE 
CONTROL 
INDEX 
SIGNIFI 
CANT 
MAINFIVE PERFOR2 DIRCOMP 
INDTOTAL 1                    
    
TURNOVER -0,040 1                   
    
BIDASK -0,221*** 
-
0,179*** 1                  
    
PERFOR1  0,310*** 
-
0,339*** 0,043 1                 
    
FSIZE 0,691*** 0,007 -0,121 0,262*** 1                
    
PER -0,161* 0,113 -0,098 -0,264*** -0,314*** 1               
    
LEVERAGE 0,296*** -0,068 -0,104 -0,118 0,545*** -0,149 1              
    
INDEP 0,213** 0,213** 0,024 0,130 0,149* -0,086 0,093 1             
    
NONEXEC 0,231*** 0,215** 0,014 0,086 0,224*** -0,086 0,007 0,424*** 1            
    
BSIZE  0,455*** -0,018 -0,087 0,270*** 0,528*** -0,128 0,174** 0,165* 0,508*** 1           
    
EXPERTISE 0,204** -0,082 -0,004 0,123 0,340*** -0,199** 0,136 0,055 0,184** 0,408*** 1          
    
BIG 4  0,303*** -0,034 -0,018 0,239*** 0,306*** -0,371*** 0,042 0,199** 0,244*** 0,182** 0,129 1         
    
AUDCOM 0,323*** 0,200** 0,034 0,121 0,270*** -0,054 -0,014 0,446*** 0,701*** 0,406*** 0,060 0,335*** 1        
    
REMCOM 0,254*** 0,032 0,004 0,196** 0,174** 0,087 0,071 0,346*** 0,199** 0,278*** 0,088 0,126 0,149* 1       
    
VARREM  0,255*** -0,108 -0,094 0,147* 0,265*** -0,172* 0,186** -0,039 -0,144* 0,065 0,069 0,089 -0,011 -0,022 1      
    
OTHERREM 0,180** 0,068 -0,097 0,030 0,151* 0,012 0,018 0,203** 0,368*** 0,283*** 0,053 0,061 0,305*** 0,080 -0,347*** 1     
    
DIRCAP -0,086 -0,069 0,050 -0,033 -0,125 -0,009 0,027 -0,044 0,052 -0,009 -0,028 0,041 0,160* 0,064 -0,143 0,030 1    
    
STATEOWNER 0,161* 0,002 -0,109 0,126 0,211** -0,040 0,117 0,082 -0,028 0,173** -0,095 0,101 0,042 0,077 0,002 -0,030 -0,165* 1   
    
MAINSHARE -0,084 
-
0,247*** 0,125 0,025 0,056 -0,015 0,194** -0,238*** -0,210** -0,233*** -0,104 0,088 -0,196** -0,051 0,123 -0,139 0,077 -0,154* 1  
    
CONTROLINDEX 0,423** 0,038 0,003 0,282** 0,496** -0,192* 0,201** 0,410*** 0,417*** 0,441*** 0,132 0,525*** 0,551*** 0,496*** 0,130 0,133 -0,039 0,249*** -0,009 1 
    
SIGNIFICANT -0,153* 
-
0,397*** 0,274*** 0,056 0,002 -0,022 0,137 -0,446*** -0,324*** -0,193** -0,070 0,012 -0,323*** -0,032 -0,038 -0,219** 0,200** -0,089 0,707*** -0,086 
1 
   
MAINFIVE -0,078 
-
0,322*** 0,176** 0,061 0,014 -0,028 0,099 -0,337*** -0,267*** -0,128 -0,064 0,013 -0,284*** 0,096 -0,021 -0,148* 0,191* -0,153* 0,690*** -0,059 
0,886*** 1 
  
PERFOR2 0,250*** 
-
0,426*** -0,044 0,839*** 0,080 -0,128 -0,126 0,050 0,071 0,214** 0,117 0,174** 0,126 0,017 0,079 0,075 -0,023 0,058 0,002 
0,155* 0,046 0,069 1 
 
DIRCOMP 0,352*** 0,000 -0,149* 0,132 0,328*** -0,164* 0,138 0,184** 0,252*** 0,318*** 0,107 0,140* 0,286*** 0,059 0,303*** 0,788*** -0,096 -0,023 -0,055 0,235*** -0,241*** -0,162* 0,134 1 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed);* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
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Where: 
INDTOTAL is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure total score on the six categories to the 
maximum possible score applied in those categories; 
TURNOVER is the value of shares traded during the year divided by the firm's market value of equity at the 
end of the year;  
BIDASK is the daily bid-ask spread (difference between the ask price and the bid price) average of the 
company in the year of 2007;  
PERFOR1 is the earnings before Interests and taxes divided by year-end total assets;  
FSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; 
PER is the year-end price of ordinary shares divided by earnings per share; 
LEVERAGE is the long term liabilities divided by total assets;  
INDEP is the number of independent members of the board divided by the total number of members; 
NONEXEC is the number of non-executive members of the board divided by the total number of members; 
BSIZE is the number of members of the board divided by the natural logarithm of total assets;  
EXPERTISE is the number of other societies in which board members exercise management functions;  
BIG 4 is a binary variable which took the value of 1 for Big 4 audit firms and 0 for non-Big 4 audit firms; 
AUDCOM is a binary variable which took the value of 1 if a audit committee exists and 0 otherwise; 
REMCOM is a binary variable which took the value of 1 if a remuneration committee exists and 0 otherwise; 
VARREM is the total of variable remuneration of the board divided by the total remuneration;  
OTHERREM is the total of other type of remuneration to the board divided by the total remuneration;   
DIRCAP is the proportion of capital owned by the board;   
STATEOWNER is a binary variable which took the value of 1 if a the state own shares of the company and 0 
otherwise;  
MAINSHARE is the proportion of the shares of the company own by the biggest shareholder; 
CONTROLINDEX is the Firm's individual score on monitoring and control issues (5 indicators: Big 4, Audit 
committee, Internal audit, Corporate governance commission, and Remuneration committee);  
SIGNIFICANT include the significant participations of shareholders that have, direct or indirectly, more than 
2% of share capital and the shares held by other shareholders that exercise significant influence on 
company’s life;  
MAINFIVE is the proportion of the shares of the company own by the biggest five shareholders;  
PERFOR2 is the earnings before interests, taxes, depreciations and amortizations divided by year-end total 
assets;  
DIRCOMP is the proportion of board’s remuneration that is not fixed. 
 
 
We found a strong positive correlation (0,691) between the firm size and the total 
voluntary disclosure score, which suggests that the dimension of companies is an important 
factor that conditions their disclosure policy. We also found a strong positive correlation 
with organizational performance (0,310). In relation to the ownership structure, we have a 
positive statistical significant correlation between the total voluntary disclosure score and 
the state ownership (0,161) and a significant but negative statistical significant correlation 
with the significant shareholders (-0,153). 
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The correlation between the bid-ask spread and the total voluntary disclosure score is 
negative (-0,221) with statistical significance at 0,01 level, which suggests that a higher 
level of disclosure promote more efficient prices. The correlation between the turnover 
ratio and the total voluntary disclosure score is non-significant, the correlation value is near 
to zero and has a negative sign, which is an unexpected result.  
 
Otherwise, the results show us that the turnover ratio is strongly correlated with the 
variables of organizational performance and with the variables of ownership concentration. 
We found strong negative statistical significant correlations between turnover ratio and the 
variables of organizational performance (-0,339 and -0,426). In relation to ownership 
structures, the correlation between the turnover ratio and the main shareholder is -0,247, 
with the main five shareholders is -0,322 and with the significant shareholders is -0,397, all 
with statistical significance at 0,01 level. There are no statistical significant results with the 
state ownership or with the management ownership.  
 
The turnover ratio presents very few statistical significant correlations with the variables 
related with director’s and supervisors’ structures. In the same line, there is practically no 
association between the bid-ask spread and the variables that characterize the directors’ 
and supervisors’ structures. In this sense, it’s expected an indirect relation between 
directors’ and supervisors’ structures and the proxies of information asymmetry. 
 
There were no statistical significant results between the state ownership or with the 
management ownership and the bid-ask spread. Otherwise, like with the turnover ratio, we 
found statistically significant correlation between the bid-ask spread and the variables 
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related with ownership concentration, with a positive sign. These results, therefore, show 
us the importance of studying the direct relation between ownership concentration and the 
proxies of information asymmetry.  
 
We can also see that the variables related with ownership concentration present a negative 
and statistical significant correlation with the adoption of some practices of good 
governance, such as, the proportion of independent members of the board, the proportion 
of non-executives of the board and the existence of an audit committee, suggesting that 
firms with a big shareholder or high level of concentration shares do not achieve the same 
levels of compliance with recommendations of good governance as achieved by companies 
with widely dispersed capital. Furthermore, we can see that firm size has a statistical 
significant correlation with most of the variables included in our study. This fact is 
important to prevent future problems of multicollinearity between variables. 
 
Table 5.2 provides Spearman’s correlations. Spearman’s correlation coefficient is a non-
parametric statistic and can be used when there is a possibility of violation of parametric 
assumptions such as non-normally distributed data (Field, 2005). The correlations 
according to Spearman’s typology come to bring a similar reading of the results based on 
Pearson’s correlations.  
 
Spearman’s strongest correlation is also between the firm size and the total disclosure 
score (0,672). Otherwise, we can see that firm size present now a statistical significant 
correlation with the turnover ratio (0,221) and with the bid-ask spread (-0,250). These 
results suggest that big companies face less information asymmetries than small 
companies. 
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The result of the Spearman’s correlation between the bid-ask spread and the total voluntary 
disclosure score is similar to the previous result using the Pearson’s correlation. The 
correlation is negative (-0,240) and statistically significant.  The main difference to detach 
is related with the correlation between the turnover ratio and the voluntary disclosure 
index. When we analyse the Spearman’s correlation we can see that the result is positive 
(0,234) and statistically significant. This result is different from Pearson’s correlation but 
in line with previous studies (e.g. Petersen and Plenborg, 2006). With Spearman’s 
correlation we also find a positive statistical significant correlation between the bid-ask 
spread and management ownership (0,217) and a negative statistical significant correlation 
between bid-ask spread and state ownership (-0,242). The signs of these correlations are 
equal to Pearson’s correlation but the results are now statistically significant. 
 
Following the previous results of Pearson’s correlations, the total voluntary disclosure 
score shows significant correlation with all control variables. In relation to the variables 
that characterize the directors’ and supervisors’ structures, we also have significant 
correlations with the total voluntary disclosure index, which suggest that these structures 
exercise an important influence on disclosure decisions. In relation to the variables that 
characterize the ownership structure, we found a positive statistical significant correlation 
with state ownership (0,176). The variables that characterize the ownership concentration 
(main shareholder, main five shareholders and significant participations) show a negative 
sign but non statistical significance with the total voluntary disclosure index.  
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Table 5.2 - Spearman's correlation 
 
 
  
  
INDTOTAL 
 
TURNOVER 
 
BIDASK 
 
PERFOR1 
 
FSIZE 
 
PER 
 
LEVERAGE 
 
INDEP 
 
NON 
EXEC 
BSIZE 
 
EXPERTISE 
 
BIG 4 
 
AUDCOM 
REMCOM 
 
VARREM 
 
OTHER 
REM 
DIRCAP 
 
STATE 
OWNER 
MAIN 
SHARE 
CONTROL 
INDEX 
SIGNIFI 
CANT 
MAINFIVE 
 
PERFOR2 
 
DIRCOMP 
 
INDTOTAL 1                    
    
TURNOVER 0,234*** 1                   
    
BIDASK -0,240*** -0,474*** 1                  
    
PERFOR1  0,341*** -0,105 0,087 1                 
    
FSIZE 0,672*** 0,221*** -0,250*** 0,243*** 1                
    
PER -0,233*** -0,028 -0,011 -0,226** -0,315*** 1               
    
LEVERAGE 0,316*** 0,127 -0,188** -0,091 0,555*** -0,286*** 1              
    
INDEP 0,198** 0,299*** -0,107 0,194** 0,153* -0,018 0,098 1             
    
NONEXEC 0,164* 0,213** 0,095 0,046 0,207** 0,101 0,011 0,287*** 1            
    
BSIZE  0,401*** 0,136 -0,076 0,284*** 0,501*** -0,12 0,138 0,180** 0,504*** 1           
    
EXPERTISE 0,188** -0,02 -0,020 0,144* 0,314*** -0,219** 0,146* 0,083 0,312*** 0,312*** 1          
    
BIG 4  0,298*** -0,059 -0,034 0,261*** 0,311*** -0,178** 0,026 0,210** 0,149* 0,164* 0,173** 1         
    
AUDCOM 0,307*** 0,346*** 0,055 0,175** 0,265*** 0,083 -0,023 0,440*** 0,583*** 0,422*** 0,029 0,335*** 1        
    
REMCOM 0,237*** 0,024 0,060 0,149* 0,188** 0,072 0,106 0,349*** 0,155* 0,238*** 0,119 0,126 0,149* 1       
    
VARREM  0,293*** 0,088 -0,027 0,103 0,336*** -0,062 0,189** -0,048 -0,126 0,137 0,114 0,091 0,017 -0,014 1      
    
OTHERREM 0,208** 0,172** 0,036 0,106 0,212** -0,026 0,039 0,180** 0,431*** 0,352*** 0,143* 0,087 0,346*** 0,093 -0,297*** 1     
    
DIRCAP -0,133 0,016 0,217** -0,050 -0,157* -0,008 -0,010 -0,002 0,094 0,066 0,059 -0,018 0,199** 0,044 -0,190** 0,135 1    
    
STATEOWNER 0,176** 0,068 -0,242*** 0,136 0,232*** -0,017 0,128 0,087 -0,014 0,148* -0,123 0,101 0,042 0,077 0,022 -0,025 -0,212** 1   
    
MAINSHARE -0,053 -0,320*** 0,136 -0,001 0,105 -0,099 0,168** -0,248*** -0,288*** -0,280*** -0,083 0,073 -0,215** -0,066 0,137 -0,176** -0,126 -0,155* 1  
    
CONTROLINDEX 0,387*** 0,155* -0,092 0,288*** 0,510*** -0,117 0,237*** 0,385*** 0,229*** 0,380*** 0,171** 0,495*** 0,483*** 0,420*** 0,167* 0,118 -0,112 0,257*** -0,004 1 
    
SIGNIFICANT -0,108 -0,505*** 0,227*** -0,018 0,024 -0,033 0,128 -0,392*** -0,375*** -0,276*** -0,067 -0,01 -0,368*** -0,029 0,001 -0,200** -0,008 -0,107 0,723*** -0,068 1 
   
MAINFIVE -0,041 -0,424*** 0,211** 0,04 0,047 -0,031 0,072 -0,308*** -0,297*** -0,189** -0,064 0,011 -0,310*** 0,098 0,043 -0,124 -0,008 -0,161* 0,738*** -0,053 0,887*** 1 
  
PERFOR2 0,300*** -0,072 0,016 0,881*** 0,116 -0,145 -0,147* 0,150* 0,057 0,300*** 0,197** 0,214** 0,184** 0,116 0,050 0,102 -0,025 0,089 -0,044 0,236*** -0,034 0,022 1 
 
DIRCOMP 0,359*** 0,190** 0,042 0,174** 0,354*** -0,121 0,138 0,156* 0,301*** 0,348*** 0,218*** 0,142 0,286*** 0,053 0,296*** 0,769*** -0,077 -0,014 -0,088 0,210** -0,223*** -0,141 0,113 1 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed);* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed).                     
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Where: 
 
INDTOTAL is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure total score on the six categories to the 
maximum possible score applied in those categories; 
TURNOVER is the value of shares traded during the year divided by the firm's market value of equity at the 
end of the year;  
BIDASK is the daily bid-ask spread (difference between the ask price and the bid price) average of the 
company in the year of 2007;  
PERFOR1 is the earnings before Interests and taxes divided by year-end total assets;  
FSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; 
PER is the year-end price of ordinary shares divided by earnings per share; 
LEVERAGE is the long term liabilities divided by total assets;  
INDEP is the number of independent members of the board divided by the total number of members; 
NONEXEC is the number of non-executive members of the board divided by the total number of members; 
BSIZE is the number of members of the board divided by the natural logarithm of total assets;  
EXPERTISE is the number of other societies in which board members exercise management functions;  
BIG 4 is a binary variable which took the value of 1 for Big 4 audit firms and 0 for non-Big 4 audit firms; 
AUDCOM is a binary variable which took the value of 1 if a audit committee exists and 0 otherwise; 
REMCOM is a binary variable which took the value of 1 if a remuneration committee exists and 0 otherwise; 
VARREM is the total of variable remuneration of the board divided by the total remuneration;  
OTHERREM is the total of other type of remuneration to the board divided by the total remuneration;   
DIRCAP is the proportion of capital owned by the board;   
STATEOWNER is a binary variable which took the value of 1 if a the state own shares of the company and 0 
otherwise;  
MAINSHARE is the proportion of the shares of the company own by the biggest shareholder; 
CONTROLINDEX is the Firm's individual score on monitoring and control issues (5 indicators: Big 4, Audit 
committee, Internal audit, Corporate governance commission, and Remuneration committee);  
SIGNIFICANT include the significant participations of shareholders that have, direct or indirectly, more than 
2% of share capital and the shares held by other shareholders that exercise significant influence on 
company’s life;  
MAINFIVE is the proportion of the shares of the company own by the biggest five shareholders;  
PERFOR2 is the earnings before interests, taxes, depreciations and amortizations divided by year-end total 
assets;  
DIRCOMP is the proportion of board’s remuneration that is not fixed. 
 
 
 
All other results are, in general, in line with the previous results from the Pearson’s 
correlation. We find strong negative statistical significant correlations between the 
turnover ratio and the variables that characterize ownership concentration, like the main 
shareholder (-0,320), the main five shareholders (-0,424) and the significant participations 
(-0,505). We find no relevant association between the bid-ask spread and the variables that 
characterize directors’ and supervisors’ structures. Also according with the previous 
results, we find a positive statistical significant correlation between the bid-ask spread and 
the variables related with ownership concentration. Finally, the variables that characterize 
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ownership concentration also present a negative statistical significant correlation with the 
variables that represent some of the good governance practices. 
  
In appendix 6 we present the Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlations using each category of 
voluntary disclosure. In general the results are similar with the ones described previously, 
using the total voluntary disclosure score.  
 
The six categories of voluntary disclosure show statistical significant correlations with 
most of the variables that characterize the directors’ and supervisors’ structures. Despite 
this, and considering the Pearson’s correlations, an interesting result is the non statistical 
significance correlation between the board expertise and the disclosure of information on 
strategy, on market and competition and on future perspective categories. It suggests that 
managers that exercise management functions in other companies hesitate to offer details 
about their operating environment and future development plans to outside. 
 
We found a strong positive correlation between the firm size and all the six categories of 
voluntary disclosure, in line with the previous results. We also found a strong positive 
correlation with organizational performance. In relation to the ownership structure, the 
state ownership presents positive statistical significant correlations with the strategy, the 
human capital and management and production categories.  
 
The correlation with the bid-ask spread is negative and with statistical significance only for 
the categories of market and competition, strategy and future perspective, for both 
Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlations. In relation to the turnover ratio, we only find 
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statistical significant correlations with the voluntary disclosure categories in the 
Spearman’s correlation. In this case, only the management and production category don’t 
present a positive statistical significant correlation with the turnover ratio. 
 
5.3 Multiple regression analysis 
 
With the multiple regression analysis we intend to test the developed hypotheses about 
corporate governance determinants of voluntary disclosure (first group of hypotheses). 
According to Pallant (2001: 134) multiple regression it’s a technique that can be used to 
“explore the relationship between one continuous dependent variable and a number of 
independent variables or predictors (usually continuous)”. This technique can be used to 
address a multiplicity of research questions. It can tell us how well a set of variables is able 
to predict a particular outcome. In this case, we studied the determinants of voluntary 
disclosure using, firstly, the total voluntary disclosure index as the dependent variable and, 
secondly, we made the same analysis using the six categories of the voluntary disclosure 
index. In the estimation of the model we used the method Enter (Standard Multiple 
Regression) through the SPSS 17.0. 
 
 5.3.1 Dependent variable: total voluntary disclosure index 
 
The following regression equations are adopted to test the developed hypotheses about the 
corporate governance determinants of voluntary disclosure, using as dependent variable the 
total voluntary disclosure index. We will test three models. Following Góis (2007), we will 
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start by testing a basic model. The model 1 intends to measure the impact of general 
corporate characteristics (control variables) on the voluntary disclosure of information, the 
model 2 introduces the effect of the ownership structure and model 3, as global model, 
tests simultaneously the impact of firm characteristics, ownership structure and directors' 
and supervisors' structures.  
 
Because multicollinearity is a common problem when researchers are using this kind of 
models, the variance inflation factors of independent variables (VIF) are estimated for each 
model as a check for multicollinearity. According to Pestana and Gageiro (2005) the value 
that is considered the limit above of which multicollinearity exist is 10. Also the values for 
tolerance statistic are presented for each model. If this value is very low (near zero), then 
this indicates that the multiple correlation with other variables is high, suggesting the 
possibility of multicollinearity (Pallant, 2001:143). An evaluation of the results will be 
made by checking the assumptions of multiple regression. 
 
 5.3.1.1 Model 1  
 
This model pretends to explain the impact of variables related with firm characteristics, 
such as firm size (FSIZE), performance (PERFOR1), leverage (LEVERAGE) and growth 
opportunities (PER). The regression equation of model 1 is presented below. Table 5.3 
present the regression results. 
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INDTOTAL = β0 + β1 FSIZE +  β2 PERFOR1 +  β3 PER +  β4 LEVERAGE + ε 
 
Where: 
INDTOTAL is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure total score on the six categories to the 
maximum possible score applied in those categories;  
FSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets;  
PERFOR1 is the earnings before interests and taxes divided by year-end total assets;  
PER is the year-end price of ordinary shares divided by earnings per share;  
LEVERAGE is the long term liabilities divided by total assets.  
 
 
Table 5.3 - Regression results – Model 1 
 
 Eq. ( 1 ) Collinearity Statistics 
                              Pred. Sign  Stand. Coef. (β) t-stat. Tolerance VIF 
Constant -0,083*** -6,135   
FSIZE                          +  0,746*** 8,594 0,557 1,796 
PERFOR1                    +   0,227*** 3,177 0,821 1,218 
PER                             +  0,129* 1,824 0,841 1,189 
LEVERAGE              + / -  -0,082 -0,942 0,558 1,792 
R2 0,522 
R Adjusted 0,505 
F-statistic 31,121*** 
Durbin-Watson42 2,053 
  *Significant at 0.05 < p ≤ 0.10; **Significant at 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05; ***Significant at p ≤ 0.01 
 
 
The most expressive coefficient has to do with the relation between the size of the 
company and the voluntary disclosure index, which shows a greatly positive statistical 
significant relation (0,746), as well as the coefficient associated to the organizational 
performance variable (0,227). Also the coefficient associated to the growth opportunity 
variable shows a positive and significant relation, with a coefficient in smaller scale 
(0,129) at 0,1 level of significance. Finally, the relation between leverage and the 
                                                 
42
 Durbin Watson test analyse if the residuals are independent (with proximit values of 2 autocorrelation of 
residue don’t exist). 
 
Eq. (1) 
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voluntary disclosure index, present a negative sign, with a coefficient near to zero (-0,082), 
with no statistical significance.  
 
The hypothesis H3a predicted a positive relation between companies’ performance and 
voluntary disclosure. Our result supports the previous hypothesis. This result suggests that 
companies that are performing well tend to voluntarily disclose more information. To 
Foster (1986:32) “profitable, well-run firms have incentives to distinguish themselves from 
less profitable firms in order to raise capital on the best available terms”. One way to do 
this is through voluntary information disclosure. In this sense, as the firm’s profitability 
increase, managers have incentives to supply more information to the market in order to 
give a signal about the firm’s quality. Voluntary disclosure helps investors to differentiate 
the high quality stocks. Following the signalling theory, it was expected that managers of 
companies that are performing well disclose more information about their present situation, 
in order to send signs to the market about the quality of the companies they manage. 
Furthermore, we can also analyse this result in light of the legitimacy theory. Companies 
with good performance feel persuaded by the social contract to perform voluntary 
reporting of their activities and results. This positive statistical significant relation between 
organizational performance and the voluntary disclosure index, found for Iberian Peninsula 
non-financial listed companies, corroborate previous arguments and empirical results such 
as Raffournier (1995) and Wang et al. (2008). 
 
The hypothesis H3c predicted a positive relation between companies’ size and voluntary 
disclosure. Our result supports the previous hypothesis. The firm size has been found to be 
significantly and positively correlated with disclosure level in a number of studies, 
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suggesting that larger companies disclose more information than smaller companies (e.g. 
Cooke 1989 a, b; García and Monterrey, 1993; Meek et al., 1995; Hossain et al,. 1995; 
Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Ho and Wong, 2001; Eng and Mak, 2003; Wang et al., 
2008; Domingos, 2010; Allegrini and Greco, 2011). The arguments rely on the fact large 
firms are closely watched by investors and have the ability to absorb extra costs for 
broader disclosure. Furthermore, large firms tend to have more voluntary disclosures 
because they need more financing capital than smaller firms. This positive statistical 
significant result between the firm size and the voluntary disclosure can be explained by 
the fact that larger firms make a more extensive use of the capital markets and have a 
greater number of analysts following them (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). These facts make 
the companies willing to provide more information to the market. Also the agency theory 
suggests that larger firms will have higher agency costs compared to smaller firms which 
require them to voluntarily disclose more information to mitigate this agency problem (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). The extent of the result also shows that the firm size can be considered 
a major determinant of voluntary disclosure. Also Arcay and Vázquez (2005: 323) state 
that their findings “reveal that corporate size is a significant determinant of corporate 
disclosure”. Furthermore, this result also shows that companies are worried about their 
legitimacy. Companies that feel more observed tend to increase the level of disclosure to 
keep their reputation and ensure their survival. 
 
The hypothesis H3d predicted a positive relation between companies’ growth opportunities 
and voluntary disclosure. Our result supports the previous hypothesis. The arguments rely 
on the fact that, for a company with growth opportunities, mandated disclosure might be 
insufficiently to produce low information asymmetry. These companies need external 
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finance. In this sense, these companies will improve their voluntary disclosure of 
information to assure a low cost of capital. Hossain et al. (2005) argue that high growth 
firms need external equity to maintain their growth and equity providers require additional 
information for the estimation of equity risks. Furthermore, according to the signalling 
theory, companies will disclose information in order to send signs to the market. 
 
Finally, the hypothesis H3b predicted a relation between companies’ debt and voluntary 
disclosure (with no predicted sign). Our result doesn’t support the previous hypothesis. The 
level of debt does not provide an explanation for the level of voluntary disclosure. Our 
result is similar to Raffournier (1995), Wang et al. (2008) and Allegrini and Greco (2011). 
Other disclosure studies, like Oliveira et al. (2006) and Lopes and Rodrigues (2007), using 
Portuguese companies, find no significant influence of leverage on disclosure practices. 
 
 5.3.1.2 Model 2  
 
The second version of the model incorporates explanatory variables associated to 
ownership structure. This model intends to measure the impact of variables such as 
management ownership (DIRCAP), state ownership (CAPSTATE) and the presence of a 
large shareholder (MAINSHARE). The regression equation of model 2 is presented below. 
Table 5.4 present the regression results. 
 
 
INDTOTAL = β0 + β1 FSIZE +  β2 PERFOR1  +  β3 PER +  β4 LEVERAGE +   
                      Β5  DIRCAP +  β6 CAPSTATE +  β7 MAINSHARE +  ε 
Eq. (2) 
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Where: 
INDTOTAL is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure total score on the six categories to the 
maximum possible score applied in those categories;  
FSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets;  
PERFOR1 is the earnings before Interests and taxes divided by year-end total assets;  
PER is the year-end price of ordinary shares divided by earnings per share;  
LEVERAGE is the long term liabilities divided by total assets;  
DIRCAP is the proportion of capital owned by the board;  
CAPSTATE is the proportion of the shares of the company own by the state; 
MAINSHARE is the proportion of the shares of the company own by the biggest shareholder. 
 
 
 
Table 5.4 - Regression results – Model 2 
 
 Eq. ( 2 ) Collinearity Statistics 
                              Pred. Sign  Stand. Coef. (β) t-stat. Tolerance VIF 
Constant -0,781*** -5,486   
FSIZE                           +  0,733*** 8,249 0,549 1,821 
PERFOR1                    +   0,243*** 3,312 0,803 1,246 
PER                              +  0,076 1,053 0,837 1,195 
LEVERAGE                + / -  -0,037 -0,419 0,545 1,836 
DIRCAP                        -  -0,003 -0,049 0,974 1,026 
CAPSTATE                  +  0,006 0,095 0,940 1,063 
MAINSHARE                -  -0,180*** -2,637 0,927 1,079 
R2 0,558 
R Adjusted 0,528 
F-statistic 18,428*** 
Durbin-Watson 1,969 
  *Significant at 0.05 < p ≤ 0.10; **Significant at 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05; ***Significant at p ≤ 0.01 
 
 
In model 2 we examined the impact of three attributes of ownership structure on voluntary 
disclosure: managerial ownership, government ownership and the presence of a large 
shareholder. Only the last variable presented a statistical significant result.  
 
The hypothesis H1c predicted a negative relation between the presence of a large 
shareholder and voluntary disclosure. Our result supports the previous hypothesis. There is 
a negative statistical significant relation (-0,180 at 0,01 level) between the level of 
voluntary disclosure and the presence of a large shareholder for Iberian Peninsula         
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non-financial listed companies. In the presence of a large shareholder, the owner has 
significant involvement in the firm’s management and has unlimited access to information. 
This fact restrains the voluntary disclosure of information to outside. Like stated 
previously, the Spanish and Portuguese institutional setting has in common a high level of 
concentration in corporate shareholdings. According to La Porta et al. (1999) in many 
countries large corporations have large shareholders and, further, these shareholders are 
active in corporate governance. The authors conclude that, in the case of Portugal, there are 
few widely held firms. Leech and Manjón (2002), on their study about corporate 
governance in Spain, concluded that ownership concentration is a main control 
mechanism. For Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) if a shareholder owns a large stake in a 
company, the dependence on public disclosure is likely to be smaller, because he can 
directly monitor management. Under the circumstance of a high level of capital ownership, 
the demand for information would be very low, or even absent, particularly if the manager 
owns all the firm’s shares (Raffournier, 1995). Our result is also consistent with the result 
achieved by Arcay and Vázquez (2005) for Spanish companies. Their findings showed that 
the highest mean disclosure index corresponds to firms with widely dispersed ownership. 
 
The hypothesis H1a predicted a negative relation between managerial ownership and 
voluntary disclosure. Our result doesn’t support the previous hypothesis. The relation of 
voluntary disclosure and management ownership is statistically non-significant, but 
revealed the expected negative sign. The hypothesis H1b predicted a positive relation 
between government ownership and voluntary disclosure. Our result doesn’t support the 
previous hypothesis. The relation is statistically non-significant, but also with the expected 
positive sign. Despite the statistical non-significance of the previous results, the signs are 
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in line with the predicted hypotheses and with previous findings. For example, Eng and 
Mak (2003) find that lower managerial ownership and significant government ownership 
are associated with increased disclosure. Despite this, in both cases, our results show that 
the beta coefficients are very near to zero, suggesting that these variables don’t provide an 
explanation concerning the corporate disclosure decisions. 
 
In fact, Leech and Manjón (2002: 164) state that, in Spain, “the typically highly 
concentrated ownership is the central ingredient in corporate governance practices, 
namely the disclosure ones”. A similar conclusion can be taken for Iberian Peninsula     
non-financial listed companies, having in account the results presented for the variables of 
ownership structure. 
 
 5.3.1.3 Model 3  
 
The third version of the model incorporates explanatory variables associated to directors’ 
and supervisors' structures. In this sense, regression equation (3a) introduces variables such 
as the proportion of independent directors on the board (INDEP), size of the board 
(BSIZE), board compensation (DIRCOMP), board expertise (EXPERTISE) and existence 
of monitoring and control structures (CONTROLINDEX). We tested an alternative model 
with regression equation (3b), replacing the variable independent directors on the board 
(INDEP) for the proportion of non-executive members on the board (NONEXEC). 
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The regression equations of model 3 are presented below. In Table 5.5 we present the 
regressions results43.  
 
INDTOTAL = β0 + β1 FSIZE +  β2 PERFOR1  +  β3 PER +  β4 LEVERAGE +       
 β5DIRCAP +  β6  CAPSTATE +  β7 MAINSHARE +  β8INDEP+  
 β9BSIZE + β10 DIRCOMP + β11EXPERTISE +                             
 β12 CONTROLINDEX + ε 
 
INDTOTAL = β0 + β1 FSIZE +  β2 PERFOR1  +  β3 PER +  β4 LEVERAGE +       
 β5DIRCAP +  β6 CAPSTATE +  β7 MAINSHARE + 
 β8NONEXEC+   β9BSIZE + β10 DIRCOMP +  β11EXPERTISE +                             
 β12 CONTROLINDEX + ε 
 
Where: 
 
INDTOTAL is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure total score on the six categories to the 
maximum possible score applied in those categories;  
FSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets;  
PERFOR1 is the earnings before Interests and taxes divided by year-end total assets;  
PER is the year-end price of ordinary shares divided by earnings per share;  
LEVERAGE is the long term liabilities divided by total assets; 
DIRCAP is the proportion of capital owned by the board;  
CAPSTATE is the proportion of the shares of the company own by the state; 
MAINSHARE is the proportion of the shares of the company own by the biggest shareholder; 
INDEP is the number of independent members of the board divided by the total number of members; 
                                                 
43
 Since Pearson’s correlation showed that firm size (FSIZE) is correlated with most of the other variables, 
we followed Raffournier (1995) and Morales et al. (2010) and tested the results of the regression equation 
(3a) when removing the control for firm size. According to Raffournier (1995: 275), “size probably captures 
most of other influences because of high correlation with many variables. Size has been used as proxy for 
many influences”. We saw that variables such as board size (Pearsons’ correlation of 0,528) and control and 
monitoring index (Pearsons’ correlation of 0,496) show high correlations with the firm size and present a 
positive statistical significant relation with the voluntary disclosure index. Otherwise, the variables related 
with organizational performance, large shareholder and board compensation still present a statistical 
significant relation with voluntary disclosure, even in the absence of the variable firm size. Despite this, we 
are going to consider the results of equation (3a) because the VIF values fall within acceptable levels 
regarding the problem of multicollinearity. 
 
Eq. (3a) 
Eq. (3b) 
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NONEXEC is the number of non-executives members of the board divided by the total number of 
members; 
BSIZE is the number of members of the board divided by the natural logarithm of total assets; 
DIRCOMP is the proportion of board’s remuneration that is not fixed; 
EXPERTISE is the number of other societies in which board members exercise management functions;  
CONTROLINDEX is the firm's individual score on monitoring and control issues divided by the total 
score (5 indicators: Corporate governance commission, Big 4, Internal audit, Audit committee and 
Remuneration committee). 
 
 
 
Table 5.5 - Regression results – Model 3 
 
 Eq. (3a) 
 
Eq. (3b) 
 
                              Pred. Sign 
Stand. Coef. 
(β) t-stat. VIF 
 Stand.    
Coef. (β) t-stat. VIF 
 
Constant -0,845*** -5,460   -0,840*** -5,448   
FSIZE                          +  0,743*** 6,703 2,749  0,741*** 6,794 2,754  
PERFOR1                   +   0,245*** 3,267 1,270  0,251*** 3,405 1,254  
PER                             +  0,129* 1,834 1,251  0,126* 1,717 1,242  
LEVERAGE              + / -  -0,054 -0,446 1,884  -0,049 -0,541 1,866  
DIRCAP                        - 0,017 0,257 1,047  0,015 0,230 1,044  
CAPSTATE                  +  0,013 0,191 1,314  0,014 0,193 1,177  
MAINSHARE                -  -0,201*** -2,665 1,149  -0,211*** -2,924 1,205  
INDEP                          +  0,041 0,542 1,332      
NONEXEC                   +     0,025 0,294 1,650  
BSIZE                         +/ - 0,038 0,438 1,769  0,020 0,211 2,060  
DIRCOMP                   + 0,143** 2,049 1,126  0,144** 2,029 1,172  
EXPERTISE               + / - -0,109 -1,436 1,338  -0,107 -1,410 1,337  
CONTROLINDEX       +  0,018 0,209 1,730  0,029 0,354 1,605  
R2 0,591  0,590  
RAdjusted 0,539  0,538  
F-statistic 11,426***  11,384***  
Durbin-Watson 1,958  1,970  
*Significant at 0.05 < p ≤ 0.10; **Significant at 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05; ***Significant at p ≤ 0.01 
 
 
In relation to the influence of directors’ and supervisors’ structures in voluntary disclosure, 
we can see through the results of equation (3a) that the variable related with management 
incentives is the one that present the most significant impact on the disclosure practices. In 
equation (3b) we replaced the the variable independent directors on the board (INDEP) for 
the proportion of non-executive members on the board (NONEXEC) but the results are 
very similar with the previous ones.  
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The hypothesis H2d predicted a positive relation between management incentives and 
voluntary disclosure. Our result supports the hypothesis H2d. We find a positive statistical 
significant relation (p<0,05) between the variable DIRCOMP, measured by the proportion 
of the board’s remuneration that is not fixed, and the voluntary disclosure index. This 
result supports the association between management incentives and voluntary disclosure 
practices by Iberian Peninsula non-financial listed companies. We follow the argument of 
Gutiérrez et al. (2000). Compensating board members by aligning their interests with the 
firm’s performance suggest that the association of management compensation to 
performance results in a transfer of risk to management and acts as an impeditive of 
opportunistic behaviour. Arcay and Vázquez (2005) found a similar result for Spanish 
companies. The authors showed that the mean disclosure index is significantly higher for 
companies that have established a stock option plan as a mean of director remuneration.  
 
We do not find a statistical significant association between board independence, board size 
or the existence of monitoring structures and the voluntary disclosure index, but the 
coefficients are positive. In this sense, our results don’t support the hypotheses H2a, H2b, 
H2c. Maybe the most surprising result is the one related to board independence, presented 
as one of the main flags of the new philosophy of transparency and rigour of the 
information disclosed by listed companies. The true is that literature provides us with 
mixed results. For example, Lopes and Rodrigues (2007), when analysing the determinants 
of disclosure level in the accounting for financial instruments of Portuguese listed 
companies, find no relation between the proportion of independent directors and 
disclosure. However, the work of Arcay and Vázquez (2005), for Spanish listed 
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companies, showed that the disclosure index is significantly higher for companies with 
higher proportion of independent directors on the board.  
 
The board expertise, with a negative sign, did not show statistical significance. So, our 
result doesn’t support the hypotheses H2e. The statistical non-significance may be, in part, 
consistent with the claim of Ferris et al. (2003) that busy boards are as effective as non-
busy boards at monitoring, but the negative sign is not consistent with the previous 
correlations’ results. 
 
In conclusion, and in line with previous disclosure studies, the analysis of the multiple 
regression models indicate that the disclosure decisions are affected by a number of 
interrelated factors. The results indicate that the main determinants of voluntary disclosure 
are the variables related with firm size, organizational performance, growth opportunities, 
board compensation and the presence of a large shareholder. 
 
Table 5.6 summarizes the results of the first group of hypotheses about the determinants of 
voluntary disclosure. 
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Table 5.6 – Summary of the results for the first group of hypotheses 
 
Ownership structure Validation 
H1a: Voluntary disclosure is negatively related to managerial ownership. Not validated 
H1b: Voluntary disclosure is positively related to government ownership. Not validated 
H1c: Voluntary disclosure is negatively related to the presence of a large 
shareholder. 
Validated 
Directors’ and Supervisors’ structures  
H2a: Voluntary disclosure is positively related to the proportion of             
non-executives and independents on the board. Not validated 
H2b: Voluntary disclosure is related to the size of the board. Not validated 
H2c: Voluntary disclosure is positively related with the existence of 
monitoring and control structures. Not validated 
H2d: Voluntary disclosure is positively related to management incentives. Validated 
H2e: Voluntary disclosure is related to management expertise. Not validated 
General corporate characteristics  
H3a: Voluntary disclosure is positively related to companies’ performance. Validated 
H3b: Voluntary disclosure is related to the level of companies’ debt. Not validated 
H3c: Voluntary disclosure is positively related with the size of the 
company. 
Validated 
H3d: Voluntary disclosure is positively related with growth opportunities. Validated 
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 5.3.1.4 Checking the assumptions of Multiple Regression 
 
-Sample size 
 
Different authors tend to give different guidelines concerning the number of cases required 
for multiple regressions. According to Field (2005) the number o cases should be, at least, 
10 cases of data for each predictor in the model. But according to Green (1991) the sample 
minimum should be 104 + k, where k is the number of predictors. Concerning these 
references, there is no problem in relation to sample size in our regression models. 
 
-Multicollinearity 
 
Multicollinearity exists when there is a strong correlation between two or more predictors 
in a regression model (Field, 2005). According to the author, one way of identifying 
multicollinearity is to verify the correlation matrix of the predictors variables and see if any 
correlate very highly (by very highly the author mean correlations of above 0,80 or 0,90). 
The Pearson’s correlation matrix showed that firm size (FSIZE) is correlated with most of 
the other predictors. Despite this, the biggest correlation value is 0,545. SPSS produces 
various collinearity diagnostics. The common are the VIF and the tolerance statistic. Like 
stated previously, the VIF indicates whether a preditor has a strong linear relationship with 
other predictor. Also Myers (1990) suggests that a value of 10 is a good value at which to 
worry. Related to VIF is the tolerance statistic, which also can be measured as 1/VIF. 
According to Field (2005) values below 0,1 indicate serious problems, although Menard 
(1995) suggests that values below 0,2 are worthy of concern. None of the previous models 
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presented a value for the VIF near 10. The biggest value was 2,749 for firm size in 
equation (3a). In this sense, the lower value for tolerance statistic was 0,364 (1/2,749) for 
the same predictor. 
 
-Normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, outliers and independence of residuals 
 
According to Pallant (2001) one of the ways that these assumptions - normality, linearity, 
homoscedasticity, outliers and independence of residuals - can be checked is by inspecting 
the residuals Scatterplot and the Normal Probability Plot of the regression standardized 
residuals. Residuals are the differences between the obtained and the predicted dependent 
variable scores. The residual scatterplots allow us to check: normality (the residuals should 
be normally distributed about the predicted dependent variable scores); linearity (the 
residuals should have a straight-line relationship with predicted dependent variable scores); 
and homoscedasticity (the variance of the residuals about the predicted dependent variable 
scores should be the same for all predicted scores). 
 
 In the Normal Probability Plot it is expected that the points will lie in a reasonably straight 
diagonal line from bottom left to top right. We made this analysis for each model. The 
Normal Probability Plot for the global model, equation (3a), presented in figure 5.1, shows 
us no major deviations from normality. 
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Fig 5.1- Normal probability plot for the global model 
 
 
The Scatterplot of the global model, equation (3a), is presented in figure 5.2. We can see 
that the standardized residuals are roughly rectangularly distributed, with most of the 
scores concentrated in the center (along the zero point). According to Pallant (2001) in 
deviations from a centralised rectangle suggest violation of the previous assumptions. 
 
The presence of outliers can also be detected from the Scatterplot, but it is easier if we 
analyse the residual statistics. Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) define outliers as cases that 
have a standardized residual of more than 3,3 or less than -3,3. 
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Fig 5.2 - Scatterplot of the global model 
 
 
 
The table 5.7 shows the residual statistics, removed from the SPSS output of the global 
model, equation (3a), give us the minimum (-1,960) and the maximum value (2,208) for 
the standardized residuals. According to Field (2005) ‘normally distributed errors’ means 
that the residuals in the model are random, normally distributed variables with a mean of 
zero. This table also shows us that the residuals have a mean of zero. 
 
Table 5.7 – Residuals Statistics 
 
  
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Predicted Value 0,1868147 0,8258994 0,4892326 0,11584960 
Std. Predicted Value -2,610 2,906 0,000 1,000 
Adjusted Predicted Value 0,1776905 0,8340068 0,4883669 0,11678414 
Residual -0,20062263 0,22593746 0,00000000 0,09643193 
Std. Residual -1,960 2,208 0,000 0,942 
Dependent Variable: Total voluntary disclosure index 
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For any two observations the residual terms should be uncorrelated (or independent). This 
eventuality is sometimes described as a lack of autocorrelation. According to Field (2005) 
this assumption can be tested with the Durbin-Watson test, which tests for serial 
correlations between errors. The test statistic can very between 0 and 4 with a value of 2 
meaning that the residuals are uncorrelated. According to the same author, the value should 
be near 2, and values less than 1 or greater than 3 are definitely cause of concern. In our 
case we can see that the values of Durbin-Watson test of our models are all near the value 
of 2. 
 
-Evaluating the model 
 
The coefficient of determination (usually presented by R square) is one of the most popular 
measures of goodness of fit. The value obtained for the R square of the model 3 (equation 
3a) was 0,591. This tells us how much of the variance in the dependent variable (total 
voluntary disclosure index) is explained by the model. Given these results, we conclude 
that the variables considered in the model largely explain the voluntary disclosure of 
companies. Despite this, it’s important to considerer the value of Ajusted R square, which 
for equation (3a) presents the value of 0,539. According to Tabachnick and Fidell 
(1996:164) when a small sample is involved, the R square value in the sample tends to be a 
rather optimistic overestimation of the true value in the population. In this case, the author 
state that the Adjusted R square statistic ‘corrects’ this value to provide a better estimate of 
the true population value. Finally, the F statistic test gives us the statistical significance of 
the result (Pallant, 2001). For all the models, F statistic present a statistical significance at 
0,01 level. 
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 5.3.2 Dependent variable: category of voluntary disclosure index 
 
To extend the previous analysis we plotted several multiple regressions using as the 
dependent variable each one of the six categories of the voluntary disclosure index. We 
used the model 3, equation (3a), by changing the dependent variable. 
 
Meek et al. (1995) examine voluntary disclosure in different categories of information 
contained in annual reports of multinational corporations from the United States, United 
Kingdom and continental Europe. They conclude that the factors affecting a firm’s 
disclosure decisions are expected to vary by type of information. This suggests that the 
determining factors affecting a firm’s voluntary disclosure practices are different 
depending on the type of information disclosed. Table 5.8 provides the results of the 
regression models for each category. A first analysis allows us to conclude that we have 
less statistical significant determinants for each voluntary disclosure category than the ones 
resulting from the previous analysis of the total voluntary disclosure score. Despite this, in 
general, we have the same major determinants. These determinants are related with board 
compensation, the presence of a large shareholder, firm size, growth opportunities and 
organizational performance.  
 
The firm size shows a positive statistical significant relation with all the categories of 
voluntary disclosure. As noted by Foster (1986: 44) "the variable most consistently 
reported as significant in studies examining differences across firms in their disclosure 
policy is firm size". This result confirms that firm size is significantly related to the level of 
information voluntarily disclosed by Iberian Peninsula non-financial listed companies. Growth 
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opportunities show a positive statistical significant relation with the disclosure of 
information about market and competition (0,203) and about management and production 
(0,176). Organizational performance shows a positive statistical significant relation with all 
the voluntary disclosure categories, exception made to the future perspective category. 
This last category presents no more than the firm size as the major determinant. 
 
The presence of a large shareholder shows a negative statistical significant relation with 
the disclosure of information on strategy category (-0,159), management and production    
(-0,187), on marketing category (-0,291) and on human capital category (-0,191). In 
relation to these last two categories, also Oliveira et al. (2006) find evidences from the 
Portuguese stock market that firms with lower shareholder concentration appear to disclose 
more information about intangibles voluntarily. 
 
Finally, an interesting result is the positive statistical significant relation between the board 
compensation and the disclosure of information on marketing category (0,207) and human 
capital category (0,136).  
 
Nagar et al. (2003) argue that stock price-based incentives reduce managerial reluctance to 
disclose private information. Their results suggest that stock price-based compensation 
plays a role in providing managers with an incentive to improve price informativeness 
through disclosure. To Healy and Palepu (2001) managers have incentives to make 
voluntary disclosures to correct any perceived undervaluation (relative to their own 
information set) prior to the expiration of stock option award. 
 262 
Table 5.8 – Regression results using each category of voluntary disclosure 
 
Dependent variable 
Marketing 
 (INDMARK) 
Strategy 
(INDSTRA) 
Market  and competition 
(INDCOMP) 
Management  and production 
(INDMANAG) 
Future perspective 
(INDFUT) 
Human capital 
(INDHCAP) 
Constant -1,394***  -0,715***  -0,692***  -0,256  -0,729***  -1,440***  
FSIZE     0,575***  0,696***  0,530***  0,293**  0,528***  0,616***  
 (4,541)  (5,707)  (3,708)  (2,010)  (3,716)  (5,002)  
PERFOR1 0,147*  0,224***  0,180*  0,209*  0,118  0,185**  
 (1,711)  (2,699)  (1,851)  (2,112)  (1,221)  (2,214)  
PER        0,095  0,102  0,203**  0,176*  0,030  -0,032  
 (1,107)  (1,235)  (2,102)  (1,791)  (0,309)  (-0,380)  
LEVERAGE -0,113  -0,049  -0,008  -0,056  0,055  -0,014  
 (-1,077)  (-0,483)  (-0,069)  (-0,461)  (0,467)  (-0,139)  
DIRCAP 0,106  -0,045  -0,002  0,042  -0,086  0,083  
 (1,358)  (-0,601)  (-0,018)  (0,469)  (-0,980)  (1,090)  
CAPSTATE 0,055  0,003  0,089  0,133  0,073  0,050  
 (0,674)  (0,043)  (0,967)  (1,414)  (0,797)  (0,632)  
MAINSHARE     -0,291***  -0,159**  -0,039  -0,187*  -0,021  -0,191**  
 (-3,320)  (-1,888)  (-0,396)  (-1,861)  (-0,210)  (-2,242)  
INDEP    0,000  0,058  0,004  0,069  -0,040  0,068  
 (0,000)  (0,682)  (0,040)  (0,684)  (-0,407)  (0,796)  
BSIZE          0,001  -0,014  0,055  0,172  -0,072  0,061  
 (0,003)  (-0,143)  (0,481)  (1,468)  (-0,631)  (0,617)  
DIRCOMP              0,207**  0,096  0,123  0,097  0,001  0,136*  
 (2,551)  (1,231)  (1,346)  (1,038)  (0,008)  (1,729)  
EXPERTISE -0,023  -0,139  -0,107  -0,102  -0,073  -0,039  
 (-0,266)  (-1,630)  (-1,072)  (-0,998)  (-0,719)  (-0,458)  
CONTROLINDEX   0,136  0,018  0,008  0,035  0,065  -0,111  
 (1,355)  (0,018)  (0,072)  (0,302)  (0,577)  (-1,138)  
R2 0,446  0,486  0,293  0,266  0,303  0,475  
RAdjusted 0,376  0,421  0,204  0,174  0,214  0,409  
F-statistic 6,373***  7,480***  3,285***  2,872***  3,435***  7,171***  
Durbin- Watson 1,803  2,009  2,141  1,978  1,913  1,832  
  *Significant at 0.05<p ≤ 0.10; **Significant at 0.01<p ≤ 0.05; ***Significant at p ≤ 0.01.  Test statistic below 
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Where: 
INDTOTAL is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure total score on the six categories to the 
maximum possible score applied in those categories;  
FSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets;  
PERFOR1 is the earnings before Interests and taxes divided by year-end total assets;  
PER is the year-end price of ordinary shares divided by earnings per share;  
LEVERAGE is the long term liabilities divided by total assets; 
DIRCAP is the proportion of capital owned by the board;  
STATEOWNER is a binary variable which took the value of 1 if a the state own shares of the company and 0 
otherwise;  
MAINSHARE is the proportion of the shares of the company own by the biggest shareholder; 
INDEP is the number of independent members of the board divided by the total number of members;  
BSIZE is the number of members of the board divided by the natural logarithm of total assets; 
DIRCOMP is the proportion of board’s remuneration that is not fixed; 
EXPERTISE is the number of other societies in which board members exercise management functions;  
CONTROLINDEX is the firm's individual score on monitoring and control issues divided by the total score 
(5 indicators: Corporate governance commission, Big 4, Internal audit, Audit committee and Remuneration 
committee). 
 
Otherwise, the work of Lajili and Zéghal (2005) examined the association between firm 
equity market values and human capital proxies, such as labour costs and estimated labour 
productivity and efficiency indicators and concluded that companies with valuable 
intangible human capital assets, particularly in terms of higher productivity and efficiency, 
may be undervalued in the stock market. 
 
In this sense, and following the previous arguments, the positive statistical significant 
relation between the board compensation and the disclosure of information on marketing 
and human capital categories may suggest that board compensation, especially stock price-
based incentives, induce managers to provide additional information, namely information 
on intangibles assets, on a voluntary basis, as a way to boost the market stock price of their 
companies. 
 
In the following point we describe the development of the proposed structural equation 
model in order to test the second group of hypotheses. 
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5.4 Structural Equation Model 
 
With a Structural Equation Model (SEM) we intend to study the direct and indirect relation 
between the governance rules and information asymmetry, through the voluntary 
disclosure of information and organizational performance. According to Hair et al. (1998: 
592) “the true value of SEM comes from the benefits of using the structural and 
measurement models simultaneously, each playing distinct roles in the overall analysis”. 
The authors propose a “seven-stage process”: 
 
(1) developing a theoretically based model; 
(2) constructing a path diagram of causal relationships; 
(3) converting the path diagram into a set of structural and measurement models; 
(4) analysis of  aspects that affect the estimation of SEM; 
(5) assessing the identification of the structural model; 
(6) evaluating the estimation results; 
(7) model re-specification and interpretation of the results. 
 
 5.4.1 Development of the proposed structural equation model 
 
In the estimation and evaluation of the proposed SEM we used the EQS 6.1 software 
through the SPSS 17.0 and a sample of 140 non-financial listed companies from the 
Iberian Peninsula. The model estimation was based on the matrix of variance/covariance of 
the vector of observations of the standardized observed variables, which is presented in 
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appendix 7. The choice of standardized variables overcomes the problems in fixing the 
scale of the latent variables resulting from the difference in scale of the original variables, 
as suggested by Long (1983), O’Brien and Reilly (1995), among others.  The development 
of our model is explained along the seven steps that are described below. We are going, in 
this sense, to follow the Hair et al. (1998) methodology in what concerns to the 
development of the proposed model. 
 
 5.4.1.1 Stage 1 - Developing a theoretically based model 
 
The theoretical support of the proposed model follows the literature review, presented in 
chapter 2, and the arguments that supported the development of the hypotheses, presented 
in chapter 3. Therefore, in light of the theoretical support shown, and following the 
previous statistical analysis, it can be assumed that the application of structural equation 
model is correct for this study because the aim is to confirm the possibility of a series of 
simultaneous direct and indirect relations. 
 
Following Hair et al. (1998) there may be three different strategies considered in the 
application of structural equation models44. Within our work we followed the development 
strategy. In fact, the structural equation model, originally specified on theoretical basis, 
                                                 
44
 On the confirmatory strategy the researcher specifies a single structural equation model and uses the 
technique to assess their statistical significance. On the competitive strategy the researcher compares the 
estimated initial model with different alternative models, looking for one that best fits the data. Finally, the 
development strategy differs from the previous two because although it proposes an initial model, the purpose 
of the modelling effort is to better improve itself through changes in the structural and measurement 
models. In many applications of this type of strategy, the theory serves only as a starting point for developing 
a model that as well as theoretically justified may also have empirical support  (Hair et al., 1998: 590- 592). 
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was gradually redesigned to maintain its theoretical justification and to be, simultaneously, 
supported by the empirical data collected meanwhile.  
 
The proposed structural equation model will be estimated following an approach that 
involves two steps. Initially, the measurement model will be estimated and evaluated and, 
subsequently, the structural model. This strategy of estimating the SEM in two steps is 
recommended, among others, by Anderson and Gerbing (1988), Hatcher (1994), 
Schumacker and Lomax (1996) and Hair et al. (1998). In the initial evaluation of the 
measurement models, our attention turns to how each latent variable is being measured by 
the selected indicators with the purpose of verifying whether it will fit well to the data 
collected in the sample.  
 
 5.4.1.2 Stage 2 - Constructing a path diagram of causal relationships 
 
The path diagram, formed to schematically represent the structural equation model 
proposed in this study, was presented in figure 3.1 (chapter 3). Four of the six constructs 
are endogenous45 ("voluntary disclosure”, "organizational performance", "turnover" and 
"bid-ask"), meaning they are determined by one or more of the others, existing two 
exogenous constructs ("directors’ and supervisors' structures" and "ownership structure"), 
which function as independent variables that are not predicted by any other variable 
included in the model. We established two correlations, the first between the two 
                                                 
45
 An “endogenous” construct or variable is the dependent or outcome variable in at least one casual 
relationship. In terms of a path diagram, there are one or more arrows leading into the endogenous construct 
or variable. An “exogenous” construct or variable acts only as a predictor or “cause” for other constructs or 
variables in the model. In path diagrams, the exogenous constructs have only causal arrows leading out of 
them and are not predicted by any other construct in the model (Hair et al., 1998: 580). 
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exogenous constructs that represent the “governance rules” and the second between the 
two constructs that represent proxies of information asymmetry on the market46. 
 
According to Hair et al. (1998) the path diagrams are based on two assumptions, which 
should be noted. Firstly, any causal relationships between constructs are represented, and 
its inclusion or exclusion to be justified theoretically (for these authors it’s very important 
to justify why it’s considered a causal relationship). The second is related to the 
assumption that all relations between the constructs are linear, so it is not possible to 
estimate nonlinear relationships when we use this technique. 
 
 5.4.1.3 Stage 3 - Converting the path diagram into a set of structural and  
  measurement models 
 
In the third stage we have to define our measurement model in specific terms47. To specify 
the measurement model, we started with an exploratory factor analysis and determined the 
internal consistence of each construct through the Cronbach alfa48, as well as the 
percentage of variance explained. These results, as well as the indicators for each construct 
included in the structural equation model, are shown in table 5.9.  
                                                 
46
 Although in this study we consider two proxies for information asymmetry in the market, due to their 
different nature, it seemed more enriching to analyse the impact of our model in each one of them 
separately. This fact results in the creation of two constructs with only one indicator. 
47
 In this model, η represents the endogenous latent variables (constructs) and ξ represents the exogenous 
latent variables (constructs).  
48
 The Cronbach’s alpha is a commonly used measure of reliability for a set of two or more construct 
indicators. Values range between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating higher reliability among the 
indicators. It’s also common to accept that the Cronbach’s alpha value should be above 0,7. 
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Where: 
INDEP is the number of independent members of the board divided by the total number of members; 
BSIZE is the number of members of the board divided by the natural logarithm of total assets; 
DIRCOMP is the proportion of board’s remuneration that is not fixed;  
NONEXEC is the number of non-executive members of the board divided by the total number of members; 
EXPERTISE is the number of other societies in which board members exercise management functions; 
CONTROLINDEX is the Firm's individual score on monitoring and control issues (5 indicators: Big 4, Audit 
committee, Internal audit, Corporate governance commission, and Remuneration committee); 
SIGNIFICANT include the significant participations of shareholders that have, direct or indirectly, more than 
2% of share capital and the shares held by other shareholders that exercise significant influence on 
company’s life; 
                                                 
49
 Like explained previously, we included in the construct “ownership structure” variables that pretend to 
characterize the ownership concentration of the companies under study. 
Table 5.9 – Indicators for each construct included in the structural equation model 
 
Constructs Indicators 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Variance 
Explained 
(x1)  Proportion of independent directors on the board (INDEP) 
(X2)  Size of the board (BSIZE) 
(X3)  Board’s compensations (DIRCOMP) 
(X4)  Proportion of non-executive directors on the board (NONEXEC) 
(X5)  Board expertise (EXPERTISE) 
Directors’ and supervisors’ 
structures 
ξ
 1 
(X6)  Monitoring and Control index (CONTROLINDEX) 
0,703 0,414 
(X7) Significant participations (SIGNIFICANT) 
(X8) Main shareholder (MAINSHARE) 
Ownership structure
49
 
ξ
 2 
(X9) Main five shareholders (MAINFIVE) 
0,903 0,830 
(Y1) Voluntary disclosure index in strategy (INDSTRA) 
(Y2) Voluntary disclosure index in market and competition (INDCOMP) 
(Y3) Voluntary disclosure index in management and production                       
(INDMANAG) 
(Y4) Voluntary disclosure index in future perspective (INDFUT) 
(Y5) Voluntary disclosure index in marketing (INDMARK) 
Voluntary disclosure 
η1 
(Y6) Voluntary disclosure index in human capital (INDHCAP) 
0,841 0,560 
(Y7) Return on equity (ROE) 
(Y8) Performance 1 (PERFOR1) 
Org. performance 
η2 
(Y9) Performance 2 (PERFOR2) 
0,868 0,793 
(Y10)Turnover ratio (TURNOVER) Turnover 
η3  
___ 1 
(Y11) Bid-ask spread (BIDASK) BidAsk 
η4  
___ 1 
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MAINSHARE is the proportion of the shares of the company own by the biggest shareholder; 
MAINFIVE is the proportion of the shares of the company own by the biggest five shareholders; 
INDSTRA is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on strategic issues to the maximum 
possible score applied in those issues (15 indicators); 
INDCOMP is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on market and competition issues to the 
maximum possible score applied in those issues (11 indicators); 
INDMANAG is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on management and production 
issues to the maximum possible score applied in those issues (11 indicators); 
INDFUT is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on future perspective issues to the 
maximum possible score applied in those issues (8 indicators); 
INDMARK is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on marketing issues to the maximum 
possible score applied in those issues (7 indicators); 
INDHCAP is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on human capital issues to the 
maximum possible score applied in those issues (8 indicators); 
ROE is the net income divided by the shareholders’ equity;   
PERFOR1 is the earnings before Interests and taxes divided by year-end total assets;    
PERFOR2 is the earnings before Interests, taxes, depreciations and amortizations divided by year-end total 
assets;  
TURNOVER is the value of shares traded during the year divided by the firm's market value of equity at the 
end of the year;  
BIDASK is the bid-ask spread average of the company (difference between the ask price and the bid price 
during the year). 
 
 
 
We also performed a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of measurement model for the 
exogenous latent variables (“directors’ and supervisors’ structures” and “ownership 
structure”), since it was in these constructs that we encountered more difficulties to define 
the indicators. According to Byrne (1994) confirmatory factor analysis procedures are used 
in testing the validity of the indicator variables. The results of the CFA for the exogenous 
latent variables are presented in the appendix 8. The analysis of the standardized estimation 
of the measurement model coefficients and the goodness-of-fit measures allowed us to 
validate the chosen indicators.  
 
Following the confirmatory factor analysis, we proceed to the mathematical formulation of 
the path diagram. Given the indicators presented previously to measure each of the 
constructs, we start by formulating the measurement models for latent exogenous variables 
and latent endogenous variables, which affects each of these indicators to measure the 
respective latent variable. The mathematical formulation of the path diagram of our model 
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is described below, first of the measurement model (A), second of the structural model (B), 
and finally the correlation among constructs (C). 
 
(A) The Measurement Model 
 
 i) Measurement model for the latent exogenous variables 
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 ii) Measurement model for the endogenous latent variables 
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Since Y10 is a single indicator of the latent variable η3 (turnover) and Y11 is a single 
indicator of the latent variable η4 (bid-ask) we can admit, in both cases, that the indicator 
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measures without error the latent variable in question, supposing that the elements y 3,10λ e 
y
4,11λ  of the matrix Λx are equal to one and that the measurement error is zero50. 
 
In other cases we considered, explicitly, that each one of the indicators is a partial and 
incomplete measure of the latent variable that is measured, by admitting that the same 
variable is measured by more than one indicator and that each one of these is measuring it 
with error. 
 
(B) Structural Model 
 
In the structural model we specified structural relationships between latent 
variables. Having regarded the model formulated previously, this specification requires 
intending directional relationships between the latent exogenous variables and endogenous 
latent variables, as well as, causal relationships among the last. 
 












+





×












+












×












=












4
3
2
1
2
1
2,4
1,3
2,21,2
2,11,1
4
3
2
1
1,4
2,31,3
2,1
4
3
2
1
0
0
000
00
0000
000
ζ
ζ
ζ
ζ
ξ
ξ
γ
γ
γγ
γγ
η
η
η
η
β
ββ
β
η
η
η
η
 
 
 
(C) Correlations among constructs. 
 
                                                 
50
 In the case of latent variables, which are measured by a single indicator, it’s not possible to empirically 
determine the measurement error. Thus, the estimation of the model requires that the measurement error be 
secure. In our case, we fixed it at zero, being one of the procedures that can be found in the literature to 
continue in the estimation and evaluation of the model (e.g. Augusto, 2003). 
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There are two correlations matrices pertaining to the structural equations. The first denotes 
the correlations among the exogenous constructs.  
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The second denotes the correlations among two endogenous constructs. 
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Figure 5.3 represents in a schematic manner, the measurement and structural models 
corresponding to the proposed structural equation model. 
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Fig. 5.3 – Schematic representation of the proposed model 
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 5.4.1.4 Stage 4 – Analysis of aspects that affect the estimation of SEM 
 
The structural equation models differ from other types of multivariate statistical analysis 
because of only using the matrices of variances/covariances or correlations as input data 
and not individual observations. This happens because the main focus of this multivariate 
analysis is not in the set of individual observations, but the pattern of relations between 
them (Hair et al., 1998). As stated previously, our model estimation was based on the 
matrix of variance/covariance of the vector of observations of the standardized observed 
variables. 
 
In the table 5.10 are the Skewness (a measure of symmetry) and Kurtosis (a measure of the 
‘peakedness’) for each of the observed variables of our measurement model. These 
statistics characterize the distribution of data on the asymmetry and the ‘peakedness’ and 
are commonly used to ascertain whether the distribution of a given variable moves away 
from a normal distribution.  The analysis of these statistics shows that only two variables 
deviate from the recommended levels of acceptance. Augusto (2003) followed upper 
boundaries of 3,0 for Skewness and 20,0 for Kurtosis as indicators of univariate 
normality. The variable “Turnover ratio” shows a value of 26,258 for the Kurtosis and a 
value of 4,390 for Skewness. The "Bid-ask spread” has a value of 38,032 for the Kurtosis 
and the value of 5,421 for Skewness. 
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Where: 
INDEP is the number of independent members of the board divided by the total number of members; 
BSIZE is the number of members of the board divided by the natural logarithm of total assets; 
DIRCOMP is the proportion of board’s remuneration that is not fixed;  
NONEXEC is the number of non-executive members of the board divided by the total number of members; 
EXPERTISE is the number of other societies in which board members exercise management functions; 
CONTROLINDEX is the Firm's individual score on monitoring and control issues (5 indicators: Big 4, Audit 
committee, Internal audit, Corporate governance commission, and Remuneration committee); 
SIGNIFICANT include the significant participations of shareholders that have, direct or indirectly, more than 
2% of share capital and the shares held by other shareholders that exercise significant influence on 
company’s life; 
MAINSHARE is the proportion of the shares of the company own by the biggest shareholder; 
MAINFIVE is the proportion of the shares of the company own by the biggest five shareholders; 
INDSTRA is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on strategic issues to the maximum 
possible score applied in those issues (15 indicators); 
INDCOMP is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on market and competition issues to the 
maximum possible score applied in those issues (11 indicators); 
INDMANAG is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on management and production 
issues to the maximum possible score applied in those issues (11 indicators); 
INDFUT is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on future perspective issues to the 
maximum possible score applied in those issues (8 indicators); 
INDMARK is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on marketing issues to the maximum 
possible score applied in those issues (7 indicators); 
INDHCAP is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on human capital issues to the 
maximum possible score applied in those issues (8 indicators); 
Table 5.10 –  Skewness and Kurtosis 
 
Constructs Variable Skewness Kurtosis 
(x1)  Proportion of independent directors on the board 0,210 -0,649 
(X2)  Size of the board 0,490 0,426 
(X3)  Board’s’ compensations 0,011 -0,904 
(X4)  Proportion of non-executive directors on the board -1,276 1,076 
(X5)  Board expertise 2,214 6,229 
Directors’ and supervisors’ 
structures 
ξ 1 
(X6)  Monitoring and Control index -0,649 0,007 
(X7) Significant participations -0,648 0,192 
(X8) Main shareholder 0,508 -0,730 
Ownership structure 
ξ 2 
(X9) Main five shareholders -0,426 -0,424 
(Y1) Voluntary disclosure index in strategy -0,656 -0,277 
(Y2) Voluntary disclosure index in market and competition -0,004 -0,706 
(Y3) Voluntary disclosure index in management and    
production 
0,109 -0,498 
(Y4) Voluntary disclosure index in future perspective 0,047 -0,490 
(Y5) Voluntary disclosure index in marketing 0,862 -0,154 
Voluntary disclosure 
η1 
(Y6) Voluntary disclosure index in human capital 0,528 -0,698 
(Y7) Return on equity -2,881 18,730 
(Y8) Performance 1 -0,908 3,474 
Org. performance 
η2 
(Y9) Performance 2 0,385 12,975 
(Y10)Turnover ratio Turnover 
η3  
4,390 26,258 
(Y11) Bid-ask spread BidAsk  
η4  5,421 38,032 
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ROE is the net income divided by the shareholders’ equity;   
PERFOR1 is the earnings before Interests and taxes divided by year-end total assets;    
PERFOR2 is the earnings before Interests, taxes, depreciations and amortizations divided by year-end total 
assets;  
TURNOVER is the value of shares traded during the year divided by the firm's market value of equity at the 
end of the year;  
BIDASK is the bid-ask spread average of the company (difference between the ask price and the bid price 
during the year). 
 
 
For Kline (1998) there is no clear guideline that indicates when the violation of the 
hypothesis of non-normality is problematic, when the basic assumptions of the estimation 
methods that their results are based on are violated, but it is accepted to be particularly 
important to analyse the robustness of the SEM.  
 
In our case, since the violation of normality is not very extensive, and taking into account 
the issues mentioned above about the different estimation methods, we decided to use the 
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation method. However, we will also use an extremely 
valuable feature unique to the EQS program that is the availability of robust statistics that 
can be associated with the maximum likelihood estimation. By specifying “ME=ML, 
ROBUST”, the output will provide a robust chi squared statistic (χ²) and robust standard 
errors, both of which have been corrected for non-normality.  
 
 5.4.1.5 Stage 5 - Assessing the identification of the structural model 
 
In the SEM estimation process the most likely cause for the computer program “blowing 
up” or producing meaningless or illogical results is the identification of the structural 
model. Identification needs arise when the parameters don’t have a unique determination 
 277 
because there is insufficient information in the matrix of variances/covariances of the 
sample (Hair et al., 1998).  
 
The proposed structural equation model is identifiable. He meets the "three-measure rule", 
since all constructs have at least three indicators. Exception made by the constructs that 
represent proxies of information asymmetry that, by having only one indicator, work in 
practice as observed variables. To check the "order condition"51 we calculate the number of 
degrees of freedom, which was done using the following formula (Hair et al., 1998): 
 
( )( )[ ] tqpqpdf −+++= 1
2
1
 
 
where: 
df = degrees of freedom 
p = the number of endogenous indicators, 
p = the number of exogenous indicators, 
t = the number of estimated coefficients in the proposed model 
 
 
 
The model originally proposed features 158 degrees of freedom, calculated as follows: 
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2
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51
 The “Order Condition” states that the model’s degrees of freedom must be greater than or equal to zero 
(Hair et al., 1998). 
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The final model has 161degrees of freedom, calculated as follows: 
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 5.4.1.6 Stage 6 - Evaluating the estimation results 
 
In sixth stage, which follows the estimation of the parameters of the proposed model, we 
proceed to evaluate the quality of the estimates and of the model as a whole, by checking 
its empirical and theoretical validity. Although we have many goodness-of-fit measures, 
we are only going to use some of them, following some authors’ recommendations. As we 
state previously, according to Fan et al. (1999) all measures overestimate goodness of fit 
for small samples (< 200), though RMSEA and CFI are less sensitive to sample size than 
others. 
 
Kline (1998) recommends the analysis of at least four tests, such as chi-square; Goodness-
of-fit Index (GFI), Normed Fit Index (NFI) or Comparative Fit Index (CFI);  Tucker-Lewis 
Index (TLI); and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). By convention, 
CFI should be equal to or greater than 0,90 to accept the model, indicating that 90% of the 
co-variation in the data can be reproduced by the given model. By convention, TLI should 
be equal to or greater than 0,90 to accept the model. According to Schumacker and Lomax 
(2004) there is good model fit if RMSEA less than or equal to 0,05. Other researchers state 
that there is adequate fit if RMSEA is less than or equal to 0,08. Hu and Bentler (1999) 
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have suggested RMSEA less or equal to 0,06 as the cut-off for a good model fit.  
Schumacker and Lomax (1996) defend values close to 0,9 for the GFI index. 
 
The Normed Chi-square is the chi-square divided by degrees of freedom, in an attempt to 
make it less dependent on sample size. Carmines and McIver (1981) state that Normed 
Chi-square should be in the 2:1 or 3:1 range for an acceptable model. Ullman (2001) states 
that 2 or less reflects a good fit. Kline (1998) argues that 3 or less is acceptable. Some 
researchers allow values as high as 5 to consider a good model fit (e.g. Schumacker and 
Lomax, 2004) while others insist that the Normed Chi-square should be 2 or less. 
 
Following the previous recommendations, in our model we are going to analyse the values 
for the Normed Chi-square, CFI, GFI, RMSEA and TLI.  Table 5.11 shows us the 
considered goodness of fit tests for the initial model52. 
 
 
Comparing these results with what the literature has suggested, so that the proposed model 
can be considered adequately adjusted to the data, we are led to conclude that our sample is 
well described by our model. All the measures we considered are within acceptable levels 
                                                 
52
 As explained before, we also used a robust method to avoid possible problems related with the non-
fulfilment of the normality conditions of variables. The results were very similar with the ones using the 
maximum likelihood estimation: Normed Chi-squared = 1,39; CFI = 0,92; TLI = 0,90; RMSEA = 0,06. 
Table 5.11 – Goodness of Fit Tests  - Initial Model  
 
Normed Chi-squared  (χ²/df) (205,780 / 158) =1,302 
CFI (Comparative Fit Index) 0,952 
GFI (Goodness-of-fit Index) 0,855 
RMSEA (Root-Mean-Square Error of Approximation) 0,051 
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) 0,942 
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taking into account the recommendations outlined above. Just GFI indicator is slightly 
below the reference value for some authors, i.e., 0,9. 
 
In addition to these measures of overall evaluation of the model, we conducted an analysis 
of the elements of the matrix of variance/covariance of standardized residuals. The 
standardized residuals represent the differences between the observed co-variance and the 
estimated covariance matrix. Residual values greater than ±  2,58 are considered 
statistically significant at the 0,05 level. Significant residuals indicate a substantial 
prediction error for a par of indicators (i.e. one of the covariances in the original input data) 
(Hair et al., 1998). To accept the proposal model, the authors recommend that the residual 
values greater than ±  2,58 should not exceed five percent of the number of standardized 
residuals. Our matrix of variances/covariances of standardized residuals, presented in 
appendix 9, don’t present any value greater than the described limit. 
 
Once the overall model fit has been evaluated, it’s important to examine in more detail 
each of its component parts: (A) the measurement model and (B) structural model.  
 
(A) Measurement model fit 
 
Regarding the measurement model, its evaluation will allow us to perceive how the 
unobservable or latent variables were measured by the indicators selected for purposes of 
measurement. It is recommended the analysis of: (i) the reliability and the validity of the 
observed variables (indicators), and (ii) the reliability of the latent variables (constructs). 
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 (i)   reliability and validity of the observed variables (indicators) 
 
The analysis of the reliability of each indicator is allowed by the multiple correlation 
coefficients, R2 (Hatcher, 1994). This measure of reliability reflects the percentage of the 
variance of the indicator that is explained by the latent variable. Although it is generally 
agreed that the higher the R2 the greater the reliability of the indicator in question, there is 
no threshold. 
 
The indicators that measure the same latent variable must have a convergent validity, this 
means that, on the one hand, a significant correlation between them and, on the other hand, 
the coefficients that express the directional relationships between indicators and latent 
variables, which those are measuring, should all be significant. From the practical point of 
view, this analysis is possible by testing the significance of coefficients that express those 
relationships (Hatcher, 1994). In the cases that statistical significance is not achieved, “the 
researcher may wish to eliminate the indicator or attempt to transform it for better fit with 
the construct” (Hair et al., 1998: 612). Another important dimension in assessing the 
measurement model is the analysis of the sign and magnitude of the estimated coefficients. 
 
According to Hair et al. (1998) is very important when we are evaluating the results to 
make an inspection for “offending estimates”. These are estimated coefficients in either the 
structural or measurement models that exceed acceptable limits. The most common 
examples of offending estimates are: (1) negative errors; (2) standardized coefficients 
exceeding the unity; (3) very large standard errors associated with any estimated 
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coefficient. A problem of this nature must first be resolved before proceeding to the 
evaluation/interpretation of any specific results from the model.  
 
The standardized estimation of the measurement model coefficients are shown in table 
5.12. We made the analysis of the offending estimates and verified the non existence of 
negative errors. The results also show us that we don’t have any standardized coefficient 
that exceeds unity and we didn’t find any very large standard error associated with any 
estimated coefficient. In addition, all coefficients have the expected sign.  
 
Regarding the value of R2 for each indicator, and although it is agreed that the higher the 
value the better the indicator, in our case it varies from 0,100 for the X6 indicator and 0,941 
for the Y8 indicator.  
 
The results also show us the statistical significance of each indicator within each one of its 
constructs. If all the coefficients are significant, there is evidence that all indicators 
affected to the same construct are effectively measuring it (Anderson and Gerbing, 
1988). As shown in the table 5.12, all indicators show a statistical significance at 0,01 
levels, which supports the hypothesis of convergent validity for all indicators. 
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*Significant at 0.05 < p ≤ 0.10; **Significant at 0.01< p ≤ 0.05; ***Significant at p ≤ 0.01 
a: fixed parameters 
Test statistic below  
 
Table 5.12 – Standardized estimation of the measurement model coefficients  
– initial model 
 
 η1 η2 η3 η4 
 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
Org 
performance 
Turnover Bid-ask 
ξ 1 
Directors’ and 
supervisors’ 
structures 
 
ξ 2 
Ownership 
structure 
 
S.E. R2 
(Y1) INDSTRA 0,939***      0,235 0,883 
 (6,939)        
(Y2) INDCOMP 0,565***      0,191 0,319 
 (4,999)        
(Y3) INDMANAG 0,574***      0,162 0,329 
 (6,164)        
(Y4) INDFUT 0,600***      0,205 0,360 
 (5,224)        
a(Y5) INDMARK 0,571      ----- 0,326 
 -----        
(Y6) INDHCAP 0,731***      0,173 0,534 
 (7,251)        
 (Y7) ROE  0,679***     0,066 0,461 
  (8,747)       
a (Y8) PERFOR1  0,970     ----- 0,941 
  -----       
(Y9) PERFOR2  0,866***     0,043 0,750 
  (12,926)       
a (Y10) TURNOVER   1,000    ----- 1 
   -----      
a (Y11) BIDASK    1,000   ----- 1 
    -----     
(X1) INDEP     0,532***  0,144 0,282 
     (4,928)    
a (X2) BSIZE     0,724  ----- 0,524 
     -----    
(X3) DIRCOMP     0,400***  0,141 0,160 
     (3,802)    
(X4) NONEXEC     0,689***  0,153 0,475 
     (6,248)    
(X5) 
CONTROLINDEX 
    
0,666***  
0,148 0,444 
     (6,084)    
(X6) EXPERTISE     0,316***  0,150 0,100 
     (3,143)    
 (X7) QUALIFIED      0,983*** 0,073 0,966 
      (14,640)   
 (X8) MAINSHARE      0,720*** 0,090 0,519 
      (9,554)   
a (X9) MAINFIVE      0,877 ----- 0,769 
      -----   
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Where: 
INDSTRA is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on strategic issues to the maximum 
possible score applied in those issues (15 indicators); 
INDCOMP is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on market and competition issues to the 
maximum possible score applied in those issues (11 indicators); 
INDMANAG is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on management and production 
issues to the maximum possible score applied in those issues (11 indicators); 
INDFUT is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on future perspective issues to the 
maximum possible score applied in those issues (8 indicators); 
INDMARK is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on marketing issues to the maximum 
possible score applied in those issues (7 indicators); 
INDHCAP is the proportion of the firm's individual disclosure score on human capital issues to the 
maximum possible score applied in those issues (8 indicators); 
ROE is the net income divided by the shareholders’ equity;   
PERFOR1 is the earnings before Interests and taxes divided by year-end total assets;    
PERFOR2 is the earnings before Interests, taxes, depreciations and amortizations divided by year-end total 
assets;  
TURNOVER is the value of shares traded during the year divided by the firm's market value of equity at the 
end of the year;  
BIDASK is the bid-ask spread average of the company (difference between the ask price and the bid price 
during the year); 
INDEP is the number of independent members of the board divided by the total number of members; 
BSIZE is the number of members of the board divided by the natural logarithm of total assets; 
DIRCOMP is the proportion of board’s remuneration that is not fixed; ROE is the net income divided by the 
shareholders’ equity; 
NONEXEC is the number of non-executive members of the board divided by the total number of members; 
EXPERTISE is the number of other societies in which board members exercise management functions; 
CONTROLINDEX is the Firm's individual score on monitoring and control issues (5 indicators: Big 4, Audit 
committee, Internal audit, Corporate governance commission, and Remuneration committee); 
SIGNIFICANT include the significant participations of shareholders that have, direct or indirectly, more than 
2% of share capital and the shares held by other shareholders that exercise significant influence on 
company’s life; 
MAINSHARE is the proportion of the shares of the company own by the biggest shareholder; 
MAINFIVE is the proportion of the shares of the company own by the biggest five shareholders. 
 
 
 (ii) reliability of the latent variables (constructs). 
 
An important measure in assessing the measurement model is the reliability of each 
construct. Reliability is a measure of the internal consistency of the constructs indicators, 
depicting the degree to which they “indicate” the common latent (unobserved) construct. 
“More reliable measurements provide the researcher with greater confidence that the 
individual indicators are all consistent in their measurements” (Hair et al., 1998: 612). 
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Fornell and Lacker (1981), as well as Hair et al. (1998), propose a way to estimate the 
construct reliability, according to the following formula: 
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Where the standardized loadings are obtained directly from the program output and εj is the 
measurement error for each indicator. The measurement error is 1,0 minus the reliability of 
the indicator, which is the square of the indicator’s standardized loading.  
 
Another measure of reliability, and that is a complementary measure to construct reliability 
measure, is the variance extracted measure. This measure reflects the overall amount of 
variance in the indicators accounted for by the latent construct. “Higher variance extracted 
values occur when the indicators are truly representative of the latent construct” (Hair et 
al., 1998: 612). This measure is quite similar to the reliability measure but differs in that 
the standardized loadings are squared before summing them. 
 
 
∑ ∑
∑
+
=
jloadingsdardizeds
loadingsdardizeds
ExtractedVariance
ε2
2
)_tan(
)_tan(
_  
 
 
 286 
Although there are no limits, unanimously accepted, for each of these measures, it is usual 
to suggest values above 0,7 in the case of the construct reliability, and 0,5 in the case of the 
variance extracted (Fornell and Lacker, 1981 and Hair et al., 1998).  
 
Table 5.13 shows us the constructs’ reliability and the variance extracted calculated 
according to the formulas presented earlier. 
 
Table 5.13 – Constructs’ reliability and variance extracted 
 
 η1 η2 η3 η4 
 
 
Voluntary 
disclosure 
 
Org 
performance 
 
Turnover 
 
Bid-ask 
ξ
 1 
Directors’ 
and 
supervisors’ 
structures 
 
ξ
 2 
Ownership 
structure 
 
Construct reliability 0,83 0,88 1 1 0,73 0,86 
Variance extracted 0,46 0,72 1 1 0,33 0,75 
 
We can see that all constructs, with more than one indicator, presented a value greater than 
0,70 in relation to their reliability. The values range from 0,73 for the "directors’ and 
supervisors’ structures" construct, to 0,88 for the "organizational performance" 
construct. Regarding the variance extracted, we have values below 0,5, namely for the 
construct "directors’ and supervisors’ structures" and for the construct “voluntary 
disclosure”. Despite this, as stated previously, these constructs present acceptable values 
regarding construct reliability. 
 
(B) Structural model fit 
 
Similarly to what happens in multiple regressions, also here the results may be affected 
because of problems with multicollinearity. In these cases we must always be aware of the 
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estimated correlations among constructs in the SEM results. Table 5.14 presents the 
correlation matrix between constructs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis of this table shows that the correlations between different constructs of the 
model are within the acceptable limits. As referred by Hair et al. (1998: 613), in the case of 
SEM, although there is no fixed limit to define the correlations that should be considered 
high, “values exceeding 0,90 should always be examined, and many times correlations 
exceeding 0,80 can be indicative of problems”. 
 
According to Hair et al. (1998) the examination of the structural model involves the 
significance of the estimated coefficients. Structural equation modelling methods provide 
not only estimated coefficients but also standard errors and calculate t values for each 
coefficient. For Byrne (1998) the evaluation of each model parameter can be done through: 
(i) feasibility of the estimated parameter, (ii) convenience of standard deviations, and (iii) 
statistical significance of each of the estimated parameters. First, the parameter is 
acceptable if the estimated value has the correct sign and magnitude and is consistent with 
the theoretical guidelines. Second, very high or very small values of standard deviation, is 
Table 5.14 – Correlation matrix  between constructs 
 
 ξ
 1 ξ 2 η1 η2 η3 η4 
ξ
 1 1      
ξ
 2 -0.409 1     
η1 0.558 -0.245 1    
η2 0.340 -0.139 0.470 1   
η3 0.167 -0.443 0.100 -0.193 1  
η4 -0.239 0.282 -0.323 -0.157 -0.267 1 
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indicative of poor adjustment. Third, the estimated parameter should be statistically 
significant i.e. significantly different from zero.  
  
Table 5.15 presents the standardized estimates for the coefficients expressing the 
directional relationship initially proposed, as well as the statistical test associated with 
each. The results of the estimation of the structural model revealed the absence of 
offending estimates. 
 
Some of those coefficients appear non statistically significant. These coefficients express 
directional relationships between both exogenous and endogenous latent variables, or 
between the latter. As recommended by the literature, these coefficients are strong 
candidates for removal from the model, through re-specification, in order to improve their 
parsimony. 
 
 289 
 
 
Table 5.15 - Standardized estimation of the initial structural model coefficients 
 
Structural Equations 
 
η1 η2 η3 η4 
 
Voluntary disclosure Org performance Turnover Bid-ask 
ξ
 1 0,449*** 0,401***   
Directors’ and supervisors’ 
structures 
 
(3,243) (3,242)  
 
ξ
 2 -0,014 0,117 -0,447*** 0,217** 
Ownership structure 
 
(-0,151) (1,104) (-5,239) (2,390) 
η1   0,140 -0,270*** 
Voluntary disclosure 
 
  
(1,408) (-2,703) 
η2 0,309***  -0,318***  
Org performance 
 
(3,008) 
 
(-3,403) 
 
*Significant at 0.05< p ≤ 0.10 ; **Significant at 0.01< p ≤ 0.05; ***Significant at  p ≤ 0.01 
Test statistic below  
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The estimation results also show that the correlation between directors’ and supervisors’ 
structures and ownership structure (St. Beta = -0,419; p < 0,01) and between the turnover 
and the bid-ask spread (St. Beta = -0,182 ; p < 0,05) presented a negative sign and 
statistical significance. The first correlation result is consistence with the work of Mak and 
Li (2001). The authors analysed the determinants of corporate ownership and board 
structure. Their findings indicate that corporate ownership and board structures are related, 
and that there are significant interrelationships among board structure characteristics. The 
second correlation result is also consistence with the work of Petersen and Plenborg 
(2006). The authors also found a negative statistical significant correlation between these 
two proxies of information asymmetry. 
 
 5.4.1.7 Stage 7 – Model respecification and interpretation of the results 
 
Once the model is deemed acceptable, we should examine the results for their 
correspondence to the proposed theory.  
 
In our case, our model re-specification will pass through the analysis of the statistical 
significance of our established relationships. If a given estimated parameter is not, under 
the statistical point of view, different from zero, for the levels of significance considered in 
the analysis, there are arguments in the literature to recommend its elimination. Byrne 
(1998), for example, argue that these parameters are not important for the model and 
should therefore be eliminated in order to improve the parsimony of the model. Also 
Bentler and Chou (1987) recommend that the model respecification starts by considering 
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which of the parameters can be eliminated, because it is generally safer to eliminate 
parameters than to add new parameters. 
 
In this first model the non-significant relations allow us to reject some of the developed 
hypotheses. We find three statistically non-significant relations.  
 
The hypothesis H5a predicted a negative relation between ownership concentration and 
voluntary disclosure. Given the previous results obtained from the multiple regression 
analysis methodology, an unexpected result rise from the relation between ownership 
structure and voluntary disclosure. Although presenting the expected negative sign, which 
suggests that bigger ownership concentration leads to a lower level of voluntary disclosure, 
this relation is statistically non-significant. Otherwise, we can see that the construct 
“directors’ and supervisors’ structures” present a positive statistical significant relation 
with voluntary disclosure. These results suggest that, when considering the simultaneous 
effect of governance rules on voluntary disclosure, the “ownership structure” construct 
prove to have a weaker negative effect on voluntary disclosure compared with the positive 
effect of the “directors’ and supervisors’ structures” construct. So, our result doesn’t 
support the hypothesis H5a.  
 
The hypothesis H5d predicted a positive relation between ownership concentration and 
organizational performance. This relation present a positive coefficient, but also 
statistically non-significant. Like previously, it is the construct “directors’ and supervisors’ 
structures” that presents a positive statistical significant result in relation to organizational 
performance. In this sense, our result doesn’t support the hypothesis H5d. 
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Finally, the hypothesis H7b predicted a positive relation between voluntary disclosure and 
the turnover ratio. This relation present a positive sign, but statistically non-significant. 
The results of the proposed model show that the trading of shares is more related to the 
greater or lesser ownership concentration and with the performance of companies than with 
the access to information. In this sense, our result doesn’t support the hypothesis H7b. 
 
We made the respecification of the model by withdrawing the non-significant relations. 
We followed the recommendations of Long (1983) and we withdrew the non-significant 
relations one at a time (first one that had a smaller t value) because changing a parameter 
can reduce, or even eliminate, the need to change the other parameter. After each step the 
model is analysed in terms of overall adjustment of the data or the level of statistical 
significance of each of its coefficients. The withdrawal of non-significant relations results 
in a further simplification of the model, remaining, however, the same "level" of overall 
adjustment, as evidenced by the values obtained for the global fit indices of the model that 
remain practically unchanged, as we can see in table 5.16. This result provides support for 
re-specification made to the model. The mathematical formulation of the final structural 
model is present in appendix 10. 
 
Table 5.16 – Goodness of Fit Tests  - Final Model 
 
 Initial Model Final Model 
Relative Chi-squared  (χ²/df) (205,780 / 158) =1,302 (207,872/161) =1,291 
CFI (Comparative Fit Index) 0,952 0,953 
GFI (Goodness-of-fit Index) 0,855 0,854 
RMSEA (Root-Mean-Square Error of Approx.) 0,051 0,050 
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) 0,942 0,944 
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Drawing on these results we developed the final model, as shown in figure 5.4. In table 
5.17 we show the standardized estimation of the final structural model coefficients and 
their statistical significance. 
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Figure 5.4 – Path graphic of the final model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H7a      -0,249 
Organizational 
Performance 
 η2 
 
Bid-Ask  
η4 
 
Turnover 
η3 
 H6a     0,312 
η1 
H6b      -0,255 
H4b     0,337 
Voluntary disclosure 
Governance Rules 
H4a      0,456 
H5b     -0,481 
H5c     0,222 
Information Asymmetry 
Directors’ and supervisors’ 
structures 
ξ 1 
Ownership 
structure 
ξ 2 
  -0,414   -0,193 
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Table 5.17 – Standardized estimation of the final structural model coefficients 
 
Structural Equations 
 η1 η2 η3 η4 
 Voluntary disclosure Org performance Turnover Bid-ask 
ξ
 1 0,456*** 0,337***   
Director’s and supervisors’ 
structures 
 
(3,622) (3,119) 
 
 
ξ
 2  
 
-0,481*** 0,222** 
Ownership structure 
 
  
(-5,621) (2,429) 
η1    -0,249** 
Voluntary disclosure 
 
  
 
(-2,529) 
η2 0,312***  -0,255***  
Org performance 
 
(3,091)  (-3,092) 
 
*Significant at 0.05 < p ≤ 0.10 ; **Significant at 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05; ***Significant at  p ≤ 0.01 
Test statistic below  
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The final results confirm that the correlation between directors’ and supervisors’ structures 
and ownership structure (St. Beta = -0,414; p < 0,01) and between the turnover and the   
bid-ask spread (St. Beta = -0,193 ; p < 0,05 ) are both negative and statistically significant. 
 
The hypothesis H4a predicted a positive relation between directors’ and supervisors’ 
structures and voluntary disclosure. The hypothesis H4b predicted a positive relation 
between directors’ and supervisors’ structures and organizational performance. The 
directors’ and supervisors’ structures present positive and statistically significant relations 
(p < 0,01) with voluntary disclosure and with organizational performance. These results 
suggest that the appointment of non-executive and independent directors, the dimension of 
the board, the board expertise, the board compensation and the formation of supervising 
structures are positively related to the provision of voluntary information and follow the 
literature that relates corporate governance characteristics to organizational performance. 
Klein (1998) finds significant ties between firm performance and how boards are 
structured. Kanagaretnam et al. (2007) also find that the effectiveness of the board has a 
significant impact on both the quantity and quality of corporate disclosures. So, our results 
support the hypotheses H4a and H4b. 
 
The hypothesis H5b predicted a negative relation between ownership concentration and the 
turnover ratio. The hypothesis H7b predicted a relation between organizational performance 
and the turnover ratio. The turnover ratio is, as stated in the previous literature review, the 
willingness of some investors to sell shares and others to buy. The results show that the 
turnover ratio is negatively related with ownership structure construct and with 
organizational performance. The negative relation with the ownership structure construct 
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suggests that a bigger ownership concentration leads to less stock transactions in the 
market. Following the arguments of Bolton and Von Thadden (1998), in a concentrated 
ownership structure the number of shareholders who can trade the stock is also smaller, 
which in turn reduces the liquidity of the stock. The negative relation with organizational 
performance suggests that shares of companies with high performances are held by 
shareholders for a longer period than shares of companies that present worse performances. 
We follow the arguments of Amihud and Mendelson (1986). Stocks of firms with higher 
returns are allocated in equilibrium to portfolios with longer expected holding periods. In 
this sense, the observed asset return must be an increasing function of the expected holding 
periods, it also implies that the observed asset return must be a decreasing function of the 
turnover rate of that asset. In this sense, our results support the hypotheses H5b and H7b. 
 
The hypothesis H5c predicted a positive relation between ownership concentration and the 
bid-ask spread. We find a positive statistically significant relation (p < 0,05). This result 
suggests that bigger ownership concentration leads to the formation of inefficient prices in 
the market. In a situation of concentrated ownership, which is the case of Iberian Peninsula 
non-financial listed companies, the main shareholders may have access to private, valuable 
and relevant information about the firm. In this situation, investors mitigate losses to 
informed traders by charging wider spreads (Heflin and Shaw, 2000). On the contrary, the 
hypothesis H7a predicted a negative relation between voluntary disclosure and the bid-ask 
spread. The relation between the bid-ask spread and voluntary disclosure is negative and 
statistically significant (p < 0,05), following the results obtained by Petersen and Plenborg 
(2006) and Espinosa et al. (2008). This result confirms that voluntary disclosure leads to 
more efficient prices and tends to reduce information asymmetries among informed and 
 298 
uninformed investors (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). In this 
sense, our results support the hypotheses H5c and H7a.  
 
Table 5.18 summarizes the results of the second group of hypotheses. 
 
 
Table 5.18 – Summary of the results for the second group of hypotheses 
 
Directors’ and supervisors’ structures Validation 
H4a: There is a positive relation between directors’ and supervisors’ 
structures and voluntary disclosure. 
Validated 
H4b: There is a positive relation between directors’ and supervisors’ 
structures and the level of organizational performance. 
Validated 
Ownership structure  
H5a: There is a negative relation between ownership concentration and 
voluntary disclosure. 
Not validated 
H5b: There is a negative relation between ownership concentration and the 
 turnover ratio. 
Validated 
H5c: There is a positive relation between ownership concentration and the 
bid-ask spread in the market. 
Validated 
H5d: There is a positive relation between ownership concentration and 
 organizational performance. 
Not validated 
Organizational performance  
H6a: There is a positive relation between organizational performance and 
 voluntary disclosure. 
Validated 
H6b: There is a relation between organizational performance and the 
turnover ratio (no predicted sign) 
Validated 
Voluntary disclosure  
H7a: There is a negative relation between voluntary disclosure of 
information and the bid-ask spread. 
Validated 
H7b: There is a positive relation between voluntary disclosure of 
information and the turnover ratio. 
Not validated 
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 5.4.1.8 Decomposition of structural effects for the proxies of information   
  asymmetry: direct, indirect and total effects 
 
The final model allows us to do the decomposition of the structural effect that a particular 
latent variable (construct) has on others, in three categories: direct, indirect and total 
effects. The direct effect is quantified by the coefficient that determines the causal 
relationship between the two variables. Regarding indirect effects, they “involve one or 
more intervening variables that transmit some of the causal effect of prior variables onto 
subsequent variables” (Kline, 1998: 52).  So, the total effect is nothing more than the sum 
of the direct and indirect effects that one variable exerts on another. 
 
The quantification of indirect effects requires taking into consideration the different 
coefficients that express the causal relationships between the variables involved. By the 
analysis of the final path graphic we can see that there are two indirect effects on the 
information asymmetry proxies. The first indirect effect is between directors’ and 
supervisors’ structures and turnover ratio, through organizational performance, being the 
value calculated based on the effect that the latent variable ξ1 (directors 'and supervisors 
structures') has on the latent variable η2 (organizational performance) and the effect that the 
latter carries on the latent variable η3 (turnover).  
 
The calculation of the indirect effect will be: 0,337 * (-0,255) = -0,086 
 
The second indirect effect is verified between directors’ and supervisors’ structures and 
bid-ask spread, through organizational performance and voluntary disclosure, being the 
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value calculated on the basis: (i) of the effect that the latent variable ξ1 (directors' 
and supervisors structures) has on the latent variable η1 (voluntary disclosure) and the latter 
effect that has on the latent variable η4 (bid-ask); and (ii)  of the effect that the latent 
variable ξ1 (directors' and supervisors structures) has  on the latent variable η2 
(organizational performance), which in turn has an effect on the latent variable η1 
(voluntary disclosure) and this last on the latent variable η4 (bid-ask). 
 
The calculation of the indirect effect will be: 0,456 * (-0,249) + 0,337 * 0,312 * (-0,249) = 
-0,140  
 
 In table 5.19 we show the standardized coefficients and the statistical significance of the 
direct and indirect effects on the information asymmetry proxies. 
 
The indirect effect of directors’ and supervisors’ structures on turnover ratio, through 
organizational performance, is statistically significant at 0,05 level and presents a negative 
coefficient. This result is consistent with the previous analysis that effective directors’ and 
supervisors’ structures promote organizational performance, and shareholders tend to hold 
their shares for longer periods in companies with high profitability, which results in a 
lower turnover ratio. The indirect effect of directors’ and supervisors’ structures on bid-ask 
spread, through organizational performance and voluntary disclosure, is statistically 
significant at 0,05 level and presents a negative coefficient. This result is also consistent 
with the previous analysis that directors’ and supervisors’ structures increase directly, or 
indirectly through organizational performance, the voluntary disclosure that, in turn, will 
lead to the formation of more efficient prices in the market, resulting in a lower bid-ask 
spread. 
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Table 5.19 – Structural effect decomposition 
 
 Effect on 
 Turnover Bid-ask 
Effect origin Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
Director’s and supervisors’ structures   ----- -0,086 -0,086** ----- -0,140 -0,140** 
 
 
 (-2,203) 
  
(-2,379) 
 
      
Ownership structure -0,481 ----- -0,481*** 0,222 ----- 0,222** 
  
 (-5,621) 
 
 (2,429) 
  
  
 
  
Org. Performance -0,255 ----- -0,255*** 
----- ----- ----- 
  
 (-3,092) 
 
  
  
  
 
  
Voluntary disclosure ----- ----- ----- -0,249 ----- -0,249** 
 
 
  
 
 (-2,529) 
*Significant at 0.05 < p ≤ 0.10 ; **Significant at 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05; ***Significant at  p ≤ 0.01 
Test statistic below 
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 5.4.2 Development of the proposed model using each category of voluntary  
           disclosure separately 
 
In this point we analyse the impact of the different categories of voluntary disclosure on 
information asymmetry, with the objective of understanding if the effect of providing 
information about strategy, for example, has a different impact on the level of information 
asymmetry than other kind of information category. We are going to use the same 
structural equation model, developed previously, by modifying the voluntary disclosure 
construct. In the previous analysis this construct contained six indicators, indicators that 
corresponded to the six categories of voluntary disclosure considered in our study. To be 
able to asses the impact of each category of disclosure in the information asymmetry,  we 
constructed six models where, in each case, the construct “voluntary disclosure” will have 
only one indicator, in other words, a category of voluntary disclosure. In practice this 
construct will function as an observed variable. 
 
Six models were estimated and re-specified after. As explained above, the re-specification 
of the six models will pass through the analysis of the statistical significance of the 
established relationships. If a given estimated parameter is not - under the statistical point 
of view - different from zero, for the levels of significance considered in the analysis, there 
are arguments in the literature to recommend its elimination. So, we made the re-
specification of the models by withdrawing the non-significant relations. The standardized 
estimation of the final six structural models coefficients, their statistical significance and 
the goodness of fit tests are presented in table 5.20. 
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Table 5.20 - Standardized estimation of the final six structural models coefficients  
 
Model using the strategy category of voluntary disclosure 
  η1 η2 η3 η4 Goodness of fit tests  
  
Voluntary disclosure 
(strategy category) Org performance Turnover Bid -ask Final model 
ξ 1 0,415*** 0,336***     
Director’s and supervisors’ structures (4,415) (3,103)     
ξ 2   -0,481*** 0,225** (χ²/df) (126,502/84)=1,505 
Ownership structure   (-5,622) (2,495) CFI 0,941 
η1    -0,253*** GFI 0,876 
Voluntary disclosure (strategy category)    (-2,903) RMSEA 0,066 
η2 0,306***  -0,256***  TLI 0,924 
Org performance (3,506)  (-3,103)    
         
 
 Model using the market and competition category of voluntary disclosure 
 η1 η2 η3 η4 Goodness of fit tests 
  
Voluntary disclosure 
(market and competition category) Org performance Turnover Bid-ask Final model 
ξ 1 0,222** 0,333***     
Director’s and supervisors’ structures (2.037) (3,089)     
ξ 2   -0,48*** 0,276*** (χ²/df) (136,707/85)=1,608 
Ownership structure   (-5,627) (3,015) CFI 0,925 
η1     GFI 0,869 
Voluntary disclosure (market and competition category)     RMSEA 0,072 
η2 0,192**  -0,276***  TLI 0,905 
Org performance (1,964)   (-3,382)      
 
 
   
   
*Significant at 0.05< p ≤ 0.10 ; **Significant at 0.01< p ≤ 0.05; ***Significant at  p ≤ 0.01 
Test statistic below 
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Table 5.20 - Standardized estimation of the final six structural models coefficients (continuation) 
 
Model using the marketing category of voluntary disclosure 
  η1 η2 η3 η4 Goodness of fit tests  
  
Voluntary disclosure 
(marketing category) Org performance Turnover Bid -ask Final model 
ξ 1 0,457*** 0,346***     
Director’s and supervisors’ structures (4,302) (3,210)     
ξ 2   -0,481*** 0,277*** (χ²/df) (128,454/86)=1,493 
Ownership structure   (-5,630) (3,017) CFI 0,939 
η1     GFI 0,878 
Voluntary disclosure (marketing category)     RMSEA 0,065 
η2   -0,278***  TLI 0,923 
Org performance   (-3,388)    
         
 
 Model using the human capital category of voluntary disclosure 
 η1 η2 η3 η4 Goodness of fit tests 
  
Voluntary disclosure 
(human capital category) Org performance Turnover Bid-ask Final model 
ξ 1 0,347*** 0,331***     
Director’s and supervisors’ structures (3,213) (3,082)     
ξ 2   -0,479*** 0,276*** (χ²/df) (126,711/85)=1,490 
Ownership structure   (-5,626) (3,016) CFI 0,940 
η1     GFI 0,875 
Voluntary disclosure (human capital category)     RMSEA 0,065 
η2 0,198**  -0,276***  TLI 0,923 
Org performance (2,118)   (-3,390)      
     
   
*Significant at 0.05 < p ≤ 0.10 ;  **Significant at 0.01 < p  ≤ 0.05;  ***Significant at  p ≤ 0.01 
Test statistic below 
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Table 5.20 - Standardized estimation of the final six structural models coefficients (continuation) 
 
Model using the management and production category of voluntary disclosure 
  
η1 η2 η3 η4 Goodness of  fit tests  
  
Voluntary disclosure 
(management and 
production category) Org performance Turnover Bid- ask Final model 
ξ 1 0,366*** 0,330***     
Director’s and supervisors’ structures (3,405) (3,050)     
ξ 2   -0,481*** 0,277*** (χ²/df) (126,486/85)=1,488 
Ownership structure   (-5,635) (3,017) CFI 0,940 
η1     GFI 0,877 
Voluntary disclosure (management and production 
category)    
 
RMSEA 0,065 
η2 0,214**  -0,277***  TLI 0,924 
Org performance (2,306)  (-3,389)  
 
 
     
    
 
 Model using the future perspective category of voluntary disclosure 
 
η1 η2 η3 η4 Goodness of fit tests 
  
Voluntary disclosure 
(future perspective category) Org performance Turnover Bid -ask Final model 
ξ 1 0,339*** 0,355***     
Director’s and supervisors’ structures (3,222) (3,280)     
ξ 2   -0,459*** 0,252*** (χ²/df) (128,865/84)=1,534 
Ownership structure   (-5,494) (2,814) CFI 0,935 
η1   0,193** -0,239*** GFI 0,872 
Voluntary disclosure (future perspective category)   (2,454) (-2,737) RMSEA 0,068 
η2   -0,311***  TLI 0,917 
Org performance    (-3,831)      
     
   
*Significant at 0.05 < p ≤ 0.10 ; **Significant at 0.01 < p  ≤ 0.05; ***Significant at  p ≤ 0.01 
Test statistic below 
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The most surprising result appears in the model that uses the category of future 
perspective, since there is a statistically significant relationship between this category of 
disclosure and the turnover ratio, a result not previously observed in the global model53. In 
addition, the models results show that it is the information on strategy and future 
perspective that most influence investors in their investment decision making. These are 
the two categories of voluntary disclosure that present the highest impact on the proxies of 
information asymmetry.  
 
The results of the final model using the strategy category of voluntary disclosure are very 
similar to those found for the global model since, after the respecification, all the same 
relationships remained statistically significant. We should emphasize that the relationship 
between the disclosure of information about strategy and the bid-ask spread, as well as 
being negative and statistically significant, shows a slightly higher value for the 
standardized coefficient than the one found for the global model. This result reflects the 
degree of relevance and acceptance of the market to this kind of information. In relation to 
the turnover ratio, and in line with the results of the global model, there is no statistically 
significant relationship. 
 
The results of the final model using the future perspective category of voluntary disclosure 
show the existence of statistically significant relationships, with the expected sign, among 
this category of disclosure and both proxies of information asymmetry. The positive 
relationship between this category of disclosure and the turnover ratio suggests that the 
                                                 
53
  We are going to call “global model” to the previous estimated SEM model that used the six categories of 
voluntary disclosure as indicators of the construct “voluntary disclosure”. 
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investors’ decisions to allocate shares of a company in portfolios with lesser or longer 
expecting holding periods is also sensible to this type of information.  
 
The results of the remaining categories of voluntary disclosure (market and competition, 
management and production, marketing and human capital) show that these categories, 
when analysed individually, do not establish a statistically significant relationship with any 
of the proxies of information asymmetry, which suggests its minor relevance in the context 
of the information that investors use for making investment decisions. 
 
The analysis of the models also allows us to check, in line with the global model, that the 
relationship between the construct “directors’ and supervisors’ structures” and the different 
categories of voluntary disclosure remain positive and statistically significant and that 
there is no statistically significant relation between the different categories of voluntary 
disclosure and the construct “ownership structure”. It is also to be noted that, in some 
models, the relationship between organizational performance and the category of voluntary 
disclosure ceases to be strong enough, losing its statistical significance. 
 
We also made the structural effect decomposition for each of the six models in the 
analysis. The standardized coefficients and the statistical significance of the direct and 
indirect effects on the information asymmetry proxies are presented in table 5.21. With this 
analysis we can verify the statistical significance of the indirect effects between the 
construct “directors’ and supervisors’ structures” and the proxies of information 
asymmetry. 
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Table 5.21 – Structural Effect decomposition of the six final models 
              
            
 
Strategy category 
 
Market and competition category 
 
Management and production category 
 
 Effect on Effect on Effect on 
 Turnover Bid-ask Turnover Bid-ask Turnover Bid-ask 
Effect origin Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
Director’s and supervisors’   ----- -0,086 -0,086** ----- -0,131  -0,131** ----- -0,092 -0,092** ----- ----- ----- ----- -0,092 -0,092** ----- ----- ----- 
structures 
  
  (-2,210) 
    
(-2,490) 
  
  (-2,289) 
    
 
  
  (-2,276) 
    
 
    
    
    
  
  
    
    
  
  
    
    
  
Ownership structure -0,481 ----- -0,481*** 0,225 ----- 0,225** -0,480 ----- -0,480*** 0,276 ----- 0,276*** -0,481 ----- -0,481*** 0,277 ----- 0,277*** 
    
  (-5,622)     (2,495) 
  
  (-5,627)     (3,015) 
  
  (-5,635)     (3,017) 
    
          
  
          
  
          
Org. Performance -0,256 ----- -0,256*** 
----- ----- ----- 
-0,276 ----- -0,276*** 
----- ----- ----- 
-0,277 ----- -0,277*** 
----- ----- ----- 
    
  (-3,103)       
  
  (-3,382)       
  
  (-3,389)       
    
          
  
          
  
          
Category of voluntary 
disclosure ----- ----- ----- -0,253 ----- -0,253*** ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
    
        (-2,903) 
  
         
  
         
 
            
*Significant at 0.05< p ≤ 0.10 ; **Significant at 0.01< p ≤ 0.05; ***Significant at  p ≤ 0.01           
Test statistic below 
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Table 5.21 – Structural Effect decomposition of the six final models (continuation) 
              
            
 
Future perspective category 
 
Marketing category 
 
Human capital category 
 
 Effect on Effect on Effect on 
 Turnover Bid-ask Turnover Bid-ask Turnover Bid-ask 
Effect origin Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total 
Director’s and supervisors’   ----- -0,045 -0,045 ----- -0,081  -0,081** ----- -0,096 -0,096** ----- ----- ----- ----- -0,092 -0,092** ----- ----- ----- 
structures 
  
  (-0,859) 
    
(-2,087) 
  
  (-2,340) 
    
 
  
  (-2,228) 
    
 
    
    
    
  
  
    
    
  
  
    
    
  
Ownership structure -0,459 ----- -0,459*** 0,252 ----- 0,252*** -0,481 ----- -0,481*** 0,277 ----- 0,277*** -0,479 ----- -0,479*** 0,276 ----- 0,276*** 
    
  (-5,494)     (2,814) 
  
  (-5,630)     (3,017) 
  
  (-5,626)     (3,016) 
    
          
  
          
  
          
Org. Performance -0,311 ----- -0,311*** 
----- ----- ----- 
-0,278 ----- -0,278*** 
----- ----- ----- 
-0,276 ----- -0,276*** 
----- ----- ----- 
    
  (-3,831)       
  
  (-3,388)       
  
  (-3,390)       
    
          
  
          
  
          
Category of voluntary 
disclosure 0,193 ----- 0,193** -0,239 ----- -0,239*** ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 
    
   (2,454)     (-2,737) 
  
         
  
         
 
            
*Significant at 0.05< p ≤ 0.10 ; **Significant at 0.01< p ≤ 0.05; ***Significant at  p ≤ 0.01           
Test statistic below 
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In the categories of management and production, market and competition, marketing and 
human capital the indirect effect of the construct “directors’ and supervisors’ structures” on 
bid-ask spread it is not verified, due to the fact that there were no relationships between 
these categories of disclosure and this proxy of information asymmetry. Otherwise, in the 
model using the strategy category, the negative indirect effect of directors’ and 
supervisors’ structures on bid-ask spread maintains itself, through organizational 
performance and through this category of voluntary disclosure. When using the future 
perspective category, this indirect effect takes on a lesser amplitude because there was no 
statistically significant relationship between the organizational performance and this 
category of voluntary disclosure. In this sense, we only have an indirect effect of the 
construct “directors’ and supervisors’ structures” on bid-ask spread for the models using 
the strategy or the future perspective category. 
 
The indirect effect of the construct “directors’ and supervisors’ structures” on turnover 
ratio, through organizational performance and through the future perspective category, is 
negative but loses its statistical significance due to the strong positive direct relation 
between the future perspective category of disclosure and this proxy of information 
asymmetry. Otherwise, the negative indirect effect of the construct “directors’ and 
supervisors’ structures” on turnover ratio, only through organizational performance, is 
statistically significant for all the remaining categories of voluntary disclosure.  
 
In sum, the estimation of the six structural equation models, using individually each one of 
the categories considered in the construct of the voluntary disclosure index, allows us to 
pursue two main analyses. Firstly, when we analyse the models using each category of 
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voluntary disclosure separately we see that some relationships are no longer statistically 
significant, when compared to the results obtained with the estimation of the global model 
This can suggest that, in general, one type of information can be insufficient in itself. Only 
when the information is combined can provide useful information for investors. Secondly, 
we found that the disclosure of informations about the company’s strategy and future 
perspective are more useful than other types of information as tools that companies possess 
to communicate and to influence the market. Our results showed that these categories of 
voluntary disclosure exert a significant influence on information asymmetry. Still, others 
cease to have any relevant action when their effects are analysed individually. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented and discussed the results of univariate and multivariate data 
analysis. 
 
We presented and discussed the results of the univariate and multivariate data analysis. We 
started with the analysis of the results from Pearson’s and Spearman’s correlations. After 
that we applied the technique of multiple regression to test the first group of research 
hypotheses about the corporate governance determinants of voluntary disclosure. We used, 
firstly, the total voluntary disclosure index as the dependent variable and, secondly, we 
made the same analysis using the six categories of the voluntary disclosure. We presented 
and discussed the results for the developed hypotheses. 
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To test the second group of hypotheses we used a structural equation model. We intended 
to study the direct and indirect relation between the governance rules and information 
asymmetry, through the voluntary disclosure of information and organizational 
performance. In this point we described the steps for the development of the proposed 
model. Following this, we presented and discussed the results from the second group of 
research hypotheses and analysed the decomposition of structural effects for the proxies of 
information asymmetry. Finally, we analysed the impact of the different categories of 
voluntary disclosure on information asymmetry. We used the same structural equation 
model by modifying the voluntary disclosure construct. 
 
The following chapter summarizes the main conclusions and contributions of this study, as 
well as their limitations. We also present some suggestions for future investigations. 
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Chapter 6 - Conclusions  
 
With this research we intend to contribute to the study of the impact of corporate 
governance rules in the disclosure of information and hence in the reduction of information 
asymmetries, in the specific case and reality of the countries of the Iberian Peninsula. In 
the following points we expose the main conclusions, contributions and limitations of this 
research, and present some suggestions for future investigation. 
 
- Main Conclusions 
 
We empirically examined the corporate governance determinants of voluntary disclosure, 
for Iberian Peninsula non-financial listed companies, and its effects on the information 
asymmetry. In our study we proceeded to the test of two groups of hypotheses. The first 
group of hypotheses presented studied the corporate governance determinants of voluntary 
corporate disclosure, using the multiple regression methodology. The second group of 
hypotheses was tested using the methodology of structural equation models. We studied 
the direct and indirect relations between governance rules and information asymmetry, 
through the voluntary disclosure of information and the organizational performance. 
 
We wanted to understand how the corporate governance rules affect the level of 
information asymmetry in the capital market, directly and indirectly. For that we divided 
the governance rules in two major constructs: the ownership structure and the directors’ 
and supervisors’ structures. We hypothesized that directors’ and supervisors’ structures can 
 314 
influence the organizational performance and the information disclosed by firms and this, 
in turn, would affect the level of information asymmetry between management and 
shareholders. In relation to ownership structure, it was expected to exert an indirect 
influence on the level of information asymmetry, but a direct influence was also expected. 
 
We built a voluntary disclosure index based on the information firms provided in their 
annual reports to shareholders. The index was based on six categories: strategy, market and 
competition, management and production, marketing, future perspective and human 
capital. The results show that the score for strategy is significantly higher than for 
marketing and human capital. The score for strategy is the highest score, suggesting that 
management find information about strategy the most important disclosure category. 
Marketing is the category that presented the lowest score. The total voluntary disclosure 
index presented a mean of 47%. 
 
By the analysis of the correlation matrix we saw that the total voluntary disclosure index 
showed significant correlations with most of the variables that characterize the directors’ 
and supervisors’ structures. We also saw that ownership concentration is negatively 
correlated with the adoption of practices of good governance, suggesting that firms with 
concentrated capital do not reach the same levels of compliance with recommendations of 
good governance compared with companies with dispersed capital. In this sense, 
information asymmetry is expected to be higher in a setting with a high ownership 
concentration.  
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In line with previous disclosure studies, the analysis of the multiple regression models 
indicated that disclosure decisions are a complex process affected by a number of 
interrelated factors. The results indicate that the main determinants of voluntary disclosure 
are the variables related with firm size, growth opportunities, organizational performance, 
board compensation and the presence of a large shareholder. 
 
The extent of the result showed that the firm size can be considered a major determinant of 
voluntary disclosure. The firm size presented a positive statistical significant relation with 
all the categories of voluntary disclosure. These results confirm that firm size is 
significantly related to the level of information voluntarily disclosed by non-financial 
Iberian Peninsula listed companies. Also the agency theory suggests that larger firms will 
have higher agency costs compared to smaller firms which require them to voluntarily disclose 
more information to mitigate this agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This variable 
has been found to be significantly and positively correlated with disclosure level in a 
number of studies, suggesting that larger companies disclose more information, either 
mandatory or voluntary, than smaller companies (Cooke 1989a, b; Meek et al., 1995; 
Hossain et al. 1995, Camfferman and Cooke, 2002; Eng and Mak, 2003; Allegrini and 
Greco, 2011). Large firms are likely to make more voluntary disclosures because of the 
greater demand for outside capital, lower average costs of collecting and disseminating 
information, and greater demand for information by financial analysts (Hossain et al., 
1995).  
 
The positive relation between organizational performance and the voluntary disclosure 
index corroborate the arguments of Singhvi and Desai (1971), Meek et al. (1995) and 
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Petersen and Plenborg (2006). Profit and return have been recognized in the literature as 
relevant explanatory variables for the disclosure level. When the rate of return is high, 
managers are motivated to disclose detailed information in order to support the 
continuance of their positions and remuneration. We also found a positive relation between 
growth opportunities and the voluntary disclosure of the Iberian Peninsula companies. A 
higher provision disclosure level should also be associated with a better market expectation 
for the firm’s future growth. These results are also consistence with the legitimacy theory. 
Companies with good performance feel persuaded by the social contract to perform 
voluntary reporting of their activities and results. According to the signalling theory, 
managers of companies that are performing well disclose more information about their 
present situation, in order to send signs to the market about the quality of the companies 
they manage.  
 
We found a negative association between the level of voluntary disclosure and the 
presence of a large shareholder in Iberian Peninsula non-financial listed companies. Like 
stated previously, the Spanish and Portuguese institutional setting has in common a high 
level of concentration in corporate shareholdings. Our results show that this characteristic 
of the Iberian Peninsula ownership structure have a significant impact on the adoption of 
rules of good governance which, in turn, affect the corporate disclosure. Large shareholder 
ownership may be accompanied by the owner’s considerable participation in the firm’s 
management, which may lead to unlimited access to information. Under these 
circumstances, the demand for information would be very low, or even absent, particularly 
if the manager owns all the firm’s shares (Raffournier, 1995). As suggested by Wymeersch 
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(2002) compliance with the recommendations of codes of good governance is more 
difficult when a significant proportion of a firm’s equity is held by a majority shareholder. 
 
In relation to the influence of directors’ and supervisors’ structures in voluntary disclosure, 
we saw that the variable related with board compensation is the one that present the most 
significant impact on the disclosure practices. Our result suggests that management 
incentives could mitigate the agency problem and enhance alignment of managers’ 
interests with those of shareholders. The linkage of management compensation to 
performance results in a transfer of risk to management and acts as an impeditive of their 
opportunistic behaviour. In this way, we confirm the results obtained in other studies (e.g. 
Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; Lim et al. 2007). A consistent result was also produced by a 
study which examined the association between disclosure activities of managers and stock-
based incentives of United States companies (Nagar et al. 2003).  
 
We plotted several multiple regressions using as the dependent variable each one of the six 
categories of the voluntary disclosure index and concluded that we have less statistical 
significant determinants for each voluntary disclosure category than the ones resulting 
from the previous analysis of the total voluntary disclosure score. Despite this, in general, 
we have the same major corporate governance determinants. An interesting result was the 
positive statistical significant relation between the board compensation and the disclosure 
of information on marketing category and human capital category. This result can suggest 
that board compensation, especially stock price-based incentives, induce managers to 
provide additional information on intangibles, on a voluntary basis, with the purpose of 
boosting the market stock price of their companies. 
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To extend the regression model results we applied the technique of structural equation 
modelling, path analysis, to test simultaneously for existing relationships among the 
variables included in our study. We divided the governance rules in two constructs, one for 
the directors’ and supervisors’ structures and another for the ownership structure. In the 
last one we included mainly variables related with ownership concentration. The results 
showed that the appointment of independent and non-executive directors, the dimension of 
the board, the management incentives and expertise, and the formation of supervising 
structures, as indicators of the directors’ and supervisors’ structures construct, are 
positively related to the provision of voluntary information and follow the literature that 
relate corporate governance characteristics to organizational performance (Baysinger and 
Butler, 1985; Dehaene et al., 2001; Kanagaretnam et al., 2007). 
 
The turnover ratio was negatively related with the ownership structure construct which 
suggests that a bigger ownership concentration lead to less stock transactions. The negative 
relation with organizational performance suggests that stocks of firms with higher returns 
are allocated in portfolios with longer expected holding periods. The positive relation 
between bid-ask spread and the ownership structure construct suggests that bigger 
ownership concentration lead to the formation of inefficient prices in the market. On the 
other hand, the negative relation between the bid-ask spread and voluntary disclosure 
follows the argument that voluntary disclosure leads to more efficient prices and tends to 
reduce information asymmetry in the market. These results follow those obtained in 
previous research (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Petersen and Plenborg, 2006; 
Espinosa et al., 2008). 
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It was possible to analyse the indirect effects between constructs by using the structural 
equation model. We found two statistically significant indirect effects. We found a 
negative indirect effect of directors’ and supervisors’ structures on turnover ratio, through 
organizational performance. This result is consistent with the previous analysis that 
effective directors’ and supervisors’ structures increase organizational performance, and 
shareholders tend to hold their shares for longer periods in companies with high 
profitability. We also found a negative indirect effect of directors’ and supervisors’ 
structures on bid-ask spread, through organizational performance and voluntary disclosure. 
This result is consistent with the previous analysis that directors’ and supervisors’ 
structures increase directly, or indirectly through organizational performance, the voluntary 
disclosure that, in turn, will lead to the formation of more efficient prices in the market. 
 
In this sense, our results follow the argument that for firms with high levels of disclosure 
the bid-ask spread is lower. In this case, investors can be relatively confident that their 
stock transaction occurs near to a “fair price” (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Kim and 
Verrecchia, 1994). However, in firms with a high ownership concentration investors tend 
to increase the bid-ask spreads and trade less, which, in this case, reduces the liquidity of 
the stock. These results are consistent with those obtained in previous research (Bolton and 
Von Thadden, 1998; Heflin and Shaw, 2000; Petersen and Plenborg, 2006; or more 
recently Jiang et al., 2011). Otherwise, our results support the adverse selection hypothesis 
and demonstrate that voluntary disclosure attenuate information asymmetry associated 
with ownership concentration. 
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We also examined the impact of the different categories of voluntary disclosure on 
information asymmetry. When we analysed the estimation of the six structural equation 
models, using each category of voluntary disclosure separately, we saw that some 
relationships were no longer statistically significant, when compared to the results obtained 
with the estimation of the previous global model. The models results suggest that each 
category of information can be insufficient in itself. Generally when the information is 
combined it provides more useful information to form the investors’ expectation about the 
future performance and risk of the company. The characteristics of the companies and their 
decisions concerning the disclosure policy have influence on the information that is 
disclosed to all users. However, we can also verify that some categories of voluntary 
disclosure exert a significant influence on information asymmetry, particularly in the case 
of disclosure of information about the company’s strategy and future perspective. Still, 
others cease to have any relevant action when their effect is analysed individually.  
 
In this sense, the models results show that it is the information on strategy and future 
perspective that most influence investors in their investment decision making. These are 
the two categories of voluntary disclosure that present the highest impact on the proxies of 
information asymmetry. In this sense, this information can be distinguished by its capacity 
to differentiate the companies that act on the market and have an obvious decision 
relevance to investors. 
 
-Contributions of the study  
 
The previous research about the subject of corporate governance was predominantly based 
on studies done with countries belonging to the Anglo-Saxon sphere using as a base their 
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financial markets. These financial markets are generally efficient and with significant 
levels of transparency. The existing literature on the relationship between the disclosure of 
information and good practices of corporate governance shows the existence of a positive 
relationship, favouring the reduction of information asymmetries in the market. Thus, the 
presence of “good governance” is traditionally associated with high levels of transparency, 
benefiting market efficiency. However, more studies on other realities should be improved. 
This work analysed the association between governance rules and information asymmetry, 
in a set of corporate voluntary disclosure, using Iberian Peninsula non-financial listed 
companies. By using the methodology of structural equation modelling, we were able to 
analyse the direct and indirect relations among the variables under study. Furthermore, we 
analysed the impact of the different voluntary information categories on the information 
asymmetry proxies. It was possible to conclude which categories of voluntary disclosure 
exert a significant influence on information asymmetry. The results should draw 
companies’ attention to the possibilities that exist to improve communication with the 
market. 
 
Most of previous research has examined the impact of public disclosure on information 
asymmetry and market liquidity around well defined information events, such as earnings 
announcements. This study intended to extend the previous research by analysing the 
relation between corporate governance rules, firm’s disclosure practices and information 
asymmetry proxies, not conditioned by the occurrence of an information release. 
Furthermore, most of the previous research studied the effect of one single corporate 
governance attribute. In this study we examined, simultaneously, several corporate 
governance mechanisms, assuming that the different mechanisms interact with each other.  
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Unlike the homogeneous United States capital market, the European market is 
heterogeneous in terms of capital market culture and development, legal framework and 
corporate governance standards. The most important difference lies in the composition of 
the shareholder structure (Dardas and Güttler, 2011). Most publicly traded companies in 
the United States and the United Kingdom tend to be widely-held, whereas the ownership 
structure of most continental European companies presents a large and dominant 
shareholder, who exerts considerable control (Faccio and Lang, 2002). The literature 
recognizes that the ownership structure provides fundamental explanation for governance 
issues, including corporate disclosures policies. Ownership concentration is acknowledged 
as a central concept in the theory of corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
 
Spain and Portugal have in common a high level of concentration in corporate 
shareholdings. Our results demonstrate that this characteristic of the Iberian Peninsula 
ownership structure have a significant impact on the adoption of rules of good governance 
which, in turn, affect the corporate disclosure. The results in our study are consistent with 
the agency theory explanation of the complementary relationship between governance 
rules and voluntary disclosure, in a setting featured by large controlling shareholders.  
 
The results obtained with the use of the proposed models for non-financial listed 
companies of Iberian Peninsula, corroborate some of the main theoretical foundations so 
far available concerning the relationship between corporate governance and voluntary 
disclosure, as well as the relationship between voluntary disclosure and information 
asymmetry. In addition, the results from the structural equation model allowed us to 
understand how the governance rules exert influence on the proxies of information 
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asymmetry in the market. We concluded that the ownership structure exerts a direct 
influence on information asymmetry and that directors’ and supervisors’ structures exert an 
indirect influence, through the organizational performance and the voluntary disclosure of 
information.  
 
The failure to find the relationship between the total voluntary disclosure index and the 
turnover ratio shows that stock liquidity is more related to the greater or lesser ownership 
concentration and with the performance of companies than with the access to information. 
Moreover, it is clear that the role that information disclosure plays in these markets is 
mainly at the level of price formation. These results provide additional insight into the 
determinants of stock liquidity for the companies under study. 
 
We analysed the information disclosed by Iberian Peninsula non-financial listed 
companies, concerning the year of 2007. In this sense, we analysed the information 
disclosed after the obligation of following International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). Furthermore, in Spain, the Unified Good Governance Code, applicable from 2007 
onwards, provided a common standard for the good governance practices of all listed 
firms. In Portugal, the recommendations on Corporate Governance were implemented on a 
comply-or-explain basis in 2001, continuing to be regularly improved through a process of 
bi-annual amendments. We hope that this research and the results obtained have 
contributed to the perception of the practices of governance and disclosure adopted by 
Iberian Peninsula listed companies. The results of this study should be of interest of 
corporate reporting regulators to better understand the factors that explain voluntary 
disclosure, to assist them in the formulation of corporate reporting standards and 
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recommendations, and in their actions aimed at improving transparency in publicly traded 
companies. Furthermore, the results of this study may also be useful to investors, company 
managers and other researchers interested in the information disclosed by companies to the 
market and their determining factors. 
 
In conclusion, our results show that good corporate governance contributes to the 
improvement of a more equitable and transparent security market, and should reinforce 
investor confidence in the financial markets. The disclosure policy is an important 
mechanism to mitigate agency conflicts and information asymmetry between large insider 
shareholders and minority outsider shareholders. Our results are consistent with the calls 
for more disclosure requirements in an agency setting and highlight the importance of 
corporate disclosures under concentrated ownership structures in order to reduce 
information asymmetry. Furthermore, our results also provide evidences on how the 
different categories of voluntary disclosure are related to information asymmetry and are of 
interest to regulators and companies who wish to use disclosure policy to reduce the level 
of information asymmetry in the market.  
 
-Limitations and future research 
 
Our study has some limitations that suggest a need for future work. 
 
The existing literature showed that measuring firm’s disclosure activities is difficult and 
that commonly used proxies exhibit numerous problems (Beyer et al., 2010). One 
limitation that can be pointed out is our self constructed measure of voluntary disclosure. 
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Our voluntary disclosure index was based on the information provided by the firms in their 
annual reports or in public websites. As a result any disclosure those firms provided in 
analysts meetings, conference calls and in other circumstances are not included in the final 
result of our index.  
 
We focused on the extent of voluntary disclosure. However, such disclosures do not mean 
that they are credible or reflecting the true state of the company. Therefore, further 
research is needed to provide evidence on the determinants of high quality disclosure. 
Other limitations are related with the selection of the items in the disclosure index, the 
content analysis and the researcher inevitable subjective assessment. Furthermore, 
according to Beattie et al. (2004), studies that have specified a broad-based set of 
information items ex ante, have the limitation of ignore any disclosures that fall outside 
that list.  
 
We have examined the extent of voluntary disclosure cross-sectionally using one year, 
considering that companies operating in continuity and that, in general, they don’t 
dramatically change their disclosure policies from year to year (Botosan, 1997). This was 
also justified based on a lengthy analysis of variables related to voluntary disclosure of 
information, which involved reading and classifying the information contained in 
voluntary reporting of annual accounts and the official websites of the companies. Future 
researches may perform a longitudinal analysis to assess how disclosure changes over 
time. Another limitation has to do with the size of the sample used. It would be beneficial 
to have a sample of greater dimension to be able to generalize more confidently on the 
results obtained. 
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We have just analysed the information disclosed by non-financial listed companies, the 
biggest ones, operating in Portugal and Spain. But Portuguese and Spanish companies are 
mostly composed of small and medium-sized companies and, in this sense, we cannot 
extrapolate results obtained in our study to other companies’ realities. Furthermore, the 
companies included in the samples are the ones subject to a greater examination and 
pressure by the market to disclose relevant information in their annual reports. In addition 
we found that size is the most significant variable in explaining the extent of voluntary 
disclosure in Iberian Peninsula non-financial listed companies.  
 
We analysed the corporate governance determinants of voluntary disclosure and we are 
conscious of the existence of other variables that can have influence and that were not 
included in the proposed models. Despite this, we are conscious of the impossibility of 
inclusion of all variables that potentially influence the level of voluntary disclosure of 
Iberian Peninsula non-financial listed companies.  
 
Despite all the limitations mentioned, the results of this study should contribute for a more 
extensive future research. 
 
The objective of corporate reports is to supply information to a number of user groups to 
enable them to make decisions about the allocation of scarce resources (Cooke, 1989b). 
With our work we seek to understand the specific aspects related with the voluntary 
disclosure of information by firms, but the corporate information environment is wider. In 
this sense, and for future work, it would be interesting to explore the interactions among 
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the several information sources, namely the relations between firm’s voluntary disclosure 
policies, mandatory disclosure requirements and the information produced by analysts.  
 
Furthermore, the published research on the extent of voluntary disclosure focused on listed 
companies and it is clearly insufficient in relation to unlisted companies. Therefore, future 
research on the extent of voluntary disclosure, by unlisted Iberian Peninsula companies, 
represents a contribution to knowledge and could help to improve a minimum level of 
acceptable disclosure.  
 
Moreover, many disclosure studies, including the present one, tend to focus on the benefits 
of the increased disclosures, namely in capital markets. Future research should consider the 
costs of providing additional disclosure such as loss of competitiveness and increased 
reporting expenses. To FASB (2001b) it is important to consider whether voluntary 
disclosures about the company’s forward-looking strategies, would adversely affect the 
company’s competitive position and whether the risk of adversely affecting competitive 
position exceeds the expected benefit of making the voluntary disclosure. Following Beyer 
et al. (2010) the costs and benefits of voluntary disclosures may not be independent. 
 
In relation to the determinants of voluntary disclosure, there are many other variables that 
could influence the disclosure practices of companies. It is important to analyse, in future 
works, the relation of other variables used in other studies, such as the company being 
listed in foreign exchanges (e.g. Cooke, 1989a, b; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Wang et al., 
2008) or the multinationality (e.g. Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Monteiro and Aibar-
Guzmán, 2010). According to Cooke (1989b) if the extent of voluntary disclosure by 
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multiple listed companies is generally higher than other companies the regulatory 
authorities might wish to analyse why and, if foreign regulation is an important factor, it 
might decide to internalise such disclosures. To Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) the more 
internationalised a company is the more it has to show its stakeholders (customers, 
suppliers, government) that it is a good company. Even a company that is not listed 
internationally may have an interest in showing good levels of disclosure if it has 
international operations.  
 
Furthermore, future research should investigate other variables which might influence the 
relation between corporate governance, disclosure policy and information asymmetry, 
using alternative proxies for information asymmetry. Future research could also analyse 
the relation between governance rules, disclosure changes and information asymmetry in 
different disclosure regulatory environments, through longitudinal studies and international 
comparisons.  
 
With the above suggestions we pretend to contribute to the expansion of this area of 
research. 
 
Finally, we hope that this research has contributed to draw conclusions on the voluntary 
disclosure practices, adopted by Iberian Peninsula non-financial listed companies, the 
corporate governance determinants of these practices and their impact on information 
asymmetry in the market. 
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Appendix 1 
 
List of companies 
 
Order 
Number Name of the company Country 
1 Altri, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
2 Brisa, Auto Estradas de Portugal, S.A. Portugal 
3 Cimpor, Cimentos de Portugal, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
4 Comp. Industrial Resinas Sintéticas - Cires, S.A. Portugal 
5 Cofina, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
6 Compta, Equipamentos e Serviços de Informática, S.A. Portugal 
7 Corticeira Amorim, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
8 EDP, Energias de Portugal, S.A. Portugal 
9 Estoril Sol, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
10 Fisipe, Fibras Sintéticas de Portugal, S.A. Portugal 
11 Galp Energia, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
12 Glintt, Global Intelligent Technologies, SGPS, S.A.  Portugal 
13 Ibersol, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
14 Imobiliária Construtora Grão Pará, S.A. Portugal 
15 Impresa, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
16 Inapa, Investimentos, Participações e Gestão, S.A. Portugal 
17 Jerónimo Martins, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
18 Lisgráfica, Impressão e Artes Gráficas, S.A. Portugal 
19 Martifer, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
20 Grupo Media Capital, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
21 Mota-Engil Engenharia e Construção, S.A.  Portugal 
22 Novabase, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
23 Sociedade Comercial Orey Antunes, S.A. Portugal 
24 Papelaria Fernandes, Indústria e Comércio, S.A. Portugal 
25 Portucel, Emp. Celulose e Papel Portugal, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
26 Portugal Telecom, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
27 Reditus, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
28 REN, Redes Energéticas Nacionais, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
29 SAG Gest, Soluções Automóvel Globais, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
30 Semapa, Sociedade Investimento e Gestão, SGPS, S.A. Portugal  
31 Grupo Soares da Costa, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
32 Sonaecom, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
33 Sonae Indústria, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
34 Sonae, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
35 Sumolis, S.A. Portugal 
36 Teixeira Duarte, Engenharia e Construções, S.A. Portugal 
37 Zon Multimedia, Serviços de Telecomunicações e Multimédia, SGPS, S.A. Portugal 
38 Toyota Caetano Portugal, S.A. Portugal 
39 Abengoa, S.A. Spain 
40 Abertis Infraestructuras, S.A. Spain 
41 Acciona, S.A. Spain 
42 Acerinox, S.A. Spain 
43 ACS, Actividades de Construccion y Servicios, S.A. Spain 
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44 Afirma Grupo Inmobiliário, S.A. Spain 
45 Adolfo Dominguez, S.A. Spain 
46 Amper, S.A. Spain 
47 Anten 3 de Television, S.A. Spain 
48 Avanzit, S.A. Spain 
49 Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. Spain 
50 Azkoyen, S.A. Spain 
51 Baron de Ley, S.A. Spain 
52 Befesa Medio Ambiente, S.A. Spain 
53 Bodegas Riojanas, S.A Spain 
54 Campofrio Food Group, S.A. Spain 
55 Cementos Portland Valderrivas, S.A. Spain 
56 Compañia Vinicola del Norte de España, S.A. Spain 
57 Cie Automotive, S.A. Spain  
58 Cintra Concesiones de Infrastructuras de Transporte, S.A. Spain 
59 Clínica  Baviera, S.A. Spain 
60 Codere, S.A. Spain 
61 Construcciones y Auxiliar de Ferrocarriles, S.A Spain 
62 Corporacion Dermoestetica, S.A. Spain 
63 Dogi Internacional Fabrics, S.A. Spain 
64 Duro Felguera, S.A. Spain 
65 Ebro Puleva, S.A Spain 
66 Elecnor, S.A. Spain 
67 Enagas, S.A. Spain 
68 Endesa, S.A. Spain 
69 Ercros, S.A. Spain 
70 Exide Techonologies, S.A. Spain 
71 Faes Farma, S.A. Spain 
72 Federico Paternina, S.A. Spain 
73 Fersa Energias Renovables, S.A. Spain 
74 Fluidram, S.A. Spain 
75 Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas, S.A. Spain 
76 Funespaña, S.A. Spain 
77 Gamesa Corporation Tecnologica, S.A. Spain 
78 Gas Natural SDG, S.A. Spain 
79 Grifols, S.A. Spain 
80 Grupo Empresarial Ence, S.A. Spain 
81 General de aquiler maquinaria Spain 
82 Grupo Ferrovial, S.A. Spain 
83 Inditex, Industria de Diseño Textil, S.A. Spain 
84 Inbesos, S.A. Spain 
85 Iberdrola, S.A. Spain 
86 Iberia, S.A Spain 
87 Indo International, S.A. Spain 
88 Iberpapel Gestion, S.A. Spain 
89 Indra Sistemas, S.A. Spain 
90 Inypsa,S.A. Spain 
91 Imobiliaria Colonial, S.A. Spain 
92 Itinere Infraestructuras, S.A. Spain 
93 Jazztel, S.A. Spain 
94 Laboratorio Almirall, S.A. Spain 
95 Lingotes Especiales, S.A Spain 
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96 Metrovacesa, S.A Spain 
97 Mecalux, S.A. Spain 
98 Miquel y Costas, S.A. Spain 
99 Montebalito, S.A. Spain 
100 Natra, S.A Spain 
101 Natraceutical, S.A. Spain 
102 NH Hoteles, S.A. Spain 
103 Nicolas Correa, S.A Spain 
104 Obrascon Huarte Lain, S.A. Spain 
105 Petroleos Companhia Española, S.A. (Cepsa) Spain 
106 Parquesol, Inmobiliaria y Proyectos, S.A. Spain 
107 Papeles y Cartones, S.A Spain 
108 Pescanova, S.A Spain 
109 Prisa, Promotora de Informaciones, S.A.  Spain 
110 Prosegur, Compañia de Seguridad, S.A. Spain 
111 Puleva Biotech, S.A Spain 
112 Renta Corporation Real Estate, S.A. Spain 
113 Red Electrica de España, S.A Spain 
114 Repsol YPF, S.A. Spain 
115 Sacyr Vallehermoso, S.A. Spain 
116 Seda de Barcelona, S.A Spain 
117 Service Point Solutions, S.A. Spain 
118 Sniace, S.A. Spain 
119 Sol Melia, S.A. Spain 
120 Solaria Energia y Medioambiente, S.A. Spain 
121 Sotogrande, S.A. Spain 
122 SOS Corporation Alimentaria, S.A. Spain 
123 Testa, Inmuebles en Renta, S.A. Spain 
124 Telecinco, Gestivision, S.A. Spain 
125 Tavex, S.A. Spain 
126 Tecnicas Reunidas, S.A. Spain 
127 Tecnocom, Telecomunicaciones y Energia, S.A. Spain 
128 Telefonica, S.A. Spain 
129 Tubacex, S.A. Spain 
130 Tubos Reunidos, S.A. Spain 
131 Union Fenosa, S.A Spain 
132 Urbas Guadahermosa, S.A. Spain 
133 Unipapel, S.A Spain 
134 Uralita, S.A Spain 
135 Vidrala, S.A Spain 
136 Viscofan, S.A. Spain 
137 Vocento, S.A. Spain 
138 Vueling Arlines, S.A. Spain 
139 Zardoya Otis, S.A. Spain 
140 Zeltia, S.A. Spain 
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Adapted from Garson (2009) 
 
 
 
SEM estimation methods 
 
ML 
(Maximum 
likelihood 
estimation) 
ML is by far the most common method. Unless the researcher has good reason, 
this default should be taken even if other methods are offered by the modelling 
software. ML makes estimates based on maximizing the probability (likelihood) 
that the observed co-variance are drawn from a population assumed to be the 
same as that reflected in the coefficient estimates. Key assumption of ML 
estimation is indicator variables with multivariate normal distribution. 
GLS 
(Generalized 
least squares) 
GLS is an adaptation of OLS to minimize the sum of the differences between 
observed and predicted covariance rather than between estimates and scores. It is 
probably the second-most common estimation method after ML. Olsson et al. 
(2000) compared ML and GLS under different model conditions, including non-
normality, and found that ML estimation, under conditions of misspecification, 
provided more realistic indices of overall fit and less biased parameter values for 
paths that overlap with the true model than did GLS. GLS works well even for 
non-normal data when samples are large (n>250). 
OLS (Ordinary 
least squares) 
OLS makes estimates based on minimizing the sum of squared deviations of the 
linear estimates from the observed scores. However, even for path modelling of 
one-indicator variables, ML is still preferred in SEM because ML estimation 
estimates are computed simultaneously for the model as a whole, whereas OLS 
estimates are computed separately in relation to each endogenous variable. OLS 
assumes similar underlying distributions but not multivariate normality, as does 
ML, but ADF (see below) is even less restrictive and is a better choice when 
ML's multivariate normality assumption is severely violated. 
ULS 
(Unweighted 
least squares) 
ULS also focuses on the difference between observed and predicted co-variances, 
but does not adjust for differences in the metric (scale) used to measure different 
variables, whereas GLS is scale-invariant, and is usually preferred for this reason. 
Also, ULS does not assume multivariate normality as does ML. However ULS is 
rarely used, perhaps in part because it does not generate model chi-square values. 
ADF 
(Asymptotically 
distribution-
free) 
ADF estimation does not assume multivariate normality (whereas ML, GLS, and 
ULS do). For this reason it may be preferred where the researcher has reason to 
believe that ML's multivariate normality assumption has been violated. ADF 
estimation starts with raw data, not just the correlation and covariance matrices. 
ADF is even more computer-intensive than ML and is accurate only with very 
large samples (200-500, even for simple models). 
WLS 
(Weighted least 
squares) 
WLS requires very large sample sizes for dependable results. Olsson et al. (2000) 
compared WLS with ML and GLS under different model conditions and found 
that contrary to texts which recommend WLS when data are non-normal, in 
simulated runs under non-normality, WLS was never better than ML and GLS 
even for non-normal data. The authors concluded that for wrongly specified 
models, WLS tended to give unreliable estimates and over-optimistic fit values.  
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Goodness-of-fit Measures 
  
Measures Description Acceptance level 
Measures of absolute Fit 
 
Likelihood-Ratio Chi-Square 
Statistic (χ²) 
A large value of chi-square relative to the degrees of freedom signifies that the observed and estimated 
matrices differ considerably. Low chi-square values, which result in significance levels greater than 0,05 or 
0,01, indicate that the actual and predicted input matrices are not statistically different. However, even 
statistical nonsignificance does not guarantee that the "correct" model has been identified, but only that this 
proposed model fits the observed covariances and correlations well. 
p> 0,05 or p>0,01, 
associated with the 
value of χ² 
 
Goodness-of-fit Index (GFI) It is a nonstatistical measure ranging in value from 0 (poor fit) to 1,0 (perfect fit). It represents the overall 
degree of fit (the squared residuals from prediction compared with the actual data), but is not adjusted for 
degrees of freedom. Higher values indicate better fit, but no absolute threshold levels for acceptability have 
been established. 
Value greater or 
equal to 0,9. 
 
Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation ((RMSEA) 
 
The RMSEA is the discrepancy per degree of freedom. The value is representative of the goodness-of-fit that 
could be expected if the model were estimated in the population, not just the sample drawn for estimation. Value ranging 
 from 0,05 to 0,08. 
Incremental Fit Measures 
 
Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index 
(AGFI) 
The AGFI is an extension of the GFI, adjusted by the ratio of degrees of freedom for the proposed model to 
the degrees of freedom for the null model. 
Value greater or 
equal to 0,9. 
 
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) Also known as nonnormed fit index (NNFI). It combines a measure of parsimony into a comparative index 
between the proposed and null models, resulting in values ranging from 0 to 1,0. 
Value greater or 
equal to 0,9. 
 
Normed fit Index (NFI) The NFI is a relative comparison of the proposed model to the null model. Is a measure ranging from 0 (no fit 
at all) to 1,0 (perfect fit). 
Value greater or 
equal to 0,9. 
 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
 
 
CFI represent a comparison between the estimated model and a null or independence model. The values lies 
between 0 and 1,0, and larger values indicate higher levels of goodness-of-fit. The CFI has been found to be 
more appropriated in a model development strategy or when a smaller sample is available. 
Value greater or 
equal to 0,9.0 
Parsimonious Fit Measures 
  
Normed Chi-Square This measure is the ratio of the chi-square divided by the degrees of freedom. This measure provides two 
ways to assess inappropriate models: (1) a model that may be "overfitted", thereby capitalizing on chance, 
typified by values less than 1,0; and (2) models that are not yet truly representative of the observed data and 
thus need improvement, having values greater than an upper threshold, either 2,0 or 3,0 or more liberal limit 
of 5,0. 
Value ranging from: 
lower limit of 1,0; 
upper limit of 
2,0/3,0 or 5,0. 
Adapted from Hair et al. (1998)  
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Voluntary disclosure Index 
 
Category Voluntary disclosure items     
Strategy     
 
Didn’t 
disclose 
Disclosed 
without 
detail 
Disclosed 
with 
detail 
score 
15 items General presentation of the company’s strategy   X 2 
 Main corporate goals or objectives   X 2 
 Main actions taken to achieve the corporate goals   X 2 
 Definition of the deadline for each corporate goal X   0 
 Corporate position related to ethic/social questions   X 2 
 Corporate position related to environment issues  X  1 
 Detailed segment/unit performance   X 2 
 Evaluation of the commercial risk   X 2 
 Evaluation of the financial risk   X 2 
 Evaluation of other risks  X  1 
 Corporate I&D/Innovation policy X   0 
 Organizational Culture X   0 
 Main events of the current year   X 2 
 Information about annalists   X 2 
 Other important strategic information  X  1 
 21 
Market and 
Competition 
 
    
 
Didn’t 
disclose 
Disclosed 
without 
detail 
Disclosed 
with 
detail 
score 
11 items Identification of the principal markets   X 2 
 Specific characteristics of these markets   X 2 
 Dimension of the markets   X 2 
 Identification of the main competitors   X 2 
 Market shares   X 2 
 Forecast of market growth  X  1 
 Forecast of share market growth   X 2 
 Impact of competition on profits  X  1 
 Identification of markets’ barriers to entry X   0 
 Impact of markets barriers to entry on future profits X   0 
 Impact  of competition on future profits  X  1 
     15 
Management 
and 
Production 
 
    
 
Didn’t 
disclose 
Disclosed 
without 
detail 
Disclosed 
with 
detail 
score 
11 items Identification of the principal products/ services   X 2 
 Specific characteristics of these products/services   X 2 
 Proposal for new products/services  X  1 
 Changes in production/services methods X   0 
 Investment in production/services  X  1 
 Norms of the quality of the product/service X   0 
 Rejection/defect rates (when applicable)    Não Aplicável 
 Input/output rates (when applicable)    Não Aplicável 
 Volume of materials consumed (when applicable)    Não Aplicável 
 Change in product materials (when applicable)    Não Aplicável 
 Life cycle of the product ( when applicable )    Não Aplicável 
 
 
 
 
 
   6 
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Future 
perspective 
 
 
    
 
Didn’t 
disclose 
Disclosed 
without 
detail 
Disclosed 
with 
detail 
score 
8 items Result application proposal   X 2 
 New action/initiative/event   X 2 
 Forecasts of sales/results/cash  flows X   0 
 Investment forecasts   X 2 
 Return rates for each investment project X   0 
 Hypotheses considered in forecast X   0 
 Dividend policy  X  1 
 Macroeconomic background   X 2 
 9 
Marketing      
 
Didn’t 
disclose 
Disclosed 
without 
detail 
Disclosed 
with 
detail 
score 
7 items Disclosure of marketing strategy X   0 
 Disclosure of sales strategy X   0 
 Disclosure of  distribution channels  X  1 
 Disclosure of  sales and marketing costs X   0 
 Disclosure of brand equity/visibility ratings X   0 
 Disclosure of the costumer satisfaction level X   0 
 Disclosure of customer mix   X 2 
     3 
Human 
capital 
 
    
 
Didn’t 
disclose 
Disclosed 
without 
detail 
Disclosed 
with 
detail 
score 
8 items Description of workforce  X  1 
 Description of the remuneration/ compensation system  X  1 
 Qualification policy of workers  X  1 
 Value created by worker X   0 
 Employee retention rates X   0 
 Productivity indicators X   0 
 Strategies to measure human capital X   0 
 Other measures of Human capital X   0 
     3 
Total score 56 
Maximum score 110 
Índex O,518 
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MANOVA’s results for Corporate Characteristics 
 
 
Country 
Identification Mean Std. Deviation 
Tests of Between-
Subjects Effects 
PER  Portugal  25,853 32,928 
 Spain 26,256 23,740 F=0,005 
Leverage Portugal  0,332 0,167 
 Spain 0,289 0,188 F=1,303 
Performance 1 Portugal  0,062 0,033 
 Spain 0,072 0,042 F=1,436 
Firm size Portugal  20,627 1,704 
 Spain 21,134 1,864 F=1,847 
Pillai’s Trace = 0,072 (df=4); F=2,208 
*p<0,1; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01 
 
 
MANOVA’s results for directors’ and supervisors’ structures 
 
 
Country 
Identification Mean Std. Deviation 
Tests of Between-
Subjects Effects 
Portugal  0,162 0,193 Proportion of independent 
members of the board Spain 0,301 0,172 F=16,705*** 
Portugal  0,386 0,171 Size of the board 
Spain 0,509 0,147 F=17,667*** 
Portugal  0,362 0,254 Proportion of non-executive 
members of the board Spain 0,788 0,141 F=154,987*** 
Portugal  0,605 0,280 Monitoring and control 
index Spain 0,712 0,145 F=8,491*** 
Portugal  2,870 2,952 Board expertise 
Spain 4,620 5,067 F=4,012** 
Portugal  0,297 0,226 Board’s compensation  
Spain 0,531 0,285 F=20,583*** 
Portugal  0,004 0,006 Total remuneration of the 
board divided by the total 
assets Spain 0,002 0,002 
F=6,976*** 
Pillai’s Trace = 0,576 (df=7); F=25,23*** 
*p<0,1; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01 
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MANOVA’s results for ownership structure 
 
 
Country 
Identification Mean Std. Deviation 
Tests of Between-
Subjects Effects 
Main shareholder Portugal 0,459 0,237 
 Spain 0,359 0,243 F=3,703* 
State ownership Portugal 0,032 0,090 
 Spain 0,003 0,021 F=8,769*** 
Directors ownership Portugal 0,101 0,189 
 Spain 0,271 0,272 F=9,491*** 
Qualified participations Portugal 0,735 0,170 
 Spain 0,590 0,201 F=11,906*** 
Pillai’s Trace = 0,251 (df=4); F=10,06*** 
*p<0,1; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01 
 
 
 
 
MANOVA’s results for voluntary disclosure variables 
 
 
Country 
Identification Mean Std. Deviation 
Tests of Between-
Subjects Effects 
Portugal  0,415 0,143 Total disclosure index 
Spain 0,490 0,150 F=6,993*** 
Portugal  0,210 0,192 Marketing disclosure 
index Spain 0,354 0,238 F=11,113*** 
Portugal  0,618 0,206 Strategy disclosure 
index Spain 0,691 0,180 F=4,246** 
Portugal  0,360 0,186 Market and competition 
disclosure index Spain 0,372 0,155 F=0,159 
Portugal  0,498 0,215 Management and 
production disclosure 
index Spain 0,606 0,181 
F=8,765*** 
Portugal  0,388 0,193 Future perspective 
disclosure index Spain 0,381 0,175 F=0,035 
Portugal  0,264 0,184 Human capital 
disclosure index Spain 0,386 0,268 F=6,564** 
Pillai’s Trace = 0,111 (df=7); F=2,758** 
*p<0,1; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01 
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MANOVA’s results for information asymmetry proxies 
 
 
Country 
Identification Mean Std. Deviation 
Tests of Between-Subjects 
Effects 
Turnover ratio Portugal  0,783 0,731 
 Spain 1,976 2,610 F= 7,680*** 
Bid-ask spread Portugal  0,08 0,17 
 Spain 0,11 0,21 F= 0,443 
Pillai’s Trace = 0,055 (df=2); F=3,960** 
*p<0,1; **p<0,05; ***p<0,01 
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Correlations, with Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal, using strategy category 
 
 
 INDSTRA 
TURN 
OVER BIDASK PERFOR1  FSIZE PER LEVERAGE INDEP 
NON 
EXEC BSIZE  
EXPERTIS
E BIG 4  
AUD 
COM REMCOM VARREM  
OTHER 
REM DIRCAP 
STATE 
OWNER 
MAIN 
SHARE 
CONTROL 
INDEX 
SIGNIFI 
CANT 
MAINFIVE PERFOR2 DIRCOMP 
INDSTRA 
1 0,248*** -0,293*** 0,325*** 0,672*** -0,224** 0,301*** 0,218*** 0,101 0,335*** 0,170** 0,342*** 0,207** 
-
0,489*** 
0,182*** -0,130 0,175** -0,039 0,368*** -0,121 -0,071 0,277*** 0,277*** 0,276*** 
TURNOVER 
-0,058 1 -0,474*** -0,105 0,221*** -0,028 0,127 0,299*** 0,213** 0,136 -0,02 -0,059 0,346*** 0,024 0,088 0,172** 0,016 0,068 -0,320*** 0,155* -0,505*** -0,424*** -0,072 0,190** 
BIDASK 
-0,212** -0,179*** 1 0,087 -0,250*** -0,011 -0,188** -0,107 0,095 -0,076 -0,020 -0,034 0,055 0,060 -0,027 0,036 0,217** -0,242*** 0,136 -0,092 0,227*** 0,211** 0,016 0,087 
PERFOR1  
0,318*** -0,339*** 0,043 1 0,243*** -0,226** -0,091 0,194** 0,046 0,284*** 0,144* 0,261*** 0,175** 0,149* 0,103 0,106 -0,050 0,136 -0,001 0,288*** -0,018 0,04 0,881*** 0,174** 
FSIZE 
0,649*** 0,007 -0,121 0,262*** 1 -0,315*** 0,555*** 0,153* 0,207** 0,501*** 0,314*** 0,311*** 0,265*** 0,188** 0,336*** 0,212** -0,157* 0,232*** 0,105 0,510*** 0,024 0,047 0,116 0,354*** 
PER 
-0,193** 0,113 -0,098 -0,264*** -0,314*** 1 -0,286*** -0,018 0,101 -0,12 -0,219** -0,178** 0,083 0,072 -0,062 -0,026 -0,008 -0,017 -0,099 -0,117 -0,033 -0,031 -0,145 -0,121 
LEVERAGE 
0,261*** -0,068 -0,104 -0,118 0,545*** -0,149 1 0,098 0,011 0,138 0,146* 0,026 -0,023 0,106 0,189** 0,039 -0,010 0,128 0,168** 0,237*** 0,128 0,072 -0,147* 0,138 
INDEP 
0,226*** 0,213** 0,024 0,130 0,149* -0,086 0,093 1 0,287*** 0,180** 0,083 0,210** 0,440*** 0,349*** -0,048 0,180** -0,002 0,087 -0,248*** 0,385*** -0,392*** -0,308*** 0,150* 0,156* 
NONEXEC 
0,218*** 0,215** 0,014 0,086 0,224*** -0,086 0,007 0,424*** 1 0,504*** 0,312*** 0,149* 0,583*** 0,155* -0,126 0,431*** 0,094 -0,014 -0,288*** 0,229*** -0,375*** -0,297*** 0,057 0,301*** 
BSIZE  
0,404*** -0,018 -0,087 0,270*** 0,528*** -0,128 0,174** 0,165* 0,508*** 1 0,312*** 0,164* 0,422*** 0,238*** 0,137 0,352*** 0,066 0,148* -0,280*** 0,380*** -0,276*** -0,189** 0,300*** 0,348*** 
EXPERTISE 
0,136 -0,082 -0,004 0,123 0,340*** -0,199** 0,136 0,055 0,184** 0,408*** 1 0,173** 0,029 0,119 0,114 0,143* 0,059 -0,123 -0,083 0,171** -0,067 -0,064 0,197** 0,218*** 
BIG 4  
0,353*** -0,034 -0,018 0,239*** 0,306*** 
-
0,371*** 
0,042 0,199** 0,244*** 0,182** 0,129 1 0,335*** 0,126 0,091 0,087 -0,018 0,101 0,073 0,495*** -0,01 0,011 0,214** 0,142 
AUDCOM 
0,310*** 0,200** 0,034 0,121 0,270*** -0,054 -0,014 0,446*** 0,701*** 0,406*** 0,060 0,335*** 1 0,149* 0,017 0,346*** 0,199** 0,042 -0,215** 0,483*** -0,368*** -0,310*** 0,184** 0,286*** 
REMCOM 
0,238*** 0,032 0,004 0,196** 0,174** 0,087 0,071 0,346*** 0,199** 0,278*** 0,088 0,126 0,149* 1 -0,014 0,093 0,044 0,077 -0,066 0,420*** -0,029 0,098 0,116 0,053 
VARREM  
0,218** -0,108 -0,094 0,147* 0,265*** -0,172* 0,186** -0,039 -0,144* 0,065 0,069 0,089 -0,011 -0,022 1 -0,297*** -0,190** 0,022 0,137 0,167* 0,001 0,043 0,050 0,296*** 
OTHERREM 
0,147* 0,068 -0,097 0,030 0,151* 0,012 0,018 0,203** 0,368*** 0,283*** 0,053 0,061 0,305*** 0,080 -0,347*** 1 0,135 -0,025 -0,176** 0,118 -0,200** -0,124 0,102 0,769*** 
DIRCAP 
-0,141 -0,069 0,050 -0,033 -0,125 -0,009 0,027 -0,044 0,052 -0,009 -0,028 0,041 0,160* 0,064 -0,143 0,030 1 -0,212** -0,126 -0,112 -0,008 -0,008 -0,025 -0,077 
STATEOWNER 
0,173** 0,002 -0,109 0,126 0,211** -0,040 0,117 0,082 -0,028 0,173** -0,095 0,101 0,042 0,077 0,002 -0,030 -0,165* 1 -0,155* 0,257*** -0,107 -0,161* 0,089 -0,014 
MAINSHARE 
-0,075 -0,247*** 0,125 0,025 0,056 -0,015 0,194** -0,238*** -0,210** -0,233*** -0,104 0,088 -0,196** -0,051 0,123 -0,139 0,077 -0,154* 1 -0,004 0,723*** 0,738*** -0,044 -0,088 
CONTROLINDEX 
0,425*** 0,038 0,003 0,282** 0,496** -0,192* 0,201** 0,410*** 0,417*** 0,441*** 0,132 0,525*** 0,551*** 0,496*** 0,130 0,133 -0,039 0,249*** -0,009 1 -0,068 -0,053 0,236*** 0,210** 
SIGNIFICANT 
-0,161* -0,397*** 0,274*** 0,056 0,002 -0,022 0,137 -0,446*** -0,324*** -0,193** -0,070 0,012 -0,323*** -0,032 -0,038 -0,219** 0,200** -0,089 0,707*** -0,086 1 0,887*** -0,034 -0,223*** 
MAINFIVE 
0,099 -0,322*** 0,176** 0,061 0,014 -0,028 0,099 -0,337*** -0,267*** -0,128 -0,064 0,013 -0,284*** 0,096 -0,021 -0,148* 0,191* -0,153* 0,690*** -0,059 0,886*** 1 0,022 -0,141 
PERFOR2 
0,266*** -0,426*** -0,044 0,839*** 0,080 -0,128 -0,126 0,050 0,071 0,214** 0,117 0,174** 0,126 0,017 0,079 0,075 -0,023 0,058 0,002 0,155* 0,046 0,069 1 0,113 
DIRCOMP 
0,298*** 0,000 -0,149* 0,132 0,328*** -0,164* 0,138 0,184** 0,252*** 0,318*** 0,107 0,140* 0,286*** 0,059 0,303*** 0,788*** -0,096 -0,023 -0,055 0,235*** -0,241*** -0,162* 0,134 1 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed);* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlations, with Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal, using the management and production category 
 
 
 INDMANAG 
TURN 
OVER BIDASK PERFOR1  FSIZE PER 
LEVERAG
E INDEP 
NON 
EXEC BSIZE  
EXPERTIS
E BIG 4  
AUD 
COM REMCOM VARREM  
OTHER 
REM DIRCAP 
STATE 
OWNER 
MAIN 
SHARE 
CONTROL 
INDEX 
SIGNIFI 
CANT 
MAINFIVE PERFOR2 DIRCOMP 
INDMANAG 
1 0,131 -0,105 0,308*** 0,351*** -0,004 0,131 0,186** 0,226*** 0,327*** 0,073 0,122 0,314*** 0,242*** 0,105 0,260*** -0,054 0,219*** 0,184** 0,256*** -0,141 -0,100 0,317*** 0,294*** 
TURNOVER 
-0,005 1 -0,474*** -0,105 0,221*** -0,028 0,127 0,299*** 0,213** 0,136 -0,02 -0,059 0,346*** 0,024 0,088 0,172** 0,016 0,068 -0,320*** 0,155* -0,505*** -0,424*** -0,072 0,190** 
BIDASK 
-0,138 -0,179*** 1 0,087 -0,250*** -0,011 -0,188** -0,107 0,095 -0,076 -0,020 -0,034 0,055 0,060 -0,027 0,036 0,217** -0,242*** 0,136 -0,092 0,227*** 0,211** 0,016 0,087 
PERFOR1  
0,251*** -0,339*** 0,043 1 0,243*** -0,226** -0,091 0,194** 0,046 0,284*** 0,144* 0,261*** 0,175** 0,149* 0,103 0,106 -0,050 0,136 -0,001 0,288*** -0,018 0,04 0,881*** 0,174** 
FSIZE 
0,330*** 0,007 -0,121 0,262*** 1 -0,315*** 0,555*** 0,153* 0,207** 0,501*** 0,314*** 0,311*** 0,265*** 0,188** 0,336*** 0,212** -0,157* 0,232*** 0,105 0,510*** 0,024 0,047 0,116 0,354*** 
PER 
0,012 0,113 -0,098 -0,264*** -0,314*** 1 -0,286*** -0,018 0,101 -0,12 -0,219** -0,178** 0,083 0,072 -0,062 -0,026 -0,008 -0,017 -0,099 -0,117 -0,033 -0,031 -0,145 -0,121 
LEVERAGE 
0,105 -0,068 -0,104 -0,118 0,545*** -0,149 1 0,098 0,011 0,138 0,146* 0,026 -0,023 0,106 0,189** 0,039 -0,010 0,128 0,168** 0,237*** 0,128 0,072 -0,147* 0,138 
INDEP 
0215** 0,213** 0,024 0,130 0,149* -0,086 0,093 1 0,287*** 0,180** 0,083 0,210** 0,440*** 0,349*** -0,048 0,180** -0,002 0,087 -0,248*** 0,385*** -0,392*** -0,308*** 0,150* 0,156* 
NONEXEC 
0,277*** 0,215** 0,014 0,086 0,224*** -0,086 0,007 0,424*** 1 0,504*** 0,312*** 0,149* 0,583*** 0,155* -0,126 0,431*** 0,094 -0,014 -0,288*** 0,229*** -0,375*** -0,297*** 0,057 0,301*** 
BSIZE  
0,347*** -0,018 -0,087 0,270*** 0,528*** -0,128 0,174** 0,165* 0,508*** 1 0,312*** 0,164* 0,422*** 0,238*** 0,137 0,352*** 0,066 0,148* -0,280*** 0,380*** -0,276*** -0,189** 0,300*** 0,348*** 
EXPERTISE 
0,081 -0,082 -0,004 0,123 0,340*** -0,199** 0,136 0,055 0,184** 0,408*** 1 0,173** 0,029 0,119 0,114 0,143* 0,059 -0,123 -0,083 0,171** -0,067 -0,064 0,197** 0,218*** 
BIG 4  
0,116 -0,034 -0,018 0,239*** 0,306*** -0,371*** 0,042 0,199** 0,244*** 0,182** 0,129 1 0,335*** 0,126 0,091 0,087 -0,018 0,101 0,073 0,495*** -0,01 0,011 0,214** 0,142 
AUDCOM 
0,330*** 0,200** 0,034 0,121 0,270*** -0,054 -0,014 0,446*** 0,701*** 0,406*** 0,060 0,335*** 1 0,149* 0,017 0,346*** 0,199** 0,042 -0,215** 0,483*** -0,368*** -0,310*** 0,184** 0,286*** 
REMCOM 
0,221*** 0,032 0,004 0,196** 0,174** 0,087 0,071 0,346*** 0,199** 0,278*** 0,088 0,126 0,149* 1 -0,014 0,093 0,044 0,077 -0,066 0,420*** -0,029 0,098 0,116 0,053 
VARREM  
0,073 -0,108 -0,094 0,147* 0,265*** -0,172* 0,186** -0,039 -0,144* 0,065 0,069 0,089 -0,011 -0,022 1 -0,297*** -0,190** 0,022 0,137 0,167* 0,001 0,043 0,050 0,296*** 
OTHERREM 
0,241*** 0,068 -0,097 0,030 0,151* 0,012 0,018 0,203** 0,368*** 0,283*** 0,053 0,061 0,305*** 0,080 -0,347*** 1 0,135 -0,025 -0,176** 0,118 -0,200** -0,124 0,102 0,769*** 
DIRCAP 
0,001 -0,069 0,050 -0,033 -0,125 -0,009 0,027 -0,044 0,052 -0,009 -0,028 0,041 0,160* 0,064 -0,143 0,030 1 -0,212** -0,126 -0,112 -0,008 -0,008 -0,025 -0,077 
STATEOWNER 
0,229*** 0,002 -0,109 0,126 0,211** -0,040 0,117 0,082 -0,028 0,173** -0,095 0,101 0,042 0,077 0,002 -0,030 -0,165* 1 -0,155* 0,257*** -0,107 -0,161* 0,089 -0,014 
MAINSHARE 
-0,191** -0,247*** 0,125 0,025 0,056 -0,015 0,194** -0,238*** -0,210** -0,233*** -0,104 0,088 -0,196** -0,051 0,123 -0,139 0,077 -0,154* 1 -0,004 0,723*** 0,738*** -0,044 -0,088 
CONTROLINDEX 
0,287*** 0,038 0,003 0,282** 0,496** -0,192* 0,201** 0,410*** 0,417*** 0,441*** 0,132 0,525*** 0,551*** 0,496*** 0,130 0,133 -0,039 0,249*** -0,009 1 -0,068 -0,053 0,236*** 0,210** 
SIGNIFICANT 
-0,180** -0,397*** 0,274*** 0,056 0,002 -0,022 0,137 -0,446*** -0,324*** -0,193** -0,070 0,012 -0,323*** -0,032 -0,038 -0,219** 0,200** -0,089 0,707*** -0,086 1 0,887*** -0,034 -0,223*** 
MAINFIVE 
-0,128 -0,322*** 0,176** 0,061 0,014 -0,028 0,099 -0,337*** -0,267*** -0,128 -0,064 0,013 -0,284*** 0,096 -0,021 -0,148* 0,191* -0,153* 0,690*** -0,059 0,886*** 1 0,022 -0,141 
PERFOR2 
0,205** -0,426*** -0,044 0,839*** 0,080 -0,128 -0,126 0,050 0,071 0,214** 0,117 0,174** 0,126 0,017 0,079 0,075 -0,023 0,058 0,002 0,155* 0,046 0,069 1 0,113 
DIRCOMP 
0,288*** 0,000 -0,149* 0,132 0,328*** -0,164* 0,138 0,184** 0,252*** 0,318*** 0,107 0,140* 0,286*** 0,059 0,303*** 0,788*** -0,096 -0,023 -0,055 0,235*** -0,241*** -0,162* 0,134 1 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed);* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlations, with Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal, using the future perspective category 
 
 
 INDFUT 
TURN 
OVER BIDASK PERFOR1  FSIZE PER 
LEVERAG
E INDEP 
NON 
EXEC BSIZE  
EXPERTIS
E BIG 4  
AUD 
COM REMCOM VARREM  
OTHER 
REM DIRCAP 
STATE 
OWNER 
MAIN 
SHARE 
CONTROL 
INDEX 
SIGNIFI 
CANT 
MAINFIVE PERFOR2 DIRCOMP 
INDFUT 
1 0,239*** -0,358*** 0,137 0,525*** -0,129 0,304*** 0,092 0,071 0,236*** 0,087 0,147* 0,091 0,119 0,193** 0,122 -0,176** 0,143* 0,093 0,291*** -0,026 0,005 0,125 0,234*** 
TURNOVER 
0,033 1 -0,474*** -0,105 0,221*** -0,028 0,127 0,299*** 0,213** 0,136 -0,02 -0,059 0,346*** 0,024 0,088 0,172** 0,016 0,068 -0,320*** 0,155* -0,505*** -0,424*** -0,072 0,190** 
BIDASK 
-0,186** -0,179*** 1 0,087 -0,250*** -0,011 -0,188** -0,107 0,095 -0,076 -0,020 -0,034 0,055 0,060 -0,027 0,036 0,217** -0,242*** 0,136 -0,092 0,227*** 0,211** 0,016 0,087 
PERFOR1  
0,173** -0,339*** 0,043 1 0,243*** -0,226** -0,091 0,194** 0,046 0,284*** 0,144* 0,261*** 0,175** 0,149* 0,103 0,106 -0,050 0,136 -0,001 0,288*** -0,018 0,04 0,881*** 0,174** 
FSIZE 
0,527*** 0,007 -0,121 0,262*** 1 -0,315*** 0,555*** 0,153* 0,207** 0,501*** 0,314*** 0,311*** 0,265*** 0,188** 0,336*** 0,212** -0,157* 0,232*** 0,105 0,510*** 0,024 0,047 0,116 0,354*** 
PER 
-0,062 0,113 -0,098 -0,264*** -0,314*** 1 -0,286*** -0,018 0,101 -0,12 -0,219** -0,178** 0,083 0,072 -0,062 -0,026 -0,008 -0,017 -0,099 -0,117 -0,033 -0,031 -0,145 -0,121 
LEVERAGE 
0,286*** -0,068 -0,104 -0,118 0,545*** -0,149 1 0,098 0,011 0,138 0,146* 0,026 -0,023 0,106 0,189** 0,039 -0,010 0,128 0,168** 0,237*** 0,128 0,072 -0,147* 0,138 
INDEP 
0,092 0,213** 0,024 0,130 0,149* -0,086 0,093 1 0,287*** 0,180** 0,083 0,210** 0,440*** 0,349*** -0,048 0,180** -0,002 0,087 -0,248*** 0,385*** -0,392*** -0,308*** 0,150* 0,156* 
NONEXEC 
0,088 0,215** 0,014 0,086 0,224*** -0,086 0,007 0,424*** 1 0,504*** 0,312*** 0,149* 0,583*** 0,155* -0,126 0,431*** 0,094 -0,014 -0,288*** 0,229*** -0,375*** -0,297*** 0,057 0,301*** 
BSIZE  
0,257*** -0,018 -0,087 0,270*** 0,528*** -0,128 0,174** 0,165* 0,508*** 1 0,312*** 0,164* 0,422*** 0,238*** 0,137 0,352*** 0,066 0,148* -0,280*** 0,380*** -0,276*** -0,189** 0,300*** 0,348*** 
EXPERTISE 
0,117 -0,082 -0,004 0,123 0,340*** -0,199** 0,136 0,055 0,184** 0,408*** 1 0,173** 0,029 0,119 0,114 0,143* 0,059 -0,123 -0,083 0,171** -0,067 -0,064 0,197** 0,218*** 
BIG 4  
0,159* -0,034 -0,018 0,239*** 0,306*** -0,371*** 0,042 0,199** 0,244*** 0,182** 0,129 1 0,335*** 0,126 0,091 0,087 -0,018 0,101 0,073 0,495*** -0,01 0,011 0,214** 0,142 
AUDCOM 
0,101 0,200** 0,034 0,121 0,270*** -0,054 -0,014 0,446*** 0,701*** 0,406*** 0,060 0,335*** 1 0,149* 0,017 0,346*** 0,199** 0,042 -0,215** 0,483*** -0,368*** -0,310*** 0,184** 0,286*** 
REMCOM 
0,134 0,032 0,004 0,196** 0,174** 0,087 0,071 0,346*** 0,199** 0,278*** 0,088 0,126 0,149* 1 -0,014 0,093 0,044 0,077 -0,066 0,420*** -0,029 0,098 0,116 0,053 
VARREM  
0,168** -0,108 -0,094 0,147* 0,265*** -0,172* 0,186** -0,039 -0,144* 0,065 0,069 0,089 -0,011 -0,022 1 -0,297*** -0,190** 0,022 0,137 0,167* 0,001 0,043 0,050 0,296*** 
OTHERREM 
0,134 0,068 -0,097 0,030 0,151* 0,012 0,018 0,203** 0,368*** 0,283*** 0,053 0,061 0,305*** 0,080 -0,347*** 1 0,135 -0,025 -0,176** 0,118 -0,200** -0,124 0,102 0,769*** 
DIRCAP 
-0,138 -0,069 0,050 -0,033 -0,125 -0,009 0,027 -0,044 0,052 -0,009 -0,028 0,041 0,160* 0,064 -0,143 0,030 1 -0,212** -0,126 -0,112 -0,008 -0,008 -0,025 -0,077 
STATEOWNER 
0,119 0,002 -0,109 0,126 0,211** -0,040 0,117 0,082 -0,028 0,173** -0,095 0,101 0,042 0,077 0,002 -0,030 -0,165* 1 -0,155* 0,257*** -0,107 -0,161* 0,089 -0,014 
MAINSHARE 
0,080 -0,247*** 0,125 0,025 0,056 -0,015 0,194** -0,238*** -0,210** -0,233*** -0,104 0,088 -0,196** -0,051 0,123 -0,139 0,077 -0,154* 1 -0,004 0,723*** 0,738*** -0,044 -0,088 
CONTROLINDEX 
0,289*** 0,038 0,003 0,282** 0,496** -0,192* 0,201** 0,410*** 0,417*** 0,441*** 0,132 0,525*** 0,551*** 0,496*** 0,130 0,133 -0,039 0,249*** -0,009 1 -0,068 -0,053 0,236*** 0,210** 
SIGNIFICANT 
-0,033 -0,397*** 0,274*** 0,056 0,002 -0,022 0,137 -0,446*** -0,324*** -0,193** -0,070 0,012 -0,323*** -0,032 -0,038 -0,219** 0,200** -0,089 0,707*** -0,086 1 0,887*** -0,034 -0,223*** 
MAINFIVE 
0,028 -0,322*** 0,176** 0,061 0,014 -0,028 0,099 -0,337*** -0,267*** -0,128 -0,064 0,013 -0,284*** 0,096 -0,021 -0,148* 0,191* -0,153* 0,690*** -0,059 0,886*** 1 0,022 -0,141 
PERFOR2 
0,102 -0,426*** -0,044 0,839*** 0,080 -0,128 -0,126 0,050 0,071 0,214** 0,117 0,174** 0,126 0,017 0,079 0,075 -0,023 0,058 0,002 0,155* 0,046 0,069 1 0,113 
DIRCOMP 
0,234*** 0,000 -0,149* 0,132 0,328*** -0,164* 0,138 0,184** 0,252*** 0,318*** 0,107 0,140* 0,286*** 0,059 0,303*** 0,788*** -0,096 -0,023 -0,055 0,235*** -0,241*** -0,162* 0,134 1 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed);* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlations, with Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal, using the market and competition category 
 
 
 INDCOMP 
TURN 
OVER BIDASK PERFOR1  FSIZE PER 
LEVERAG
E INDEP 
NON 
EXEC BSIZE  
EXPERTIS
E BIG 4  
AUD 
COM REMCOM VARREM  
OTHER 
REM DIRCAP 
STATE 
OWNER 
MAIN 
SHARE 
CONTROL 
INDEX 
SIGNIFI 
CANT 
MAINFIVE PERFOR2 DIRCOMP 
INDCOMP 
1 0,182** -0,235*** 0,167* 0,466*** -0,096 0,242*** 0,075 -0,097 0,279*** 0,085 0,119 0,129 0,210** 0,248*** 0,047 -0,137 -0,007 0,074 0,206** 0,010 0,057 0,153* 0,196* 
TURNOVER 
-0,047 1 -0,474*** -0,105 0,221*** -0,028 0,127 0,299*** 0,213** 0,136 -0,02 -0,059 0,346*** 0,024 0,088 0,172** 0,016 0,068 -0,320*** 0,155* -0,505*** -0,424*** -0,072 0,190** 
BIDASK 
-0,208** -0,179*** 1 0,087 -0,250*** -0,011 -0,188** -0,107 0,095 -0,076 -0,020 -0,034 0,055 0,060 -0,027 0,036 0,217** -0,242*** 0,136 -0,092 0,227*** 0,211** 0,016 0,087 
PERFOR1  
0,194** -0,339*** 0,043 1 0,243*** -0,226** -0,091 0,194** 0,046 0,284*** 0,144* 0,261*** 0,175** 0,149* 0,103 0,106 -0,050 0,136 -0,001 0,288*** -0,018 0,04 0,881*** 0,174** 
FSIZE 
0,479*** 0,007 -0,121 0,262*** 1 -0,315*** 0,555*** 0,153* 0,207** 0,501*** 0,314*** 0,311*** 0,265*** 0,188** 0,336*** 0,212** -0,157* 0,232*** 0,105 0,510*** 0,024 0,047 0,116 0,354*** 
PER 
-0,033 0,113 -0,098 -0,264*** -0,314*** 1 -0,286*** -0,018 0,101 -0,12 -0,219** -0,178** 0,083 0,072 -0,062 -0,026 -0,008 -0,017 -0,099 -0,117 -0,033 -0,031 -0,145 -0,121 
LEVERAGE 
0,231*** -0,068 -0,104 -0,118 0,545*** -0,149 1 0,098 0,011 0,138 0,146* 0,026 -0,023 0,106 0,189** 0,039 -0,010 0,128 0,168** 0,237*** 0,128 0,072 -0,147* 0,138 
INDEP 
0,093 0,213** 0,024 0,130 0,149* -0,086 0,093 1 0,287*** 0,180** 0,083 0,210** 0,440*** 0,349*** -0,048 0,180** -0,002 0,087 -0,248*** 0,385*** -0,392*** -0,308*** 0,150* 0,156* 
NONEXEC 
-0,008 0,215** 0,014 0,086 0,224*** -0,086 0,007 0,424*** 1 0,504*** 0,312*** 0,149* 0,583*** 0,155* -0,126 0,431*** 0,094 -0,014 -0,288*** 0,229*** -0,375*** -0,297*** 0,057 0,301*** 
BSIZE  
0,294*** -0,018 -0,087 0,270*** 0,528*** -0,128 0,174** 0,165* 0,508*** 1 0,312*** 0,164* 0,422*** 0,238*** 0,137 0,352*** 0,066 0,148* -0,280*** 0,380*** -0,276*** -0,189** 0,300*** 0,348*** 
EXPERTISE 
0,120 -0,082 -0,004 0,123 0,340*** -0,199** 0,136 0,055 0,184** 0,408*** 1 0,173** 0,029 0,119 0,114 0,143* 0,059 -0,123 -0,083 0,171** -0,067 -0,064 0,197** 0,218*** 
BIG 4  
0,155* -0,034 -0,018 0,239*** 0,306*** -0,371*** 0,042 0,199** 0,244*** 0,182** 0,129 1 0,335*** 0,126 0,091 0,087 -0,018 0,101 0,073 0,495*** -0,01 0,011 0,214** 0,142 
AUDCOM 
0,147* 0,200** 0,034 0,121 0,270*** -0,054 -0,014 0,446*** 0,701*** 0,406*** 0,060 0,335*** 1 0,149* 0,017 0,346*** 0,199** 0,042 -0,215** 0,483*** -0,368*** -0,310*** 0,184** 0,286*** 
REMCOM 
0,202** 0,032 0,004 0,196** 0,174** 0,087 0,071 0,346*** 0,199** 0,278*** 0,088 0,126 0,149* 1 -0,014 0,093 0,044 0,077 -0,066 0,420*** -0,029 0,098 0,116 0,053 
VARREM  
0,232*** -0,108 -0,094 0,147* 0,265*** -0,172* 0,186** -0,039 -0,144* 0,065 0,069 0,089 -0,011 -0,022 1 -0,297*** -0,190** 0,022 0,137 0,167* 0,001 0,043 0,050 0,296*** 
OTHERREM 
0,039 0,068 -0,097 0,030 0,151* 0,012 0,018 0,203** 0,368*** 0,283*** 0,053 0,061 0,305*** 0,080 -0,347*** 1 0,135 -0,025 -0,176** 0,118 -0,200** -0,124 0,102 0,769*** 
DIRCAP 
-0,085 -0,069 0,050 -0,033 -0,125 -0,009 0,027 -0,044 0,052 -0,009 -0,028 0,041 0,160* 0,064 -0,143 0,030 1 -0,212** -0,126 -0,112 -0,008 -0,008 -0,025 -0,077 
STATEOWNER 
-0,009 0,002 -0,109 0,126 0,211** -0,040 0,117 0,082 -0,028 0,173** -0,095 0,101 0,042 0,077 0,002 -0,030 -0,165* 1 -0,155* 0,257*** -0,107 -0,161* 0,089 -0,014 
MAINSHARE 
0,081 -0,247*** 0,125 0,025 0,056 -0,015 0,194** -0,238*** -0,210** -0,233*** -0,104 0,088 -0,196** -0,051 0,123 -0,139 0,077 -0,154* 1 -0,004 0,723*** 0,738*** -0,044 -0,088 
CONTROLINDEX 
0,250*** 0,038 0,003 0,282** 0,496** -0,192* 0,201** 0,410*** 0,417*** 0,441*** 0,132 0,525*** 0,551*** 0,496*** 0,130 0,133 -0,039 0,249*** -0,009 1 -0,068 -0,053 0,236*** 0,210** 
SIGNIFICANT 
-0,005 -0,397*** 0,274*** 0,056 0,002 -0,022 0,137 -0,446*** -0,324*** -0,193** -0,070 0,012 -0,323*** -0,032 -0,038 -0,219** 0,200** -0,089 0,707*** -0,086 1 0,887*** -0,034 -0,223*** 
MAINFIVE 
0,045 -0,322*** 0,176** 0,061 0,014 -0,028 0,099 -0,337*** -0,267*** -0,128 -0,064 0,013 -0,284*** 0,096 -0,021 -0,148* 0,191* -0,153* 0,690*** -0,059 0,886*** 1 0,022 -0,141 
PERFOR2 
0,188** -0,426*** -0,044 0,839*** 0,080 -0,128 -0,126 0,050 0,071 0,214** 0,117 0,174** 0,126 0,017 0,079 0,075 -0,023 0,058 0,002 0,155* 0,046 0,069 1 0,113 
DIRCOMP 
0,204** 0,000 -0,149* 0,132 0,328*** -0,164* 0,138 0,184** 0,252*** 0,318*** 0,107 0,140* 0,286*** 0,059 0,303*** 0,788*** -0,096 -0,023 -0,055 0,235*** -0,241*** -0,162* 0,134 1 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed);* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlations, with Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal, using the marketing category 
 
 
 INDSMARK 
TURN 
OVER BIDASK PERFOR1  FSIZE PER 
LEVERAG
E INDEP 
NON 
EXEC BSIZE  
EXPERTIS
E BIG 4  
AUD 
COM REMCOM VARREM  
OTHER 
REM DIRCAP 
STATE 
OWNER 
MAIN 
SHARE 
CONTROL 
INDEX 
SIGNIFI 
CANT 
MAINFIVE PERFOR2 DIRCOMP 
INDMARK 
1 0,201** -0,058 0,215** 0,423*** -0,134 0,222*** 0,157* 0,261*** 0,371*** 0,202** 0,227*** 0,338*** 0,170** 0,249*** 0,181* -0,004 0,135 -0,191** 0,339*** -0,158* -0,132 0,176** 0,298** 
TURNOVER 
0,010 1 -0,474*** -0,105 0,221*** -0,028 0,127 0,299*** 0,213** 0,136 -0,02 -0,059 0,346*** 0,024 0,088 0,172** 0,016 0,068 -0,320*** 0,155* -0,505*** -0,424*** -0,072 0,190** 
BIDASK 
-0,134 -0,179*** 1 0,087 -0,250*** -0,011 -0,188** -0,107 0,095 -0,076 -0,020 -0,034 0,055 0,060 -0,027 0,036 0,217** -0,242*** 0,136 -0,092 0,227*** 0,211** 0,016 0,087 
PERFOR1  
0,158* -0,339*** 0,043 1 0,243*** -0,226** -0,091 0,194** 0,046 0,284*** 0,144* 0,261*** 0,175** 0,149* 0,103 0,106 -0,050 0,136 -0,001 0,288*** -0,018 0,04 0,881*** 0,174** 
FSIZE 
0,500*** 0,007 -0,121 0,262*** 1 -0,315*** 0,555*** 0,153* 0,207** 0,501*** 0,314*** 0,311*** 0,265*** 0,188** 0,336*** 0,212** -0,157* 0,232*** 0,105 0,510*** 0,024 0,047 0,116 0,354*** 
PER 
-0,111 0,113 -0,098 -0,264*** -0,314*** 1 -0,286*** -0,018 0,101 -0,12 -0,219** -0,178** 0,083 0,072 -0,062 -0,026 -0,008 -0,017 -0,099 -0,117 -0,033 -0,031 -0,145 -0,121 
LEVERAGE 
0,213** -0,068 -0,104 -0,118 0,545*** -0,149 1 0,098 0,011 0,138 0,146* 0,026 -0,023 0,106 0,189** 0,039 -0,010 0,128 0,168** 0,237*** 0,128 0,072 -0,147* 0,138 
INDEP 
0,156* 0,213** 0,024 0,130 0,149* -0,086 0,093 1 0,287*** 0,180** 0,083 0,210** 0,440*** 0,349*** -0,048 0,180** -0,002 0,087 -0,248*** 0,385*** -0,392*** -0,308*** 0,150* 0,156* 
NONEXEC 
0,222*** 0,215** 0,014 0,086 0,224*** -0,086 0,007 0,424*** 1 0,504*** 0,312*** 0,149* 0,583*** 0,155* -0,126 0,431*** 0,094 -0,014 -0,288*** 0,229*** -0,375*** -0,297*** 0,057 0,301*** 
BSIZE  
0,345*** -0,018 -0,087 0,270*** 0,528*** -0,128 0,174** 0,165* 0,508*** 1 0,312*** 0,164* 0,422*** 0,238*** 0,137 0,352*** 0,066 0,148* -0,280*** 0,380*** -0,276*** -0,189** 0,300*** 0,348*** 
EXPERTISE 
0,204** -0,082 -0,004 0,123 0,340*** -0,199** 0,136 0,055 0,184** 0,408*** 1 0,173** 0,029 0,119 0,114 0,143* 0,059 -0,123 -0,083 0,171** -0,067 -0,064 0,197** 0,218*** 
BIG 4  
0,224*** -0,034 -0,018 0,239*** 0,306*** -0,371*** 0,042 0,199** 0,244*** 0,182** 0,129 1 0,335*** 0,126 0,091 0,087 -0,018 0,101 0,073 0,495*** -0,01 0,011 0,214** 0,142 
AUDCOM 
0,289*** 0,200** 0,034 0,121 0,270*** -0,054 -0,014 0,446*** 0,701*** 0,406*** 0,060 0,335*** 1 0,149* 0,017 0,346*** 0,199** 0,042 -0,215** 0,483*** -0,368*** -0,310*** 0,184** 0,286*** 
REMCOM 
0,166** 0,032 0,004 0,196** 0,174** 0,087 0,071 0,346*** 0,199** 0,278*** 0,088 0,126 0,149* 1 -0,014 0,093 0,044 0,077 -0,066 0,420*** -0,029 0,098 0,116 0,053 
VARREM  
0,220*** -0,108 -0,094 0,147* 0,265*** -0,172* 0,186** -0,039 -0,144* 0,065 0,069 0,089 -0,011 -0,022 1 -0,297*** -0,190** 0,022 0,137 0,167* 0,001 0,043 0,050 0,296*** 
OTHERREM 
0,110 0,068 -0,097 0,030 0,151* 0,012 0,018 0,203** 0,368*** 0,283*** 0,053 0,061 0,305*** 0,080 -0,347*** 1 0,135 -0,025 -0,176** 0,118 -0,200** -0,124 0,102 0,769*** 
DIRCAP 
0,030 -0,069 0,050 -0,033 -0,125 -0,009 0,027 -0,044 0,052 -0,009 -0,028 0,041 0,160* 0,064 -0,143 0,030 1 -0,212** -0,126 -0,112 -0,008 -0,008 -0,025 -0,077 
STATEOWNER 
0,091 0,002 -0,109 0,126 0,211** -0,040 0,117 0,082 -0,028 0,173** -0,095 0,101 0,042 0,077 0,002 -0,030 -0,165* 1 -0,155* 0,257*** -0,107 -0,161* 0,089 -0,014 
MAINSHARE 
-0,170** -0,247*** 0,125 0,025 0,056 -0,015 0,194** -0,238*** -0,210** -0,233*** -0,104 0,088 -0,196** -0,051 0,123 -0,139 0,077 -0,154* 1 -0,004 0,723*** 0,738*** -0,044 -0,088 
CONTROLINDEX 
0,345*** 0,038 0,003 0,282** 0,496** -0,192* 0,201** 0,410*** 0,417*** 0,441*** 0,132 0,525*** 0,551*** 0,496*** 0,130 0,133 -0,039 0,249*** -0,009 1 -0,068 -0,053 0,236*** 0,210** 
SIGNIFICANT 
-0,150* -0,397*** 0,274*** 0,056 0,002 -0,022 0,137 -0,446*** -0,324*** -0,193** -0,070 0,012 -0,323*** -0,032 -0,038 -0,219** 0,200** -0,089 0,707*** -0,086 1 0,887*** -0,034 -0,223*** 
MAINFIVE 
-0,119 -0,322*** 0,176** 0,061 0,014 -0,028 0,099 -0,337*** -0,267*** -0,128 -0,064 0,013 -0,284*** 0,096 -0,021 -0,148* 0,191* -0,153* 0,690*** -0,059 0,886*** 1 0,022 -0,141 
PERFOR2 
0,094 -0,426*** -0,044 0,839*** 0,080 -0,128 -0,126 0,050 0,071 0,214** 0,117 0,174** 0,126 0,017 0,079 0,075 -0,023 0,058 0,002 0,155* 0,046 0,069 1 0,113 
DIRCOMP 
0,266*** 0,000 -0,149* 0,132 0,328*** -0,164* 0,138 0,184** 0,252*** 0,318*** 0,107 0,140* 0,286*** 0,059 0,303*** 0,788*** -0,096 -0,023 -0,055 0,235*** -0,241*** -0,162* 0,134 1 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed);* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlations, with Pearson (Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal, using human capital category 
 
 
 INDHCAP 
TURN 
OVER BIDASK PERFOR1  FSIZE PER 
LEVERAG
E INDEP 
NON 
EXEC BSIZE  
EXPERTIS
E BIG 4  
AUD 
COM REMCOM VARREM  
OTHER 
REM DIRCAP 
STATE 
OWNER 
MAIN 
SHARE 
CONTROL 
INDEX 
SIGNIFI 
CANT 
MAINFIVE PERFOR2 DIRCOMP 
INDHCAP 
1 0,213** -0,117 0,293*** 0,575*** -0,329*** 0,270*** 0,139 0,200** 0,339*** 0,213** 0,249*** 0,234*** 0,201** 0,307*** 0,146* -0,049 0,161* -0,075 0,290*** -0,118 -0,040 0,239*** 0,314*** 
TURNOVER 
-0,044 1 -0,474*** -0,105 0,221*** -0,028 0,127 0,299*** 0,213** 0,136 -0,02 -0,059 0,346*** 0,024 0,088 0,172** 0,016 0,068 -0,320*** 0,155* -0,505*** -0,424*** -0,072 0,190** 
BIDASK 
-0,140 -0,179*** 1 0,087 -0,250*** -0,011 -0,188** -0,107 0,095 -0,076 -0,020 -0,034 0,055 0,060 -0,027 0,036 0,217** -0,242*** 0,136 -0,092 0,227*** 0,211** 0,016 0,087 
PERFOR1  
0,248*** -0,339*** 0,043 1 0,243*** -0,226** -0,091 0,194** 0,046 0,284*** 0,144* 0,261*** 0,175** 0,149* 0,103 0,106 -0,050 0,136 -0,001 0,288*** -0,018 0,04 0,881*** 0,174** 
FSIZE 
0,596*** 0,007 -0,121 0,262*** 1 -0,315*** 0,555*** 0,153* 0,207** 0,501*** 0,314*** 0,311*** 0,265*** 0,188** 0,336*** 0,212** -0,157* 0,232*** 0,105 0,510*** 0,024 0,047 0,116 0,354*** 
PER 
-0,289*** 0,113 -0,098 -0,264*** -0,314*** 1 -0,286*** -0,018 0,101 -0,12 -0,219** -0,178** 0,083 0,072 -0,062 -0,026 -0,008 -0,017 -0,099 -0,117 -0,033 -0,031 -0,145 -0,121 
LEVERAGE 
0,268*** -0,068 -0,104 -0,118 0,545*** -0,149 1 0,098 0,011 0,138 0,146* 0,026 -0,023 0,106 0,189** 0,039 -0,010 0,128 0,168** 0,237*** 0,128 0,072 -0,147* 0,138 
INDEP 
0,155* 0,213** 0,024 0,130 0,149* -0,086 0,093 1 0,287*** 0,180** 0,083 0,210** 0,440*** 0,349*** -0,048 0,180** -0,002 0,087 -0,248*** 0,385*** -0,392*** -0,308*** 0,150* 0,156* 
NONEXEC 
0,205* 0,215** 0,014 0,086 0,224*** -0,086 0,007 0,424*** 1 0,504*** 0,312*** 0,149* 0,583*** 0,155* -0,126 0,431*** 0,094 -0,014 -0,288*** 0,229*** -0,375*** -0,297*** 0,057 0,301*** 
BSIZE  
0,382*** -0,018 -0,087 0,270*** 0,528*** -0,128 0,174** 0,165* 0,508*** 1 0,312*** 0,164* 0,422*** 0,238*** 0,137 0,352*** 0,066 0,148* -0,280*** 0,380*** -0,276*** -0,189** 0,300*** 0,348*** 
EXPERTISE 
0,250*** -0,082 -0,004 0,123 0,340*** -0,199** 0,136 0,055 0,184** 0,408*** 1 0,173** 0,029 0,119 0,114 0,143* 0,059 -0,123 -0,083 0,171** -0,067 -0,064 0,197** 0,218*** 
BIG 4  
0,246*** -0,034 -0,018 0,239*** 0,306*** -0,371*** 0,042 0,199** 0,244*** 0,182** 0,129 1 0,335*** 0,126 0,091 0,087 -0,018 0,101 0,073 0,495*** -0,01 0,011 0,214** 0,142 
AUDCOM 
0,232*** 0,200** 0,034 0,121 0,270*** -0,054 -0,014 0,446*** 0,701*** 0,406*** 0,060 0,335*** 1 0,149* 0,017 0,346*** 0,199** 0,042 -0,215** 0,483*** -0,368*** -0,310*** 0,184** 0,286*** 
REMCOM 
0,191** 0,032 0,004 0,196** 0,174** 0,087 0,071 0,346*** 0,199** 0,278*** 0,088 0,126 0,149* 1 -0,014 0,093 0,044 0,077 -0,066 0,420*** -0,029 0,098 0,116 0,053 
VARREM  
0,234*** -0,108 -0,094 0,147* 0,265*** -0,172* 0,186** -0,039 -0,144* 0,065 0,069 0,089 -0,011 -0,022 1 -0,297*** -0,190** 0,022 0,137 0,167* 0,001 0,043 0,050 0,296*** 
OTHERREM 
0,137 0,068 -0,097 0,030 0,151* 0,012 0,018 0,203** 0,368*** 0,283*** 0,053 0,061 0,305*** 0,080 -0,347*** 1 0,135 -0,025 -0,176** 0,118 -0,200** -0,124 0,102 0,769*** 
DIRCAP 
-0,026 -0,069 0,050 -0,033 -0,125 -0,009 0,027 -0,044 0,052 -0,009 -0,028 0,041 0,160* 0,064 -0,143 0,030 1 -0,212** -0,126 -0,112 -0,008 -0,008 -0,025 -0,077 
STATEOWNER 
0,167** 0,002 -0,109 0,126 0,211** -0,040 0,117 0,082 -0,028 0,173** -0,095 0,101 0,042 0,077 0,002 -0,030 -0,165* 1 -0,155* 0,257*** -0,107 -0,161* 0,089 -0,014 
MAINSHARE 
-0,106 -0,247*** 0,125 0,025 0,056 -0,015 0,194** -0,238*** -0,210** -0,233*** -0,104 0,088 -0,196** -0,051 0,123 -0,139 0,077 -0,154* 1 -0,004 0,723*** 0,738*** -0,044 -0,088 
CONTROLINDEX 
0,301*** 0,038 0,003 0,282** 0,496** -0,192* 0,201** 0,410*** 0,417*** 0,441*** 0,132 0,525*** 0,551*** 0,496*** 0,130 0,133 -0,039 0,249*** -0,009 1 -0,068 -0,053 0,236*** 0,210** 
SIGNIFICANT 
-0,121 -0,397*** 0,274*** 0,056 0,002 -0,022 0,137 -0,446*** -0,324*** -0,193** -0,070 0,012 -0,323*** -0,032 -0,038 -0,219** 0,200** -0,089 0,707*** -0,086 1 0,887*** -0,034 -0,223*** 
MAINFIVE 
-0,052 -0,322*** 0,176** 0,061 0,014 -0,028 0,099 -0,337*** -0,267*** -0,128 -0,064 0,013 -0,284*** 0,096 -0,021 -0,148* 0,191* -0,153* 0,690*** -0,059 0,886*** 1 0,022 -0,141 
PERFOR2 
0,205** -0,426*** -0,044 0,839*** 0,080 -0,128 -0,126 0,050 0,071 0,214** 0,117 0,174** 0,126 0,017 0,079 0,075 -0,023 0,058 0,002 0,155* 0,046 0,069 1 0,113 
DIRCOMP 
0,298*** 0,000 -0,149* 0,132 0,328*** -0,164* 0,138 0,184** 0,252*** 0,318*** 0,107 0,140* 0,286*** 0,059 0,303*** 0,788*** -0,096 -0,023 -0,055 0,235*** -0,241*** -0,162* 0,134 1 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed);* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
 376 
 
 
Appendix 7  
 
Matrix of variance/covariance of the vector of observations of the standardized observed variables 
 
 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y11 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 
Y1 1                    
Y2 0.5233 1                   
Y3 0.5406 0.2289 1                  
Y4 0.5554 0.4787 0.3083 1                 
Y5 0.5318 0.3736 0.5508 0.2861 1                
Y6 0.6914 0.4198 0.4262 0.4269 0.6168 1               
Y7 0.3950 0.2846 0.1627 0.2892 0.1000 0.2944 1              
Y8 0.4277 0.2624 0.3183 0.2124 0.2139 0.3076 0.6583 1             
Y9 0.3889 0.1800 0.3469 0.2048 0.2162 0.2282 0.5603 0.8422 1            
Y10 0.0777 0.0568 0.0640 0.1712 0.1191 0.0050 -0.2198 -0.2363 -0.1717 1           
Y11 -0.3166 -0.1641 -0.1543 -0.2658 -0.1605 -0.1605 -0.0989 -0.0552 -0.0748 -0.2869 1          
  X1 0.2638 0.1820 0.2002 0.1433 0.2036 0.1920 0.0410 0.1885 0.1967 0.2515 0.0012 1         
X2 0.3935 0.2757 0.3362 0.2625 0.3082 0.3453 0.3365 0.2847 0.3166 0.0382 -0.1863 0.2257 1        
X3 0.2536 0.1900 0.2376 0.2413 0.2550 0.2566 0.2266 0.1282 0.0862 0.1608 -0.1233 0.1920 0.3063 1       
X4 0.2548 0.0221 0.2996 0.1084 0.2515 0.1879 0.0556 0.1168 0.1063 0.1693 -0.0745 0.4448 0.5324 0.2433 1      
X5 0.4457 0.2632 0.2772 0.2994 0.3451 0.2807 0.3041 0.2468 0.3446 0.0203 -0.1334 0.4459 0.4683 0.2420 0.4498 1     
X6 0.1012 0.0912 0.0548 0.1082 0.1827 0.2183 0.1562 0.1162 0.1794 -0.0697 -0.0393 0.0510 0.4118 0.0995 0.1779 0.1238 1    
X7 -0.2066 -0.1064 -0.2057 -0.1197 -0.2430 -0.1653 -0.0515 -0.0436 -0.0956 -0.4602 0.2672 -0.4150 -0.2638 -0.2153 -0.3403 -0.1451 -0.1256 1   
X8 -0.0747 0.0088 -0.2051 0.0088 -0.2099 -0.1136 0.0241 -0.0116 -0.0301 -0.2812 0.2366 -0.2054 -0.2433 -0.0713 -0.2053 -0.0120 -0.1348 0.7037 1  
X9 -0.1325 -0.0410 -0.1557 -0.0226 -0.1870 -0.0818 -0.0457 -0.0099 -0.0663 -0.3649 0.2564 -0.2880 -0.1979 -0.1321 -0.2779 -0.0838 -0.1263 0.8613 0.6713 1 
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Appendix 8  
Confirmatory factor analysis for the exogenous constructs 
The figure represents the path diagram, including the variables measuring each exogenous construct.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standardized estimation of the measurement model coefficients 
 
ξ 1 
Directors’ and supervisors’ structures 
 
ξ 2 
Ownership structure 
 
S.E. R2 
(X1) INDEP 0,510***  0,148 0,26 
 (4,948)    
a (X2) BSIZE 0,706  ----- 0,499 
 -----    
(X3) DIRCOMP 0,399***  0,142 0,159 
 (3,952)    
(X4) NONEXEC 0,734***  0,172 0,539 
 (6,483)    
(X5) 
CONTROLINDEX 0,610**  
0,153 0,372 
 (5,759)    
(X6) EXPERTISE 0,323***  0,144 0,104 
 (3,233)    
 (X7) SIGNIFICANT  0,954** 0,064 0,909 
  (16,232)   
 (X8) MAINSHARE  0,745*** 0,078 0,555 
  (11,044)   
a (X9) MAINFIVE  0,915 ----- 0,838 
  -----   
-0,395***   
Correlation 
(-3,455)   
*Significant at 0.05< p ≤ 0.10 ; **Significant at 0.01< p ≤ 0.05; ***Significant at  p ≤ 0.01 
a: fixed parameters, Test statistic below  
Goodness-of-fit tests for CFA  
Normed Chi-squared 2,532 
CFI (Comparative Fit Index) 0,916 
RMSEA 0,107 
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI)  0,883 
Directors’ and 
supervisors’ structures 
ξ 1 
Ownership 
 structure 
ξ 2 
Indicators: 
(x1)  Proportion of independent directors on the board 
(X2)  Size of the board 
(X3)  Board’s compensations 
(X4)  Proportion of non-executive directors on the board 
(X5)  Board expertise 
(X6)  Monitoring and Control index 
 
Indicators: 
(X7) Significant participations 
(X8) Main shareholder 
(X9) Main five shareholders 
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Appendix 9 
 
Standardized Residual Matrix 
 
 Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 Y11 X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 
Y1 -0.0010                    
Y2 -0.0080 0.0000                   
Y3 0.0010 -0.0950 0.0000                  
Y4 -0.0090 0.1390 -0.0360 0.0000                 
Y5 -0.0050 0.0510 0.0030 -0.0570 0.0020                
Y6 0.0040 0.0070 0.0070 -0.0120 0.0020 -0.0010               
Y7 0.0950 0.1040 -0.0200 0.0980 -0.0820 0.0610 0.0000              
Y8 -0.0010 0.0050 0.0570 -0.0610 -0.1060 -0.0260 0.0000 0.0000             
Y9 0.0060 -0.0500 0.1130 -0.0400 -0.0160 -0.0690 -0.0270 0.0020 0.0000            
Y10 -0.0150 0.0010 0.0070 0.1120 0.0630 -0.0670 -0.0900 -0.0510 -0.0070 0.0270           
Y11 -0.0130 0.0180 0.0310 -0.0720 0.0240 0.0760 0.0080 0.0970 0.0610 -0.0230 -0.0030          
  X1 -0.0150 0.0140 0.0300 -0.0350 0.0340 -0.0250 -0.0820 0.0130 0.0400 0.1640 0.1280 0.0000         
X2 0.0140 0.0470 0.1040 0.0200 0.0780 0.0500 0.1690 0.0460 0.1030 -0.0810 -0.0130 -0.1590 0.0000        
X3 0.0440 0.0640 0.1100 0.1070 0.1280 0.0930 0.1340 -0.0040 -0.0320 0.0950 -0.0280 -0.0210 0.0170 0.0000       
X4 -0.1070 -0.1950 0.0790 -0.1230 0.0320 -0.0930 -0.1030 -0.1110 -0.0970 0.0560 0.0900 0.0790 0.0340 -0.0320 0.0000      
X5 -0.0650 -0.0090 -0.0460 0.0020 0.0820 0.0890 0.0830 0.0120 0.0860 -0.1220 0.0360 -0.1170 0.1830 -0.0270 -0.0400 0.0000     
X6 0.0960 0.0530 0.0640 0.0760 0.1330 0.0090 0.1500 0.0270 0.1480 -0.0900 0.0260 0.0920 -0.0140 -0.0240 -0.0090 -0.0870 0.0000    
X7 0.0190 0.0290 -0.0680 0.0250 -0.1060 0.0100 0.0410 0.0890 0.0230 -0.0310 -0.0100 -0.2020 0.0270 -0.0550 -0.0640 0.0010 0.1220 0.0000   
X8 0.0910 0.1080 -0.1040 0.1150 -0.1060 0.0150 0.0920 0.0860 0.0570 0.0340 0.0330 -0.0490 -0.0300 0.0460 -0.0030 -0.0420 0.1840 -0.0040 0.0000  
X9 0.0690 0.0800 -0.0330 0.1060 -0.0650 0.0750 0.0370 0.1080 0.0390 0.0180 0.0090 -0.0970 0.0620 0.0110 -0.0310 -0.0130 0.1550 -0.0010 0.0400 0.0000 
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Final Structural Model 
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